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Postmodernism in Biblical Studies is characterised by proliferation of 
methodological and ideological interpretive perspectives, emphasis upon 
the ethics of interpretation and awareness of the role of interpretive 
communities. Following Stephen E. Fowl, the underlying motives of 
interpreters can be understood when approaches are analysed in terms of 
interpretive interests. The work of David J. A. Clines, J. Cheryl Exum and 
Stephen D. Moore reveals a strong de-confessional motive and a desire to 
exclude confessional concerns from academic interpretation. This position 
is ideologically driven and, in terms of liberal academic values, self-
contradictory. The difficulties posed for Christian interpretation by the 
postmodern context are evident in the narrative criticism of Mark Allan 
Powell and R. Alan Culpepper, where unresolved conflict of theological, 
methodological and political interests threatens the coherence of the 
approach. Recent work by Powell addresses postmodern concerns, but fails 
adequately to engage theoretical and theological issues. 
 
A postmodern understanding of the Bible as Christian scripture which 
affirms both the validity and legitimacy of multiple interpretive 
perspectives and a pneumatological understanding of the Bible as the Word 
of God can be framed using the work of Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Stephen E. 
Fowl, Roman Jakobson and Daniel Patte. Socio-pragmatic objections to the 
legitimacy and validity of Christian interpretation beyond the faith 
community can be resisted by asserting a dialogical relationship between 
the Bible, the church and the wider academic community, and by following 
Francis Watson’s argument that the church’s discourse is derived from that 
of the wider society in which it exists. Christian interpretation will seek to 
engage constructively with other interpretive approaches. A Christian 
ethics of interpretation characterised by openness, humility, repentance and 
forgiveness offers a positive contribution to the culture of postmodern 
academic interpretation. Jesus’ encounter with the Syrophoenician woman 
in Mark 7 offers a paradigm for such interpretive practice. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE POSTMODERN CONTEXT OF BIBLICAL 
INTERPRETATION 
“I’m a postmodern vegetarian. I eat meat, but I do it ironically.” 
      - Bill Bailey 
 
Over the last thirty years a sea-change has begun to work its way through 
academic Biblical Studies. At the start of the 1970s Biblical Studies was 
largely defined by a historical-critical approach which saw the purpose of 
study as the uncovering of the history of the biblical texts and the recovery of 
their original contexts of production and reception. By contrast, early twenty-
first century Biblical Studies is increasingly multi-disciplinary, interested not 
only in the authors and histories of biblical texts, but in their literary forms and 
qualities, in their reception by readers in different times and places, in their 
cultural significance, and in their ethical and moral uses and consequences. 
Biblical Studies is no longer one thing but many, and this multiplication of 
interpretive approaches within biblical scholarship mirrors the growth of the 
movement known as postmodernism in the wider academic and general 
culture within which Biblical Studies operates.1 
 
The postmodern context in Biblical Studies is characterised by a proliferation 
of interpretive voices and perspectives, each reflecting different 
methodological, ideological or theological interests. Some of these voices are 
self-consciously local and particular, others claim more universal validity. 
Some are motivated by theological or confessional concerns, others are openly 
hostile to an interpretive perspective motivated by faith interests. Some 
interpretive groups continue to draw upon traditional historical-critical 
                                                 
1
 This is not to suggest that historical-critical scholarship is monolithic or static. For a survey 
of the development of historical-critical approaches in the last century and a half, see Neill & 
Wright 1988. 
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scholarship for their critical methodologies, whilst others have imported a 
headily eclectic mixture of new methods drawn from literary and cultural 
theory. The postmodern context presents a babel of interpretive voices, 
sometimes speaking together, but more often across or against one another. In 
some places historical-critical consensus has broken down, to be replaced by a 
sometimes bewildering array of competing and often conflicting 
methodological, ideological and theological approaches.  
 
For confessional Christian scholars this emerging context offers both a 
challenge and an opportunity.2 The opportunity arises out of a new openness 
within Biblical Studies to interpretation which advocates a particular 
ideological or theological perspective. Overt commitment to a religious 
interest in the Bible as scripture has not always been welcome within 
historical-critical scholarship, which has held disinterested enquiry and 
academic objectivity to be definitive scholarly virtues. The postmodern 
context, however, makes it possible (in theory at least) for Christian critics to 
interpret the Bible in such a way that their personal interests in the Bible as 
scripture and their academic interests in biblical texts as objects of study 
cohere. The challenge to Christian scholars is that not all of the new voices in 
Biblical Studies are sympathetic to an orthodox (or even unorthodox) 
Christian approach to the Bible. Some of the most interesting and exciting new 
approaches to biblical interpretation have been imported specifically with a 
view to resisting any attempt to posit orthodox Christian perspectives as 
                                                 
2For the purposes of this thesis I propose to define “confessional” interpretation as 
interpretation in the interests of a specifically religious commitment to the biblical text as 
scripture. Confessional interpretation therefore includes Christian interpretation but is not 
restricted to it: many of the concerns expressed in this study would be shared by, for instance, 
confessing Jewish interpreters of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament. References to Christian 
interpretive perspectives  should be taken to refer to approaches consistent with the broad 
mainstream of orthodox historical Christian thought and doctrine, as expressed from time to 
time in commonly shared credal or doctrinal statements. My individual position within this 
mainstream is that of an ordained minister in the open evangelical tradition of the Church of 
England. 
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normative, or even valid, outside the boundaries of faith communities and 
their particular liturgical and devotional practices. Many of the new voices in 
Biblical Studies are not only strange because of their newness, but because 
they reflect the estranged perspective of interpreters whose relationship to the 
Bible is ambivalent or antagonistic. 
 
In this thesis, I propose to examine both the opportunities and the challenges 
of the postmodern context in Biblical Studies for confessional Christian 
scholarship. I will seek to address the question of whether an academically 
credible and genuinely postmodern interpretive approach which reflects 
orthodox Christian confessional interests is a viable concept and, if so, how 
such an approach might position itself within the arena of academic debate in 
such a way as to engage constructively with other, sometimes hostile, 
interpretive approaches. How can Christian biblical scholarship establish itself 
within a field where religious commitment and academic integrity are often 
regarded as mutually exclusive, and in which many powerful new voices are 
openly hostile to Christian insights into the Bible? More positively, what 
might a distinctively Christian interpretive approach have to contribute to the 
practice of postmodern biblical scholarship? Put simply, how should Christian 
biblical scholars talk with strangers? 
 
In order to answer these questions this thesis falls into two parts. In the first, 
we will attempt to gauge the nature and severity of the challenge posed to a 
confessional approach to academic biblical interpretation by the postmodern 
context. In the rest of this chapter the origins of postmodern biblical 
scholarship in the breakdown of consensus over historical-critical models will 
be considered, and the proliferation of methodological and ideological 
approaches within Biblical Studies will be traced. The pluralist context 
 8 
produced by these trends poses both a challenge and an opportunity to 
confessional scholarship. 
 
In chapter two we will consider how two key postmodern concepts, in the 
form of the ethics of interpretation and the interpretive community, have found 
expression in the work of David J. A. Clines, J. Cheryl Exum and Stephen D. 
Moore. Developing Stephen E. Fowl’s concept of interpretive interests we will 
examine how methodological, ideological and political interests combine in 
the work of these scholars to produce an approach to biblical interpretation 
hostile both to the ideologies of biblical texts and to mainstream Christian 
academic interpretation. Attempts to exclude Christian concerns from the 
academy on ideological grounds will be considered, and the viability of a 
genuinely academic, postmodern Christian approach in Biblical Studies will 
be asserted. 
 
In chapter three we will take narrative criticism as an example of a 
confessional approach which has fallen foul of the postmodern context by 
failing to consider the coherence of its methodological, ideological and 
political interests. Driven by a theological interest in the Bible as scripture, 
narrative criticism has projected itself as an objective formalist method when 
in reality its desire to interpret the Bible as the Word of God has driven it more 
in the direction of a reader response approach. By analysing inner tensions and 
conflicts of interest within narrative criticism we will demonstrate the 
requirements for an authentically postmodern Christian approach, and suggest 
that recent developments in narrative criticism offer the prospect of such an 
approach being viable. 
 
In chapter four we will begin to build a framework for an authentically 
Christian, postmodern academic approach in Biblical Studies by attempting a 
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postmodern definition of the Bible as scripture. Drawing in particular on the 
work of Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Stephen E. Fowl and Roman Jakobson, we will 
attempt to establish a theoretical and theological understanding of the Bible as 
scripture which affirms its role in divine self-communication as the Word of 
God, but which also affirms the need for a pluralist and polyvalent approach to 
interpretation. This will have the effect of authenticating a range of 
interpretive approaches within Christian interpretation, but will also affirm 
Christian interpretation as one of a range of valid approaches to the Bible. 
 
Chapter five will address the nature of the church and the academy as 
interpretive communities. We will respond to socio-pragmatic objections to 
Christian academic interpretation on the grounds that either the authority of 
the Christian community over the biblical texts renders the understanding of 
them as the Word of God illusory, or that the particularity of Christian 
discourse makes it impossible for Christian readings of the Bible to be shared 
meaningfully beyond the boundaries of the confessing community. In response 
to these challenges we will attempt to show that Christian commitment to the 
Bible as scripture is both internally coherent and consistent with the realities 
of Christian experience, and also a crucial motive in impelling Christian 
academics to engage constructively with other interpreters beyond their own 
community. 
 
Finally, in chapter six we will seek to establish the principles of a distinctively 
Christian ethics of interpretation characterised by openness, constructive 
engagement with outside perspectives, humility and repentance. The benefits 
of such an approach will be contrasted with the fragmentation and faction 
which accompanies some postmodern scholarship, and a biblical paradigm for 
such an ethical approach will be sought in Jesus’ encounter with the 
Syrophoenician woman in Mark 7. 
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This study will seek to make a fresh contribution in two key areas. First, the 
nature of the challenge posed to confessional Christian scholarship by the 
development of postmodern approaches in academic Biblical Studies will be 
examined in detail and some of its underlying motivations explored. 
Postmodernism has raised significant questions concerning the nature of 
biblical scholarship, and has in some areas given expression to deep hostility 
regarding the consideration of faith interests in academic interpretation. It is 
hoped that by better understanding the nature of such challenges (and 
especially where they are valid), Christian scholars will be better equipped to 
respond to them. Second, this study aims to offer the framework for an 
interpretive model in Biblical Studies which, by considering postmodern 
insights seriously and incorporating them when found to be valid, may offer 
confessional biblical scholars a way forward in operating with integrity when 
pursuing an interest in the Bible as scripture whilst simultaneously meeting 
their obligations to the broader academy within which they operate. It is hoped 
that such a model will enable Christian academics to offer confessional 
interpretations of biblical texts as academically valid in an increasingly 
pluralist context where support and sympathy for Christian interpretations 
cannot be taken for granted. 
 
Before proceeding, however, it is worthwhile to ask how the challenge of the 
postmodern interpretive context has arisen, and to attempt to give a brief 
thumbnail sketch of postmodernism as it has impacted upon Biblical Studies. 
Three key developments have been crucial to the generation of a postmodern 
interpretive context: first, the breakdown of consensus over the 
appropriateness of historical-critical models for biblical interpretation; second, 
the importation of new critical methods and paradigms from literary and 
cultural theory; and, third, the growth of overtly ideological interpretive 
approaches, of which feminism has been the most significant. 
 11 
The Breakdown of Historical-Critical Consensus 
 
A key factor in the growth of postmodernism within Biblical Studies has been 
increased disenchantment with the dominant historical-critical paradigm. By 
the 1970s a number of critics were expressing dissatisfaction with the progress 
of historical criticism, which appeared to them to have run its course as a 
productive critical method. The historical approaches, it was argued, had 
failed to deliver what they promised. One indicator of this failure was a 
fundamental lack of agreement on foundational questions. What validity could 
be credited to a method which could not achieve consensus among its 
practitioners on even basic questions such as whether Jesus actually referred to 
himself as the Son of Man or whether Matthew used Mark and Q?3 The 
proliferation of differing models of early Christianity and the formation of its 
texts were felt to be evidence that “the discipline has succeeded in generating 
a demand for what, apparently, it cannot produce”,4 or that it had “led us in 
search of a holy grail which cannot be recovered”.5 Further, the increased 
tendency of commentaries and scholarly works to devote most of their length 
to the review of existing scholarship rather than the fresh study of the biblical 
text was perceived as an indication that the historical-critical method was 
spent as a critical force.6 
 
Walter Wink, in The Bible and Human Transformation: Toward a New 
Paradigm for Biblical Study (1973), argued that historical-critical scholarship 
was “bankrupt” because it was incapable of achieving its purpose of 
interpreting scripture so that “the past becomes alive and illumines our present 
                                                 
3Keck 1980, 116. 
4Keck 1980, 117. 
5Culpepper 1984, 470. 
6Keck 1980, 117-18. Francis Watson has observed that monographs, articles and papers 
multiply, but that “the proliferation of positions and the constant deferment of the hoped-for 
consensus may be indicative not of progress but of circularity” (Watson 1994, 47).  
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with new possibilities for personal and social transformation”.7 The main 
problem, Wink argued, was historical criticism’s emphasis upon detachment 
and objectivity. In the first place, a detached, objective interpretive approach 
was inevitably inadequate when applied to texts written to and from a faith 
perspective. Indeed, the detached neutrality affected by many biblical scholars 
was in fact neither detached nor neutral, but a decision against responding to 
the rhetorical demands of the text.8 The objective, a-historical values of 
historical scholarship were, in any case, an illusion, since they projected into 
critical practice the historically situated and fundamentally rationalistic values 
of the Enlightenment. The “objective standpoint”, Wink concluded, is simply 
“the historically conditioned place where we happen to be standing, and 
possesses no neutrality or detachment at all”.9 Historical scholarship had 
developed a false consciousness, persuaded by its own objectivist rhetoric to 
suppress awareness of the high stakes its practitioners held in academic 
institutions, and blinded to the way in which scholarship unconsciously 
reflected the racial, sexual and class interests of the scholars who produced 
it.10 Wink noted that biblical scholarship had cut itself off from the church 
which had given birth to it in favour of a narrow academic professionalism, 
and argued that the approach had developed to oppose conservative fideism in 
a historical context which had now changed, rendering historical-critical 
models obsolete in their current form.11 
 
Gerhard Maier, in his book The End of the Historical-Critical Method (1977), 
similarly  argued that historical criticism was fundamentally inappropriate for 
                                                 
7Wink 1973, 1-2. 
8Wink 1973, 2. Robert M. Polzin has made the same point, arguing that the prioritisation of 
objectivity in academic study is itself a subjective value-judgement of the most profound kind. 
Polzin argues that the Bible, as a document of faith, is resistant to objectivist critical method, 
insisting that “the biblical message that this misguided scholarship uncovers would reject the 
very method by which it is uncovered” (Polzin 1980, 106, author’s emphasis). 
9Wink 1973, 3. 
10Wink 1973, 6-7. 
11Wink 1973, 10-15. 
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the study of the Bible because of the inner impossibility of the concept.12 In 
particular, the insistence of Enlightenment scholarship of taking human reason 
as the yardstick of critical evaluation represented a prejudgement in the sense 
of an a priori decision concerning the outcome.13 Crucially, historical-critical 
scholarship had failed to reach consensus in its attempt to differentiate the 
eternal and valuable from the superstitious and historically conditioned 
elements within the Bible. Failure in attempts to determine a “canon within the 
canon”, or to discern a divine as opposed to a human scripture, suggested that 
the method was inappropriate to the object of study.14 In any case, Maier 
argued, the assumption that it was necessary to distinguish between different 
elements within the Bible in the first place involved a massive prejudgement 
which inevitably coloured the results of the critical exercise.15 Finally, 
historical criticism produced results which were of limited practicability, as 
was indicated by the fact that historical criticism had failed to generate 
significant support beyond the academic community, and that many of the 
most committed practitioners of historical approaches continued to use the 
Bible in pre-critical ways in their own devotional lives.16 Maier concluded that 
historical criticism was ultimately theologically deficient in its approach to 
texts which the Church regarded as means of revelation: 
 
the correlative or counterpart to revelation is not critique but 
obedience; it is not correction - not even on the basis of a partially 
recognised and applied revelation - but it is a let-me-be-corrected. Like 
Job, man must here keep silence because God has something to say to 
him.17 
 
                                                 
12A third influential voice alongside Maier and Wink was Brevard S. Childs (see e.g. Childs 
1970). 
13Maier 1977, 11. 
14Maier 1977, 16-18. 
15Maier 1977, 19-21. 
16Maier 1977, 21-22. 
17Maier 1977, 23. 
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According to Maier, the inner impossibility of the historical-critical method 
was that, as a theological approach, it meant “a procedure according to which 
the Bible is approached from an extra-Biblical position and with extra-Biblical 
standards, with the objective of discovering the Word of God in the 
process”.18 
 
Maier and Wink’s analysis and criticism of historical-critical scholarship 
reflects the concerns of other critics of the 1970s. Not only had historical 
criticism failed to deliver the answers to its own questions, thus casting doubt 
on its efficacy as a method, it was also increasingly seen as the projection, 
under a screen of objectivity, of humanist and rationalistic values which were 
actually hostile to the character of the Bible as a theological text. This covert 
inner incoherence rendered historical criticism unsuitable as a vehicle for 
theological enquiry. What was needed was a new approach committed to a 
critical engagement with the biblical narrative, not a critical distancing from it.  
For many critics, the major failing of the historical approach, infused as it was 
with Enlightenment values of academic objectivity and empirical detachment, 
was that it had failed to address itself appropriately to the biblical texts as 
scripture written to and from a faith perspective. Historical criticism was 
unfitted to examine or evaluate these qualities, and had thus failed to engage 
with precisely the aspects of the biblical texts which were of most value. 
 
A second major issue for many critics of the historical-critical method was that 
it had demonstrated some serious weaknesses in its treatment of biblical texts. 
The evolutionary model of textual development which underlay the historical 
approaches resulted in disintegrated, atomised and reductive interpretations of 
the Bible. Instead of being presented and studied as the unified works which 
their literary form and the history of their reception by the Church implied, the 
                                                 
18Maier 1977, 24. 
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biblical text was treated as “a window on the history of its own composition” 
or “an effect, to be understood in light of its causes”.19 “All too often,” R. 
Alan Culpepper argued, “the assumption has been made that we have 
understood the text when we see how logically it can be taken apart. Attention 
has thereby been diverted from the text as it stands”.20 
 
David Clines’ influential work The Theme of the Pentateuch (1978) criticised 
historical scholarship both for its tendency towards atomism, concentrating on 
ever smaller aspects of detail and so missing the overall themes and thrust of 
biblical texts; and for its insistence upon geneticism, the argument that a text 
could only be properly understood in light of its origins. Clines eschewed both 
of these approaches in favour of a thematic approach to the entire Pentateuch, 
anticipating accusations that such an approach was “subjective” with the 
retort: 
 
It is ironic, is it not, that the soundest historical-critical scholar, who 
will find talk of themes and structures “subjective” in the extreme, will 
have no hesitation in expounding the significance of a (sometimes 
conjectural) document from a conjectural period for a hypothetical 
audience of which he has, even if he has defined the period correctly, 
only the most meagre knowledge, without any control over the all-
important question of how representative of and how acceptable to the 
community the given document was.21 
 
Norman Petersen, similarly, argued that historical-critical disassembling of 
biblical texts resulted in interpretations which failed to address their true 
nature: 
 
source and form criticism knocked our textual Humpty Dumpty off the 
wall and failed to reconstitute him with their evolutionary theory, since 
the latter produced only an anonymous community product, not 
Humpty Dumpty. Redaction criticism, on the other hand, has 
                                                 
19Keck 1980, 116; Culpepper 1984, 469. 
20Culpepper 1984, 469. 
21Clines 1978, 14. 
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attempted to reconstruct from the seams between the fragmented 
pieces not Humpty Dumpty but his theology!22 
 
The failure of historical criticism to develop an interpretive approach which 
addressed the literary forms of biblical texts on their own terms, Petersen 
argued, had led to the creation of  “a desert that is in literary matters doubly 
barren”.23 
 
For many, the opening of new possibilities for literary approaches in biblical 
interpretation was heralded by James Muilenburg, whose 1968 address to the 
Society of Biblical Literature, “Form Criticism and Beyond”, was taken as an 
appeal for a new direction in Biblical Studies.24 Beginning with a survey of 
the development of Form Criticism, Muilenburg declared that it had 
effectively exhausted itself and needed to be superseded by a new “Rhetorical 
Criticism”, which would concentrate upon the rhetorical or persuasive 
qualities of biblical texts. Muilenburg’s outline of his new approach bore 
strong similarities to New Criticism, the dominant literary theory of the day, in 
emphasising the need to recognise the unity of literary form and conceptual 
content, to focus on the unity of the text through close reading, and to 
appreciate how biblical literature plumbed the human condition. For the first 
time a major figure of the Biblical Studies establishment had actively 
promoted a literary approach as a serious alternative to conventional 
historical-critical models, and this encouraged a number of critics to seek 
beyond the boundaries of traditional historical-critical scholarship for 
interpretive models which might address their literary and theological interests 
in the biblical texts. 
                                                 
22Petersen 1978, 19-20. 
23Petersen 1980, 32. 
24Muilenburg 1969. Other important attempts by biblical scholars to apply literary criticism to 
biblical texts before 1970 include the work of Amos Wilder (Wilder 1964), Edwin M. Good 
(Good 1965), and Dan O. Via (Via 1967). 
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Through the 1970s and into the 1980s historical criticism was increasingly 
seen by more and more critics to have comprehensively failed as a critical 
method.25 It represented the imposition of a foreign ideology onto the biblical 
text, and produced results which were of little use either for theological 
enquiry or for the faith communities which largely supported it. Worse, 
historical criticism had failed to deliver on its own promises, succeeding only 
in producing a self-consuming scholarship which appeared more and more 
obscure to outside observers. Historical criticism asked questions of the 
biblical texts which they were not written to answer, and had failed to develop 
an appropriate methodology for addressing the texts on their own terms as 
theological and literary documents. A number of critics, therefore, set out to 
seek for more productive approaches to biblical interpretation, resulting in a 
proliferation of interpretive methods in Biblical Studies 
 
 
The “Literary Turn” and the Proliferation of Methodologies 
 
Having grown dissatisfied with historical-critical methods, a number of 
biblical scholars during the 1970s turned to literary theory as a source of 
interpretive approaches which might enable them more adequately to address 
the theological and literary aspects of the Bible which historical criticism had 
neglected.26 One  of the more important figures in placing literary approaches 
                                                 
25It is important to say that historical criticism is alive and well, and continues to be the 
dominant approach in academic Biblical Studies. A recent positive evaluation of historical 
criticism in relation to other approaches is Collins 2005. 
26There is not space here to give more than the briefest and most inadequate sketch of literary 
theory and its importation into Biblical Studies. The standard introduction to literary theory 
for many biblical critics has been Terry Eagleton’s Literary Theory: An Introduction 
(Eagleton 1996), although Chris Baldick’s Criticism and Literary Theory 1890 to the Present 
(Baldick 1996) is equally comprehensive and less biased towards a cultural materialist point 
of view. Numerous other introductions to critical and literary theory exist. The foremost 
survey of biblical literary criticism from a theoretical point of view continues to be Stephen D. 
Moore’s Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge (Moore 1989), but 
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on the Biblical Studies map was Hans Frei, whose book The Eclipse of 
Biblical Narrative (1974) was highly influential.27 Drawing upon the work of 
literary historian Erich Auerbach,28 Frei advocated the recognition of biblical 
narratives as “realistic” or “history-like”: like novels, biblical narratives were 
characterised by narrative forms which intended to create a realistic story-
world into which the reader could be drawn. The important thing in 
interpreting such narratives was not to confuse their history-like quality with a 
claim to historicity. In an extended study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century biblical scholarship, however, Frei demonstrated that the literary 
quality of biblical narratives had been largely ignored in favour of two 
alternative interpretive options: either to read the text literally as historically 
accurate, or to dismantle the text through a historical-critical process which 
relocated truth and meaning from the text itself to the context and history of its 
production. The result, Frei argued, was that biblical scholarship “lacked the 
distinctive category and the appropriate interpretative procedure for 
understanding what [...] has actually been recognised: the high significance of 
the literal, narrative shape of the stories for their meaning”.29 In response to 
this lack, Frei proposed an alternative critical method drawn from the literary 
approach of Anglo-American New Criticism as better suited to engage with 
the distinctively literary qualities of biblical texts.30 
                                                                                                                                
good shorter surveys include those by Stanley E. Porter (Porter 1995), and by Robert 
Detweiler and Vernon K. Robbins (Detweiler and Robbins 1991). Comprehensive 
bibliographical surveys of literary-critical biblical scholarship to the mid-1990s have been 
compiled by Mark Minor (Minor 1992; Minor 1996) and Mark Allan Powell (Powell, Gray et 
al. 1992). 
27For a sympathetic assessment of Frei’s role in opening Biblical Studies to literary 
approaches, see David Lee’s Luke’s Stories of Jesus: Theological Reading of Gospel 
Narrative and the Legacy of Hans Frei (Lee 1999). 
28Auerbach’s Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (Auerbach 1953) 
was one of the first works to apply current literary theory to biblical narratives. Auerbach 
argues that the dominant influence upon European literary culture has been a “serious realism” 
derived ultimately not from Greco-Roman literature but from the Bible in general and the 
Gospels in particular (Auerbach 1953, 555). 
29Frei 1974, 10. 
30Finding its origins in the 1920s, New Criticism was largely unchallenged as the major 
approach to literary criticism for several decades. Its classic expression was René Wellek and 
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Following the lead of Muilenburg and Frei, an increasing number of literary 
interpretations of the Bible appeared through the 1970s and 1980s. Many, such 
as William A. Beardslee’s Literary Criticism of the New Testament (1970), 
drew upon established literary-theoretical approaches such as New Criticism 
or Russian Formalism,31 but at precisely the point at which many in Biblical 
Studies were adopting New-Critical insights and methods, New Criticism was 
itself being challenged and eventually supplanted as the dominant force in 
literary theory by a variety of vigorous new approaches, one of the most 
influential of which was structuralism.32 The appeal of structuralism was 
varied, but rested largely upon its support for the fundamental integrity of the 
biblical texts as unified systems of signification, a supposedly objective 
concentration upon qualities of textual form, and a clearly defined and 
‘scientific’ critical method.33 Unsurprisingly, given the preponderance of 
narrative form within the Bible, narrative quickly became a major focus of 
literary interpretation, and pioneering work was done by scholars such as 
                                                                                                                                
Austin Warren’s Theory of Literature, which was first published in 1949, ran through three 
editions, and was still in print in the early 1990s. 
31Beardslee 1970, x. Beardslee’s  sources included Erich Auerbach and Northrop Frye, René 
Wellek and Austin Warren’s classic Theory of Literature (3rd edition 1963), and Russian 
Formalism. 
32Structuralism is based upon the application to literary texts of methods developed for the 
analysis of language as a semiotic system. Standard introductions include Jonathan Culler’s 
Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature (Culler 1975), and 
Terence Hawkes’ Structuralism and Semiotics (Hawkes 1983). 
33In the long term, structuralism failed to take as an enduring approach in Biblical Studies, 
becoming something of a cul-de-sac, or “a moribund sub-discipline” of Biblical Studies 
(Porter 1995, 83). One reason for this was structuralism’s formidable and mystifying technical 
jargon, which many found off-putting compared to models drawn from Russian Formalism or 
New Criticism which were more easily grasped. Another was that it was not around long 
enough in Biblical Studies to establish itself before it was overtaken by newer literary-critical 
methods which were themselves both derived from and subversive of it, in the form of 
poststructuralism in general and deconstruction in particular, and a number of scholars, such 
as John Dominic Crossan, found themselves moving rapidly through structuralist criticism 
towards poststructuralism. Structuralism cannot, however, be said to have had no lasting 
impact on Biblical Studies. Indirectly, through the influence of structuralist narratologists such 
as Gerard Genette, Vladimir Propp, Tszvetan Todorov, Viktor Tomashevsky and Boris 
Uspensky, structuralism has been foundational for biblical narrative criticism in both Old and 
New Testaments (see e.g. Tomashevsky 1965; Propp 1968; Uspensky 1973; Todorov 1977; 
Genette 1980; Todorov 1981), whilst an enduring legacy of the structuralist approach within 
Biblical Studies is the journal Semeia, which devoted much of its early space to structuralist 
analysis of parables, and continues to be a major showcase for new approaches in the 
application of literary and cultural theory to biblical texts. 
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David J. A. Clines, David Jobling, Jan Fokkelman and David M. Gunn.34 This 
early narrative study was to bear significant fruit in the 1980s in the form of 
robust narrative-theoretical approaches in both Old Testament/Hebrew Bible 
and New Testament studies.35 
 
The impact of the new literary approaches in Biblical Studies was greater than 
simply the importation of new critical methods. New Criticism, structuralism 
and Russian Formalism were not, as Source, Form, Redaction and 
Composition Criticism had been, new methods for answering old historicist 
questions, but addressed crucially different interpretive concerns and interests. 
Instead of searching for meaning in the historical background of the texts, 
formalist approaches saw the meaning of the text as contained within itself, 
and the task of the interpreter as the unlocking of textual meaning through the 
interpretation of literary form. The significance of this perceptual shift was 
significantly to broaden the horizons of Biblical Studies, and was accentuated 
by the speed with which new literary approaches were able to establish 
themselves within the discipline.36 One reason for this was that most of the 
new approaches were imported intact from the fields of literary theory and 
criticism where they had already undergone a long period of gestation and 
development, and brought with them academically-credible methodological 
                                                 
34See e.g.: Fokkelman 1975; Clines 1978; Gunn 1978; Gunn 1980; Fokkelman 1981, 1986; 
Jobling 1986. Most of the analyses of whole books in the early phase of literary-biblical 
approaches are found in Old Testament/Hebrew Bible studies. Prior to the advent of narrative 
criticism in the 1980s, critical attention in New Testament studies had tended to focus on 
Gospel parables, which offered the prospect of smaller and simpler narrative units which were 
particularly conducive to structuralist analysis. Early issues of Semeia provide numerous 
examples of this interest. 
35These developments will be examined in detail later, as a test case of the difficulties posed 
by the postmodern context for confessional approaches. 
36The pace of change in literary Biblical Studies has been both a blessing and a curse. On the 
one hand, the fact that Biblical Studies has in thirty years covered the same ground that 
literary theory covered in almost a century has had a transforming effect. On the other hand, 
the pace of change has meant that biblical scholars have sometimes lacked the necessary depth 
of experience to apply their new critical tools appropriately, and that potentially helpful 
approaches have been dismissed as passé on the basis of their apparent supersession in literary 
theory before their prospects for biblical interpretation have been properly assessed. 
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tools honed and ready for immediate use. As well as challenging the 
hegemony of the historical-critical paradigm, therefore, literary approaches 
also began the process of transforming Biblical Studies from a closed, self-
validating academic community into a postmodern interdisciplinary field of 
study. Biblical and literary critics were suddenly able to collaborate in an 
exciting and, for many, mutually beneficial manner, as both were able to speak 
about the Bible using the same critical language.37 
 
It is also important to note that just as the disenchantment with historical-
critical scholarship which prompted many critics to seek out new literary 
methods was motivated both by academic and confessional concerns, so these 
confessional interests were welded together with literary ones. The 
importation of literary approaches by many biblical scholars, therefore, should 
be viewed as a genuine combination of theological and literary interpretive 
interests. The express intention of William A. Beardslee’s Literary Criticism 
of the New Testament is to use formalist literary criticism to engage the 
“religious functions of the narrative form”,38 and Mark Allan Powell has been 
careful to differentiate the “literary turn” in Biblical Studies from the study of 
“The Bible as Literature”, which studied biblical texts from a purely literary 
and humanist perspective.39 Whereas previous interpretation by literary 
                                                 
37The importance of literary critics stepping across into biblical interpretation should not be 
underestimated: influential examples include Erich Auerbach (Auerbach 1953), Northrop Frye 
(Frye 1957; Frye 1982), Frank Kermode (Kermode 1979), Roland Barthes (Barthes 1974), 
Gabriel Josipovici (Josipovici 1988) and Mieke Bal (Bal 1987; Bal 1988b; Bal 1988a). 
Important examples of collaboration between literary and biblical scholars include the 
anthologies of narrative studies compiled by Kenneth R. R. Gros Louis (Gros Louis 1974; 
Gros Louis 1982), Robert Alter and Frank Kermode’s Literary Guide to the Bible (Alter and 
Kermode 1987), and David Rhoads and Donald Michie’s Mark as Story (Rhoads and Michie 
1982). 
38Beardslee 1970, ix. 
39
 “The Bible as Literature” is a long-running strand of populist literary criticism. A classic 
example is Mary Ellen Chase’s The Bible and the Common Reader (Chase 1946), which 
addresses itself to the Bible in the Authorised Version as the classic work of English prose, 
without which no truly liberal education is complete (Chase 1946, 20), and praises the poetry 
of the Old Testament as suggesting “the accents of the human voice as expressive of human 
emotions at their height and depth” (Chase 1946, 82). David Robertson praises the Bible, 
“taken as a single work of art”, as a classic of world literature, on a par with Homer and 
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scholars tended to address the Bible as literature instead of as scripture, 
rendering aesthetic evaluation distinct from theological interpretation, Powell 
argues that the new convergence of literary and biblical criticism “destroys 
this dichotomy”, so that “recent studies attempt to examine the Bible as 
literature and as scripture at the same time. Literary criticism becomes the 
means but theological interpretation remains the end”.40 
 
By the end of the 1970s, however, formalism was beginning to look somewhat 
passé in literary theory, overtaken by newer approaches which challenged its 
emphasis on the literary text. Poststructuralism, for instance, questioned the 
very concept of the text as a stable repository of meaning, extending 
structuralist analysis of language and literary form to interrogate the 
conceptual structure of  thought itself. Rather than a stable, coherent system of 
concepts and linguistic signifiers, poststructuralism saw concepts (and 
therefore language, and therefore texts as linguistic structures) as unstable and 
indeterminate, constantly shifting and changing their meaning in an unending 
cycle of construction, deconstruction and reconstruction.41 At the same time, 
radical reader response theory challenged the formalist emphasis upon the 
priority of the text in the interpretive process, arguing that readers, not texts, 
make meaning.42  These developments were not long in making themselves 
                                                                                                                                
Shakespeare as part of “literature’s grand symphony of imaginative speech that offers 
temporary order, insight and peace” (Robertson 1977, 15). 
40Powell, Gray et al. 1992, 3. 
41Poststructuralism is most simply defined as the application of structuralist theory not only to 
linguistic and literary vehicles of meaning, but to the structure of meaning itself. It therefore 
shares the reflexive quality of postmodernity, which relentlessly interrogates and calls into 
question its own presuppositions and foundational commitments. The writers of The 
Postmodern Bible observe that “If poststructuralism is the genus, then deconstruction is its 
best known species” (Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 119), making the point that 
poststructuralism is often identified with deconstruction and the work of Jacques Derrida, but 
is actually a broader movement whose major contributors include the cultural  historian 
Michel Foucault, the literary and cultural theorist Roland Barthes, and the psychoanalytic 
theorist Jacques Lacan. 
42Reader response is a broad and contested field in literary theory, ranging from formalism to 
radical socio-pragmatism. Comprehensive introductions to the breadth of reader response 
theory include Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman’s The Reader in the Text: Essays on 
Audience and Interpretation (Suleiman and Crosman 1980), Jane P. Tompkins’ Reader 
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felt in biblical literary criticism:43 as early as 1985 critiques of formalism were 
appearing within Biblical Studies,44 and an increasing number of reader 
response and poststructuralist approaches to the Bible began to appear.45 
These new approaches further diversified the methodological options available 
to biblical critics, as well as opening the door to a variety of ideological 
positions whose voices had previously been marginalised or suppressed. 
 
The “literary turn” was highly significant in the development of a postmodern 
context in Biblical Studies for three reasons. First, the importation of new 
interpretive approaches ready-formed from the fields of literary theory and 
criticism produced a rapid expansion in the critical alternatives open to 
biblical scholars, introducing a variety of new critical concepts, not all of 
which were mutually compatible. This inevitably resulted in a certain 
fragmentation of the discipline, as the relatively unified historical-critical 
terminology was replaced in some quarters by a babel of competing jargons 
and terminologies.  
 
                                                                                                                                
Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism (Tompkins 1980), and Elizabeth 
Freund’s The Return of the Reader: Reader-Response Criticism (Freund 1987). The two most 
important reader response theorists for biblical interpretation have been Stanley Fish 
(especially Fish 1980a) and Wolfgang Iser (Iser 1974; Iser 1978). Fish and Iser have engaged 
in heated argument over the nature of reader interests in texts (see Kuenzli 1980; Fish 1981; 
Iser 1981). Fish will be discussed in more detail in chapter two, Iser in chapter three. 
43A herald of this shift for many was Frank Kermode’s The Genesis of Secrecy (1979): 
through examination of Mark’s Gospel, Kermode argues that in the story world of the Gospel 
meaning is not susceptible to final determination. Rather, the text lends itself to multiple 
interpretations, and the meaning (if there is one) is obscured behind “structures of 
interpretation which come between us and the text [...] like some wall of wavy glass” 
(Kermode 1979, 125). The reader who wishes to discern the core of meaning in the Gospel is 
engaged on an illusory quest, since that core is overlaid by a potentially infinite number of 
interpretive layers. Although Kermode is not a poststructuralist, the tenor of his work has 
strong affinities with some poststructuralist thinking. 
44See e.g. Poland 1985. Poland advocates a broad reader response hermeneutic based upon the 
theory of Paul Ricoeur. 
45Advocates of reader response included Edgar V. McKnight (McKnight 1988), Jeffrey Lloyd 
Staley (Staley 1988) and Robert M. Fowler (Fowler 1991). John Dominic Crossan was an 
early advocate of poststructuralist indeterminacy in interpretation (Crossan 1980). Stephen D. 
Moore, arguably the most influential advocate of poststructuralism in Biblical Studies, will be 
studied in detail in the next chapter. 
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Second, literary approaches introduced not only new methods but new 
interpretive paradigms, addressing questions and interests which historical-
critical scholarship had previously ignored or suppressed. Hence, text-centred 
formalist criticism challenged historicism’s emphasis upon the intention of the 
author or the historical context of textual production, but was itself challenged 
and subverted by poststructuralist and reader response approaches which 
focussed their critical attention upon the reader’s role in interpretation. By the 
1990s, therefore, the integrity of Biblical Studies as a discipline could be seen 
to be under strain, as author-, text- and reader-centred approaches vied for 
attention in the critical arena.  
 
A third consequence of the literary turn, however, was that it also opened the 
door to new ideological perspectives in biblical interpretation. Formalist 
biblical-literary critics reacted not only against historicist methods, but against 
the values of “objectivity” and “detachment” which were perceived as 
projections of Enlightenment values onto the biblical texts. The literary 
readings which they sought to produce through closer engagement with textual 
rhetoric often reflected the confessional interests of the interpreters concerned. 
Poststructuralism and radical reader response, however, introduced a 
hermeneutics of suspicion which suited the inclinations of other interpreters 
whose readings of the Bible were increasingly interrogatory or resistant. The 
challenge to historical-critical hegemony, therefore, was not only 






The “Ideological Turn” and the Proliferation of Perspectives 
 
Since the early 1970s Biblical Studies has diversified and expanded not only 
methodologically but ideologically. Alongside new critical methodologies, 
new ideological perspectives on the Bible have gained footholds and taken 
root within the discipline. Indeed, the advent of ideological criticism within 
Biblical Studies can be taken to mark the beginning of a genuinely postmodern 
context for interpretation. Biblical Studies is increasingly diverse, decentred 
and diffuse, as interpretive perspectives and methods proliferate. 
 
“Ideological criticism” is a catch-all term which encompasses a wide range of 
interpretive approaches. Indeed, the writers of The Postmodern Bible regard 
the term “ideological criticism” as “a limited, reductionist term for a much 
larger context of cultural relations and processes”.46 Broadly speaking, 
ideological critics begin from the position that all interactions between readers 
and texts are affected by ideology - that is, by the values, beliefs and vested 
interests inscribed into texts and brought to the interpretive process by 
readers.47 Ideological critics are therefore sensitive to the impact of beliefs, 
commitments and interests upon interpretation, especially where texts and 
their interpretation impact in turn upon the relationships between different 
groups of people within and between societies. Ideological criticism is 
frequently characterised by reading practices intended to uncover and resist 
the oppressive use of power in discourse. Tina Pippin has identified two main 
streams in ideological interpretation: one is the work of scholars within 
Western academia who have tended to apply Marxist insights to their analysis 
                                                 
46Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 306. For overviews of ideological approaches see Bible 
and Culture Collective 1995, 272-308 and Pippin 1996. 
47Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 302. There is debate among ideological critics over what 
ideology actually is and where it is located. Some, such as Meir Sternberg, see ideology as a 
property of texts (Sternberg 1985), whilst others, such as Stephen E. Fowl, argue that it is 
reader ideologies which fundamentally affect interpretation (Fowl 1995). Between these two 
poles there is a whole spectrum of other positions. 
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of texts and their reception;48 the other consists of readings by groups on the 
cultural and academic margins, such as postcolonial and liberation-theological 
readings from the third world,49 by African-Americans and other marginalised 
groups within the United States,50 and by women. 
 
As the first to establish itself firmly within Biblical Studies, feminist biblical 
criticism is arguably the archetypal ideological approach, and has been crucial 
in establishing a postmodern context within the discipline.51 Feminist criticism 
is distinguished from historical and literary approaches primarily by being 
“neither a discipline nor a method but more a variety of approaches, informed 
not so much by the biblical texts themselves as by the interests and concerns 
of feminism as a world view and political enterprise”.52 The coherence of 
feminism is therefore to be found in a fundamental concern for issues of 
gender in the interpretation of biblical texts, rather than in the adoption of any 
particular critical method. Indeed, the methodological eclecticism of feminist 
biblical scholarship is one of its primary features, as feminist critics select 
methods which cohere with their fundamental commitments and further their 
project of revealing and combatting gender bias in both biblical texts and their 
interpretation. One consequence of this methodological breadth is that the 
impact of feminist criticism within Biblical Studies has been broad and 
cumulative, rather than narrowly focussed. Individual feminist scholars 
                                                 
48Pippin identifies the main theoretical sources for this strand of scholarship as Frederick 
Jameson and Terry Eagleton, and cites Norman K. Gottwald’s The Tribes of Yahweh: A 
Sociology of Religion of Liberated Israel 1250-1050 B.C.E. (Gottwald 1979) as an example of 
this kind of scholarship in Biblical Studies. 
49See e.g. Sugirtharajah 1991; Segovia and Tolbert 1995a; Sugirtharajah 1998; Sugirtharajah 
2001. 
50See e.g. Felder 1991; Segovia and Tolbert 1995b. 
51Feminist biblical criticism is now a large and well-established field. A very accessible 
general survey is offered by Cullen Murphy (Murphy 1999). Athalya Brenner (Brenner and 
Fontaine 1997) has edited a comprehensive collection of essays covering the range of feminist 
approaches, whilst Janice Capel Anderson has provided briefer general and bibliographical 
surveys of the field (Anderson 1991; Anderson 1992). 
52Exum 1998a, 207. The Postmodern Bible describes feminism as “not a method of reading, 
but rather both a set of political positions and strategies and a contested intellectual terrain” 
(Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 234). 
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working in diverse areas and using various critical tools have produced a 
collective body of scholarship which poses a significant challenge to existing 
interpretation.53 Janice Capel Anderson uses a striking image to describe this 
effect: 
 
Each feminist critic is a unique pearl with a unique colour and shape 
formed out of the variables of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, 
nationality, education, age, religion, and personal experience. Some of 
us use primarily literary, others historical or sociological methods. 
Together we form intertwining strands of pearls, pearls of great price.54 
 
Feminism has been an important catalyst in introducing some of the newer 
critical methods into Biblical Studies, as feminist critics have been quick to 
seize upon approaches such as deconstruction, radical reader response and 
psychoanalysis, whose dominant hermeneutics of suspicion makes them useful 
in revealing gender bias in texts and interpretations. Hence, methodological 
and ideological proliferation within Biblical Studies can be seen to have gone 
together. 
 
As well as broadening the ideological and methodological horizons of Biblical 
Studies, feminist and other ideological approaches have introduced a strong 
ethical concern into the discipline. A significant element in this development 
has been a broadening of critical focus to include not only texts but their 
                                                 
53Some of the best-known feminist scholars demonstrate this methodological breadth. Phyllis 
Trible, one of the pioneers of feminist biblical interpretation, was a student of James 
Muilenburg and deploys a version of rhetorical criticism in her groundbreaking work (Trible 
1978; Trible 1984). Cheryl J. Exum and Mieke Bal both pursue a narratological approach as 
the foundation of their work, but build on it using a mixture of psychoanalysis, anthropology, 
deconstruction and, in Exum’s case, film and cultural criticism (Bal 1987; Bal 1988b; Bal 
1988a; Exum 1992; Exum 1993a; Exum 1996). Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, meanwhile, has 
tended to use more conventional historical-critical methods in her work (Schüssler Fiorenza 
1983; Schüssler Fiorenza 1984). 
54Anderson 1992, 105. Collaboration and co-operation has been a notable feature of feminist 
scholarship, and some feminists have argued that feminist discourse itself needs to be 
superseded by an inclusive discipline of gender studies which include insights from 
masculinist as well as feminist scholars (Bach 1993, 192-93; Reinhartz 1997, 35; Exum 
1998a, 224-25). 
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interpretations. Feminist scholars demand that interpreters be held accountable 
for the values and interests which are implicated in their interpretation of what 
feminists regard as highly ideological texts. The Bible and Culture Collective, 
for instance, conceive ideological criticism as a fundamentally ethical 
exercise, in the form of “a deliberate effort to read against the grain - of texts, 
of disciplinary norms, of traditions, of cultures. It is a disturbing way to read 
because ideological criticism demands a high level of self-consciousness and 
makes an explicit, unabashed appeal to justice. [...] It challenges readers to 
accept political responsibility for themselves and for the world in which they 
live”.55 Ideological interpretation, therefore, challenges both historicism and 
literary formalism to become self-aware, recognising the interests which they 
were created to serve and promote, and acknowledging where those interests 
render their interpretations problematic for other readers. Feminism in 
particular has led the way in breaking down the monolithic tendencies in much 
previous biblical scholarship and giving a voice to previously marginalised 
interpretive perspectives. 
 
If feminism has helped to diversify Biblical Studies both methodologically 
and ideologically, it also demonstrates some of the issues which a postmodern 
Biblical Studies will have to face. A particular concern is the increasing 
fragmentation and dissonance produced by the proliferation of perspectives 
and approaches. Cullen Murphy, for instance, observes of feminist criticism 
that “the movement fractures and calves with an enthusiasm reminiscent of the 
left in the 1930s, and with the same sense of injury and righteousness and the 
same level of noise”.56 Pamela J. Milne, similarly, argues that the term 
“feminist” is no longer adequate to describe the range of concerns focussed 
around the issues of gender in biblical interpretation. One significant division 
                                                 
55Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 275. 
56Murphy 1999, xxiii. 
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within feminist interpretation is over the authority of the Bible: while some 
critics see their role as the recovery of positive biblical portrayals of women, 
the reinterpretation of biblical texts in ways that affirm women or the 
rediscovery of the place of women within the history of Judaism and 
Christianity, others reject both Bible and Christianity as irredeemably 
patriarchal.57  
 
Another division has arisen over whom feminist scholarship actually 
represents. Some expositions of feminism, particularly in the United States, 
have assumed a self-evident commonality among women because they are 
women. This has in turn been challenged by African American and Latina 
critics on the basis that the feminist movement has, by and large, been 
predominantly white and middle-class, resulting in the relabelling of 
mainstream feminist scholarship by some black and Latina critics as “white 
feminism” and their own self-definition as “womanist” or “mujerista”.58 Adele 
Reinhartz has pointed out that exclusive concentration on the dynamics of 
male-female oppression can mask the collusion of some women in the 
oppression of others through racism or classism, and argued for a broader 
ideological critique of oppression within Biblical Studies.59  
                                                 
57Alice Bach, for instance, has been critical of Phyllis Trible, among others, for attempting to 
rehabilitate the Bible and seeking to “make this patriarchal corpus safe and still authoritative 
for faithful readers with feminist sensibilities” (Bach 1993, 196). Bach praises feminists who 
have sought to interpret the Bible “without a theological lens”, such as Cheryl J. Exum and 
Mieke Bal (Bach 1993). Pamela J. Milne has noted that one reason why feminist biblical 
scholarship is itself marginalised within feminist scholarship as a whole is the suspicion of 
other feminists that feminist biblical criticism seeks to defend the authority and spiritual value 
of the Bible no matter how sexist it appears to be, subordinating feminist ideological values to 
theological ones (Milne 1997, 45-46). 
58For a survey of this debate see Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 234-44. Loraine 
MacKenzie Shepherd, for instance, has taken issue with Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s 
depiction of women struggling for liberation from patriarchy within the church, arguing that 
“only a small minority of women, almost entirely white and middle-class, would identify 
themselves with Schüssler Fiorenza’s definition of women-church” (Shepherd 1995, 155). 
Janice Capel Anderson confesses that “No one can speak for everyone. I can speak and read 
only as a white middle-class American heterosexual Christian feminist” (Anderson 1992, 
112). 
59Reinhartz 1997, 33. “The feminist battle itself must be seen as only one front in an all out 
war within Western intellectual thought” (Reinhartz 1997, 32). 
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A third area of argument relates to the academic politics of feminist 
scholarship, as some feminists see the acceptance of feminist insights within 
the academy as effectively neutering feminism’s political agenda in favour of 
issues of philosophy and theory.60 Some critics have worried that acceptance 
of feminist scholarship within the mainstream of Biblical Studies represents 
the co-option of feminist scholarship by the academy so as to neutralise the 
impact of its critique whilst leaving other perspectives marginalised. If 
feminism reveals something of the potential of new methodological and 
ideological approaches in Biblical Studies, it also demonstrates that the more 
perspectives attempt to co-exist within the discipline, the more competition 
and scope for disagreement there will be. How to address and resolve 




The Postmodern Context in Biblical Studies 
 
How, then, can we characterise the postmodern context which has arisen out 
of the developments we have examined? Arguably the most important thing to 
say about postmodernism in Biblical Studies, as in Western culture in general, 
is that it is not one thing but many. Indeed, it is more appropriate to speak of 
postmodernisms in the plural than in the singular. Francis Watson has pointed 
                                                 
60The argument arises from the perception by some prominent feminists that poststructuralist 
theory renders political and ethical activism problematic by rendering all ethical concepts 
unstable and therefore unsustainable, and by promoting a deterministic view of individuals as 
the products of impersonal cultural systems. The writers of The Postmodern Bible, for 
instance, respond to such suspicions in the work of Schüssler Fiorenza with an extended 
critique of her “anti-postmodern rhetoric” (Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 260-67). Their 
treatment of feminist scholarship has prompted a heated response by Alice Bach and Schüssler 
Fiorenza herself to The Postmodern Bible’s “arrogance, if not downright impudence”, “mean-
spirited smugness”, and “dismissive and condescending attitude” to previous feminist work 
which the Bible and Culture Collective had labelled “naive, quaint and imprecise” (Bible and 
Culture Collective 1995, 235; Bach 1997, 37-40; Bach, Glancy et al. 1997, 70-73). 
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out that postmodernism is a broadly-based cultural phenomenon rather than an 
academic trend,61 and the increasing pervasiveness of postmodern insights and 
patterns of thought within Western culture and society means that rather than 
attempting to define postmodernism in terms of a particular philosophy or 
critical practice, it is more appropriate to think of it as the cultural context 
within which Biblical Studies operates, and which therefore exerts a defining 
and shaping influence over the nature and practice of the discipline. Hence, as 
postmodernism has grown in influence within the wider culture, so its impact 
upon Biblical Studies has increased.  
 
Within this wider context, as A. K. M. Adam observes, there are as many 
varieties of postmodernism as there are people who want to talk about it.62 
Furthermore, not all varieties of postmodern thought and critical practice are 
mutually supportive or sympathetic: indeed, Adam further notes the “enduring 
capacity” of postmodernism to “start heated arguments under any 
circumstances”.63 The writers of The Postmodern Bible similarly reject the 
suggestion that the postmodern can be easily encapsulated in a single 
definition or restricted to a particular area of cultural or academic influence, 
arguing that instead of a unified critical position, postmodernism should be 
regarded as to do with “transformation in the local ways we understand 
ourselves in relation to modernity and to contemporary culture and history, the 
social and personal dimensions of that awareness, and the ethical and political 
decisions that it generates”.64 
 
The relationship of the postmodern and the modern is complex. On the one 
hand, postmodernism includes the modern in that it represents the application 
                                                 
61Watson 1994, 86. 
62Adam 1995, 1. 
63Adam 1995, 1. 
64Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 9. 
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of modernist critical attention to its own foundations, to the previously 
unquestioned presuppositions which inform and underpin modernist thought 
and critical practice.65 Hence, as David J. A. Clines puts it, postmodernism 
can be understood as “the modern conscious of itself”.66 One influential 
exposition of this postmodern characteristic is that of Zygmunt Baumann: 
 
Postmodernity is no more (but no less either) than the modern mind 
taking a long, attentive and sober look at itself, at its conditions and its 
past works, not fully liking what it sees and sensing the urge to change. 
Postmodernity is modernity coming of age: modernity looking at itself 
at a distance rather than from inside, making a full inventory of its 
gains and losses, psychoanalysing itself, discovering the intentions it 
never before spelled out, finding them mutually cancelling and 
incongruous. Postmodernity is modernity coming to terms with its own 
impossibility: a self-monitoring modernity, one that consciously 




On the one hand, then, postmodernism is simply the self-reflexive extension of 
modernist critical enquiry to include modernist thought itself as an object of 
critical interrogation, so that Clines characterises the postmodern turn in 
Biblical Studies as “a turn from interpretation to critique, from understanding 
to evaluation, from hermeneutics to ethics”.68 In this sense postmodernism is 
the logical and natural successor of the modern, and thus includes the modern 
within itself. 
 
In another way, however, postmodernism may be seen as a reaction against 
modernity, and it is in this guise that it has most often manifested itself within 
Biblical Studies. Adam notes that it is “almost always fair” to think of 
                                                 
65Adam 1995, 12. 
66Clines 1998c, 277. 
67Baumann 1991, 272. 
68Clines 1998c, 290. 
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postmodernism as a movement of resistance, which defines itself over against 
modernity:69 
 
Where modern criticism is absolute, postmodern criticism is relative; 
where modern knowledge is universal, unified, and total, postmodern 
knowledge is local and particular; where modern knowledge rests on a 
mystified account of intellectual discourse, postmodern knowledge 
acknowledges that various forces that are ostensibly external to 
intellectual discourse nonetheless impinge on the entire process of 
perceiving, thinking, and of reaching and communicating one’s 
conclusions. Nothing is pure; nothing is absolute; nothing is total, 




What postmodernism reacts against in particular is hegemony, whether 
cultural, intellectual or theological. Within Biblical Studies, and within 
Western culture generally, the key postmodern insight is that no single 
interpretive perspective can achieve an absolute monopoly of truth. Concepts 
and perspectives which were previously accepted as universal, unified and 
absolute are increasingly perceived to be anything but. Walter Brueggemann 
has characterised the fundamental postmodern insight as recognising that 
knowledge and interpretation is inherently contextual, in that “what one knows 
and sees depends upon where one stands or sits”.71 Furthermore, contexts are 
invariably local, so that whilst it is possible to propose that a local truth ought 
to apply beyond one’s local context, it is not possible to proclaim a local truth 
as universally applicable. Finally, it follows for Brueggemann that knowledge 
is inherently pluralistic, “a cacophony of claims, each of which rings true to 
its own advocates”. 
 
The recognition that knowledge is context-specific, and that a variety of 
interpretations or perceptions of a text may therefore be equally legitimate or 
                                                 
69Adam 1995, 1. 
70Adam 1995, 16. 
71Brueggemann 1993, 8-9. 
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valid, has led to the increasing dominance of a “hermeneutics of suspicion” 
within postmodern Biblical Studies, directed at interpretations and interpretive 
paradigms which claim to provide definitive readings of biblical texts. 
Postmodern critics recognise that interpreters are themselves conditioned and 
shaped by their interpretive contexts. Socio-political, institutional, gender-
political, theological, racial and a host of other factors all combine to influence 
both the questions that interpreters ask of texts and the critical methods which 
they apply to them, and therefore to a large extent determine the results of 
interpretation. The result, as Robert Fowler points out, is that: 
 
reading and interpretation is always interested, never disinterested; 
always significantly subjective, never completely objective; always 
committed and therefore always political, never uncommitted and 
apolitical; always historically-bound, never ahistorical. The modernist 




One consequence of this recognition is that interpretations and interpretive 
approaches which claim to be objective and absolute now appear to be 
exercises in ideological projection. Objectivity, as Brueggemann puts it, “is in 
fact one more practice of ideology that presents interest in covert form as an 
established fact”.73 Postmodern readings of biblical texts which foreground 
their own contextuality and provisionality challenge traditional interpretations 
which claim universality, completeness and priority over other interpretations 
on the grounds that such interpretations “are themselves enactments of 
domination or, in simpler terms, power plays”.74 The key insight which 
motivates much postmodern biblical criticism is that there is no interpretation 
                                                 
72Fowler 1989, 21. 
73Brueggemann 1993, 9. 
74Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 3. 
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which does not reflect the interests of the interpreter and the community of 
interpretation to which they belong.75 
 
The trajectory of Biblical Studies since the 1970s and the growth of 
postmodernism offer both possibilities and challenges to confessional 
scholarship. The breakdown of historical-critical hegemony has meant that a 
wider range of questions and interests than ever before have become 
legitimate pursuits for biblical scholars, including the goal of producing 
theological and explicitly confessional readings. The “literary turn” has 
introduced exciting new methods which can unlock previously unexplored 
aspects of biblical texts and produce innovative new interpretations. Finally, 
the introduction of ideological criticism in the wake of feminist biblical 
scholarship means that the possibilities for an explicitly confessional and yet 
genuinely academic critical approach to biblical interpretation are, at least in 
theory, bright. 
 
The challenges, however, are also significant. Confessional criticism needs to 
establish itself not only in relation to historical criticism, but in relation to a 
bewildering array of competing and overlapping ideological and 
methodological approaches, each with its own jargon and terminology, and 
each pursuing its own interests in the Bible. Some of these approaches are 
sympathetic, some are violently hostile. Some may be helpful, some will be 
totally disinterested. If a confessional approach to Biblical Studies is to 
establish itself within the postmodern academy, it must first understand the 
nature of the field in which it seeks to take its place. In the next chapter, 
therefore, we will examine in detail the work of three postmodern scholars, in 
order to work towards a definition of what might count as authentically 
postmodern academic scholarship at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
                                                 
75See e.g. Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 4; Brueggemann 1997, 63. 
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CHAPTER TWO: POSTMODERN BIBLICAL CRITICISM – THE 
RULES OF THE GAME 
 
 I don’t want you to worry ‘bout me, ‘cause I’m alright; 
 I don’t want you to tell me it’s time to come home; 
 I don’t care what you say any more, this is my life; 
 Go ahead with your own life, leave me alone. 
  - Billy Joel    
 
 
In this chapter we will attempt to establish a more detailed picture of 
postmodern biblical criticism based upon the actual critical practice of 
scholars in the field. Through the analysis of critical practice we will attempt 
to discern what actually counts as academically valid postmodern biblical 
scholarship, and hence identify a number of key criteria which a confessional 
critic must consider in attempting to engage in postmodern scholarly 
discourse. 
 
The three scholars with whom this chapter will engage are David J. A. Clines, 
Stephen D. Moore and J. Cheryl Exum. These three represent between them a 
range of postmodern critical methods, theoretical approaches and ideological 
motivations which reflects the diversity of postmodern biblical scholarship, 
and represent a coherent grouping in that during the 1990s they were all 
faculty members of the Department of Biblical Studies at the University of 
Sheffield.1 Founded in 1947 as the Department of Biblical History and 
Literature under the  professorship of F. F. Bruce, the Department has come to 
occupy an internationally dominant role at the cutting edge of new approaches, 
methods and theories in Biblical Studies. As well as establishing a strong 
                                                 
1Clines joined the department in 1964, Exum in 1993 and Moore in 1996. Moore left Sheffield 
in 1999 to become Professor of New Testament at Drew University. 
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reputation for leading-edge and innovative scholarship the Department is also 
recognised as a leading and prodigious publisher of research through the 
Sheffield Academic Press, and this publishing output reflects a distinctively 
postmodern departmental ethos.2 This ethos does not constitute a Sheffield 
“School” in the sense of a strong commitment to any particular theory, 
methodology or interest in the Bible, but coheres around a shared commitment 
to the study of the biblical texts as cultural artefacts, a recognition of the 
subjectivity of the interpretive enterprise, and the need to adopt an 
multidimensional approach to the practice of biblical interpretation. 
 
Two key factors have contributed to the formation of a distinctive 
departmental ethos at Sheffield.3 First is the fact that the Department was 
originally established as part of the Arts Faculty in a secular university rather 
than as a subdivision of a larger Theology department or Church training 
institution. This has meant that the Department has often felt free to operate 
independently of theological or ecclesiological constraints.4 Second, the 
Department’s establishment within Sheffield’s Faculty of Arts has made it 
open to interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation. Sheffield scholars such as David 
                                                 
2The Sheffield Academic Press was founded in  1975 as the JSOT Press, partly with the 
intention of making the results of newer approaches in Biblical Studies more widely available. 
This objective has been comprehensively achieved, largely through the publication of the 
Journal for the Study of the New Testament, the Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 
and their associated supplement series. Members of the Department also serve as editors or 
members of editorial boards for a number of influential journals not published in Sheffield, 
such as the Journal of Biblical Literature, Biblical Interpretation and Semeia. Although 
Sheffield Academic Press has recently been absorbed into the Continuum publishing group 
and its journals sold off to another publisher, Clines, a champion of internet publishing, has 
made much of his own work available on his website and has championed the launch of the 
Sheffield Phoenix Press, which continues to publish innovative work in Biblical Studies. 
3For an extended survey of the development of the Sheffield Department, see Clines 1998d. A 
briefer account of the Department’s early phase is to be found in Bruce 1990. It is important to 
note that the Department is not uniform in its approach, and that historical-critical approaches 
continue to be practised there: at the same time, the conjunction of like-minded scholars 
described here has given the Department a key role in introducing postmodern approaches to a 
wider audience through its teaching and its publishing output. 
4Clines 1998d, 59. A good example of this tendency is Philip R. Davies’ controversial work In 
Search of “Ancient Israel”  (Davies 1992), in which he challenges established scholarly 
consensus about the origins of Jewish identity, the Hebrew Bible, and Israelite history. 
 38 
Clines and David Gunn were some of the first to import literary theory and 
critical practice across disciplinary boundaries during the 1970s, and this has 
come to be a distinctive feature of the Department’s work and of its publishing 
output. Further engagement with hermeneutics, philosophy, gender, cultural 
and media studies have resulted in a distinctively postmodern self-
consciousness, to the extent that Clines describes postmodernism as “the key 
intellectual concept in the Department” during the 1990s. 
 
In this chapter we will use the work of these three scholars to identify some of 
the key features of postmodern academic discourse in Biblical Studies. The 
framework for this analysis will be provided by considering the development 
of ethics of interpretation in Biblical Studies, and the concept of interpretive 
communities and interests. We will then examine the way in which 
methodological, ideological and political interests shape the work of our 
subjects and define their approach as distinctively postmodern. Having 
outlined the salient features of postmodern critical practice as these scholars 
have established it, the challenges of their work to confessional biblical 
interpretation will be assessed. 
 
 
Ethics of Interpretation 
 
Although Clines, Moore and Exum are highly individual scholars, their work 
shares a common ideological concern for the ethics of interpretation, and this 
provides a useful lens to help focus discussion of their work and the issues 
which arise from it. The concept was first given major currency in Elizabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza’s seminal essay “The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation”, 
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presented as the presidential address to the 1987 meeting of the SBL.5 
Schüssler Fiorenza has continued to develop and nuance her thinking through 
the 1990s, and continues to be a major figure in the debate over interpretive 
ethics.6 Her work has had a notable effect in shaping the self-conception 
which Exum, Moore and Clines share as biblical critics.7 
 
Schüssler Fiorenza’s case begins with a critical analysis of the scientific-
positivist ethos of mainstream (or, as she prefers, malestream) Biblical Studies 
which, she argues, prioritises interests which are both Eurocentric and 
androcentric. Biblical Studies’ own objectivist rhetoric blinds scholars to this 
fact: the ‘universal’ facts and truths which they seek in their study are, in fact, 
supportive of their own ideological and socio-political commitments and 
exclusive of the interests of other interpretive communities. ‘Objective’ 
Biblical Studies is thus blind to its own complicity in the promotion of certain 
interests and the suppression of others, and incapable of engaging 
constructively with those from other socio-political locations who seek a voice 
within the arena of biblical interpretation.8 
 
Schüssler Fiorenza draws upon hermeneutical and rhetorical theory to show 
that value-neutrality in scholarship is a chimera. Following Gadamer, she 
insists that “Our very ability to understand [is] defined by our 
preunderstandings, which we cannot simply cast off as we would a coat or a 
                                                 
5Schüssler Fiorenza 1988. 
6Other significant figures include Fernando F. Segovia (Segovia and Tolbert 1995b; Segovia 
and Tolbert 1995a), R. S. Sugirtharajah (Sugirtharajah 1991; Sugirtharajah 1998; 
Sugirtharajah 2001), and Brian K. Blount (Blount 1995). 
7At a superficial level this influence can be shown in the way Clines and Exum in particular 
have drawn upon Schüssler Fiorenza’s work. Clines, for instance, has taken her question, 
“What does the language of a biblical text ‘do’ to a reader who submits to its world of 
vision?” (Schüssler Fiorenza 1988, 15) as the basis for essay titles such as, “Why is there a 
Song of Songs and What Does It Do to You If You Read It?” (Clines 1995c, 94-121), and 
“Why Is There a Book of Job, and What Does It Do to You If You Read It?” (Clines 1995c, 
122-44).  
8Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 41-2. 
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hat.”9 Presuppositions do not inhibit interpretation but enable it, providing a 
conceptual framework which facilitates engagement with the text.  This being 
the case, Schüssler Fiorenza argues, the competing claims of different 
interpretations for attention in the critical arena must be negotiated in a new 
way.10 
 
Schüssler Fiorenza calls for a twofold ethics of interpretation. First, she argues 
the need for an ethics of historical reading which emphasises the gap between 
the historical text and the contemporary interpreter, prevents uncritical 
assimilation of the biblical text and its ideology, and “allows us not only to 
relativise through contextualisation the values and authority claims of the 
biblical text but also to assess and critically evaluate them”.11  
 
Second, Schüssler Fiorenza insists upon the need for an ethics of 
accountability by which biblical scholars are held responsible for the ethical 
consequences of their readings of the biblical text. Both the ideologies of 
biblical texts and the interpretations derived from those texts should be 
available for evaluation and critique: 
 
If scriptural texts have served not only noble causes but also to 
legitimate war, to nurture anti-Judaism and misogynism, to justify the 
exploitation of slavery, and to promote colonial dehumanization, then 
biblical scholarship must take the responsibility not only to interpret 
biblical texts in their historical contexts but also to evaluate the 
construction of their historical worlds and symbolic universes in terms 
of a religious scale of values. [...] students of the Bible must learn how 
to examine both the rhetorical aims of biblical texts and the rhetorical 
interests emerging in the history of interpretation or in contemporary 
scholarship.12 
 
                                                 
9Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 59. 
10Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 60. 
11Schüssler Fiorenza 1988, 14. 
12Schüssler Fiorenza 1988, 15. 
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Schüssler Fiorenza has outlined a new paradigm for biblical interpretation, and 
promoted the metaphor of Biblical Studies as a dance with a number of 
“moves”, “turns” or “steps”.13 These are not to be thought of as sequential or 
discrete methodological rules, but as interpretive moves or strategies which 
simultaneously interact, and which engage both the biblical text itself and the 
contemporary reader who attempts to interpret it.14 First and most important, 
Schüssler Fiorenza advocates a hermeneutics of experience and social 
location, whereby the critic reflects upon how their experience with the 
biblical text is shaped by their sociopolitical context. This is linked with an 
analytic of domination by means of which the text’s role in promoting or 
supporting social structures of domination and subordination can be 
systematically analysed.15 A hermeneutics of suspicion questions the 
underlying presuppositions and ideologies both of interpreters and biblical 
texts by querying ideological or theological ‘truths’ which they might take for 
granted. A hermeneutics of ethical and theological evaluation assesses the 
values of texts and interpreters according to an external scale of values.16 A 
hermeneutics of remembrance and re-construction attempts to recover both 
the victimization and accomplishments of those marginalized or repressed by 
the text or the history of its interpretation.17 A hermeneutics of imagination 
                                                 
13Schüssler Fiorenza also favours the metaphor of cooking: “one could [...] think of biblical 
interpretation as cooking a stew and utilizing different herbs and spices that season the 
potatoes, meats, and carrots equally and when stirred together combine into a new and 
different flavour” (Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 428). 
14For a more detailed summary of these moves see Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 48-54 or 
Schüssler Fiorenza 2001, 165-90. 
15Schüssler Fiorenza’s feminism is a radically democratic one in which she advocates the 
freedom of all people (wo/men) from cultural or political oppression by kyriarchal structures 
and systems. Schüssler Fiorenza understands kyriarchy  not simply as gender-based dualism 
but as “more comprehensive, interlocking, hierarchically ordered structures of domination, 
evident in a variety of oppressions, such as racism, poverty, heterosexism, and colonialism” 
(Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, ix). 
16In Schüssler Fiorenza’s case, a feminist scale of values which “may be inspired by, but is not 
necessarily derived from, the Bible” (Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 51). 
17Schüssler Fiorenza stresses that such reconstructions are as rhetorical as the interpretations 
they seek to correct, producing a retelling of the past which must itself be critically evaluated: 
“Historical understanding depends on analogy. It is narrative laden and amounts to a remaking 
and retelling of reality, but it is not reality itself” (Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 52). 
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both inspires and complements such reconstruction, seeking “to generate 
utopian visions that have not yet been realized and to ‘dream’ a different 
world of justice and well-being”.18 Finally, Schüssler Fiorenza argues for a 
hermeneutics of transformation and action for change which not only analyses 
the past text and present context of interpretation, but articulates new visions 
of the future. The task of interpretation, she asserts, is not simply to describe 
the world of text and reader as it has been or as it is, but to use interpretation 
as a means of ideological and sociopolitical change in the interests of the 
oppressed and marginalised. 
 
Two further significant points should be noted about Schüssler Fiorenza’s 
ethical approach. First, although Schüssler Fiorenza sees the biblical texts as 
ideological products fundamentally bound up with the values and interests of 
kyriarchal social structures, she insists that the impact of a hermeneutics which 
involves suspicion and evaluation of the biblical text does not entail rejection 
and disengagement, but rather prompts continued grappling with the text as it 
is read in changing contexts. The temptation to label texts as oppressive or 
emancipatory should be resisted: instead, a “hermeneutics of evaluation” will 
seek “to adjudicate again and again how biblical texts function in particular 
situations”.19 Each biblical text must be engaged afresh each time it is read in 
a new context, and its power for good or ill assessed in an ongoing struggle 
over authority, values, and meaning.20 
 
Second, Schüssler Fiorenza’s pursuit of a radically democratic vision of 
biblical interpretation in which all interpreters engage with the Bible on a level 
                                                 
18The mutual complimentarity of Schüssler Fiorenza’s “moves” is demonstrated by her 
insistence that the hermeneutics of imagination must itself be subject to a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, because the imagination engages kyriocentric texts and is itself culturally located: 
“our imagination and utopian visions are always both informed and deformed by our present 
sociopolitical location” (Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 53, author’s emphasis). 
19Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 51.  
20Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 45. 
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playing field, is a profoundly theological one. The relations of power and 
domination which she sees underpinning much biblical interpretation are, she 
argues, structural sin.21 These should be replaced by a new paradigm which 
“has its roots in the ekklesia as the public assembly of free and equal citizens 
in the power of the Spirit”22, exercising judgement and discernment in pursuit 
of gospel values of liberation and freedom: 
 
one needs to reconceptualise the traditional spiritual practice of 
discerning the spirits as a critical ethical-political practice. As 
interpreting subjects, biblical readers must learn to claim their spiritual 
authority to assess both the oppressive as well as the liberating 
imagination of particular biblical texts and their interpretations.23 
 
The interpretive dance which Schüssler Fiorenza envisages is an ongoing 
hermeneutical spiral in which readers and texts constantly re-engage with one 
another as interpretive contexts change. The community of faith is shaped by 
its interaction with the Bible, but is an active partner in that shaping, 
exercising spiritual discernment and judgement as all whose experiences are 
affected by the text or its interpretation are heard, valued and weighed. 
 
Schüssler Fiorenza’s moves are subtle and mutually interactive, allowing no 
position to be taken for granted and permitting no ideological or theoretical 
interest to be universalised and thereby elevated to a dominant position. Her 
ethics of interpretation require that critics recognise both the subjectivity of 
their own interpretive perspective and the validity of others, and bring their 
differing interpretations into a relationship of mutual dialogue. The result, she 
suggests, is a hermeneutical dance in which interpreters and texts are in 
constant motion, engaging, disengaging and re-engaging: 
 
                                                 
21Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 64. 
22Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 89. 
23Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 47. 
 44 
It suggests an image of interpretation as forward movement and 
spiralling repetition, stepping in place, turning over and changing of 
venue in which discrete methodological approaches become moving 
steps and artful patterns. Clumsy participants in this dance that figures 
the complex enterprise of biblical criticism may frequently step on 
each others’ toes and interrupt each others’ turns, but they can still 
dance together as long as they acknowledge each other as equals who 
are conscious of dancing through a political minefield. Such a dance 
can have many partners; it is neither heterosexually overdetermined 
nor an expression of competition and takeover. It does not need 
landmarks and fixed points, but its conjunctions need space and 
minimal rules of engagement.24 
 
Schüssler Fiorenza outlines a vision of Biblical Studies which is self-aware, 
honest and open in its interests and its methods, critically self-evaluating and 
accountable for the consequences of its interpretations and the uses to which 
they are put. Whilst still not mainstream within the broader horizons of 
Biblical Studies, the influence of Schüssler Fiorenza’s new paradigm is 
evident in much postmodern scholarship, and especially that which has come 
from the University of Sheffield. 
 
 
Interpretive Communities and Interpretive Interests 
 
As well as drawing upon interpretive ethics it may also be helpful to see 
Sheffield postmodernism through the lens of Stanley Fish’s concept of the 
interpretive community. Fish has been an influence on Clines and Moore in 
particular, and it is arguable that his understanding of interpretive 
communities has been fundamental to the development of a postmodern 
consciousness in the work of many biblical scholars. 
 
                                                 
24Schüssler Fiorenza 1999, 101. 
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Fish’s key contention is that it is readers, in the collective form of interpretive 
communities, and not texts which ultimately determine the results of 
interpretation. This assertion is based upon the epistemological argument that 
linguistic utterances are only intelligible when situated within a system of 
interpretive strategies and pre-understandings which provide hearers and 
readers with the means to make sense of them. Since we cannot make sense of 
the world without such interpretive frameworks, Fish argues, then:  
 
what anyone sees is not independent of his verbal and mental 
categories but is in fact a product of them; and it is because these 
categories, rather than being added to perception, are its content that 
the entities they bring into being seem to be a part of the world in the 
sense that they were there before there was anyone to perceive them.25  
 
Applying this insight to literary interpretation, Fish rejects the conventional 
notion that texts exist conceptually prior to interpretation. If texts are 
intelligible only in the context of interpretive strategies, then it is the strategies 
applied to the text which give shape to the interpretation, with the result that 
textual meaning is not discovered but produced by the interpretive process.26 
 
The key element in determining which strategies will be applied to a text in 
any given situation is the interpretive community, defined as a community of 
readers who share a common set of interpretive strategies which “exist prior to 
the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather 
than, as is usually assumed, the other way around”.27 For Fish, the interpretive 
community is the locus of authority in interpretation. Communities 
predetermine the generic categories to which texts belong, and thus determine 
the interpretive strategies which will be applied to those texts. These agreed 
strategies further determine what interpretations will be acceptable, and which 
                                                 
25Fish 1980a, 270. 
26Fish 1980a, 168. 
27Fish 1980a, 171. 
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will be ruled out of bounds.28 Fish gives the example of a group of students 
who, when asked to interpret a list of theoretical linguists using conventions 
relating to seventeenth-century religious poetry, produced coherent and 
reasoned interpretations of the list as a poem, leading Fish to argue that it is in 
readers and not in texts that meaning resides: “Interpretation is not the art of 
construing but the art of constructing. Interpreters do not decode poems; they 
make them”.29 
 
Fish insists that all linguistic activity is concretely rooted in social and cultural 
contexts, and that communication is only intelligible within a contextually-
specific interpretive framework or system of intelligibility provided by an 
interpretive community: 
 
communication occurs only within such a system (or context, or 
situation, or interpretive community) and [...] the understanding 
achieved by two or more persons is specific to that system and 
determinate only within its confines.30 
 
Fish’s understanding of the interpretive community therefore renders 
communication between communities problematic, as a shared framework for 
understanding is not in place between them. Fish argues that mutual 
understanding is only achievable intrasystemically, and that attempts to 
communicate across systemic boundaries are fraught with difficulty. 
                                                 
28Fish’s insistence on the authority of interpretive communities appears to offer a liberation of 
the reader from textual authority, but Fish’s thought takes a determinist slant when he argues 
that since individual readers, like texts, operate within the context of interpretive communities, 
the community forms readers as well as texts: “while it is true to say that we create poetry 
(and assignments and lists), we create it through interpretive strategies that are finally not our 
own but have their source in a publicly available system of intelligibility. Insofar as the 
system (in this case a literary system) constrains us, it also fashions us, furnishing us with 
categories of understanding, with which we in turn fashion the entities to which we can then 
point. In short, to the list of made or constructed objects we must add ourselves, for we no less 
than the poems and assignments we see are the products of social and cultural patterns of 
thought” (Fish 1980a, 332). 
29Fish 1980a, 327. 
30Fish 1980a, 304. 
 47 
 
In the light of Fish’s model, it is possible to interpret the development of 
postmodern approaches to biblical interpretation at Sheffield and in other 
places as the birth of a new interpretive community within Biblical Studies. 
This community exerts its authority in the two vital areas identified by Fish, 
namely the definition of the texts it interprets, and the laying down of 
acceptable interpretive criteria and strategies. In contrast to the Bible which 
forms the object of study for historical-critical or confessional scholarship, the 
Bible which Clines, Exum and Moore interpret is neither a historical window 
onto its own composition history nor a vehicle of divine revelation, but an 
ideological artefact, a product and a tool of human culture which continues to 
have relevance in the contemporary context because of its pervasive historical 
influence upon art, ethics, gender roles and, indeed, the very concept of what it 
is to be human. The appropriate methods for studying this Bible are those 
dominated by a hermeneutics of suspicion which facilitates the uncovering and 
critique of harmful ideologies in the biblical texts and in the history of their 
interpretation.31 In this respect, it can be argued that Sheffield scholarship as 
practised by Clines, Exum and Moore operates as a Fishian community of 
interpretation, determining both the conception of the biblical text as object of 
study and the critical methods which are appropriate to that study. 
 
But what are the forces, motivations and presuppositions which shape the 
community to which Clines, Moore and Exum have contributed? A sharper 
focus and clearer image may be generated in light of a suggestion of Stephen 
E. Fowl.32 Responding to Schüssler Fiorenza and to Fish, Fowl suggests that 
                                                 
31It will be noticed that these two functions of the interpretive community form a closed 
hermeneutical circle. The predisposition to view the Bible as ideologically suspect determines 
the choice of hermeneutically suspicious critical methods, which in turn give rise to 
interpretations which confirm the initial preconception. Fish would argue that all interpretive 
communities operate in this manner, but it raises issues of how different communities can 
engage in dialogue with one another, as we shall see.  
32Fowl 1990. 
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traditional definitions of interpretive approaches in terms of textual meaning 
should be redefined in terms of interpretive interests. In his essay “The Ethics 
of Interpretation, or What’s Left Over After the Elimination of Meaning”, 
Fowl argues that the problem with meaning as a critical term is that it is too 
broad. Different critical or theoretical approaches claim to locate meaning in 
different places (for instance, in authorial intention, in aspects of textual form 
or in the application of readers’ concerns to the text), and thus claim priority 
over other approaches. Scholars agree about the importance of meaning, but 
disagree over where it is to be found or the basis on which such a judgement 
might be made. As a result, arguments over meaning become intractable, 
inconclusive and unhelpful because scholars are not actually debating the 
same thing.33 In Fishian terms, different interpretive communities approach 
the Bible with different definitions of the text and, therefore, of what textual 
meaning is. Agreement that meaning is important hides fundamental 
differences in the way meaning is defined within the interpretive frameworks 
of different communities. 
 
Following Jeffrey Stout, Fowl proposes that different interpretive approaches 
should be defined not in terms of meaning but in terms of their interpretive 
interests.34 Fowl goes on to suggest two advantages of this move: first, 
defining one’s interest in a particular aspect of the text will allow the defusing 
of some disagreements by showing that although disparate interests may not 
be compatible, they are not in conflict either; second, where disagreement 
persists, definition of interpretive interests may assist in clarifying the nature 
of the disagreement and thus facilitate a speedier resolution.35 
 
                                                 
33Fowl 1990, 385. 
34Stout 1982. 
35Clines has noted Fowl’s work as a major step forward in the development of ethically-aware 
biblical scholarship, arguing that he goes beyond Schüssler Fiorenza’s suggestions in her 1987 
SBL address (see Clines 1997, 24). 
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A third advantage of Fowl’s proposal, I would argue, is that it provides a 
helpful diagnostic tool which allows for sharper definition of interpretive 
approaches not only in terms of their methodological or critical interests in 
biblical texts, but also in terms of their ideologies and underlying motivations. 
Defining approaches in terms of their interpretive interests allows for greater 
understanding not only of what critical questions different approaches ask of 
the Bible, but also of why they ask those questions in the first place. In 
relation to postmodern interpretation as practised by Clines, Moore and Exum, 
I would suggest that three key levels of interpretive interests can be discerned. 
 
First, Clines, Exum and Moore have strong and clearly defined 
methodological interests which find expression in the application of 
interpretive strategies drawn from literary theory and criticism, characterised 
by an interest in digging beneath the surface meaning of the biblical text to 
uncover its underlying ideology so it can be examined and critiqued. As Fish 
has suggested, their critical tools provide a characteristic marker of the 
interpretive community to which these scholars belong. Drawing upon 
theoretical models which conceive the biblical texts as ideological constructs 
rather than as evolving traditions or as divine communications, these three 
critics produce interpretations which mark their own scholarship as distinct 
from other approaches within Biblical Studies.36 
 
The critical methods which scholars choose to deploy, however, themselves 
reflect a deeper set of ideological interests, which motivate and find 
expression in their critical output. The work of Exum, Moore and Clines is 
                                                 
36Fowl’s argument for the abandonment of meaning as a definitive term in Biblical Studies 
arises at least in part from his awareness that “It is no secret that what counts as meaning in 
Sheffield most certainly does not count as meaning in every other university. This would not 
bother someone like me [...] if there were some way to show that Sheffield is right and those 
who do things differently are wrong. What is so distressing is that there do not seem to be any 
defensible criteria by which one could argue the case either for Sheffield or against” (Fowl 
1990, 380). 
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marked by a strong hermeneutics of suspicion both in relation to the Bible and 
to its subsequent interpretation by historical and confessional scholarship. 
Their interpretations repeatedly hold biblical texts to the light of modern 
liberal humanist values only to find them wanting, and they criticise 
mainstream biblical scholarship for unthinkingly perpetuating harmful and 
outdated ideologies and cultural norms. For our three scholars it is a matter of 
personal ethics that their personal beliefs should be applied to their 
scholarship, and that their ideological commitments should be openly declared 
so that their impact upon the interpretive process can be discerned. Their 
ideological interests cause them to seek to render themselves accountable 
whilst at the same time holding others to account for the ideological impact of 
their interpretations. 
 
From the point of view of seeking to establish constructive engagement 
between postmodernism and confessional interpretation of the Bible, however, 
the most significant level of interpretive interests is the political. Clines, Exum 
and Moore have arguably sought to establish a distinct interpretive community 
within Biblical Studies, one of whose major features being the deliberate 
exclusion of confessional and theological concerns. This reflects the presence 
within much postmodern biblical scholarship of tendencies which are  strongly 
anti-authoritarian, anti-establishment and anti-ecclesiastical. The growth of 
literary approaches in general as a viable alternative to historical-critical 
orthodoxy, and of poststructuralist criticism in particular as a means of 
deconstructing and critiquing previously unchallenged theological positions, 
has provided an opportunity for the establishment of an interpretive 
community within Biblical Studies which finds itself at odds with the 




Having constructed an analytical framework based upon the nature of 
interpretive communities, the ethics of interpretation and especially the 
concept of varying levels of interpretive interests, I now propose to apply this 
framework to the work of Clines, Moore and Exum. In doing so, the influence 
of these concepts upon their work will be made clear, and the nature of the 
underlying motives and interests which drive their study of the Bible will be 
clarified. This, in turn, will help us to understand the nature of the challenge to 
confessional scholarship posed by the kinds of approaches which these critics 
have sought to establish within Biblical Studies. Having understood the 
challenge better, we will then be in a position to consider how confessional 
critics might best respond to it. 
 
 
David J. A. Clines 
 
David Clines joined the Department of Biblical Studies at Sheffield in 1964, 
and has been a major figure in the world of Old Testament scholarship since 
the late 1970s. His principal contribution lies not only in his insightful and 
incisive interpretations of biblical texts, but in the role he has played at the 
forefront of postmodernism’s incursions into the discipline of Biblical Studies. 
Over the forty years of his career Clines has developed from a formalist 
literary critic writing in a confessional mode to a champion of secular Biblical 
Studies as distinct from its confessional counterpart, and a fierce ideological 







Clines has given prominence to the role of ideology in interpretation.37 By 
“ideology” he tends to mean a more or less coherent set of values and 
precommitments which may constitute a world-view. Such ideologies are 
often special to particular social groups or classes whose interests they serve, 
and are often assumed or held to be common sense rather than explicitly 
stated.38 Ideologies often express the “will to power” of one group over and 
against others within society, and this makes the uncovering of implicit 
ideologies in both texts and interpretations an ethical imperative. Clines is 
deeply uneasy at the often unconscious role of hidden agendas and 
presuppositions in much biblical interpretation, and doubly uneasy at the 
impact these interpretations have in influencing or even controlling other 
readers.39  
 
Clines advocates an interpretive shift from understanding to critique, 
contending that much biblical scholarship has been content to discern and to 
re-articulate, rather than to evaluate, ideological perspectives inscribed in 
biblical texts. To correct this error, Clines argues that interpreters should keep 
three factors in view: that the biblical text is an ideological production; that 
interpreters bring their own ideologies to the process of interpretation; and that 
biblical and modern ideological formations are separated by significant 
cultural and historical divides.40 Clines insists that serious engagement with 
biblical ideology requires that the critic be prepared to grapple with biblical 
texts, unlocking and evaluating their ideological messages: 
 
                                                 
37See especially Clines 1995c. 
38Clines 1995c, 9-11. 
39Clines 1995c, 11-12. 
40Clines 1995c, 19. 
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It is a measure of our commitment to our own standards and values 
that we register disappointment, dismay or disgust when we encounter 
in the texts of ancient Israel ideologies that we judge to be inferior to 
ours. And it is a measure of our open-mindedness and eagerness to 
learn and do better that we remark with pleasure, respect and envy 
values and ideologies within the biblical texts that we judge to be 
superior to our own.41  
 
Much of Clines’ work over the last decade has engaged in precisely this kind 
of critical and evaluative approach to the interpretation of biblical texts. One 
good example is his essay “Psalm 2 and the MLF (Moabite Liberation 
Front)”.42 Clines opens the essay by asserting that “every interpretation of and 
commentary on this psalm ever written adopts the viewpoint of the text, and, 
moreover, assumes that the readers addressed by the scholarly commentator 
share the ideology of the text and its author”.43 He then goes on to suggest that 
this assumption has allowed readers and scholars to ignore the ideological 
tensions and conflicts which the text of the psalm embodies. First, the psalm 
describes a situation of conflict in which a nation subject to Israelite 
overlordship has rebelled against what they consider to be their oppressors. 
The aspirations attributed to them in the psalm are those of any national 
liberation movement, “urging nothing but freedom from oppression”.44 The 
response of the psalmist is scornful and dismissive: the nations rage “in vain”, 
and the psalm reiterates a statement by the Israelite king of his divinely 
sanctioned right to their submission. This prerogative is backed up by the 
threat of force: the Israelite king has been granted by God the right to rule with 
a rod of iron, with which he may destroy the opposition to his rule like a 
potter’s vessel. Clines concludes his initial analysis by describing the Israelite 
                                                 
41Clines 1995c, 20. Clines is careful to say that evaluation need not always be negative, but his 
body of work suggests that he rarely finds anything commendable in the Bible. 
42An early version of this essay appeared as Clines 1995d. This discussion refers to a later 
version in Clines 1995c, 244-75. 
43Clines 1995c, 244. 
44Clines 1995c, 247. 
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response to the nations’ aspirations to liberation as “unmistakably and smugly 
typical of an insensitive imperial despotism”.45 
 
Clines’ concern with the ideology of the psalm is twofold: first, as a person 
living in a post-imperialist culture he finds himself uneasy at the imperialism 
which the psalm celebrates. Second, he finds the ideology of the psalm to be at 
odds with that of the rest of the Old Testament: as a liberated nation Israel 
places a high value on national freedom, yet this psalm appears to wish to 
deny precisely that freedom to others, with the result that it “seems to 
undermine the value Israel put on national freedom, and to render its attitude 
to freedom ambivalent and incoherent”.46 
 
Clines then goes on to show how subsequent scholarly interpretation of the 
psalm has tended uncritically to adopt the psalmist’s perspective, and so 
ignore the reality of the conflict that the psalm describes.47 Clines notes a 
tendency in commentators to evade the uncomfortable political character of 
the psalm by moralising or theologising the nature of the conflict which the 
psalm depicts, universalising the portrayal of God in the psalm so as to turn it 
into a metaphysical reflection upon God’s transcendent rule, or idealising the 
psalm by positing a postexilic date of composition and rendering it an 
expression of hope in oppression rather than an expression of imperial 
dominance. Clines also outlines scholarly attempts to soften some of the more 
“astringent” elements in the psalm, and to ignore the ideological content of the 
psalm by focussing on its aesthetic qualities. Finally, Clines is heavily critical 
of modern Christian translations of the psalm which import the translators’ 
own ideologies into the language of the poem, capitalising terms such as 
                                                 
45Clines 1995c, 248. 
46Clines 1995c, 269. 
47Clines 1995c, 248-68. 
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“Anointed One”, “King” and “Son” in such a way as to christianise what is 
essentially a political Israelite text. 
 
Clines expresses concern at the ethics of interpreters who have failed (as he 
sees it) to critically evaluate the ideological content of the psalm. He finds it 
“shocking” that scholars should comment on the truth or insight of the text 
without ever critically evaluating it, and argues that “They compound the 
moral dubiety of the text by perpetuating its claims and by lending them their 
own moral authority”.48 Clines concludes the essay by calling for the 
liberation of the reader from “bondage either to the text or to the approved 
interpretations of the text”, arguing that readers should be free to make up 
their own minds. Clines insists that such freedom does not mean denying or 
rejecting everything which the psalm or its scholarly interpreters have to say, 
but nevertheless reflects that “It is a sad day for theism if the only language its 
adherents can find to express their sense of the divine is the language of 
oriental despotism, with its scornful deity who offers comfort to petty kings in 
their grandiose ambitions and authorizes state violence and a regime of terror 
against those who want nothing more gross than self-determination”.49 
 
One implication of Clines’ approach to interpretation, with its emphasis upon 
the dominant role of the reader and the importance of evaluating biblical 
ideologies, is that it automatically qualifies any claim for the Bible as a locus 
of authority. Clines clearly feels that authority is in the gift of the reader, not 
something to be demanded by the text (or, for that matter, by professional or 
confessional interpreters). Clines suggests that readers should “accept the 
authority of the Bible in matters to which the heart and mind can gladly give 
consent, and to reject it when it conflicts, not with our prejudices but with our 
                                                 
48Clines 1995c, 270. 
49Clines 1995c, 274. 
 56 
deeply held convictions”.50 For Clines, the Bible is a functional text, a human 
construction, a cultural artefact which can be deployed, used and interpreted in 
any number of ways. The net effect of an ideological approach which 
emphasises the culturally-specific nature of the Bible, “is to relativise the 
biblical text and make it less malleable to theological reconstruction”.51 Such 
relativisation enables the reader to evaluate and resist (if necessary) attempts 
by various groups within society to use the Bible as a means of exerting 
ideological power through the universalisation of its ethical, theological or 
cultural world-view. 
 
For Clines, integrity as a biblical critic involves not simply sitting at the feet of 
the biblical writers or their interpreters and receiving wisdom. Rather, it 
entails open acknowledgement of one’s own ideological commitments and 
presuppositions and the bringing of those interests to bear on the interpretive 
process. The biblical text is to be interrogated as an ideological artefact using 
critical and evaluative methods consistent with a hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Further, the validity of other interpretive approaches needs to be recognised, 
with the result that debate over the ethics not only of biblical texts but also 




Clines has claimed that although he is interested in literary theory, he tends in 
his own readings to adopt a pragmatic and eclectic approach.52 That said, one 
                                                 
50Clines 1990, 46-7. It would be interesting to ask what, hermeneutically speaking, the 
difference between a prejudice and a conviction might be. Both, in hermeneutical terms, might 
be defined as prejudgements, presuppositions or preunderstandings which, as has been argued 
above, are fundamental to the process of interpretation. 
51Clines 1993, 85. 
52Clines 1990, 12.Indeed, this eclecticism is a feature of the “new” literary approaches in 
biblical studies which Clines is inclined to celebrate (see e.g. Exum and Clines 1993, 13; 
Clines 1995e). 
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of the major influences upon Clines has been Stanley Fish’s reader response 
criticism.53 For Clines, a fundamental and essential step in achieving integrity 
in interpretation is to recognise the ideological interests which readers bring to 
texts as a shaping factor in interpretation. Reader interests, values and 
commitments are what make readers people with integrity and identity, and 
they should not be asked to hide or abandon their values in interpretation. 
Whilst it must be acknowledged that the text will have little interest in, say, 
the interests of “a feminist pacifist vegetarian”, the fact that such interests are 
of importance to the reader means they can legitimately be placed on the 
agenda for interpretation. One result of this is that the text is then illuminated 
in unpredictable ways.54 
 
For Clines, reader response insights mean that the scholarly search for a single 
determinate meaning in the text becomes questionable.55 Instead, it is the roles 
of readers which should be a primary focus in Biblical Studies, on the basis 
that readers are the dominant players in the interpretive game: 
 
In any contest between texts and readers, readers are always going to 
win. For readers have in their hands the life of the text. If a text is 
going to be opened, it will be a reader who decides that. If it is to be 
shut, or ignored, or misapprehended, or read out of order or upside 
down, readers will do whatever they choose to do. Even if the readers 
do not really know what they are doing to their texts, they will be 
doing it all the same - and getting away with it. Such are the risks texts 
run by lying around on shelves and tables.56 
 
In light of this recognition, Clines insists, the search for determinate meaning 
must be abandoned. Meaning is contextual, dependent upon many factors 
                                                 
53Clines 1990, 21-2. Clines has acknowledged a particular indebtedness to Fish’s concept of 
“affective stylistics”, and Fish’s concept of the interpretive community has come to feature 
large in Clines’ work since the early 1990s. 
54Clines 1990, 12. This point is clearly a programmatic one for Clines, being repeated more 
than once elsewhere in his work. See Clines 1989, xlvii; Clines 1997, 16. 
55Clines 1990, 9. 
56Clines 1990, 103. 
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among which the most important is the plurality of readers and readerly 
perspectives. Interpretations of the same text from differing interpretive 
approaches can therefore claim equal validity, and Clines has been 
enthusiastic about the possibilities of dialogue between different  reader 
perspectives.57 
 
Clines favours deconstruction as a critical approach which encourages 
ideological interrogation of the biblical text, but tempers his deployment of 
deconstructive methods with a healthy dose of pragmatism. Clines is 
suspicious of  deconstructionists who believe that all texts are inevitably liable 
to an endless deconstructive spiral as each reading is itself in turn 
deconstructed by the same method that generated it. Real readers, Clines 
argues, who “cannot bear too much dizziness and nausea”, will use a 
deconstructive reading as the basis for a reconstruction of the text which will 
take into account the questioning of the text’s dominant ideological voice 
which deconstruction has highlighted.58 Deconstruction, when used as a 
critical tool by real readers, has less the effect of causing readers to disengage 
from the text than of impelling them to re-engage, constructing new meanings 
and new interpretive positions.59 
 
Deconstruction, in Clines’ view, is a constructive approach to ethical 
interpretation, not robbing a text of its power to speak but calling into question 
and rendering equivocal the text’s requirement that the reader submit to its 
ideology. Instead, Clines argues, deconstruction frees the reader to make their 
own choices, transferring both authority and responsibility for interpretation 
from the text to the  individual interpreter. This transfer of power is to be 
                                                 
57Clines and Eskenazi 1991. 62-3. 
58Clines 1990, 121. 
59Clines 1995c, 186. 
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affirmed, since “what the taking charge of one’s own ethical decisions does is 
to make one more of an ethical person”.60 
 
Clines wishes readers to be free from the expectation that they will 
automatically subscribe to the values of the text (or another interpreter), but at 
the same time argues that the values of the text cannot be ignored or blithely 
over-written in the process of reading. Clines acknowledges that 
deconstruction is “the deconstruction of something”, and that it is necessarily 
“parasitic” on the text whose structures of meaning it seeks to break down. 
The biblical text and its historical formulation of ideas is the “given” from 
which deconstruction works, and which the whole process necessarily respects 
as its object of study.61 
 
It is evident that Clines has selected critical methods which cohere with his 
underlying motivations, particularly his desire to interrogate the ideology of 
biblical texts. A strong anti-authoritarian streak prompts Clines to argue for 
reader response as a means of liberating readers not only from the authority of 
the Bible but also of ecclesial and academic institutions, whilst deconstruction 
facilitates critique of the Bible and a strong ethics of interpretation, based 





An important contextual factor in Clines’ scholarship is the fact that most of 
his career has been spent in the Department of Biblical Studies at Sheffield, 
aligned firmly with the other humanities disciplines in a secular university. 
                                                 
60Clines 1995b, 105. 
61Clines 1995b, 105-6. 
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The academic values of the department have thus been shaped as much by the 
discourse of the secular humanities as by the more theologically-orientated 
language of Theology and Biblical Studies, and this has particularly sensitised 
Clines to the “impact of confessional standards upon biblical scholarship”.62 
Clines also remarks that “some of my best friends and conversation-partners 
are atheists”, a circumstance which makes him very aware of the need to adopt 
an inclusive academic discourse and of the “impoliteness or unfriendliness of 
making theological assumptions that may not be shared by the people I am 
speaking with”.63 
 
Second, as an Old Testament scholar Clines has from an early stage been 
sensitive to the perceived tendency of much confessional scholarship to read 
back into the Old Testament concepts derived either from the New Testament 
or from later Christian doctrine. Clines has argued that a Christian reading of 
the Old Testament is a reading from a perspective outside that of the texts 
themselves, and he is wary of confessional interpretations which attempt to 
smooth over the gaps between the differing ideological and theological 
horizons implicit in such readings.64 A major issue for Clines, therefore, has 
been to address the question of what a secular or non-confessional Biblical 
Studies might look like, and what the consequences might be for those who 
practise it. 
 
Clines’ evident sense of discomfort with much of the Bible and with biblical 
scholarship appears to arise from a sense of personal dissonance with biblical 
ideologies which Clines finds offensive.65 Arguing that the traditional 
                                                 
62Clines 1993, 68-9. 
63Clines 1993, 69. 
64Clines 1989, lv. 
65At an earlier stage of his life Clines was an active member of the Brethren, but appears to 
have left his faith commitment behind. I would wish to argue that his hostility to the Bible and 
its ideology reflects a dynamic common to converts, whereby one’s former position must be 
utterly rejected and shown to be false in order to justify one’s conversion to a new point of 
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requirement that biblical scholars suppress their personal beliefs and values in 
the interests of ‘objective’ scholarship is unethical, Clines insists that his own 
set of distinctive beliefs are what make him an individual. Since his beliefs 
and commitments constitute his identity, to suppress them in the interests of 
scholarship is to suffer a loss of personal integrity.66 It therefore becomes a 
matter of principle that in engaging in biblical interpretation Clines should 
remain honest to his own sense of identity and values, refusing to sublimate 
them to the dictates of any higher authority: 
 
there is nothing wrong with using your own standards. Not only is 
there nothing wrong, nothing else would be right; for ‘ethical’ can only 
mean ‘ethical according to me and people who think like me’, and if I 
don’t make judgements according to my own standards, according to 
whose standards shall I be making them, and in what sense could those 
judgements be mine?67  
 
For Clines, identity and integrity are fundamentally personal and individual, 
and the ultimate moral authority in interpretation is the conscience of the 
reader. 
 
For Clines, the goal of a postmodern Biblical Studies is a scholarship free 
from any externally imposed ideological constraints, recognising a plurality of 
interpretive interests and communities which will enable the Bible to remain 
influential within the wider culture. Such a pluralistic approach does not result 
in ethical or interpretive anarchy. Rather, it frees readers to engage seriously 
with the text without having to conform to the expectations of church or 
scholarly communities. Clines makes the point that validity is not an intrinsic 
quality in interpretation, but is granted by interpretive communities: valid 
                                                                                                                                
view. In spite of his insistence that critique of the Bible need not always be negative, Clines 
increasingly engages with biblical texts which he wishes somehow to neuter as ideological 
sources. 
66Clines 1993, 74. 
67Clines 1997, 25. 
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readings are those which are accepted, invalid ones are not.68 Readers should 
therefore be free to align themselves with communities whose ideologies they 
find convincing or appealing, and these communities will then set their own 
parameters for interpretation. 
 
One advantage which Clines sees in the proliferation of interpretive 
communities is that an extending of the boundaries of valid interpretation 
beyond the limitations of the church and  confessionally-committed academic 
scholarship ensures a future for Clines as a secular biblical scholar. By 
identifying the Bible as the property of the wider culture and not just an 
“ecclesiastical object”,69 Clines immediately expands the potential 
marketplace for his professional expertise, arguing that it is part of the 
responsibility of a professional academic biblical scholar to be able to move 
between interpretive communities and provide interpretations tailored to suit 
those communities: 
 
Like the “bespoke” tailor, who fashions from the roll of cloth a suit to 
the measurements and pocket of the customer, a suit individually 
ordered or bespoken, the bespoke interpreter has a professional skill in 
tailoring interpretations to the needs of the various communities who 
are in the market for interpretations. [...] As a bespoke interpreter 
responding to the needs of the market, I will be interested, not so much 
in the truth, not at all in universally acceptable meanings, but in 
identifying shoddy interpretations that are badly stitched together and 
have no durability, and I will be giving my energies to producing 
attractive interpretations that represent good value for money.70  
 
The appeal of this development of the interpretive marketplace for Clines 
becomes clear when his context as a scholar in a secular institution is 
                                                 
68Clines 1993, 79. The same argument can also be found in Clines 1995c, 178-82. Clines 
denies the existence of absolute categories in interpretation, insisting instead that facts are 
only mutually agreed perceptions, so that “if it is your fact and not mine, then it is not a fact 
for me, so I have no compunction about resisting and ignoring” (Clines 1995b, 105). 
69Clines 1993, 78. 
70Clines 1993, 80. 
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considered. Clines feels that in order to justify their place within secular 
universities, professional interpreters of the Bible will need to show the 
relevance of their work to the whole of society, not just to one faith 
community. Clines’ response (and that of his department) to this has been to 
broaden the horizons of Biblical Studies: first through engaging with 
ideological approaches other than the confessional; second, by expanding their 
sphere of interest to include the uses to which the Bible is put within the wider 
culture. Confessional interpretation of the Bible is increasingly a niche market, 
albeit a well-established one, and what Clines and his colleagues have done is 
to seek to broaden the marketability of their department in the wider 
marketplace of higher education.71 
 
 
J. Cheryl Exum 
 
J. Cheryl Exum was involved from an early stage in the importation of literary 
approaches into Biblical Studies, much of her work being marked by the 
deployment of a variety of critical methods culled from the field of literary 
criticism and theory. At the same time, Exum has been very much involved 
since the early 1980s with the development of feminist interpretations of the 
Bible, and the gradual shaping of her approach over time has mirrored broader 
developments within feminist scholarship. Perhaps the most significant aspect 
of Exum’s work for this study, however, is the fact that she is first and 
foremost a critic rather than a theorist, interested primarily in the interpretation 
of texts rather than the construction of theoretical systems. Exum deploys a 
range of methods in pursuit of her interpretive goals, and does so with 
                                                 
71
 A number of commentators have remarked on the adoption of marketplace values within 
literary studies in recent years. Terry Eagleton observes that “Theory has been one symptom 
in our time of the commodifying of the intellectual life itself, as one conceptual fashion usurps 
another as shortwindedly as changes in hairstyle” (Eagleton 1996, 206). 
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discrimination and flexibility, but also demonstrates the pre-eminent 
requirement of a postmodern critic: scholarly competence and integrity 
combined with a self-aware ideological motivation. As such, alongside Clines 
and Moore she serves as a classic example of the breed of scholarship with 
which a confessional postmodern approach must engage. 
 
Three main strands can be discerned within Exum’s published work: a strong 
grounding in formalist literary criticism; an equally strong commitment to 
feminist interpretation of the Bible; and a growing and increasingly nuanced 
interest in the interdisciplinary field of cultural studies, specifically focussed 
on the interaction between Biblical Studies and interpretation of the visual 
arts. Exum’s earliest work drew principally upon formalist rhetorical criticism, 
culminating in her 1992 book Tragedy and Biblical Narrative: Arrows of the 
Almighty.72 Exum’s published work then moved into developing a feminist 
approach to biblical narratives drawing on deconstruction and psychoanalytic 
literary criticism which she demonstrated in a number of articles and two 
books, Fragmented Women: Feminist (Sub)versions of Biblical Narratives 
(1993) and Plotted, Shot, and Painted: Cultural Representations of Biblical 
Women (1996).73 Plotted, Shot, and Painted also revealed Exum’s growing 
interest in the study of biblical texts through the lens of Cultural Studies and 
especially through the interpretation of the visual arts, and she has continued 




                                                 
72Exum 1992. See also Exum and Whedbee 1984; Exum 1989; Exum 1990. 
73Exum 1993a; Exum 1996. 




Exum’s feminist stance rests upon the insight that from a feminist perspective 
the portrayal of women in the Bible, whether positive or negative, is located in 
a text which serves androcentric interests. Like Clines, Exum argues that a 
critical approach which deals only with the surface details of the text and 
remains within the textual horizon “limits us to describing, and thus to 
reinscribing, the text’s gender ideology”.75 For Exum, the biblical texts in their 
original setting served as means of social control and, to the extent that 
modern women wish to identify with these models, still do.76 A feminist 
critical approach therefore needs to recognise the differing experiences of 
male and female readers of biblical texts. If biblical literature was produced 
for androcentric societies, then the women portrayed within that literature are 
necessarily male constructs, created to serve androcentric interests. A feminist 
critique must, of necessity, read against the grain, since female readers of 
androcentric texts are often required to read against their own interests. To the 
extent that female readers accept the roles offered to them they collude with 
the gender ideology of the text and the androcentric community whose values 
it expresses. The key objective in interpretation, therefore, is to discern what 
sort of androcentrism the biblical text represents, and to evaluate it from a 
standpoint outside the text’s own ideological horizon.77 
 
Exum has illustrated this point with reference to the character of Bathsheba.78 
In 2 Samuel 11, the female reader is positioned by the narrative so as to gaze 
at the naked Bathsheba from the voyeuristic David’s point of view, but this 
places the female reader in the role both of the gazer and the gazed-upon: the 
                                                 
75Exum 1996, 88. 
76Exum 1996, 88, n.18. 
77Exum 1993a, 11. 
78Exum 1996, 25-29. A similar argument is made in relation to Delilah in the same book, 
pp.232-37. 
 66 
focalisation of the narrative invites the reader to identify with David’s desire 
for Bathsheba, but a female reader instinctively identifies with Bathsheba as a 
female character, resulting in the collapse of the subject/object division.79 The 
result of this collapse for the female reader, Exum argues, is a negative self-
image, internalising male fear of women as a source of sexual temptation. This 
is an inevitable consequence of texts (and interpretations) which fail to 
account for the differing experiences of male and female readers when 
confronted by androcentric ideologies. 
 
Exum observes the same dynamic operating in the prophetic use of infidelity 
as a metaphor for Israel’s relationship with God in Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah and 
Ezekiel.80 In these texts, sin is equated with female sexuality, so that ‘bad’ 
women are promiscuous, rapacious, and ultimately self-harming. This 
supports the textual argument that male control is both necessary and 
desirable, and that the appropriate means of exercising that control is 
sexualised violence. Exum is disturbed that the physical assaults which the 
prophets depict are seen within the texts as essential steps in the process of 
reconciliation, conflating love and abuse in a pattern that fatally undermines 
women’s sense of worth and self-esteem.81 The blame for the breakdown of 
relationship is placed entirely upon the woman to the extent that the woman is 
scapegoated, justifying violent, humiliating and sexually degrading retribution 
as God the husband’s way of reasserting control. The texts assume an 
ideological perspective which sees the woman’s body not as her own property 
but as that of her husband, and the woman’s appropriate response to her 
experience is to submit totally and passively to the husband’s authority, 
keeping her in the role of victim within the marriage relationship.82 Ascribing 
                                                 
79Exum 1996, 28-29. 
80See e.g. Hosea 1-3; Isaiah 3:16-24; Jeremiah 13:20-27; Ezekiel 16:23-42; Ezekiel 23. 
81Exum 1996, 114. 
82Exum 1996, 112. 
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such behaviour and attitudes to God, Exum argues, is to give them divine 
sanction and to encourage other men to emulate them, with disastrous 
consequences for women. The ideology which informs the prophetic metaphor 
of Israel as adulterous wife, Exum insists, is one which victimises women and 
sanctions their abuse, and as such, should be resisted. 
 
Turning to the history of interpretation of these texts, however, Exum notes 
with dismay  that the majority of male biblical critics have not only adopted 
the texts’ point of view, but have endorsed it. The explicit and sexual violence 
of the passages is skated over or ignored, the woman’s point of view hardly 
addressed. Exum expresses deep misgivings over the impact of such 
commentary upon ordinary readers,83 and insists that an ideological critique of 
the biblical text is essential for women readers if they are not to produce 
conflicted, self-harming or even self-abusive interpretations. Only when the 
reader steps outside the ideological horizon of the text, Exum argues, can she 
find a place of safety from which to evaluate and assess the impact of the 
Bible’s gendered ideology upon her as a reading subject, deciding for herself 
whether or not to subscribe to the vision of woman which the biblical texts 
inscribe.  
 
Exum is equivocal about the status of the Bible as an authoritative text, 
preferring to do away with notions of canon and authority altogether: 
“Because the Bible is an important part of our cultural heritage, it would be 
presumptuous to suggest that we can casually dispense with it. But I see no 
reason to privilege it”.84 Exum prefers a materialist approach to the Bible, in 
the sense that she perceives it only as the enscripted projection of human 
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ideology. This being the case, she is reluctant to accord the text, or its 
portrayal of God, any divine authority in and of itself: 
 
I think it important to recognize that God is a character in the biblical 
narrative (as much a male construct as the women in biblical literature) 
and thus not to be confused with anyone’s notion of a ‘real’ god. 
Increasingly, as investigations into the gender-determined nature of 
biblical discourse becomes more sophisticated, biblical interpreters 
will have to come to terms with this fact.85  
 
For Exum, as we have seen, the establishment of alternative interpretations of 
biblical texts is a crucial step in resisting the patriarchal ideology either of the 
Bible or of its interpreters, because the construction of a viable alternative 
reading effectively denies patriarchal interpretation the ability to claim 
universal applicability. The relationship of these variant readings to the 
dominant ideology is, of necessity, adversarial, so that Exum fails to explore 
how readings produced by different interpretive communities or ideological 




Exum’s critical methods are deployed firmly in the service of her ideological 
commitment to feminist interpretation, her preferred tools being 
deconstruction and psychoanalytic criticism.86 Exum sees a twofold value for 
feminist analysis in deconstruction: first, it uncovers the patriarchal ideology 
                                                 
85Exum 1996, 122. 
86Exum 1996, 87. Although Exum has moved on from her early formalism she has not 
abandoned it completely, arguing that the potential of the method is far from exhausted. Exum 
is still happy, on occasion, to operate in this or similar mode, as for instance in her 1997 essay 
“Harvesting the Biblical Narrator’s Scanty Plot of Ground” (Exum 1997), in which she 
engages in a very tight formalist reading of Judges 16:4-22 using a narratological method 
developed by Moshe Greenberg (in whose honour the essay was written) and citing not only 
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of the text; and second, reveals the instabilities and inconsistencies which 
might enable a feminist critic to resist that ideology. Exum maintains that her 
aim is not to overthrow the text, but simply to create room for an alternative 
ideological perspective. By foregrounding repressed and sublimated elements 
of patriarchal texts, deconstruction draws attention to the woman’s point of 
view, providing the material for a counter-reading which empowers women as 
reading subjects by enabling them to offer alternative interpretations which 
address their interests.87 
 
Exum’s deconstructive approach therefore works with the text, identifying its 
ideology and its inherent instability so as to create a hermeneutical space in 
which alternative interpretations can be offered. Exum observes that it is not 
possible to disengage from the text, since “reading against the grain involves 
first determining what I perceive the grain to be”.88 Like Jacob at the Jabbok 
river, the deconstructive critic must wrestle with that which she seeks to resist, 
grasping that which she would escape, engaging the inscribed ideology of the 
text in order to challenge it. 
 
Exum’s second critical tool in the service of feminist critique is 
psychoanalytic criticism. If deconstruction can identify the text’s ideology and 
help to subvert it, psychoanalysis may help to uncover the motivation for such 
                                                                                                                                
narratological scholars (Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Tzvetan Todorov and Meir Sternberg) but 
also Russian Formalism as methodological sources. 
87Exum 1997, 128. This position has much in common with that of Mieke Bal. Exum’s career 
and critical stance shares much with that of Bal, who has similar interests and emphases, 
including an early training in formalist analysis, an understanding of critical tools as heuristic, 
a recognition of deconstruction and psychoanalysis as potentially fruitful for feminist critique 
of Biblical texts, and an interest in the relationship of the visual arts and Biblical 
interpretation. Bal read early drafts of Fragmented Women (Exum 1993a, 14) and is 
frequently cited in Exum’s work. 
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ideological portrayals of gender roles.89 In particular, Exum uses 
psychoanalytic criticism to explore the role texts might play in the 
socialization of gender roles, asking what texts tell women about how to view 
themselves and how to behave, and what these messages in turn reveal about 
those who produced the text in the first place.90 Exum uses psychoanalysis to 
show how the male narrators’ portrayal of women in biblical stories is 
motivated by fear of female sexuality or by projecting unconscious male 
desires which in turn express the fears, fantasies and desires of the community 
whose ideology they voice.91 
 
In the final chapter of Plotted, Shot, and Painted, “Why, Why, Why, 
Delilah?”, Exum uses psychoanalysis to shed light on the gender ideology 
encoded in the narrative of Judges 16:4-21, describing what she labels the 
“Samson complex”. Exum seeks to demonstrate that the figure of Delilah, 
encoded in the text as femme fatale and appropriated as such in subsequent 
depictions in art and film, expresses both male desire and fear of female 
sexuality. Samson (and with him, the androcentric narrator) is drawn to 
Delilah by her sexual allure and desires to surrender his mastery to her, but the 
desire is balanced by a fear (indeed, a knowledge by the end of the story) of 
what such surrender might mean - his emasculation and destruction. Exum 
draws upon the work of Karen Horney, who argues that male fear of female 
sexuality is based not (as in Freud) on castration anxiety but on a feeling of 
inadequacy which finds its root in the boy’s desire for his mother but also his 
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awareness that his penis is too small to satisfy an adult woman.92 The woman 
thus comes to be a subconscious threat to male self-esteem, and the man’s 
great fear is of rejection and derision by the woman, hence his desire for the 
woman in spite of his fear of her power over him.93 Exum finds this analysis 
illuminating when applied to the Samson story in terms of explaining the 
portrayal of Delilah within the narrative of Judges 16, and for explaining why 
Samson reveals his secret to her even when he knows she will use that 
knowledge to betray him, an act which otherwise appears inexplicable. 
 
Importantly, Exum is not a slave to the critical theories she deploys. Indeed, 
she has expressed serious reservations about theory in general. Exum refuses, 
for instance, to identify herself totally with psychoanalytic theory, largely 
because of feminist criticism of Freud’s understanding of gender and 
sexuality, but also because of her perception that theoretical arguments are 
ultimately inconclusive.94 This does not, however, prevent her from affirming 
the heuristic use of psychoanalysis as a tool of feminist criticism, claiming that 
psychoanalysis can be adopted as a useful approach “without necessarily 
accepting the validity of its claims”.95 For Exum, psychoanalysis is a critical 
tool, a possible illuminator of textual dynamics which is to be deployed when 
it can be useful, and which can be drawn upon without a commitment to 
                                                                                                                                
91See for example: Exum 1993b(also printed as Exum 1993a); Exum 1996, 219-26. For a 
detailed setting-out of method, see Exum 2000a, 87-88. 
92Horney 1967. 
93Exum 2000a, 222. 
94Exum 1993a, 160, n.24. 
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accept fully the theoretical base upon which the tool rests, or to become 
ensnared in theoretical controversy.96 
 
If Exum’s critical toolkit is eclectic, her stance in relation to the text she 
studies is consistent with a moderate reader response theory, based upon a 
conviction that “meaning resides in the interaction between reader and text”.97 
Exum clearly wishes to resist the voice of the text when that voice drowns out 
the interests of the reader, especially when that reader is female. Indeed, more 
than once she deploys a quotation from Mieke Bal to sum up her approach: 
“Thanks for your text, and I’ll decide how to read it”.98 At the same time, 
however, Exum is honest about the implications of a reader-orientated 
approach to textual interpretation, acknowledging that the subjective 
perspective of the reader inevitably necessitates the qualification of any 
reading. Exum freely accepts and, indeed, draws attention to, the conditional 
nature of her readings and the possibility of her own interests affecting her 
understanding of the text.99 
 
Exum agrees with Clines that different reader perspectives will generate 
multiple valid interpretations of texts.100 Readers will appropriate texts in 
various cultural contexts, not all of which might be anticipated or considered 
                                                 
96Nor is Exum inclined to jump onto every passing theoretical bandwagon. In a comment on 
autobiographical criticism Exum queries the usefulness of some varieties of the approach, 
remarking that “I would distinguish autobiographical criticism in which the focus is on some 
unique, unrepeatable situation from what, in my opinion, is a more relevant sort of 
autobiographical criticism that discusses the reader’s response in terms of wider issues of race, 
class, gender, and social location - things that might be shared by, and thus more meaningful 
for, other readers” (Exum 1998b, 410). 
97Exum 1996, 90. 
98Exum 1993a, 14; Exum 2000b, 35. 
99Exum 1993a, 17; Exum 1996, 90. 
100Exum 1996, 11. 
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appropriate by the text’s authors or by professional interpreters, so that Bible 
stories will enter into the popular culture all the time with new meanings. As a 
result, “There is really no point for me, as a biblical scholar, to say, ‘You can’t 
do this; that’s not what the text means’”.101 Because of the shifting cultural 
context within which biblical interpretation takes place, Exum is reluctant to 
set limits to the range of valid interests which might seek to engage in 
interpretation,102 but argues strongly that an interpretive standpoint outside the 
horizons of the text may sometimes be necessary for ethical or ideological 
reasons, insisting that, “if the only way we can lay claim to our cultural 
heritage is to reinterpret or, indeed, misread it, then reinterpret and misread it 
we shall. For to allow notions of inviolate ‘original meanings’ or ‘authentic 
contexts’ to prevent us from doing so would leave us impoverished”.103 
 
Exum can thus be seen to be a critical pragmatist within the stream of 
postmodern approaches. Comfortable with a variety of critical methods, self-
aware in terms of her ideological motivation and insistent on the futility of 
searching after objectively verifiable interpretations, she is nevertheless 
equally insistent that the biblical text must be allowed its own role and voice 
in the process of interpretation, even if the interpreter wishes to take a critical 
standpoint which resists the textual ideology. Equally importantly, Exum’s 
methodological interests are clearly subordinate to her ideological concerns 
over issues of gender in the biblical texts and their interpretation. 
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Exum’s motivation in engaging with the Bible as she does is, in one sense, 
less individualised than Clines’, though no less personal. As a feminist, Exum 
places herself in a tradition of scholarship which is now well established in 
Biblical Studies, and the politicised nature of her scholarship is both integral 
to her approach and openly declared from the start. The Bible, Exum argues, 
was written by men for men and, as such, demands that women readers read 
actively against their own interests. This lack of equality in interpretive status 
needs to be addressed, and Exum deploys her considerable critical skills in the 
service of this agenda. In doing so, Exum makes common cause with a 
significant body of work by many feminist scholars and, in this regard, her 
critical motivation is necessarily displayed both implicitly and explicitly 
throughout her work. 
 
At the same time, however, Exum does not simply take a stand on a pre-
existing political position. Rather, she is candid about the personal 
implications of her study and what motivates it. In the preface to Plotted, Shot, 
and Painted she declares her personal interest in feminist interpretation: 
 
As a woman and a feminist, I have something at stake in the cultural 
representations of biblical women I examine in this book. Voyeurism 
[...], the positioning of the female body as an object of male desire in 
literature, art, and film [...], and pornography [...] have an urgency 
about them for me because they relate to contemporary issues about 
women’s rights, and they affect my life. In view of the past and 
ongoing influence of the Bible and its manifold cultural representations 
within Western culture, it seems to me especially important to examine 
the roots of these social problems here. The extent to which (male) 
commentators reinscribe the pornographic ideology of the prophetic 
texts [...] actually came as something of a shock to me. Their influence 
 75 
on Bible readers frightens me, and I hope my critique might increase 
critical awareness of the harmful ideology they are perpetuating.104 
 
 
Exum makes no attempt to appear disinterested or objective about her 
scholarship. Rather, her interests in interpretation are openly displayed, and 
their role both in her selection of appropriate critical tools and in the 
interpretations she offers are transparently represented to the reader. For 
Exum, integrity as an ideological critic involves the willingness to admit her 
own ideological commitments as a factor in her own interpretation. 
 
 
Stephen D. Moore 
 
From one perspective (and certainly from his own), Stephen D. Moore 
occupies a marginal position in respect of mainstream Biblical Studies. From 
another, Moore has been one of the most significant figures in the movement 
beyond historical criticism since the 1980s, especially in his championing of 
the application of poststructuralist theory not only to the biblical text but to the 
practice of interpreting it. Moore first came to prominence in 1989 with the 
publication of Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge, 
a work which remains the most comprehensive and insightful survey and 
critique of narrative and reader-response approaches in Biblical Studies, but 
which also sought to bring poststructuralist theory to bear on biblical 
interpretation. This train of thought was developed, applied and embellished 
by Moore’s next two books, Mark and Luke in Poststructuralist Perspectives: 
Jesus Begins to Write (1992), and Poststructuralism and the New Testament: 
Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross (1994). More recently, Moore 
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has broadened his theoretical base and emerged as a strongly ideological critic. 
In his most recent books, God’s Gym: Divine Male Bodies of the Bible (1996) 
and God’s Beauty Parlour: And Other Queer Spaces in and Around the Bible 
(2001) he has expanded beyond literary theory into the rich and heady 
interdisciplinarity of cultural theory and criticism, and in his introduction to 
God’s Beauty Parlour cites queer theory, masculinity studies, cultural studies, 
postcolonial studies and autobiographical criticism alongside more 
mainstream Biblical Studies as his theoretical and methodological sources.105 
Moore’s progression through the landscape of postmodern theory and 
criticism is linked to his own love-hate relationship with the biblical text he 
studies and the practices of the guild of biblical scholars to which he belongs, 
a relationship which he discusses with candour in the more autobiographical 
portions of his writings. Moore’s work thus poses a challenge to more 
mainstream biblical critics, and especially those of a confessional persuasion - 
a challenge which is rendered formidable both by its fearsome theoretical 





Moore has described his own approach as “a hermeneutics of suspicion, if not 
a hermeneutics of paranoia”.106 As his career as a biblical critic has 
progressed, Moore has become increasingly suspicious of the Bible and its 
ideology and heavily influenced by Foucault, who sees culture in terms of the 
concept of power within society, expressed in differential relationships 
between groups (and individuals) and manifested in relationships of influence, 
                                                 
105Moore 1996b; Moore 2001. Moore has also flirted with New Historicism, although this has 
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control and even repression. Power is the fundamental principle behind all 
cultural action so that, as Moore puts it, “every proclamation of a truth is the 
expression of a will to power”.107 
 
Moore is deeply suspicious of the Bible and its subsequent interpretation as 
means of ideological control. One example of this is his analysis of the 
doctrine of the atonement.108 Moore finds that in the development of the 
Christian doctrine of the atonement earlier concepts of retribution and punitive 
justice have been displaced by more refined doctrines of reform and discipline. 
But this distinction is undercut by what Moore finds in the New Testament 
texts which source the doctrine, and which rely upon strong conceptual 
hierarchies of power and subordination.109 Contrasting the ‘soft’ 
transformational interpretation of the atonement (by which the believer is 
empowered by Christ’s death to overcome sin in their own life through the 
renewing of their mind) with the ‘hard’ and punitive substitutionary model 
(whereby Jesus takes on himself the punishment for the believer’s sin), Moore 
observes that the transformational interpretation masks the fundamental power 
relationship between God and the believer. The transformation of the believer 
is simply a more efficient exercise of power, “still exercised on the body but 
now reaching into the psyche as well to fashion acceptable thoughts and 
                                                 
107Moore 1994, 89. 
108Moore 1994, 98. Moore draws heavily upon Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (Foucault 
1977) , which traces the history of judicial punishment from the feudal concept of justice as 
retribution expressed through torture, through more refined concepts of justice as punishment 
through imprisonment, to modern notions of discipline and reform. Foucault contends that this 
transition reflects not a lessening of power under the humanizing influence of the 
Enlightenment, but a strengthening of state power as its exercise is extended from the physical 
to the psychological and even the spiritual, to the extent that nineteenth-century penal reform 
“concealed an iron fist of totalitarianism in a velvet glove of humanitarianism”. 
109This survey appears in Poststructuralism and the New Testament, where the focus is on the 
theologians’ development of the doctrine rather than the biblical basis of the doctrine, and 
again in expanded form in God’s Gym, where the biblical treatment of the atonement itself 
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attitudes yielding acceptable behaviour, of power absolutised to a degree 
unimaginable even in a situation of extreme physical torture”.110 
 
Moore notes, moreover, that Paul’s discussions of the atonement consistently 
fail to make a distinction between retribution and discipline as he “refuses to 
separate torture from reform”.111 The Cross thus becomes an instrument of 
power expressed both through physical torture and through psychological 
conditioning, and Moore’s discussion of the role of the Holy Spirit in the life 
of the believer according to Paul reflects his unease: 
 
You are no longer regulated from without, as formerly, but from within 
[...]. No longer must you police your own thoughts, desires and 
emotions; they are now overseen by an inner sentinel [...] whose 
relationship to you is one of permanent penetration and absolute 
possession [...], closer than the most intimate act of love, closer than 
the most exquisite act of torture [...]. The Spirit is in you, filling your 
every orifice [...], insinuating itself between you and your self. Its 
fingers uncoil within you and extend outward until everything you 
once thought you were is but a tight glove adorning its open hand, 
always about to become a clenched fist [...].112 
 
Moore’s suspicions are heightened when he considers Paul’s exhortation to his 
readers to imitate him in submission to Christ. Asking who stands to gain from 
such an imitation he concludes that the answer can only be Paul himself, and 
concludes that “To appeal to one’s own exemplary subjection to a 
conveniently absent authority in order to legitimate the subjection of others 
[...] is a strategy as ancient as it is suspect”.113 
                                                 
110Moore 1996b, 24. Moore places great significance upon the crucifixion, seeing it mythically 
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Moore’s Foucauldian treatment of Paul is not that distant from conventional 
interpretations of Pauline doctrine in its depiction of the shape of Paul’s 
argument and of his doctrine (indeed, it draws upon such treatments for 
support). What marks it out, however, is a deep suspicion, almost a fear of 
what Paul has to say about the Cross and its consequences for the believer.114 
Where a confessional critic would happily conform themselves and their 
reading to the rhetoric of a text which they already consider authoritative, 
Moore resists. 
 
Moore’s suspicion of the motivation of the biblical writers extends equally to 
subsequent biblical interpreters. Echoing Schüssler Fiorenza’s criticism of 
‘objective’ Biblical Studies, he has compared the development of biblical 
criticism with that of anatomy, reflecting upon its tendency to violate the 
object of study it claims to respect, and its cultivation of an attitude of clinical 
distance at the same time as it attempts to literally “get inside” its object.115 
The majority of biblical critics, he argues, are insufficiently emotionally 
detached from their subject to ask important questions about the ethical 
implications of the readings they produce, or to interrogate the ideology 
embedded in the biblical texts themselves. Non-confessional criticism, on the 
other hand, cuts deep in its dissection of the text and resists the Bible’s appeals 
to be devoured, digested and internalised by its reader instead, precisely 
                                                 
114Moore engages in a similar exercise in relation to Lukan rhetoric in Moore 1992, 129-44. 
Moore’s analysis of Lukan rhetoric is essentially identical to that a conventional narrative 
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115Moore 1996b, 40-50. 
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because it fears the object of its study will have “mind-altering effects that we 
will be unable to control”.116 
 
Moore is profoundly nervous of the God whom he sees portrayed in the pages 
of the Bible. In the third section of God’s Gym, “Resurrection: Horrible Pain, 
Glorious Gain”, Moore traces the corporeal depiction of God from Genesis to 
Revelation, drawing comparisons with the culture of body-building. The 
portrait of God which Moore paints is of a conflicted, narcissistic deity, 
fixated with proving his own hyper-masculinity and prone to bouts of steroid-
induced apoplexy, finally depicted in Revelation enthroned amid all the 
fascistic trappings of Imperial Rome (the writer’s subversion of imperial 
pretension itself contaminated by the imagery he seeks to undermine). God’s 
Gym closes with a summary of the God Moore has found in the pages of the 
Bible: the biblical God is “the supreme embodiment of hegemonic 
hypermasculinity”, his objective “total control”, and the cross is “a 
surprisingly subtle and therefore effective instrument of subjection”.117 
Moore’s response is not positive: 
 
if what I have been arguing about the Bible is indeed the case - that its 
God is a singularly pure projection of the will to power - then the 
biblical critic might have no choice but to clutch his or her scalpel 
defensively, to brandish it threateningly, as the hypermasculine bulk 
that is the biblical God lumbers across the examining room, an 
imperious frown furrowing his perfectly handsome features, and a pair 
of handcuffs dangling ominously from his weight-lifting belt, which is 
cinched around his bloodstained butcher’s apron, from the pocket of 
which a blindfold protrudes. “You do not believe because you have 
seen me,” he intones. “Blessed are those who have not seen and 
therefore believe.”118  
 
                                                 
116Moore 1996b, 71-72. 
117Moore 1996b, 139. 
118Moore 1996b, 139-40. 
 81 
For Moore, the task of the critic is urgent - to dissect, interrogate and evaluate 
the Bible so as to be able to resist the subtly invasive ideological claims which 





David Clines has remarked that Stephen Moore’s works “have almost always 
been theoretically inspired”.119 Certainly, Moore is one of the most widely-
read and insightful theoreticians in Biblical Studies, and it is theoretical rather 
than exegetical or critical issues which have provided the focus of much of his 
work. Put simply, Moore has often been less concerned with what the biblical 
text says than with how we read that text in the first place. 
 
Moore’s wide-ranging familiarity with the leading edge of cultural and literary 
theory has often led him to press for Biblical Studies as a discipline to engage 
with emerging approaches in literary and cultural studies at a serious level. A 
particular irritation for the theoretically-literate Moore is the time-lag which 
exists between secular theory and its counterpart in Biblical Studies, whereby 
“the arrival in biblical studies of a fledgling literary-critical methodology [...] 
generally signals its geriatric status, or utter exhaustion, if not its outright 
demise, in literary studies”.120 Moore is impatient that biblical literary 
criticism should remain preoccupied with issues of reader-response and 
narrative form which have been largely left behind in secular literary studies 
for over twenty years, and that much discussion of these methods within 
Biblical Studies declines to engage with literary theory on its own terms.121 
                                                 
119Clines and Moore 1998, 81. 
120Moore 1994, 279; Moore 2001, 8-9. 
121Moore 1994, 5. Moore opines: “I wonder [...] whether I myself am not trying to tunnel 
under the fence in the opposite direction, to escape altogether from biblical studies, a 
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Moore insists that he is not wishing to suggest that Biblical Studies should 
blindly follow every critical or theoretical fad of literary studies, but rather 
that “I merely wish to suggest [...] that if we purport to do interdisciplinary 
literary work on the Bible without having any real clue as to what is currently 
going on in literary studies, we are engaged in something still more silly”.122 
 
A major drive in much of Moore’s work has been to push biblical criticism 
beyond the focus upon authors and texts which characterise historicist and 
formalist criticism. The major challenge to biblical scholarship is “the 
reduction of disciplinary walls and the beginning of the end of the situation 
whereby biblical studies is something one does secure behind a door bearing 
that name, whereas sociology, anthropology, women’s studies, literary 
criticism, and philosophy are other things someone else does down the 
hall”.123 The result of such a movement, Moore argues, will be the dawning of 
a postcritical era in biblical interpretation in which biblical criticism can be 
free from the need to defer to the authority of a text or to remain blind to the 
theological commitments which underpin so much of its methodology. 
Poststructuralist criticism, Moore asserts, is placed to address both of these 
defects. Ruthlessly self-aware and fundamentally questioning of the texts it 
analyses, poststructuralism offers an interpretive approach which is both 
methodologically and theoretically honest, working alongside established 
                                                                                                                                
discipline that, despite the deep affection I still feel for it, insists on burying me alive every 
now and then.” 
122Moore 1998, 251n.. Clines has echoed this point in his essay “From Salamanca to Cracow: 
SBL International Meetings” (Clines 1998b), where he points out that biblical scholarship as 
represented by papers presented at the SBL to that point has failed to address a number of 
major areas of contemporary thought, among which he highlights the impact of French 
thinking (especially that of Derrida and Foucault); the impact of queer theory and the issues of 
gender and sexuality in secular literary and cultural criticism; postmodernism’s questioning of 
the notion of disinterested scholarship; and the need to consider the ethical and social 
consequences of one’s scholarship. It is notable that much of the work of the Sheffield 
Department of Biblical Studies has focussed on precisely these issues over recent years, and 
Clines himself has most recently been addressing the subject of gender construction in the 
Bible in a number of published and unpublished works (see Clines 1995a; Clines 1998a). 
123Moore 1989, 151. 
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historical approaches to provide a Biblical Studies “unfettered at last from the 
ecclesiastical superego that has always compelled it to genuflect before the 
icons it had come to destroy”.124 
 
Moore’s early criticism was heavily influenced by the work of Derridean 
deconstruction.125 For him in the early 1990s the biblical text was a fluid 
entity in a never-ending linguistic play of meaning, constantly flexing and 
shifting through its interplay with its own elements, other texts, and the 
predispositions and subjective linguistic structures of readers themselves. 
Biblical texts - and interpretations of those texts - are subject to Derrida’s 
concept of différance: not stable and whole but unstable and fractured, held 
together by differential relationships which creak under the strain. The 
presence of a concept automatically entails the differential presence of its 
opposite, suppressed and hidden by the textual voice but necessarily implied 
as a negative image of the text’s affirmations. Any interpretation of the text, 
therefore, is always liable to be undermined and destabilised by a reading 
which takes what the text does not say as seriously as what it does. This 
realisation, in Moore’s view, frees the critic from slavish subordination to the 
rhetoric of the text, enabling critic and text together to engage self-consciously 
in linguistic ‘play’. Attempts to fix textual meaning do violence to texts, so 
that “at the moment when the critic, seeking to arrest the movement of its 
meanings, lays rough hands on the text, it exposes the truth of criticism as 
denuding, and denuding as a form of violence. Criticism (st)rips the page”.126 
 
Rather than trying to possess the text and force it to conform to a single 
meaning, the Derridean Moore prefers criticism which is self-consciously 
playful, dancing lightly across the surface of the text and deftly exploring the 
                                                 
124Moore 1994, 117. 
125For Moore’s understanding of Derrida, see Moore 1989, 131-38; Moore 1994, 13-41. 
126Moore 1992, 33. 
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intertwinings of its language. Moore skilfully uses puns to draw out the 
surplus of meaning in biblical texts as, for example, when he discusses the 
significance of the cross or chiasmus in Mark: 
 
Chiasmus comes from the Greek verb chiazein, “to mark with the letter 
X,” or chi. And chi is an anagram of Ich, which is German for the 
personal pronoun I and the technical term in Freud that English 
translators render as ego. [...] And Jesus, who identifies himself to his 
terrified disciples in Mark 6:50 with the words ego eimi (“I am” or “it 
is I”), himself possesses a name that is an echo of the French je suis (“I 
am”), the single superfluous letter being the I (or ego), which is thus 
marked out for deletion: “Father, ... not what I (ego) want, but what 
you want” (14:36).127 
 
Moore follows Derrida in seeking to uncover the “textual unconscious” 
through what amounts to an alternative epistemology not of rigid oppositional 
definition but of free association, an epistemology to which, Moore argues 
(with some success), the Gospels are conducive.128 
 
Through the 1990s, however, Moore has moved away from Derrida in the 
direction of Foucault. One reason for this is Moore’s awareness of the 
fundamental instability of Derrida’s theoretical position: if the basic premise 
of Derridean deconstruction is that all texts and interpretations are unstable 
and internally conflicted, then the same premise must apply to any 
deconstructive position. Pronouncing the death of metaphysics, deconstruction 
sets itself up in place of that which it has deconstructed, only to find itself 
forced by its own logic to eat itself.129  
 
Moore demonstrates this awareness in his deconstruction of Johannine irony 
in respect of Jesus’ conversation with the Samaritan woman in John 4, in 
                                                 
127Moore 1992, 55. 
128Moore 1992, 61-73. 
129Moore 1989, 145-46. See also Moore 1994, 17f.. 
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Poststructuralism and the New Testament.130 As an example of how Derridean 
deconstruction effectively dissolves the oppositions which support any 
interpretation of a text, Moore observes how the conventional reading of the 
conversation between Jesus and the Samaritan woman rests upon an 
opposition of the literal and the figurative: the woman fails to understand that 
Jesus’ references to water are symbolic, and thus becomes the subject of irony 
in the episode. Moore goes on to point out that at Jesus’ crucifixion, the 
quenching of his physical thirst becomes a precondition of his yielding up 
his/the Spirit (19:30), thus inverting the hierarchy of literal and figurative 
thirst/water that had been previously established. Furthermore, the outpouring 
of water and blood from Jesus’ side dissolves the opposition altogether 
(19:34), since the physical flow of water becomes a metaphor for the 
figurative symbolism of the language of water, itself representing the Spirit. 
Hence, Moore concludes, the text is divided against itself, subverting by its 
own dynamics the attempts of critics and readers to provide a definitive 
interpretation which speaks on its behalf.131  
 
This deconstruction of the water imagery of John also necessitates a 
reconsideration of the ironic structure of chapter 4: it is Jesus who maintains 
the superiority of the figurative over the physical and the Samaritan woman 
who insists on confusing the two, but the climax of the Gospel vindicates the 
Samaritan woman rather than Jesus by indicating that physical and figurative 
levels of meaning cannot, in the end, be segregated.132 This rhetorical 
collapse, Moore concludes, shows how deconstructive interpretation can be 
deployed in the service of ideological approaches such as feminism. 
 
                                                 
130Moore has visited this scene twice, first in Moore 1989, 159-70, then in Moore 1994, 43-64. 
We will focus on the latter visit here. 
131Moore 1994, 48-9. See also Moore 1992, 28. 
132Moore 1994, 59, 62. 
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Moore is aware, however, that the logic of his own theoretical position cannot 
allow him to rest on this conclusion, and he proceeds in a footnote to undercut 
the argument he has just made, observing that his deconstruction of the 
hierarchical opposition spiritual/material has resulted in an inversion of the 
opposition male/female, but that “This inverted opposition could, of course, be 
deconstructed in its turn, should space permit it or strategy require it”.133 
 
The inability of Derridean deconstruction to say anything concrete or firm 
about the text becomes, for Moore, an ethical dilemma as his resistance to the 
Bible and its ideology grows. If a feminist reading can be deconstructed as 
easily as the patriarchal interpretation it replaces, then what ethical force does 
it have? Very little, it would seem. And if one cannot say anything meaningful 
about anything without being run down by the logic of one’s argument coming 
full circle and hitting one in the rear, then why say anything at all?134 It is 
clear from Moore’s writing that he regards the Bible as important, yet the logic 
of Derridean deconstruction prevents him from speaking authoritatively about 
it. This perhaps explains his increasing abandonment of Derrida after the mid-
1990s in favour of the cultural historian and philosopher Michel Foucault, 
whose work is more conducive to a cultural and ethical approach to biblical 
interpretation.135 
                                                 
133Moore 1994, 62. 
134Terry Eagleton has remarked that one of the key features of Derridean deconstruction as a 
tool of ideological critique is “that it allows you to drive a coach and horses through 
everybody else’s beliefs while not saddling you with the inconvenience of having to adopt any 
yourself. It is, in effect, an invulnerable position, and the fact that it is also purely empty is 
simply the price one has to pay for this” (Eagleton 1996, 125). Noting further that 
deconstructions are always vulnerable to further deconstruction, Eagleton observes that 
Derridean interpretation “is a power-game, a mirror-image of orthodox academic competition. 
It is just that now, in a religious twist to the old ideology, victory is achieved by kenosis or 
self-emptying: the winner is the one who has managed to get rid of all his cards and sit with 
empty hands” (Eagleton 1996, 127). 
135It is important to note that this transition is phased rather than abrupt. Derrida and Foucault 
sit side by side in Mark and Luke (1992) and in Poststructuralism and the New Testament 
(1994). By the advent of God’s Gym (1996), however, Derrida appears to have been 
supplanted by Foucault altogether. Foucault also provides the foundation for New Historicism, 
with which Moore flirted in the pages of Biblical Interpretation in 1997 (Graham and Moore 
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Of our three scholars Moore is arguably the most driven by theoretical 
concerns, but even so, his attitude to theory is not to be slavishly adherent to 
it. Moore evaluates his theoretical sources against his personal and political 
aims and objectives, and has moved from one theoretical base to another in 
order to develop his particular line of approach to the Bible, whilst remaining 
within the boundaries of poststructuralist thought. One thing which is very 
clear in Moore’s work, however, is that any critic attempting to engage him in 
debate will need to demonstrate theoretical literacy in the discourse of 
poststructuralism. This, for many, will be a formidable and off-putting 





Moore has been candid about his personal motives in interpretation, and his 
work has a strong autobiographical element. Tracing his own personal history 
from his strict Catholic upbringing in Limerick, through his conversion to 
Christianity, his involvement with charismatic renewal and his entry into a 
Cistercian monastery, Moore has laid bare the course of his increasing 
disenchantment with confessional criticism and with Christianity in general, 
beginning with a first encounter with historical criticism in his monastery 
library.136 Moore has described his current position as agnosticism “(Or is it 
atheism? I’m never quite sure.)”.137 Moore’s movement beyond the 
                                                                                                                                
1997; Moore 1997), and he continues to peer over Moore’s shoulder in God’s Beauty Parlour 
(2001). 
136See Moore 1994, 95, 112, 114-15; Moore 1995; Moore 1996b, xi; Moore 1999; Moore 
2001, 174. 
137Moore 1999, 183. Moore has apparently regretted letting that particular cat out of its bag: “I 
probably shouldn’t have confessed it in the first place. And now it’s out there, observing the 
progress of my career with malevolent interest, cleaning its weapons compulsively as it plans 
its next move” (Moore 2001, 174). 
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confessional position which still characterises much mainstream biblical 
criticism creates something of a dilemma for him as a critic. He reflects that 
much confessional criticism is written from faith to faith, “about a ‘we’ that 
doesn’t include me”, and raises “a persistent little problem of my own, an itch 
I can’t seem to scratch: Why am I still in biblical studies?”138 
 
Moore’s own journey through and beyond faith is, I would argue, a crucial 
factor in his development as a critic and especially as a theorist. Moore’s work 
is, as we will see, strongly theory-driven. But is his theoretical concern a cause 
or a symptom of his own personal journey? Moore has indicated that his 
research has had the effect of “validating, indeed precipitating, my own 
unbelief”, and has stated that his reaction to strongly confessional exegesis has 
been “refashioned” by philosophical and psychoanalytic texts from Derrida to 
Freud.139 But did theory drive him to agnosticism, or vice versa? 
 
As Moore tells his own story, the answer is “both”: an encounter with 
historical criticism raised a series of questions which he pursued into the arms 
of Derrida, Foucault, Lacan and Freud (among others). But the trajectory of 
Moore’s theoretical and critical development indicates that he has also 
searched for theoretical positions conducive to his own confessional (or non-
confessional position). Looking over Moore’s work as a whole, it is possible 
to see that one objective of his criticism has been to escape from the 
constraints of a confessionally-dominated Biblical Studies which he finds less 
and less comfortable. 
                                                 
138Moore 1995, 28.Moore 1992, 3. Moore later answers his own question: “Why am I still in 
biblical studies? Simple: because I’m stuck here. I do still love the Bible, but I’m no longer in 
love with it (much less with Him), and I haven’t been for a very long time” (Moore 1995, 31). 
Moore continues to express love for the Bible, although the relationship appears to be 
becoming somewhat sadomasochistic. In the midst of a deconstruction of Revelation’s violent 
masculinity, Moore remarks wistfully, “I love Revelation for its beauty. Its intricate lacework 
of lurid images has never ceased to thrill me. [...] Revelation seduces me no matter how much 
I resist it.” (Moore 2001, 183, 203).  
139Moore 1995, 31; Moore 1996b, 119. 
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Moore’s nervousness of orthodox Christianity is motivated by a strong 
element of self-doubt and self-suspicion. Those aspects of God which Moore 
finds most repellent are those which he perceives as reflecting the darker 
aspects of his own character. Talking of the violence of God in Revelation he 
reflects that there is little of which Revelation’s God is guilty which he 
himself would not be capable of, given certain extreme stimuli and “a dash of 
omnipotence”. This, Moore reflects, “is why I fear this God as much as I do 
and resist him for all I am worth”.140 
 
Moore has a strong interest in sexuality which finds expression throughout his 
work, but it is the structures of dominance, control and power which he finds 
enshrined in the Bible and its confessional interpretation which remain the 
dominant focus of his attention.141 The very existence of inequalities of power 
is something which troubles him and his stated aim is the deconstruction and 
replacement of the structures which perpetuate such inequalities. Indeed,  it 
sometimes seems as if he believes that any inequality of power in a 
relationship must inevitably result in abuse. For Moore, the Bible is a human 
construction rather than a means of divine revelation, and the God depicted 
therein is merely a reflection of human interests, “a singularly pure projection 
of the will to power”.142 Moore looks forward to a time when he and others 
                                                 
140Moore 2001, 182.Moore later remarks that the God of Revelation is “disturbingly like 
myself”, and that reading Revelation is “uncannily like looking in a mirror - while having a 
psychotic episode” (Moore 2001, 199). 
141Moore has been candid about his sexuality, although the resulting picture is ambiguous. He 
describes himself as “more than a little bent” and as having had relationships with a number of 
men, but is married with children. He has also hinted at an attraction to sado-masochism 
(Moore 2001, 17, 174, 29-30, 31). At the same time it should be stressed that Moore is a past 
master at the tongue in cheek comment and at revealing a tantalising glimpse of something 
fleeting which may or may not be “the real him”. 
142Moore 1996b, 140. At the end of God’s Beauty Parlour Moore again muses, “this God who 
projects, who eternally projects a part of himself outward, is himself a mass projection (what 
else could he be?)” (Moore 2001, 203). Interestingly, in spite of his avowed 
atheism/agnosticism, Moore appears to hedge his bets about the existence of God, wishing 
God truly were a cultural phenomenon but not being able to bring himself explicitly to affirm 
it. 
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will be able to reconstruct a positive postmodern God, reconceived in the light 
of the constructed nature of concepts of sexuality and gender, but feels that the 
time will not be right for such a project while the old, unreconstructed God 
continues to stalk the pages of biblical scholarship: 
 
What other sacred spaces might be conjured out of his book? What 
other God might the go(o)d book yield up, so as to make it even better? 
[...] What other genders, if any, for this God? A God beyond gender? A 
God beyond God? A God beyond belief? Can we even begin to say or 
see what all of these Gods might be until we have made an end of 
saying what they should not be?143 
 
 
Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric: Rules of Engagement for Confessional and De-
Confessional Biblical Studies 
It is clear that Clines, Exum and Moore have taken Schüssler Fiorenza’s ethics 
of interpretation to heart, and have done much to establish the performance of 
her interpretive dance as a requirement of postmodern biblical criticism. 
Singly and collectively, they have addressed the impact of biblical texts and 
their interpretations upon readers using a hermeneutics of experience and 
social location; they have exposed what they perceive to be dynamics and 
rhetorical structures of domination and suppression in the biblical texts 
through rigorous ideological analysis; they have sought to uncover the hidden 
motives and ideological presuppositions of biblical texts and their interpreters 
through the application of a hermeneutics of suspicion; and they have sought 
to evaluate those motives and ideologies from the standpoint of contemporary 
liberal humanism. 
 
                                                 
143Moore 2001, 202. 
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The strong ethical dimension of a postmodern approach makes a number of 
demands upon biblical scholars, not the least significant of which is the 
requirement for critics to be transparent about their underlying motivations 
and commitments in interpretation. Clines, Moore and Exum are each candid 
about the values and presuppositions which inform their work, and claim this 
as a fundamental mark of academic integrity. Only when the interests and 
commitments of scholars are openly on view can their impact upon 
interpretation be properly assessed. This represents a new factor in 
interpretation and a dramatic shift in academic culture.144 
 
Integrity also demands congruence between underlying motivations and 
critical methods. The deep suspicion of the Bible felt by each of our three 
scholars leads them to adopt approaches characterised by a strong 
hermeneutics of suspicion, and this in turn produces evaluative readings which 
set biblical ideologies against the values of secular liberal humanism, often to 
find them wanting. Evaluation is not limited to biblical texts, however, but 
extends to the history of interpretation. Clines, Exum and Moore are not afraid 
to criticise other scholars whose work embodies values (whether derived from 
the texts they study or from their own ideological commitments) with which 
they disagree. The introduction of ethical critique into Biblical Studies thus 
introduces a strong element of intradisciplinary dissonance. 
 
The ethics of interpretation embraced by our three scholars have also thrown 
into high relief the political nature of Biblical Studies. Seen from a Fishian 
standpoint, the postmodern proliferation of interests, methods and ideologies 
threatens the homogeneity of the community of academic biblical interpreters, 
                                                 
144Clines himself has observed ironically the prevailing ethos in Biblical Studies: “we are 
objective scholars, and we prefer to keep hidden our personal preferences and our ethical and 
religious views about the subject matter of our study. Never ask a New Testament scholar for 
his or her own views on Christology, I long ago learned. It is bad form” (Clines 1997, 23). 
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amounting to an attempt to redefine it radically in terms of its core values. The 
approaches which Clines, Exum and Moore have developed arise not only 
from disenchantment with historical-critical and formalist methodologies, but 
from a deep ideological dissonance with the values and commitments of much 
mainstream biblical scholarship. The development of a strong departmental 
ethos at Sheffield can be interpreted as a deeply political act, an attempt to 
establish a new interpretive community which is attempting to remake Biblical 
Studies in its own image. 
 
The identity of this community derives from the coherence of ideology and 
methodology. For Exum, Moore and Clines, the commitment to humanist 
values they bring with them to the act of interpretation determines both the 
ideological interrogation of texts and interpretations which dominates their 
work, and the hermeneutically suspicious methods they deploy in the service 
of their interpretive interests. At each level of interest, however - 
methodological, ideological and political - their work poses major challenges 
to other approaches (and especially those informed by confessional interests) 
which might seek to engage with them. 
 
 
Issues of Method 
 
At the methodological level, Clines has himself observed that a multiplication 
of methodologies within the academic community will result in a certain 
degree of fragmentation: 
 
I do not really want to talk with most redaction critics - about their 
work, that is - because I do not think what they are doing is very 
plausible. And I presume that they don’t, for the most part, want to talk 
with me about deconstruction, let us say, for much the same reason. 
[...] I would be very happy to convince them that what I am doing is 
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worthwhile, but (to be honest) I do not particularly want to hear them 
try to convince me that what they are doing is worthwhile - partly 
because I think I know their reasoning and partly because I do not have 
very much confidence in it.145 
 
Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that different methodological 
terminologies reflect crucial ideological and conceptual differences over the 
nature of the biblical text itself. The proliferation not only of critical methods 
but of their underlying text theories means that consensus over the object of 
study in Biblical Studies could be said to be on the brink of collapse. 
Intercourse between different approaches to the study of the Bible is no longer 
possible through a common critical terminology: if source critics want to talk 
to reader response critics or to feminists they must learn one another’s’ 
languages, and some critics have already decided that it is not worth the effort 
either of attempting to learn another critical terminology or of trying to teach 
one’s own to others, either because the language is too difficult, or because the 
ideological or conceptual bases of the two approaches are incompatible.146  
 
The danger of new critical terminologies which address very specific 
interpretive interests is that they rapidly become the language of those “in the 
know”, operating as codes for the initiated rather than as means of explication 
and communication beyond the interpretive community. Moore’s work 
illustrates this tendency, in that one criticism of his deconstructive work 
                                                 
145Clines 1993, 72. 
146Chris Baldick argues that the pluralist “bazaar” of interpretive methods  has fragmented 
literary studies: “As each of these approaches has constructed self-confirming discourses 
which render it more or less deaf to critical challenge from its competitors, so the bazaar as a 
whole has tended to insulate itself from the corrective influences of a secular reading public 
outside the academy, thus exposing it instead to sudden vagaries of intellectual fashion and to 
the incrustations of jargon” (Baldick 1996, 204). Francis Watson has also noted this dynamic. 
Responding to Richard Rorty’s assertion that the task of philosophy is to facilitate 
conversation between different stories, Watson argues that recognition of the particularity of 
different interpretive perspectives means that theologians “do not usually draw the conclusion 
that animated conversation with non-theological story-tellers is now their main task. On the 
contrary, the link between story and community, suggestive of a relatively closed social 
context, creates, if anything, a withdrawal from other discourses, a respectful abandonment of 
them to their otherness” (Watson 1994, 130). 
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during the early 1990s was that the degree of theoretical knowledge necessary 
to appreciate his virtuoso deconstructions of the Gospels fully was such as to 
render his work “ a form of gnosis”, hopelessly opaque to the uninitiated.147 It 
is arguable that the language of deconstruction within Biblical Studies has 
become a patois of the hermeneutically suspicious, a Biblical Studies 
equivalent of Welsh, Basque or Catalan. The terminology of deconstruction 
serves as an identity marker and facilitates communication between members 
of a minority interpretive community, whilst simultaneously serving as a 
means of protecting that community by rendering their conversation opaque to 




Issues of Ideology 
 
A second issue identified by Clines is that of how conflicts of interest at the 
level of ideology should be addressed. Clines observes that one consequence 
of the abandonment of an objective quest for determinate meaning is the 
recognition that scholars’ interests, locations, ideologies and personalities both 
determine their scholarship “and separate us from one another”: 
 
Strip away the bonhomie that passes for scholarly interchange in the 
corridors of the international congresses, and we find that there is a lot 
we don’t like, don’t approve of, and will not stand for, in our 
colleagues, a lot that has yet to be brought into the light, taken the 
measure of, and fought over. Managing personal conflict within the 
academy may well be the new skill, harder still than Assyriology or 
deconstruction, that scholars will need to acquire in this decade.148 
 
 
                                                 
147Upton 1993, 74. 
148Clines 1995c, 92-3. 
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A major stumbling-block for confessional critics wishing to engage with 
Clines and his colleagues, however, is the fact that the version of postmodern 
scholarship which they have sought to establish is explicitly and deliberately 
de-confessional, which is to say that it deliberately excludes confessional or 
theological concerns from consideration.149 The establishment of postmodern 
approaches within Biblical Studies has offered scholars such as Clines, Exum 
and Moore a means of escape not only from the authority of the Bible but 
from the authority of an academic discipline which they perceive as 
historically dominated by confessional and theological interests.  Postmodern 
criticism has evaded those authorities by finding new methods and critical 
theories in the liberal humanities which, at least within the boundaries of 
Biblical Studies, it has claimed as its own, colonising a territory within 
Biblical Studies in which confessional critics must conform their 
interpretations to critical standards based upon an underlying secular liberal 
ideology which is hostile to the Bible and its orthodox Christian 
interpretation.150 De-confessional criticism’s self-identification relies upon a 
definition of its position in opposition to confessional interpretation, and this 
poses a major barrier to constructive engagement between confessional and 
de-confessional scholars. 
 
                                                 
149I use the term “de-confessional”, rather than “non-confessional”, advisedly. The term “non-
confessional” would imply simple disinterest as the reason for excluding theological concerns 
from interpretation. “De-confessional” scholarship, however, excludes such concerns 
deliberately for reasons of ideology, and defines itself in opposition to confessional 
approaches. 
150It is arguable that this includes the colonising or ownership of particular biblical texts 
themselves. The quantity of, for instance, feminist criticism on texts such as the creation 
narrative in Genesis 1-3, the story of Jephthah in Judges 11 or of David and Bathsheba in 2 
Samuel 11 makes it almost impossible to engage in academic literary study of these passages 
without showing that feminist scholarship has been considered. 
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It is arguable that this fragmentation results from a failure to follow through 
fully Schüssler Fiorenza’s ethical model. Schüssler Fiorenza insists upon the 
need for a hermeneutics of suspicion, but also emphasises the importance of 
reconstruction, imagination and transformation. She is opposed to the 
reification of biblical texts as either good or bad, insisting that to do so is to 
close off the ongoing and constantly shifting interpretive movement as 
contexts change. This, however, is precisely what our three postmodern critics 
appear to have done.151 They have failed to reclaim positive interpretations of 
the Bible, and as such have created a subdiscipline hostile to an interpretive 
perspective which seeks to work with, rather than against, the biblical text. 
This creates a major difficulty for Christian scholarship which, by definition, 
is predisposed to a more positive response to biblical ethics and ideologies.152 
 
De-confessional postmodernism also fails to perform a second of Schüssler 
Fiorenza’s steps in failing to engage theologically with the Bible. It is arguable 
that one reason postmodern critics have adopted a non-theological approach is 
to facilitate an ideological attack upon the Bible and its orthodox interpretation 
whilst simultaneously disabling reciprocal critique by declining to engage with 
orthodox biblical interpretation on its own ground. Ignoring theological 
questions of revelation or inspiration which arise from treating the Bible as a 
                                                 
151Exum, to be fair, explicitly guards against her interpretations being taken as exclusive. 
Rather, they are offered as correctives to conventional androcentric interpretations. That said, 
her recent work tends to a negative view of biblical texts in general. 
152It might be argued in their defence that this apparent failure on the part of de-confessional 
scholars is only because the dance is not yet complete: the dominance for so long of a 
hermeneutics of consent in Biblical Studies arguably means that the note of protest which 
Clines, Exum and Moore sound needs to continue until it finds acceptance in the mainstream 
of the discipline, and that only then can a mutual reassessment and re-evaluation of the 
biblical texts be undertaken on a level platform. But this is still to accept that the dance is not 
yet finished, that positive re-appropriation of the Bible is possible, and that the hermeneutics 
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vehicle of divine communication, postmodern critics instead limit their 
arguments to the level of the critical and the ethical, focussing solely on the 
Bible as a human construct. Postmodern critics have thus successfully 
occupied a position from which they can launch attacks on the cultural and 
social influence of the Bible whilst evading theological counterattack on the 
basis that theology does not fall within the scope of their declared interests. 
This attack is conducted primarily by emphasising contrasts between the 
ethical positions promoted in the Bible and those of modern liberal humanism, 
which are claimed to be superior. 
 
The danger of such a posture is that the postmodernists risk falling into the 
same sin which they so strongly condemn in others. Liberal humanist values 
are taken as the benchmark for evaluation of biblical ideologies, yet those 
values are not themselves in turn opened up for debate, but rather taken for 
granted.153 The elevation of modern liberal ideology over biblical ideology 
precludes the possibility of mutual critique: rather, liberal humanism stands in 
judgement upon the Bible. There is no suggestion by Clines, Exum or Moore 
that interaction with the Bible might necessitate not only the evaluation of 
biblical ideology but also of the interpreter’s own ideological presuppositions. 
 
                                                                                                                                
of suspicion is only one step in an ongoing dance. Of the three scholars we have examined, 
only Moore shows the beginning of such an awareness, and that almost as an afterthought. 
153Clines, in a recent article attacking the ethics of the Book of Job, claims that since the 
standards by which he judges the text “consist only of elemental proscription of injustice and 
cruelty, I would suggest that they are not far from universal, and were surely principles of 
Job’s own time” (Clines 2004, 234). Clines here comes perilously close to what he has argued 
to be a cardinal error: namely, collapsing the cultural distance between ancient text and 
modern reader, and claiming as universal values which by his own argument cannot be 
anything other than subjective. 
 98 
Such a stance omits a fundamental aspect of biblical criticism as Schüssler 
Fiorenza envisages it, and opens one-way ethical critique of biblical ideologies 
to accusations of self-contradiction. If the logic of postmodernism requires 
that the ideologies not only of texts but also of interpreters be rendered 
available for scrutiny and critique, then the same standard applies to the values 
which inform such critique. In the postmodern context no ideology can be 
privileged as immune from examination, and this includes the liberal 
humanism which informs the work of Clines, Exum and Moore. Two 
consequences of this are: first, that postmodern biblical critics ought to be 
open to the possibility that the biblical ideologies they seek to critique might 
be capable of challenging the values by which they are themselves evaluated; 
and, second, that the ability to negotiate conflicts of interest at the ideological 
level needs to become a conventional academic skill in the same way as a 
knowledge of biblical languages. 
 
 
Issues of Politics 
 
De-confessional postmodernism’s exclusion of faith interests from 
interpretation is not only an ideological move but a deeply political one. The 
increased politicisation of Biblical Studies is a direct result of the introduction 
of multiple competing ideological perspectives, and mirrors developments 
elsewhere in the humanities. Terry Eagleton, surveying the development of 
literary theory, has argued that questions of theory and of political ideology 
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are fundamentally linked.154 Critical discourses, in common with other kinds 
of social discourse, shape forms of consciousness and unconsciousness which 
are closely related to the maintenance or transformation of existing systems of 
power, and are thus closely linked to what it means to be a person.155 In any 
academic subject, Eagleton argues, the selection of objects and methods of 
study is governed by “frames of interest deeply rooted in our practical forms 
of social life”.156 
 
Eagleton emphasises the social and political function of departments of 
literature in higher education. Their task is to act as custodians of a discourse, 
“to preserve this discourse, extend and elaborate it as necessary, defend it from 
other forms of discourse, initiate newcomers into it and determine whether or 
not they have successfully mastered it”.157 In this way, the department 
functions as part of the ideological apparatus of the state, and in performing 
this role, academic communities exercise power: they police language so as to 
exclude that which is not acceptably sayable; they police writing itself by 
defining what counts as literature and what does not; they police who is to be 
considered suitable for entry into the community of scholarship and, thus, who 
is to be allowed to pronounce authoritatively on matters of interest to the 
community. Such matters are ultimately “a question of the power-relations 
                                                 
154Eagleton 1996, 169. 
155Eagleton 1996, 183. 
156Eagleton 1996, 184. Eagleton notes that radical critics are no different from conventional 
critics in this respect, but that they reflect a set of social values with which most people 
disagree. “This is why they are commonly dismissed as ‘ideological’, because ‘ideology’ is 
always a way of describing other people’s interests rather than one’s own” (Eagleton 1996, 
184). 
157Eagleton 1996, 175. 
 100 
between the literary-academic institution, where all of this occurs, and the 
ruling power-interests of society at large”.158 
 
Seen in this light, the rise of postmodern approaches in Biblical Studies in 
general and at Sheffield in particular can be seen as a crucially political 
development, raising questions as to what Biblical Studies is, whose interests 
it serves, and what methods are appropriate or inappropriate within the 
community of biblical scholars. Most importantly from the point of view of 
confessional scholarship, some postmodern biblical criticism has attempted a 
redefinition of Biblical Studies as exclusive of confessional concerns. This is 
in part a reaction against a resurgence of confessional interests within the 
discipline. 
 
In recent years a number of biblical theologians have made the point that 
traditional historical-critical Biblical Studies, by emphasising an objectivist 
interpretive paradigm, has institutionally excluded theological perspectives. 
Francis Watson has protested against what he sees as the unwarranted and 
arbitrary exclusion of theological interests from Biblical Studies, and argued 
for a redrawing of disciplinary boundaries.159 Watson objects in particular to 
the belief that theological commitments distort scholarship, and the 
consequent insistence that such commitments be privatised and excluded from 
public and academic discourse.160 Such privatisation is not a free choice, but is 
                                                 
158Eagleton 1996, 177. 
159See Watson 1993; Watson 1994; Watson 1996b; Watson 1997. Stephen E. Fowl makes a 
similar argument: see Fowl 1998, 13-30. 
160Watson 1994, 13. 
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imposed as a condition of membership of academic institutions.161 The 
academy has come to see itself as defending both the Bible and society from 
unthinking, unreflective ecclesial dogmatism, and posits itself as the primary 
location for socially responsible biblical interpretation.162 
 
The very structure of academic disciplines, Watson argues, reflects this 
commitment. The division of Biblical Studies from Theology, and the internal 
division of Biblical Studies into Old and New Testament Studies, establishes 
lines of demarcation which serve to protect the vested and ideological interests 
of scholars in one discipline from trespass by members of another.163 Watson 
claims that this division is ideologically motivated and has a “normative 
force” which “does not merely represent a convenient division of labour; it 
claims the right to exercise a veto”.164 As a result, the interests of Christians 
are institutionally excluded from academic study of the Bible: 
 
The claim that the role of the biblical texts within the Christian 
community is of positive hermeneutical significance is emphatically 
rejected: biblical interpretation is to be controlled by the university and 
by the universal criteria supposedly operative there. The possibility 
that Christian faith might still represent an ethically and intellectually 
defensible standpoint within the modern or postmodern world finds 
little or no acknowledgement here, at the very point where its 
foundational texts are subjected to the most intense scrutiny.165 
 
                                                 
161Watson 1994, 228. 
162It is interesting that postmodern de-confessionalism seeks to reject modernist objectivism in 
Biblical Studies whilst simultaneously maintaining the traditional hostility to overt faith 
interests in interpretation. The weakness of this position is that one cannot do both without 
appearing arbitrary. 
163Watson 1997, 4. 
164Watson 1997, 3. “They represent a collective decision of biblical scholarship that the 
biblical texts are to be construed as something other than Christian scripture. [...] ‘Normal’ 
biblical scholarship is founded upon this decision, and to reject this decision in practice as 
well as in principle is to be guilty of deviant behaviour” (Watson 1997, 6). 
165Watson 1996b, 131. 
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The advent of postmodernism and a more pluralist climate in Biblical Studies, 
however, presents opportunities to revisit some of these academic 
predispositions. The breakdown of historical-critical hegemony leads Watson 
to propose that explicitly theological approaches can now be offered to the 
academic community with some confidence. One side-effect of the 
introduction of a literary paradigm for biblical interpretation into Biblical 
Studies, Watson argues, is that “an interpretative practice oriented explicitly 
towards theological concerns can now claim the right to exist”.166  Walter 
Brueggemann similarly reflects that theological thinkers are reluctant to accept 
“a muted position of marginality” assigned by positivistic science and politics, 
arguing that the postmodern context means that “all claims of reality, 
including those by theologians, are fully under negotiation. Theological 
discourse is prepared to and capable of participating in these negotiations, no 
longer pretending to be a privileged insider, no longer willing to be a 
trivialised outsider”.167 
 
Such claims have prompted the drawing of battle-lines within Biblical Studies, 
and major figures at Sheffield have responded with hostility to the suggestion 
that confessional or theological concerns should play any role within academic 
biblical scholarship. David Clines has expressed his disappointment that 
biblical scholarship has failed to establish its academic independence from 
institutions dominated by confessional concerns. Indeed, the measure of 
Clines’ unease is indicated by the degree of language he uses to describe it: it 
is, for instance, “a bit of a scandal” that religious believers should set the tone 
for academic study of the Bible, and in a discussion of Haggai Clines observes 
                                                 
166Watson 1996b, 132. 
167Brueggemann 1993, 17. John Goldingay writes in similar vein: “Once criticism performed 
an iconoclastic function in relation to an ideological orthodoxy; now postcritical faith 
performs an iconoclastic function in relation to an ideological criticism that methodologically 
excludes commitment and considerations of ultimate truth, in a ‘second naïveté’” (Goldingay 
1995, 186). 
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that the failure of scholars to reflect critically upon the ideology of the text is 
an indication of “the depth of the corruption in our academic discipline that 
surrounds us”.168 
 
Clines is especially keen to resist any claims of the church’s ownership of the 
Bible, claiming the Bible as an artefact of the general culture. Consequently, 
no one group within society has the right to tell any other group or individual 
how they may or may not use it, so that “If I use my copy of the Bible, for 
which I have paid my own money, to prop up a chair, that is my business, and 
no one has the right to tell me I should not do that or that that is not what the 
Bible is ‘for’”.169 A major issue for Clines is that within Biblical Studies the 
ownership of the Bible by the church has often been assumed and that this has 
been a repressive influence. Clines states that “it is only the church that 
seriously threatens to encroach on the Academy’s use of the Bible [...] and so 
it is the church that the Academy is resisting when it declares the Bible to be 
public property, to be an artefact of our culture”.170 Clines sees such resistance 
as a duty, insisting that “there is something wrong with the discipline of 
Hebrew Bible studies if the vast majority of its professionals are adherents to 
its religion. You don’t need to be questioning the bona fides of any particular 
scholar to be alarmed at the fact that most people who research on the Hebrew 
Bible have an investment in it, in its ‘truth’ in the broadest sense, in its 
value”.171 
 
Similar objections have been voiced by Philip R. Davies, a prominent member 
of the Sheffield Department, who responds directly to Watson’s arguments in 
his book Whose Bible is it Anyway? (1995). Davies argues for the formal 
                                                 
168Clines 1995c, 75; Clines 1997, 17. 
169Clines 1997, 22. 
170Clines 1997, 23. 
171Clines 2006. 
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separation of confessional and non-confessional Biblical Studies - or, as he 
terms them, ‘scripture’ and ‘biblical studies’.172 Contrasting the interests of 
church (devotional and liturgical) and academy (humanistic and non-
confessional), Davies suggests that ‘scripture’ and its claim to represent the 
interests of both church and academy needs to be “outed”. ‘Scripture’ and 
‘biblical studies’ are not compatible, Davies argues, because they are based 
upon fundamentally different criteria and generate different discourses. The 
discourse of ‘scripture’ is emic, which is to say that it is only accessible and 
comprehensible to those who share its presuppositions, and therefore excludes 
those who do not.173 Furthermore, it is invulnerable to external critique 
because its premises are accepted a priori and are therefore incontestable. 
Confessional discourse “belongs to a type of communication that in principle, 
in intent and in practice implies a set of beliefs that define a community 
between the discoursants, and at the same time reinforce barriers against 
outsiders”.174 Davies contrasts this emic discourse with etic academic 
discourse which aims to be inclusive and to invite and encourage criticism and 
evaluation of its foundations and practices. Confessional discourse is a “soft” 
currency with no intrinsic value and non-exchangeable between interpretive 
communities; non-confessional discourse, however, is “hard”, and can traverse 
communal boundaries.175 
 
 Davies argues not just for a formal separation into separate disciplines within 
the academy, but for the exclusion of ‘scripture’ from the academy altogether. 
First, Davies argues that taxpayers should not pay for academic practices 
which only benefit small segments of society. Publicly funded academic 
                                                 
172The terminology is important. By wanting to keep the name ‘biblical studies’ Davies is not 
proposing an amicable divorce. Rather, he wishes to evict ‘scripture’ from the family home 
but keep the house and the furniture. 
173Davies 1995, 37-39. 
174Davies 1995, 47. 
175Davies 1995, 48. 
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departments should practice scholarship which benefits society as a whole, 
and this means it would be “unethical or unprofessional” to conduct 
confessional discourse at Sheffield.176 Second, Davies claims that he feels 
excluded by “faithism”, resenting the suggestion that his scholarship is in 
some way inappropriate and that “academic books can be written that 
explicitly exclude me”.177 Davies claims that he does not want anyone to be 
excluded from the kind of study he practises (unless they exclude themselves), 
but insists upon the usefulness of “universally agreed rules of evidence and 
argument so that we can genuinely seek to persuade or entertain one 
another”.178 Davies argues further that the interests of church and academy are 
so incompatible that academics who cannot sublimate their confessional 
interests in the service of the academy should resign on the basis that 
continuing to operate as academics would be unethical. 
 
There are a number of responses which might be offered to Davies’ attack on 
confessional scholarship,179 but its interest for the purposes of this argument is 
that it clearly demonstrates the political nature of the kind of scholarship 
which scholars at Sheffield have done so much to develop and to promote. 
When examined using the insights of Fish,  Fowl and Eagleton, it is clear that 
the introduction of postmodern approaches into Biblical Studies has served an 
ideological and political agenda whose aim is the establishment of a newly 
                                                 
176Davies 1995, 52. 
177Davies 1995, 53. 
178Davies 1995, 53. 
179
 One might be to point out that since a significant proportion of taxpayers are Christians, the 
suggestion that taxpayers’ money be used to further research into the Bible is not quite as 
outrageous as Davies makes it appear, especially in a country where an established church 
takes an active role in many areas of society from social work on housing estates to the 
framing of legislation. Davies appears to see the church as a sectarian subset existing within 
society rather than integrated into it, a view which many parts of the church would contest. In 
any case, as Francis Watson points out, the argument that academic study should be severed 
from the vested interests of non-academic social groups is not applied in other disciplines for 
precisely the reason that the academic freedom of any discipline depends to a large extent on 
the existence of a group within wider society whose interests are served by that discipline and 
who will support its continued place within academia (Watson 1994,8). 
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defined discipline: within this discipline the Bible is to be conceived in purely 
humanistic and ideological terms, and  confessional and theological interests 
are to be actively excluded. 
 
In one sense, this exclusion is simply an attempt to perpetuate a state of affairs 
which, as Francis Watson has pointed out, has long pertained within historical-
critical Biblical Studies, and within secular academia generally.180 George M. 
Marsden, in his book The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship (1997),  
aims to challenge the institutional exclusion of Christian interests from 
mainstream scholarship in the United States.181 Marsden identifies a number 
of academic objections to the idea of Christian scholarship which closely 
parallel Davies’. In particular, it is commonly argued, first, that Christian 
approaches are non-empirical and therefore not liable to critical 
interrogation;182 and second, that Christian scholarship seeks to impose itself 
as superior to and exclusive of other approaches, thus threatening 
multiculturalism and diversity.183  
 
Marsden responds that the accusation of non-empiricism is inconsistently 
applied within the academy, where approaches such as Marxism and 
feminism, which take their motivation from similarly non-empirical 
foundations, are not only tolerated but welcomed. Marsden further points out 
that the exclusion of religious views as non-empirical is simply impossible, 
                                                 
180
 The argument over the inclusion of faith perspectives within academic Biblical Studies 
continues to be fierce. See, for instance, a recent exchange at Bandy 2006, including scholars 
such as Philip Davies, Craig Blomberg, Scot McKnight and Marc Goodacre. 
181Marsden 1997, 6. Marsden recounts a conversation with a professor of religion who argued 
that it was inappropriate for anyone who practised a particular religion to teach about that 
religion on the grounds that it would transgress standards of scientific detachment. Marsden 
ponders: “What if someone suggested that no feminist should teach the history of women, or 
no gay person teach gay studies, or no political liberal should teach American political 
history? Or - for those who see religion as mainly praxis - perhaps the analog should be that 
no musician should be allowed to teach an instrument that she herself plays” (Marsden 1997, 
13). 
182Marsden 1997, 25-31. 
183Marsden 1997, 31-37. 
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since many academics are in fact Christians. The rule is not actually that 
religious beliefs should be excluded because they are irrelevant to scholarship, 
but that academics should act as though they are irrelevant. A negative 
consequence of this is that the unconscious impact of beliefs upon scholarship 
is not openly addressed. 
 
Marsden notes that fears of Christian imperialism are expressed by groups 
such as feminists, gay scholars and Jews because of a history of oppression. 
These groups see traditional Christianity as one of the powers from which the 
world needs to be liberated, and oppose what they regard as the imperialist 
tendencies of Christian perspectives within the academy. In response to this, 
Marsden observes that the exclusion of Christian approaches is to endorse the 
imperialism of other groups and interests, and especially of secularism. 
Further, Marsden argues that fears of Christian imperialism are unfounded: 
most Christians are not imperialist anyway; and Christians are too divided 
amongst themselves to achieve the kind of dominance which their opponents 
fear.184 The objection  that Christians regard their views as superior to others 
is dismissed by Marsden as a red herring: everybody believes that their views 
are superior to alternative views. Even relativists treat other viewpoints as 
inferior to their relativism and try to convince others (sometimes rather 
dogmatically) of their viewpoint.185 
 
The key weakness of the argument in favour of excluding confessional 
interests from academic scholarship, however, is that an academy which prides 
itself on diversity and freedom of enquiry cannot exclude a valid interest 
                                                 
184Marsden 1997, 33-34. 
185Marsden 1997, 10. Kevin Vanhoozer makes the same point: “Those who insist on 
inclusivity and pluralism as ethical goals in their own rights often coerce others to share their 
goals, or else exclude them! And pluralists are ironically inconsistent insofar as they 
themselves remain ‘closed’ to the possibility that there may indeed be a single correct 
interpretation. As an ideology, therefore, pluralism is as totalitarian as other forms of 
absolutism” (Vanhoozer 1998, 418). 
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without self-contradiction.  Marsden makes this point in relation to scientific 
objections to Christian scholarship, arguing that the academy on its own terms 
has no consistent ground for excluding religious perspectives: “If 
postmodernists who denounce scientific objectivism as an illusion are well 
accepted in the contemporary academy, there is little justification for the same 
academy to continue to suppress religious perspectives because they are 
‘unscientific’”.186 
 
Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones make a similar point, but identify an 
underlying reason for such apparent inconsistency. Acknowledging that a 
liberal institution has a limited stock of arguments to draw on in refusing to 
recognise and support a particular interpretive interest, they nevertheless 
recognise that the interpretation which is done in particular institutions is 
constrained by the demands and interests of that institution.187 Interpretation is 
a social activity, subject to the political constraints within which people 
interpret, and academic pluralism is not open to all perspectives. Rather, 
academic pluralism is a limited pluralism within the boundaries of “the 
presumptions and ideologies of liberal thought and practice”.188 Liberal 
pluralism, in fact, is not disinterested but ideological. 
 
This brings us back to Eagleton’s point that academic institutions are 
profoundly political and exist to serve vested ideological interests. Francis 
Watson responds to Davies by offering the perceptive insight that simply 
appealing to academic pluralism for a hearing is not sufficient to guarantee 
Christian interpretation a seat at the table of Biblical Studies, because the 
pluralism which Davies seeks to defend rests upon a prior commitment by 
academics to define the biblical texts as objects of study in such a way as to 
                                                 
186Marsden 1997, 30. 
187Fowl and Jones 1991, 17-18. 
188Fowl and Jones 1991, 18. 
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exclude their consideration as Christian scripture. Such pluralism has recourse 
to a “non-theological meta-perspective” which presupposes that the choice of 
interpretive approach is a matter of indifference and that “the text itself is 
simply a neutral site for the play of the various perspectives”.189 This 
presupposition, however, is not universally inclusive, because the decision to 
construe the text as a neutral site is already a decision against the text as 
Christian holy scripture.190 
 
Davies’ construal of academic discourse as etic as opposed to confessional 
emic discourse also falls foul of Fish’s concept of the interpretive community. 
Academic pluralist discourse rests upon an a priori presupposition about what 
the Bible is and is not, just as confessional discourse does, and that 
presupposition defines the boundaries of academic discourse in such a manner 
as to include some perspectives and exclude others, rendering academic 
discourse equally emic. Fish and Eagleton agree that the academy is an 
interpretive community with selective rules of membership, as Robert M. 
Fowler has observed: “being a critic means being part of a guild [...]. Such a 
guild has a history, it has a language, and it has rules and rituals for entrance 
into its ranks, and for subsequent advancement, demotion, or 
excommunication”.191 Any debate over what counts as a valid approach within 
Biblical Studies is a debate over what Biblical Studies actually is, what rules 
will govern its discourse, whose interests those rules will serve and, 
conversely, whose interests they will exclude. 
                                                 
189Watson 1996a, 11. 
190Watson 1996a, 12. Davies has recently outlined his understanding of the Bible as “the 
outcome of an intellectual project” whose success has paradoxically been due to strong 
“misreadings - typographical, literalistic, mystical, cryptic” which have isolated it from other 
philosophical texts such as Plato. The task of secularising Biblical Studies “means also 
secularising the Bible for a secular world, just as it was once sanctified for a religious world” 
(Davies 2005). This conception bears small relation to anything an orthodox Christian would 
recognise. 
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 Fowler 1985. Stephen Fowl makes the same observation, and suggests that the interests of 




Clines, Moore, Exum and Davies have sought to establish an interpretive 
community within which their interpretive interests, which have often been 
ignored within mainstream Biblical Studies, can be addressed. This is a 
legitimate goal, but the rhetoric of postmodern critics is constructed in such a 
way as to attempt to deny confessional criticism the power of speech in the 
postmodern critical arena, just as they have been denied a voice within 
conventional biblical scholarship. The danger of this is that it may do their 
cause more harm than good. The exclusion of confessional interests threatens 
to repeat the sins of the past, turning the victims of oppression into a lesser 
reflection of their oppressors. To draw a controversial political analogy, the 
psychology of some postmodern biblical scholarship is reminiscent of 
apartheid South Africa or post-war Israeli. A local majority, having carved out 
a territory within a wider hostile culture, seeks to maintain its integrity  and, 
indeed, its identity by suppressing representatives of that wider culture within 
its borders. Whilst explicable and, to some extent, understandable, such 
behaviour is unhelpful in moving conflicts forward. Sooner or later, as the 
South Africans and Israelis have had to do, postmodern biblical critics will 
have to start talking constructively with other approaches whose ideologies 
they oppose. To fail to do so will ensure that postmodern criticism becomes a 
ghetto within Biblical Studies rather than the reforming force which some 
have hoped.  
 
To draw another analogy, it is yet to be seen whether the rise of ideological 
postmodernism in Biblical Studies will be looked back upon as exodus or 
exile. Clines, Exum, Moore and others have sought to escape from bondage to 
historical-critical methods and confessional interests and to find an 
interpretive space of their own, where they will be free to pursue their own 
interests and develop their own critical methods. It is questionable, however, 
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whether they have yet succeeded in establishing a positive identity for their 
new interpretive community. Instead, they continue to define themselves over 
against existing scholarship in such a way that even as they resist it they are 
inextricably linked to it.192 
 
An interpretive approach which defines itself only in terms of opposition to 
other scholarship or, indeed, to its object of study, is an approach which is 
ultimately parasitic on that which it resists. The scholarship which Clines, 
Exum and Moore practise has not yet managed to escape from this dynamic, 
and therefore at present looks less like a promised land and more like a 
dissident community whose identity is fundamentally bound up with that of 
the wider academic culture against which they struggle and from which they 
yearn to be free. It might be debated whether Sheffield postmodernism is in 
Egypt, in Babylon or in the wilderness, but it has not yet reached Canaan.  
 
 
Challenge and Opportunity 
 
A truly postmodern Biblical Studies must find a way of accommodating 
multiple valid interpretive approaches, and this includes the establishment of a 
modus vivendi which includes both confessional and de-confessional 
scholarship. A vital first step in this process will be the acceptance by both 
sides that the concerns and interests of the other are valid and legitimate. De-
confessional criticism will need to move beyond its identity as a resistance 
                                                 
192Stanley Fish, indeed, has argued that this is an inescapable dynamic of development in 
academic interpretation: “A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some 
relationship of opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things 
that aren’t done) from which it can emerge into respectability. [...] Rhetorically the new 
position announces itself as a break from the old, but in fact it is radically dependent on the 
old, because it is only in the context of some differential relationship that it can be perceived 
as new or, for that matter, perceived at all” (Fish 1980a, 349). 
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movement and become a constructive voice within the discipline. 
Confessional criticism, meanwhile, will have to demonstrate that it is capable 
of operating in an authentically postmodern manner, embracing diversity and 
taking on board some of the things de-confessional scholarship has to say to it. 
 
The postmodern context poses significant challenges to a confessional 
approach within Biblical Studies, but it also offers great opportunity. For one 
thing, ethical postmodernism means that confessional critics can (indeed, 
should) be more explicit in declaring their theological commitments. It can be 
legitimately asserted that Christian interpretive perspectives are no less valid 
or worthy of attention than those of other interest groups and ideological 
approaches, and that they should therefore be allowed to take their place 
within academic debate. This does not mean that they should be granted a 
privileged position, but that they should be able to state their case, make their 
arguments and offer their interpretations on a level playing field. 
 
At the same time, Christian interpretive approaches must take account of the 
expectations of the interpretive communities with whom they wish to engage 
and be prepared to respond accordingly. In particular, confessional and de-
confessional critics must be prepared to agree that, as Marsden puts it, “there 
will be room for explicit Christian points of view (just as there are explicit 
Marxist or feminist views) for those who will play by the other rules proper to 
the diverse academy”.193  A major factor in this will be in demonstrating that 
the Christian interpretive community is not closed but open to interrogation, 
debate and even attack in relation not only to its critical practice but also to its 
foundational commitments and principles.194 Confessional criticism cannot 
                                                 
193Marsden 1997, 52. 
194Marsden observes that “A more mature version of ideologically oriented scholarship will 
include criticism of its own tradition, rather than a simple celebration of everyone and 
everything that is on one’s side” (Marsden 1997, 54). 
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assume a privileged or protected place within the academy. A postmodern 
academic approach must not only be able to critique others, but to receive 
criticism and even to self-critique. If confessional critics wish to talk with 
other approaches they must be prepared to be changed by the encounter. 
 
Confessional critics must also be sensitive to the climate within which they 
operate. We have noted that Christian approaches are viewed with 
nervousness or even fear by a number of other interpretive communities, and 
if they are to gain a hearing they must be careful in the rhetoric they deploy. 
Soft words and gentle approaches may be more productive than astringent 
attacks and polemic. The aim must be to talk with rather than to talk at or to 
others, and this means that confessional critics must pay attention to their 
critical rhetoric. How they operate within the academic arena will be just as 
important as what they think they are doing. 
 
The development of an authentically postmodern, academic and Christian 
approach to the Bible will not be easy. One reason for this is the persistent 
dominance of historical-critical approaches within the discipline at large, 
whilst another is to be found in the hostility of many ideological postmodern 
approaches. It is not always easy for interpreters to balance their various 
commitments and interests easily, and internal conflicts of interest can be 
hugely damaging to the perceived viability of a new approach. Some of these 
issues are evident in the development of narrative criticism, a confessionally-
based approach which has found the postmodern context particularly 
challenging.  
 114 
CHAPTER THREE: THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF 
NARRATIVE CRITICISM 
“One writes only half the book; the other half is with the reader.” 
     - Joseph Conrad 
 
Postmodern critical theory and practice has become firmly established within 
Biblical Studies as a place of refuge for those alienated by the practices and 
ethos of more conventional biblical scholarship. By adopting theories and 
methods from elsewhere in the humanities, postmodern scholars have been 
able to articulate their own interests in biblical texts, unhindered by the 
requirement to seek validation from a scholarly community by whom they feel 
marginalised and within whose boundaries they feel themselves to be 
oppressed. At the same time, however, these same scholars have created a 
territory on the margins of Biblical Studies which is overtly and explicitly 
hostile to a confessional approach to the Bible as Scripture. The insistence 
upon the priority of a hermeneutics of suspicion and the elevation of secular 
humanism as an ethical standard within those areas where postmodern 
approaches to the Bible are predominantly practised raises serious issues for 
Christian critics who might wish to avail themselves of the new methods. Is it 
possible to offer literary interpretations of the Bible which demonstrate both a 
confessional commitment to the text as Scripture and which meet the criteria 
of an academically credible postmodern Biblical Studies? 
 
In order to answer that question I propose to use narrative criticism as an 
example of the possibilities and pitfalls of such an enterprise, concentrating on 
the work of Mark Allan Powell. Narrative criticism has generally been viewed 
as an approach defined primarily by methodological interests, but it rests upon 
strong ideological and theological commitments. Like the postmodern 
approaches we have examined, narrative criticism found its origins in a strong 
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ideological dissatisfaction with the prevailing culture of historical-critical 
Biblical Studies. This dissatisfaction led narrative critics to import methods 
and theoretical perspectives into Biblical Studies from the field of literary 
theory and criticism, establishing a methodological space within which they 
might pursue their own interests alongside the dominant academic culture. 
Narrative criticism has, however, largely failed to mature into a fully 
postmodern ideological approach of the kind practised by the likes of Clines, 
Moore and Exum. This is due to the conservative nature of narrative 
criticism’s ideological interests (specifically, a confessional commitment to 
the Bible as scripture), and to the political interests of its relationship with 
mainstream Biblical Studies, which have caused narrative critics to downplay 
their confessional commitments. Conflicting impulses within narrative 
criticism have given rise to internal tensions which have remained unresolved, 
and which render the approach flawed from a postmodern perspective. 
Recently, however, narrative critics have demonstrated a new awareness of 
postmodern issues and have responded to earlier criticisms of their work. 
These developments raise the possibility of an authentically postmodern, 
confessional and academic approach to biblical narrative interpretation. 
 
 
Mark Allan Powell and First-Generation Narrative Criticism 
 
Narrative criticism in its inception was a product of New Testament Studies.1 
The term ‘narrative criticism’ was first coined by David Rhoads in 1980,2 but 
                                                 
1
 Parallel developments in the study of the Hebrew Bible (such as Alter 1981; Berlin 1983; 
Miscall 1983; Sternberg 1985; Bar-Efrat 1989) failed to cross-fertilise with early narrative 
criticism. This is due partly to the formal separation of New Testament and Hebrew Bible 
scholarship within Biblical Studies, and partly to the differing emphases of the two 
movements. Literary approaches to the Hebrew Bible during the 1980s tended to be exercises 
in applied poetics, drawing out general features and characteristics of biblical narratives in 
order to construct a theoretical poetics of narrative within the Hebrew Bible. New Testament 
narrative criticism, however, was more commonly an exegetical exercise, applying narrative 
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narrative critics built upon foundations laid during the ‘literary turn’ of the 
1970s.3 Narrative criticism came into its own during the 1980s, with the 
publication of a series of narrative-critical treatments of the Gospels: David 
Rhoads’ and Donald Michie’s Mark as Story: An Introduction to the Narrative 
of a Gospel (1982) was followed by R. Alan Culpepper’s Anatomy of the 
Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design (1983), by Jack Dean Kingsbury’s 
Matthew as Story (1986), and by Robert C. Tannehill’s two-volume The 
Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation (1986 and 1990).4 The 
standard introduction to narrative criticism for many, however, has been Mark 
Allan Powell’s What is Narrative Criticism? (1990).5 Whilst the other 
narrative-critical pioneers had sought to demonstrate their method in relation 
to specific Gospel texts, Powell set out a systematic account of narrative 
criticism, attempting to define it in relation to literary theory and offering it as 
a coherent methodology for the study of New Testament narrative.6 Powell’s 
book has attracted a great deal of critical attention from both historical and 
postmodern critics, and thus serves as a helpful illustration not only of some of 
                                                                                                                                
theory in order to illuminate the structure of particular biblical texts. A second key difference 
is that many scholars involved with Hebrew Bible narrative study were not primarily biblical 
critics but academics from the field of literary studies, some of whom were associated with the 
Tel Aviv school of Poetics, whereas New Testament narrative criticism was developed by 
scholars from within Biblical Studies who imported critical tools across disciplinary 
boundaries. This gave the two approaches differing emphases and priorities. Interestingly, 
however, poetical studies of the Hebrew Bible have been criticised by postmodern and 
ideological critics on the same grounds as New Testament narrative criticism, namely that 
they support a similarly conservative and uncritical approach to biblical ideologies. Meir 
Sternberg’s The Poetics of Biblical Narrative has been a particular target (see, for instance, 
Bal 1991, 59-72 and Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 112-13, 278-79). 
2Rhoads 1982. The article, published in 1982, was first given as an address to the Markan 
seminar of the SBL in 1980. 
3Two influential books in this movement were Petersen 1978 and Spencer 1980, both of which 
can be traced as discernible sources in the work of R. Alan Culpepper, himself a major 
influence on subsequent narrative critics. David Lee has correctly identified three phases in 
the development of narrative criticism to date: an initial period of gestation in the 1970s; a 
first generation period of fruition in the 1980s; and a more critically reflective phase in the 
1990s. See Lee 1999, 120. 
4Rhoads and Michie 1982; Culpepper 1983; Kingsbury 1986; Tannehill 1986; Tannehill 1990. 
5Powell 1993c. This work was published in the United States in 1990 and in the United 
Kingdom in 1993. 
6Shorter introductions to narrative criticism can be found in Malbon 1992; Bowman 1995; 
Powell 1995. Other substantial introductions to narrative criticism (both Old and New 
Testament) are Fokkelman 1999; Marguerat and Bourquin 1999; Resseguie 2005. Powell 
continues to be the standard introduction with whom other scholars interact. 
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the major features of narrative criticism, but also of the pitfalls which await 
unwary narrative critics in the jungle of postmodern biblical scholarship. 
 
What is Narrative Criticism? has arguably done more to establish narrative 
criticism as a credible approach in the field than any other single work.7 The 
version of narrative criticism expounded there rests firmly upon the foundation 
of Rhoads and Michie, Culpepper, Kinsgbury and Tannehill. At the same time, 
however, being a methodological introduction rather than a study of a 
particular text, Powell’s book presents narrative criticism in the broader 
context of both literary theory and biblical studies. Powell’s exposition of 
narrative criticism rests upon four key assertions about biblical narratives as 
literary texts. First, Powell insists that literary criticism focuses on the final 
form of the text. This differentiates it from source, form and redaction 
criticism and their observations on the history of the text, which narrative 
criticism does not deny but does ignore.8 Second, Powell emphasises the unity 
of the text as a coherent whole, advocating a critical analysis which “does not 
dissect the text but discerns the connecting threads that hold it together”.9 
Third, Powell argues, literary criticism views the text as an end in itself: using 
a metaphor of Murray Krieger, Powell compares historical criticism which 
uses the text as window onto the history of its composition with literary 
criticism which uses the text as a mirror: the literary critic seeks to look at the 
text and not through it, gaining insight through the encounter of reader and 
                                                 
7Powell’s wider body of work in narrative criticism reveals him to be a rigorous and 
theoretically literate critic. See e.g.: Poland 1985; Powell 1990; Powell 1991; Powell 1992a; 
Powell 1992b; Powell, Gray et al. 1992; Powell 1993a; Powell 1993b; Powell 1995. 
8
 “Ultimately it makes no difference for a literary interpretation whether certain portions of the 
text once existed elsewhere in some other form. The goal of literary criticism is to interpret the 
current text, in its finished form” (Powell 1993c, 7). 
9Powell 1993c, 7. Richard G. Bowman claims that narrative criticism seeks to establish those 
elements of textual form which unify meaning, emphasising “the constructive continuities of 
sense rather than the deconstructive discontinuities of nonsense” (Bowman 1995, 18). Other 
first-generation narrative critics also stressed the importance of literary unity. See e.g.: 
Culpepper 1983, 5-6; Kingsbury 1986, 1-2. 
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text.10 Where historical criticism addresses the referential function of biblical 
narratives, narrative criticism addresses the poetic aspects of texts. Literary 
critics do not deny the validity of historical enquiry, but do bracket out 
historical questions in order to focus upon literary ones. Fourth, Powell argues 
that literary criticism is based upon communication models of speech-act 
theory, citing Roman Jakobson’s text-as-communication model, in which 
every literary text involves communication from an author to a reader via the 
medium of the text. All theories of literature, Powell claims, understand the 
literary text in this way.11 
 
Powell then discusses the literary-theoretical sources for narrative criticism. 
Comparing narrative criticism with structuralism, rhetorical criticism and 
reader-response approaches, he argues that narrative criticism has no exact 
literary counterpart.12 Like structuralism, narrative criticism is text-centred 
and therefore objective, but is more interested in the linear progression of the 
narrative than in the establishment of elaborate structural principles.13 Like 
rhetorical criticism, narrative criticism is interested in the impact of the text on 
the reader, but conceives of the reader as a text-centred and idealised implied 
reader who is “presupposed by and constructed from the text itself”.14 
Narrative criticism is also distinct from reader-response approaches which 
attempt to examine how readers determine meaning, preferring to discern how 
                                                 
10Powell 1993c, 8. For the source of this metaphor see Krieger 1964, 3. This image gained 
wide currency among narrative critics, its most famous deployment being in Culpepper’s 
Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel (Culpepper 1983, 3-5). Although Culpepper is widely credited 
with the introduction of the window/mirror contrast into biblical criticism it had, in fact, been 
used by Norman R. Petersen a few years before (Petersen 1978, 19). 
11Powell 1993c, 8-9. This sweeping generalisation is unsound. What is true is that Jakobson’s 
communication model has been recognised as “the bridge linking Formalism and 
Structuralism, and as the theoretical foundation of both” (Hawkes 1983, 87), and therefore as 
fundamental to the development of narrative theory. Terry Eagleton observes that Jakobson’s 
influence “can be detected everywhere within Formalism, Czech structuralism and modern 
linguistics” (Eagleton 1996, 85). For Jakobson’s original text-as-communication model see 
Jakobson 1960.  
12Powell 1993c, 19. 
13Powell 1993c, 14. 
14Powell 1993c, 15. 
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the text determines the reader’s response and viewing the reader as being “in 
the text”, encoded or presupposed by it.15 Powell claims narrative criticism as 
a creation of Biblical Studies, “an independent, parallel movement in its own 
right”, although it might be viewed as “a subspecies of the new rhetorical 
criticism or as a variety of the reader-response movement”.16 It is important to 
note, however, that Powell takes care to define narrative criticism as a 
formalist, text-centred, objective critical method, in which the focus of 
attention is squarely upon the text rather than upon the author or reader.17 
Powell defines the central focus of narrative criticism as an attempt to 
delineate the role of the implied reader.18 
 
The implied reader is “presupposed by the narrative itself”, and is 
reconstructed by the critic from “clues within the narrative that indicate an 
anticipated response from the implied reader”.19 This is to say that the implied 
reader is a text-immanent construct, a reader-role defined and determined by 
the text itself as the ideal recipient of its meaning. Powell carefully 
distinguishes the implied reader from real readers, whose responses are 
                                                 
15Powell 1993c, 18 (author’s emphasis). It is significant that Powell distinguishes narrative 
criticism not only from Derridean deconstruction and Fishian socio-pragmatism, but also from 
Iser’s phenomenological reader-response theory. As we shall see, this distinction breaks down 
in much first-generation narrative criticism. 
16Powell 1993c, 19. 
17
 Richard G. Bowman argues that a narrative-critical emphasis upon final form renders the 
approach more objective than other alternatives: “Interpretations are based on empirically 
observable data within the text, not on the speculated intentions of the author, the hypothetical 
reconstructions of the historian, or the ideological agenda of the reader” (Bowman 1995, 18). 
18The term “implied reader” was coined by Wolfgang Iser, whose work will be examined later 
(Iser 1974; Iser 1978), as a counterpart to Wayne Booth’s “implied author” (Booth 1983, 66-
77). Powell’s understanding of the implied reader, however, is drawn from Seymour 
Chatman’s Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (1978), which has 
been said to have achieved “almost canonical status as the predominant source through which 
the communication model and narratological theory generally have been introduced into 
Gospel criticism” (Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 35). For discussion of Chatman’s 
importance for the development of narrative criticism see Moore 1989, 43-51; Bible and 
Culture Collective 1995, 85-89; Lee 1999, 122, 138, 336-41. 
19Powell 1993c, 19. 
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unpredictable.20 Using Seymour Chatman’s development of Jakobson’s text-
as-communication model, Powell argues that the act of literary communication 
is self-contained, and that the concerns of real authors and readers are extrinsic 
to the communicative act that transpires within the text. The concept of the 
implied reader as the reader “in the text”, therefore, again marks narrative 
criticism out as a text-centred, objective approach.21 The goal of narrative 
criticism is to read the text as the implied reader, to know everything the text 
assumes the reader knows and to “forget”, or bracket out, everything the text 
assumes the implied reader does not know.22 The result is a critical process 
which addresses the text on its own terms, which constantly asks “Is there 
anything in the text that indicates the reader is expected to respond in this 
way?”23 Powell is careful to point out that insofar as the implied reader is a 
“hypothetical concept” and “idealised abstraction”, the goal of reading as the 
implied reader may be unattainable, but that the goal is nevertheless worthy, 
since “the concept is actually a principle that sets criteria for interpretation”.24 
 
Much of the rest of What is Narrative Criticism? consists of explanations of 
various aspects of narrative theory as applied to the Gospels.25 Powell draws 
again upon Seymour Chatman to distinguish between story (the content of the 
narrative, or what the story is about) and discourse (the rhetoric of the 
                                                 
20For Powell the implied reader is “a heuristic construct that allows critics to limit the 
subjectivity of their analysis by distinguishing between their own responses to a narrative and 
those that the text appears to invite” (Powell 1995, 241). 
21Powell 1993c, 20. Powell later characterises narrative criticism as “a text-centred approach 
which holds that the text sets parameters on interpretation” (Powell 1993c, 95). 
22Powell 1993c, 20. Powell argues elsewhere that narrative criticism pursues a “normative 
process of reading” by means of which the critic “interprets stories from the perspective of 
implied readers who may be assumed to accept the value system that undergirds the stories 
they read” (Powell 1995, 242-44). 
23Powell 1993c, 21 (author’s emphasis). 
24Powell 1993c, 21. 
25
 I have chosen not to examine Powell’s critical tools in detail, for reasons of space. For the 
purposes of this thesis the methodological, theological/ideological and political interests 
which inform his choice of critical methods are more important than the methods themselves. 
Where a particular methodological tool reveals an underlying motive in Powell’s narrative 
approach, however, it will be discussed. 
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narrative, or how the story is told).26 Narrative criticism is interested primarily 
in the discourse by which the narrative guides the implied reader in 
understanding. Powell discusses various devices including point of view, 
narration, symbolism and irony, with reference to a number of literary-
theoretical sources. In examining narrative events Powell draws upon Roland 
Barthes to distinguish between essential elements of plot (“kernels”) and non-
essential elements (“satellites”).27 He also draws upon Gerard Genette 28 for 
categories of order, duration and frequency, then upon E. M. Forster and, 
again, Chatman for issues of causation and conflict,29 with a worked 
application to Matthew’s Gospel.30 Powell then goes on to look at characters, 
with particular attention to their rhetorical function in the narrative and 
including a case study on the portrayal of religious leaders in the synoptic 
Gospels, in which he concludes that the function of the religious leaders is to 
act as an unsympathetic foil to Jesus.31 A brief discussion of the importance 
and function of settings (temporal, spatial and social) follows with application 
to the Gospel of Mark, where Powell highlights the metaphorical and 
connotative value settings receive within the world of the narrative.32  
Throughout the book, Powell draws upon scholarship from within the 
mainstream of structuralist narratology, Russian formalism and Anglo-
American narrative theory, and is consistently concerned to demonstrate that 
narrative criticism is a text-centred critical approach whose attention is 
focussed squarely upon issues of literary form, structure and rhetoric. 
                                                 
26Powell 1993c, 23. See Chatman 1978, 19-21. This distinction is to be found in both 
Structuralist and Russian Formalist thought, which Chatman synthesizes. Both stress the 
importance of distinguishing between what the story is about (histoire/fabula) and how the 
story is told (discours/sjuzhet). A helpful comparison of different terminologies is found in 
Martin 1986, 107-09. 
27Powell 1993c, 36. Powell’s view of Barthes is filtered through Chatman (Chatman 1978, 53-
6). 
28Powell 1993c, 36-40. Genette, especially in his Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method 
(Genette 1980), is a major figure in structuralist narratology.  
29Powell 1993c, 40-4. 
30Powell 1993c, 44-50. 
31Powell 1993c, 51-67. 
32Powell 1993c, 69-83. 
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Powell concludes the book with an evaluation of the benefits of narrative 
criticism for biblical scholarship, suggestively entitled “Story as Scripture”.33 
Many of these are perceived advantages over traditional historical criticism, 
such as the ability to spend more time reading the Bible rather than reading 
about it; the prospect of bypassing some intractable disputes in historical 
scholarship; the demystification of biblical interpretation; and the possibility 
that narrative criticism offers a check against historical criticism, in that if 
narrative and historical interpretations are radically divergent, then both 
methods must reassess their evaluation of evidence.34  
 
Significantly, however, some strengths of the narrative approach identified by 
Powell relate not to the academic but to the believing community. Powell 
argues that narrative criticism “stands in a close relationship to the believing 
community”, enabling the community to engage otherwise problematic 
material such as mythological, supernatural or anti-semitic elements in the 
narratives in a constructive way.35 By working with the text’s final form, 
narrative criticism also “seeks to interpret Scripture at its canonical level”, in 
that the text which is studied is that which believing communities identify as 
their authoritative Scripture. Furthermore, Powell suggests that narrative 
criticism emphasises a Christian doctrine of the Spirit: since revelation 
happens in the present, in the interaction of reader and text, an active role for 
the Spirit is crucial to the process of interpretation. 
 
                                                 
33Powell 1993c, 85-91. 
34
 Powell is also at pains to defend narrative approaches against historical-critical objections, 
such as the argument that narrative critics treat Gospels as coherent when they are actually 
collections of disparate material; that concepts drawn from modern literature are inappropriate 
for the study of ancient texts; that methods devised for the study of fiction are generically 
inappropriate to the Gospels; that narrative criticism lacks objective criteria for the study of 
biblical texts; and that narrative approaches ignore the historical witness of the Gospels 
(Powell 1993c, 91-98). 
35Powell 1993c, 88. 
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Most importantly, Powell argues that narrative criticism “unlocks the power of 
biblical stories for personal and social transformation”.36 Stories have the 
power to shape us through their ability to engage us with a world view 
different from that which we encounter in our daily lives. By entering into the 
world of the biblical story, the reader’s own world-view can be challenged and 
shaped, so that when the story is left behind they perceive the world 
differently. Powell argues that a parallel recognition of the importance of 
narratives in theology and pastoral care offers possibilities that narrative 
criticism may provide a means of integration with these other disciplines.37  
 
Powell further offers narrative criticism as an essential element in an 
“expanded hermeneutic” for the interpretation of the Bible as the Word of 
God.38 For the Bible to function as the Word of God it must be read and 
interpreted in the present and not simply as a witness to past events, and a 
literary engagement with the Gospels facilitates a movement away from 
historicist concerns and towards questions of present meaning. Similarly, the 
moment of inspiration and textually-mediated revelation is the moment of 
reading rather than the moment of composition, so that “A better formulation 
than saying, The Bible is the Word of God, would be to say, The Bible 
becomes the Word of God in those who receive it”.39 The value of narrative 
criticism to the church is that “it enables scholars to complete the full task of 
interpretation in a way that does not limit revelation to events that happened in 
the past”.40 
 
 Powell suggests that for a believing reader committed to the scriptural status 
of the Bible, engagement with the text through narrative criticism is to hear the 
                                                 
36Powell 1993c, 90. 
37Powell 1993c, 91. 
38Powell 1993c, 98-101. 
39Powell 1993c, 98. 
40Powell 1993c, 99. 
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word of God expressed through the voice of the reliable implied author, to 
receive that word as the implied reader and to be transformed through a 
hermeneutics of reception.41 He goes further, however, by arguing that “by 
interpreting texts from the point of view of their own implied readers, 
narrative criticism offers exegesis that is inevitably from a faith perspective”.42 
Powell’s evaluation of his method reveals that his motive is not only to offer 
an objective, academic narrative model for biblical interpretation, but to offer 
a critical approach which can serve the interests of a confessional 
hermeneutics of scripture. 
 
Powell’s exposition of narrative criticism has been very influential in 
establishing the approach as a viable alternative to traditional historical-critical 
Biblical Studies. Powell offers his reader an approach which addresses some 
of the major weaknesses and inadequacies of historical-critical scholarship; 
which safeguards scholarly objectivity by means of a text-centred critical 
methodology drawn from academically credible sources in literary theory; and 
which promises academic and confessional interpretation through the 
application of a single critical method. Powell’s commitment to the literary 
unity of biblical texts and to formalist methods of interpretation, however, as 
well as his confessional motivation, has drawn severe criticism from a number 
of quarters, and the nature of the criticisms reveals some of the difficulties of 
establishing an academically-credible confessional interpretative approach in 
the postmodern context. 
 
 
                                                 
41Powell 1993c, 98. 
42Powell 1993c, 88-9 (my emphasis). 
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Objections to Narrative Criticism 
 
Postmodern and ideological critics have attacked narrative criticism on a 
number of fronts, with particular points of contention being narrative 
criticism’s theoretical coherence, its ethical consequences for interpretation, 
and the covert nature of its underlying confessional commitment. These 
criticisms relate, therefore, to the three levels of interest which we identified in 
chapter two as implicated in postmodern critical approaches: methodological, 
ideological and political. 
 
 
Methodological Interests and Theoretical Issues 
 
Stanley Porter has questioned Powell’s assertion that narrative criticism is an 
“independent, parallel movement in its own right”, without exact counterpart 
in literary theory.43 Whereas Powell seeks to identify narrative criticism with 
rhetorical or reader response approaches, Porter argues that Powell fails to 
account for New Criticism in identifying his literary sources.44 The major 
features of narrative criticism which Powell identifies (final form, textual 
unity and the text as an end in itself) are characteristic New-Critical concepts, 
causing Porter to conclude that “it is evident that this so-called narrative 
criticism is only a sub-category of the New Criticism”.45 
 
                                                 
43Powell 1993c, 19; Porter 1995. 
44
 This is not quite true. Powell features New Criticism prominently, along with Wayne 
Booth’s rhetorical criticism, in his survey of the development of literary theory (Powell 1993c, 
4-6). Powell does not, however, make his debt to New Criticism explicit, and does not include 
it alongside structuralism, rhetorical criticism and reader response when attempting to define 
the nature of narrative criticism as a literary approach. 
45Porter 1995, 103. 
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New Criticism had its origins in the 1920s and the writings of F.R. Leavis, 
I.A. Richards, William Empson and T.S. Eliot, and was formulated into a 
comprehensive approach to literary interpretation by the 1940s, finding its 
classic expression in René Wellek and Austin Warren’s Theory of Literature 
(1949).46 The goal of literary study was “the interpretation and analysis of the 
works of literature themselves”, rather than recovery of the context and 
external circumstances of textual production or considerations of reader 
reception.47 New Criticism stressed the autonomy and unity of the literary 
work, rigorously bracketing out questions of authorial intent or affective 
reader response (the so-called “intentional” and “affective” fallacies).48 
Meaning was to be found in the form of the text itself, and the practice of New 
Criticism was dominated by intrinsic textual analysis which paid close 
attention to textual form and “the words on the page”. New Critics also 
asserted that the form and content of literary works were inseparable and that 
the meaning of a work could not be identified with its paraphraseable sense, so 
that the only means of accessing that meaning was engagement with the text 
itself and not with the attempts of critics to paraphrase or explicate it.49 New 
Criticism also took a high moral view of literature as a repository of human 
values, and actively engaged with issues of morality in the literature it 
scrutinized. 
 
It is clear that Powell’s foundational emphases upon textual unity, study of the 
final form and an understanding of the text as an end in itself are all deeply 
New-Critical. Objections to this dependence have come from a number of 
critics, suspicious of narrative criticism’s links to New Criticism on theoretical 
                                                 
46Wellek and Warren 1973. 
47Wellek and Warren 1973, 139. 
48The classic New-Critical treatment of these is in the work of W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe 
Beardsley. See Wimsatt and Beardsley 1954. 
49This view is most clearly argued in Brooks 1947, but see also Wellek and Warren 1973, 141-
2. 
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and ideological grounds. One challenge is that New-Critical text theories 
appear outmoded in the light of poststructuralist theory. Stephen D. Moore has 
been particularly critical of the tendency in Biblical Studies to lag behind the 
forefront of literary theory, and narrative criticism’s reliance upon New 
Criticism serves as a good example. According to Moore, narrative criticism 
backed the wrong horse in the literary-theoretical race by aligning itself with 
New Criticism, putting its money on a commitment to textual unity and 
formalist methodology when these were being overtaken in literary theory by 
more up-to-date approaches such as reader response and deconstruction.50 The 
result, Moore argues, is that narrative criticism became burdened with a text 
theory which was, in fact, “the legacy of a particular movement whose golden 
age is now long past”.51 A consequence of this, Moore suggests, is that 
compared to mainstream literary scholarship, biblical literary criticism often 
appears retarded, obsessed with concerns which have long ceased to trouble 
literary critics.52 
 
One major issue with narrative criticism’s New-Critical emphasis on textual 
unity is that this is presented as an a priori assumption rather than something 
to be proven and argued for, and both historical and postmodern critics have 
taken issue with this.53 Petri Merenlahti, for instance, accepts that an a priori 
assumption of unity may be useful as the basis for a critical approach, opening 
up new interpretative possibilities and potentially revealing previously 
unrecognised patterns of unity in the text. At the same time, however, he 
insists that the unity of particular texts ought not to be assumed but discovered 
                                                 
50Moore has been one of narrative criticism’s fiercest critics for a number of reasons, not least 
of which is its confessional commitment to the Bible as Scripture. 
51Moore 1989, 11. 
52Stanley Porter has similarly characterised much biblical literary criticism as “brutally and 
simplistically naive” (Porter 1995, 87). Porter criticises biblical literary critics for failing to 
address or develop theoretical or methodological issues, uncritically combining incompatible  
approaches, and for failing to fully appreciate the implications of some of the methods they 
adopt (Porter 1995, 94-7, 116-20). 
53See for instance Moore 1987; de Boer 1992, 43; Ashton 1994, 144; Lee 1999, 136-37. 
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through critical analysis, and that failure to question textual unity threatens to 
render the unified readings produced from the assumption of unity self-
validating and uncritical.54 
 
Moore has also sounded a note of ideological caution over narrative 
criticism’s New-Critical roots, observing that many first-generation narrative 
critics failed to acknowledge their debt to New Criticism.55 For postmodern 
critics such as Moore, such failure appears suspicious because literary theories 
are rarely ideologically neutral, and failure to acknowledge one’s theoretical 
source may indicate an attempt to mask a hidden ideological agenda. This is 
significant in light of the fact that New Criticism rests upon a strong 
ideological foundation. The founders of New Criticism were strongly aligned 
with conservative political forces within British society during the 1920s and 
1930s. Reacting against what they saw as the decline of religion as a source of 
social values in the face of the degenerative forces of modern industrialism, 
New Criticism sought to assert the importance of literature as a repository of 
human values. Texts were scrutinised and evaluated, and those not found 
wanting were incorporated into a canon of literature which included the 
deepest and truest expressions of human life. The values expressed in this 
canon, of course, reflected those of the critics themselves: Terry Eagleton has 
characterised New Criticism as “the ideology of an uprooted, defensive 
                                                 
54Merenlahti 2002, 23-4. David Lee has similarly argued that literary unity must be 
empirically established rather than assumed. Lee further argues that a literary approach which 
insists at all times upon the unity of the text before study actually begins will be 
methodologically incapable of addressing textual elements which threaten or question that 
unity, and identifies this as a weakness of New Criticism which narrative criticism has 
inherited from its parent (Lee 1999, 136-38). 
55Moore 1989, 11. See also Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 86-7. This concern has been 
addressed by narrative critics such as Elizabeth Struthers Malbon and David Rhoads, who 
have unapologetically acknowledged their New-Critical debts (Malbon 1992, 24-6; Rhoads 
1999, 269). 
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intelligentsia who reinvented in literature what they could not locate in 
reality”.56 
 
Aware of this ideological underpinning, Moore among others has expressed 
his suspicion of the motives of narrative critics who adopt New Criticism as 
their text theory, and regards his suspicions as well-founded in the light of 
Powell’s assertion that one of the strengths of narrative criticism is its 
coherence with the concerns of believing communities.57 Moore notes a 
suggestion by Powell  that an emphasis upon the unity of the Gospel narratives 
is “especially attractive to those who have been uncomfortable with the 
challenges posed by historical criticism”.58 Just as New Criticism represented 
a conservative impulse to shy away from questions which threatened certain 
values and vested interests, so narrative criticism in the light of Powell’s 
statement appears to represent a similar retrograde step, a disengagement from 
historical scholarship to protect narrative critics’ confessional commitment to 
the biblical text as Scripture.59 Moore is further worried by Powell’s assertion 
that the attempt to read the Gospels from the point of view of their implied 
reader “offers exegesis that is inevitably from a faith perspective”,60 
responding that, “At this point, poststructuralism begins to back away 
nervously from narrative criticism, alarmed at the evangelical glint that has 
abruptly appeared in its eye”.61 
 
                                                 
56Eagleton 1996, 40. Chris Baldick has similarly described New Criticism as maintaining “a 
Romantic tradition of social and cultural criticism in their common defence of aesthetic values 
against the degradations of modern industrial capitalism and in their nostalgic attitudes to 
traditional rural societies or ‘organic communities’” (Baldick 1996, 77). 
57Moore 1994, 115-16. 
58Powell 1993c, 88. 
59Stanley Porter has also questioned whether one reason why a number of New Testament 
critics have adopted literary methodologies is to “avoid dealing with critical questions that 
might run contrary to their theologies” (Porter 1995, 119). 
60Powell 1993c, 88-9. 
61Moore 1994, 116. 
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Moore’s concern is not that Powell is motivated by an underlying confessional 
commitment, but that this commitment is largely covert. Throughout What is 
Narrative Criticism?, narrative criticism is presented as an objective, text-
centred critical method until the revelation of Powell’s “expanded 
hermeneutic” in the last chapter. The use of formalist objectivism as a stalking 
horse to sneak a confessional hermeneutic into the academic arena concerns 
Moore, who sees this as a dishonest move. 
 
The theoretical coherence of narrative criticism has also been challenged, 
largely on the basis of its eclectic culling of methodologies from literary 
theory. Biblical critics, it is argued, regularly present as straightforward and 
uncomplicated issues of theory which are far from unanimously accepted by 
literary critics, and lack a clear and informed understanding of the theories and 
methods they adopt based upon a first-hand encounter with the primary 
theoretical sources.62 Further, they are accused of adopting theoretical models 
which appear to suit their own presuppositions without engaging in serious 
thought as to the appropriateness or viability of their theoretical base.63 
 
Moore, for instance, has argued that narrative criticism’s New-Critical text 
theory is incompatible with its methodology, which is derived primarily from 
the discipline of Narratology.64 The two approaches, he argues, are about very 
different things: 
                                                 
62Porter 1990, 278-83. 
63See especially Porter 1995, 94-97 for a comprehensive attack upon biblical literary 
approaches from a theoretical point of view. 
64Moore 1987, 452. Stanley Porter has noted the remark of Terry Eagleton that attempts to 
combine critical approaches are “more likely to lead to a nervous breakdown than to a brilliant 
literary career” (Porter 1995, 95 n.43, citing Eagleton 1983, 198). Taken in context, however, 
Eagleton’s remark refers more to the attempt to combine theories with disparate philosophical 
bases. Narrative criticism, on the other hand, draws its critical terminology from a range of 
sources which cohere around Jakobson’s text-as-communication model. David Lee has 
attempted to demonstrate that narrative theory is theoretically incoherent by tracing that 
incoherence to its primary source, Seymour Chatman’s Story and Discourse. Lee is highly 
critical of Chatman, arguing that his eclectic fusion of different narrative theories results in a 
theoretically incoherent and “essentially uncritical” practice which has, in turn, fatally 
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Narratology is about theory, narrative criticism is about exegesis. 
Narratologists analyse texts mainly to develop theories. Narrative 
critics utilize theory mainly to explicate texts.65 
 
Narratology, Moore observes, “does not privilege or emphasize the unity of 
individual narrative works”, instead sampling many works to produce a 
coherent theory.66 Narrative criticism ignores this, exposing itself to the 
accusation levelled by Stanley Porter that “criticism is simply a functional 
tool, to be used as long as it is useful or in contexts where it seems to promise 
results, rather than as a way of seeing and understanding textual reality”.67 
Petri Merenlahti and Raimo Hakola have also detected a disjunction between 
New Critical and Narratological elements in narrative criticism, arguing that 
whilst New Criticism takes an evaluative approach to the text, Narratology is 
more concerned with interpretation and description, and that narrative 
criticism’s blending of the two approaches renders it somehow incoherent.68 
 
It is necessary to point out that these objections to narrative criticism rest upon 
two assumptions commonly held by poststructuralist literary theorists: first, 
that theory is necessarily a higher-order discipline than criticism and that 
theoretical concerns should take priority over critical practice; and second, that 
older theories are inevitably superseded and rendered redundant by newer 
ones. Both of these assumptions are highly questionable. 
 
                                                                                                                                
undermined the biblical narrative criticism derived from his work (Lee 1999, 138). Lee argues 
that Chatman ignores poststructuralist developments in theory and fails to generate new 
theoretical insights (Lee 1999, 340). I hope to show that these accusations are insufficient to 
undermine the viability either of Chatman’s model or of narrative criticism. 
65Moore 1989, 51 
66Moore 1989, 52-3. Moore uses Genette’s Narrative Discourse (Genette 1980) to make the 
latter point. I believe that Moore stretches the evidence a little far - throughout Narrative 
Discourse Genette points out that his text (Proust’s Récherche à la Temps Perdu) often 
provides the exception which proves the theoretical rule. 
67Porter 1995, 96. 
68Merenlahti and Hakola 1999, 19-21. 
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Theory and criticism have long been recognised by literary critics as differing 
but mutually informing enterprises. Seymour Chatman, for instance, argues 
that criticism and theory must engage in ongoing dialogue, and states that part 
of his role as theorist is to provide critics with “terms that will meet their 
requirements [...] so that they can genuinely trust them for their proper work, 
the elucidation and evaluation of texts”.69 Mieke Bal, a highly respected 
postmodern critic and herself no theoretical lightweight, similarly rejects the 
priority of theory over practice: 
 
I never lost the need to work with a text when elaborating a theoretical 
discussion, and to examine a theoretical question while engaged with a 
text. I guess this taste for an integration of theoretical and literary 
practice comes from the assumption that the two are not fundamentally 
different, let alone hierarchically ordered.70 
 
A healthy tradition of methodological and theoretical eclecticism is also 
apparent in narratology itself. Chatman, regarded as “almost canonical” as a 
theoretical source in narrative criticism, makes a point of synthesising insights 
from Booth’s rhetorical criticism, New Criticism, Russian Formalism and 
European Structuralism.71 Another major source, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, 
expresses explicit indebtedness to a similar mixture of approaches with the 
addition of Tel Aviv Poetics and Wolfgang Iser.72 These sources, whilst 
eclectic, cohere around a shared basis in Jakobson’s text as communication 
model, and therefore represent a coherent methodological grouping. Porter’s 
accusation that narrative critics treat critical methods as functional tools to be 
selected only on the basis of their usefulness can therefore be accepted as a 
description but not as a criticism. 
 
                                                 
69Chatman 1978, 266 
70Bal 1991, 8. 
71Chatman 1978; Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 35 
72Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 5 
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The notion that older methodologies are automatically rendered obsolete by 
newer ones is also dubious. In his comprehensive overview of the 
development of literary criticism, Chris Baldick has argued that:  
 
if there is ‘progress’ in this sphere, it is not of the scientific but the 
political kind, in which hitherto unrepresented interest-groups and 
constituencies assert their values alongside and against (but never 
finally in place of) the rest. New arrivals in the critical arena, then, 
should not, without strong evidence, be assumed to have superseded 
their older competitors.73  
 
Similarly, Mieke Bal has acknowledged the need to follow developments in 
literary theory whilst arguing that new work which challenges the assumptions 
of earlier approaches does not automatically render those approaches futile: 
 
assuming that the “new” is new at all is a linearist fallacy; assuming 
that the “new” is automatically superior is an evolutionist fallacy [...] I 
am arguing to expose the reactionary scenario of a simplistic plea for 
academic progressivity, and claiming that there may be more 
progressivity in not rejecting the past en bloc.74 
 
Powell has consistently rejected the “Darwinian” model of critical progress 
offered by his critics, arguing instead that different approaches engage with 
different aspects of the process of communication from author through text to 
reader.75  He notes ironically the frustration of reader-response critics  with 
narrative critics “who have not understood that text-orientation is supposed to 
be a vehicle for carrying author-oriented scholars into the realm of reader 
orientation”.76 Powell argues instead that a recognition that different critical 
                                                 
73Baldick 1996, 8-9. 
74Bal 1991, 23. 
75Powell 1992b, 45-6. In a footnote on the same page Powell is critical of the way in which 
Stephen Moore’s Literary Criticism and the Gospels presents the development of literary 
theory as a narrative of linear progression which inevitably culminates with deconstruction. 
76Powell 1992b, 46. More recently Powell has exchanged testy comments with David Lee. Lee 
is critical of Powell’s retention of E.M. Forster’s “crude and now obsolete” concept of “flat” 
and “round” characters (Lee 1999, 129 n.35). Powell ripostes by stating that “I do not shun 
what scholars deem ‘crude’ for that reason alone. Nor do I judge the usefulness of concepts by 
the date when they were proposed” (Powell 2001, 218 n.182). 
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methods ask different questions and occupy different positions along the 
author-text-reader axis should diminish “the value judgements that legitimise 
some approaches at the expense of others”.77 
 
It is ultimately unsurprising that first-generation narrative criticism sought to 
base itself upon New Criticism and narrative theory. The challenge to 
narrative criticism at the time was to establish itself as academically credible 
in a discipline which did not necessarily share an interest in the final form of 
the biblical texts, or in an interpretive model which enabled the Gospel 
narratives to function as scripture. Narrative criticism had a pressing need to 
find a methodology which would help to define the approach as both 
academically valid and distinct from existing historical-critical methods and 
found it in New Criticism, an approach which was well established and 
therefore highly credible as a theoretical and methodological source.78 New 
Criticism offered total respect for the unity of the text in its canonical form as 
well as a well-established method for reading that text in detail. Its utter 
rejection of a historicist approach sat well with narrative critics’ 
disenchantment with historical biblical criticism, whilst the simultaneous 
rejection of any consideration of readers’ reaction to the text safeguarded 
narrative critics from accusations of subjectivity and non-verifiability. The 
academic credibility of narrative critics who adopted New Criticism was also 
bolstered by the fact that, although New Criticism was beginning to be 
challenged by newer approaches by the 1970s, it was still the dominant 
approach to literary criticism within higher education. New Criticism thus 
                                                 
77Powell 1992b, 46. 
78
 Powell has pointed out that the literary schools to which narrative criticism turned such as 
structuralism, Russian formalism, narratology and New Criticism had all been established in  
literary studies for over thirty years, adding that “Biblical critics were understandably more 
interested in drawing from the tried and true than in sampling what might just be the latest 
fads” (Powell 2001, 67). 
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offered both ideological compatibility and academic credibility, and early 
narrative critics siezed upon it as their basic text-theory. 
 
A second major source in the form of narratology  provided narrative criticism 
with a rigorous formalist methodology for literary analysis of biblical 
narratives.79 The adoption of these approaches focussed narrative criticism’s 
interest on the literary rhetoric of the narrative, but also provided narrative 
critics with an academically credible analytical method derived largely from a 
structuralist background itself modelled on the natural sciences. Seymour 
Chatman’s interpretation of the text as communication model and the concept 
of the implied reader were the most important gains of narrative criticism’s 
adoption of narrative theory, representing an advance on New Criticism’s 
theory of text. Instead of a static aesthetic model of the text as a timeless 
literary work, Chatman offered a model of the text as rhetorical. This had 
obvious appeal to critics who wished to respond confessionally to the Bible as 
the Word of God. At the same time, however, Chatman’s approach was still 
firmly text-centred, acknowledging the existential reality of author and reader 
but bracketing them for the purposes of literary analysis which was still firmly 
formalist, focussed through the text-immanent construct of the implied reader. 
 
Narrative criticism in the 1980s was forged from an amalgam of  theories and 
approaches selected on the basis of their suitability for the narrative-critical 
programme. Theoretical coherence based upon the formalist text-as-
communication model was underpinned by ideological coherence based upon 
a confessional commitment to the Bible as scripture, but unfortunately this 
coherence has not always been perceived by its opponents. One important 
reason for this is that narrative critics have not always devoted sufficient 
                                                 
79
 Other influential works include Uspensky 1973; Todorov 1977; Genette 1980; Todorov 
1981; Booth 1983; Rimmon-Kenan 1983; Bal 1997.  
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attention to the theoretical underpinnings of their critical practice, causing 
their approach to appear theoretically weak. This renders narrative criticism 
vulnerable to attack by theoretically-literate postmodern scholars such as 
Moore. If narrative criticism is to emerge as a fully-fledged postmodern 
approach it will need to ensure that both its theory of text and its critical 
practice are transparently robust and coherent. 
 
 
Ethical and Theological Issues with Narrative-Critical Formalism 
 
As well as strong challenges over its theoretical base, its text theory and its 
theoretical coherence, narrative criticism following Powell’s model has also 
faced attack on ethical and theological grounds. The major issue has been 
narrative criticism’s insistence on bracketing out any consideration of textual 
referentiality in favour of an analysis of the story-world of Gospel narratives. 
This has led, it is argued, to unfortunate consequences with regard to the ethics 
of interpretation. 
 
Unsurprisingly, narrative criticism’s rejection of referential concerns has been 
greeted with bewilderment, bemusement and no small amount of scorn by 
historical critics,80 but a postmodern challenge has been mounted by Petri 
Merenlahti and Raimo Hakola, who take issue with Powell’s treatment of the 
characterisation of Jewish leaders in the synoptic Gospels.81 Powell stresses 
the role of Jewish leaders in the narrative structure and their function as foils 
                                                 
80John Ashton, for instance, argues that “narrative criticism is more of a fad than a fashion, 
and that since it misconceives the true nature of the Gospels the results it yields are trifling, if 
not altogether illusory” (Ashton 1994, 141). Ashton is highly critical of Culpepper’s Anatomy 
of the Fourth Gospel which, he suggests, “evokes the image of a pathologist who, after a close 
inspection of a corpse that has earlier undergone major surgery, makes no reference to this in 
his report, and is even reluctant to mention the fact that the body has recently been fitted with 
a sizeable prosthesis” (Ashton 1994, 147). 
81Powell 1993c, 58ff.. See also Powell 1990. 
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for Jesus both in their spoken dialogue and in the character traits they exhibit, 
such as lack of authority, self-righteousness, lack of love, selfishness or 
downright evil. Powell agrees that this depiction is overwhelmingly negative, 
but then goes on to argue that historical approaches to the Jewish leaders in the 
Gospels which criticise their portrayal as historically inaccurate are misguided. 
In particular, he defends Matthew’s Gospel against the accusation of anti-
semitism, claiming that “such a reading represents a gross example of the 
referential fallacy and completely misses the point of the story” by failing to 
recognize that “Regardless of whether they were modelled after real people 
known to the real author, their current function as characters in a story is not 
referential but poetic”.82 From a narrative-critical point of view the historical 
accuracy of the characterisation is irrelevant: what is important is the impact 
of that characterisation on the way the implied readers understands the role of 
the Jewish leaders within the world of the Gospel story. 
 
Merenlahti and Hakola take issue with this bracketing of referential ethical 
considerations, objecting that Powell ignores the fact that the Gospels 
frequently make truth-claims which refer outside the boundaries of their story 
worlds.83 The narrative rhetoric of the Gospels makes clear that readers are 
expected to respond not just aesthetically but ideologically to the story they 
are reading, and that the ideology of the story has direct bearing upon the real 
reader’s real life. Agreeing that Powell’s intrinsic analysis of Matthew is 
sound per se, Merenlahti and Hakola take issue with his interpretation of the 
narrative as purely literary, insisting that Powell is “grossly misreading” the 
Gospel by treating it as a fictional narrative.84  If Jesus is not to be regarded as 
                                                 
82Powell 1993c, 66. 
83Merenlahti and Hakola 1999, 34. 
84Merenlahti and Hakola 1999, 41. 
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a character whose relevance is limited within the boundaries of the story, why 
should the Jewish leaders be?85 The problem with Powell’s approach is that: 
 
Powell’s idea of textual analysis can only reckon with two levels of 
meaning, namely literary and real-world. What should properly be the 
level of ideology is replaced with a blind-spot. As a consequence, the 
ideology reflected in the text is seen as a mere literary device.86 
 
Merenlahti and Hakola insist that an essential element of any critical 
interpretive approach is an ideological-critical awareness which allows textual 
ideology to be examined and evaluated.87 Narrative criticism lacks such 
awareness, and is therefore deficient. 
 
Significantly, however, Merenlahti and Hakola go on to identify a theological 
motive in Powell’s bracketing of historical, ethical and ideological issues. The  
aesthetic emphasis of narrative criticism has strong appeal to a confessional 
critic, especially “the promise to centre on the poetic aspects of the Gospels 
and leave aside all conclusions that might concern the history, doctrine or 
policies of the church. [...] the very promise to ignore every ideological aspect 
might make the approach useful ideologically”.88 In short, narrative criticism’s 
interest in issues of literary aesthetics and literary form is neither literary nor 
aesthetic but theological. 
 
We have noted that theological interests play a large part in motivating 
narrative critics. Ironically, however, the insistence of Powell and others upon 
nailing their colours to a formalist critical methodology has drawn the 
                                                 
85Merenlahti and Hakola 1999, 42. 
86Merenlahti and Hakola 1999, 41n.. 
87Merenlahti and Hakola 1999, 43. 
88Merenlahti and Hakola 1999, 45. Merenlahti and Hakola identify the same tendencies in 
Mark Stibbe’s narrative-critical work on John. Interestingly, Stibbe has also attempted to 
rehabilitate the portrayal of Jews in John’s Gospel, laying the blame for anti-semitic 
interpretations on the shoulders of “those who have interpreted John with a prior commitment 
to anti-semitism” (Stibbe 1993, 19). 
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accusation that narrative criticism is actually inadequate as a theological 
approach to the Bible. Francis Watson has welcomed the contribution of 
literary approaches in breaking down monolithic historical-critical scholarship, 
noting that the importation of the literary paradigm into Biblical Studies has 
eroded historical-critical consensus, and that “an unintended side effect of this 
is that an interpretative practice oriented explicitly towards theological 
concerns can now claim the right to exist”.89 Watson is deeply uneasy, 
however, about the notion of biblical narratives as self-contained, and the 
bracketing of textual truth claims. Watson notes that literary emphasis on the 
text as an end in itself can serve a theological agenda, but argues that the 
exclusion of the text’s referential function from consideration results in 
“failure adequately to address the church’s proper concern with the 
fundamental truth of the biblical story of salvation: for if, and only if, this 
story is true, then all worldly reality must be understood in the light of it”.90 
 
Issues of referential truth cannot be bracketed out in a properly theological 
interpretation of the Bible, Watson claims, because the power of the text to 
transform its reader depends upon its truth claims. Hence, Jesus considered 
only as a character in the biblical narrative “is theologically uninteresting; for 
the Word became flesh and not text, even though the enfleshed Word is 
textually mediated”.91 The reader of the Gospels “reads these texts in order to 
discover again that, outside and prior to these texts, Jesus is the Christ. The 
possibility of this discovery is dependent on their claim to be truthful to the 
prior reality they seek to render”.92 Narrative criticism’s methodological 
failure to address textual truth claims thus renders it deficient as a theological 
approach. 
                                                 
89Watson 1996b, 132. 
90Watson 1994, 29. 
91Watson 1997, 34 (author’s emphasis). 
92Watson 1997, 36. 
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Like Merenlahti and Hakola, Watson is also suspicious of Powell’s use of 
literary formalism to defuse ethical difficulties in interpretation. The concept 
of Gospel texts as self-contained literary worlds ignores the fact that these 
texts function within a broader socio-political domain in which Scripture is “a 
blessing and a curse”, both “the vehicle of the life-giving Spirit of truth” and 
also “the letter that kills”, and in seeking to ignore this, final form criticism 
“fails to discharge its ethical responsibilities”.93 As an example of this failure, 
Watson engages Powell’s assertion in What is Narrative Criticism? that 
readers must suspend their own judgement during the act of reading on the 
basis that initial acceptance of the textual point of view is an essential 
preliminary to any criticism of it.94 Watson responds that this is “poor 
phenomenology of reading”, since readers cannot help but evaluate narrative 
point of view as they read, but is also suspicious of what he sees as an 
underlying desire in Powell to evade serious engagement with biblical 
narratives which pose ethical problems to the contemporary interpreter:95 
 
Underlying this refusal to engage in serious critical analysis of the 
rhetoric of oppression is not only the methodological self-limitation 
proper to any interpretative paradigm, but also an unquestioning faith 
in the revelatory power and positive innocence of stories. The reader of 
a story is magically transported back to the Garden of Eden, and a 
reader tactless enough to criticise the story that is told there will 
immediately be expelled.96 
 
The history of biblical interpretation, Watson argues, is one in which 
liberating and oppressive uses of texts are intertwined. These uses persist into 
the present, so that “an analysis of the texts in the light of this broader context 
is a theological imperative”.97 Canonical texts should not be abstracted from 
                                                 
93Watson 1994, 60. 
94Powell 1993c, 24. 
95Watson 1994, 60. 
96Watson 1994, 61. 
97Watson 1994, 74. 
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the contemporary context within which they operate, but should be interpreted 
in relation to that context if they are to function as Scripture. This renders a 
purely formalist literary approach which seeks to interpret biblical narratives 
only in terms of their closed story worlds inadequate, since “the theological 
task is to understand not only the text but reality in the light of the text”.98 
 
Within the postmodern context, the above criticisms are highly significant. In 
an academic community where ethics of interpretation are taken seriously, for 
narrative criticism explicitly to bracket such considerations is a highly suspect 
move and raises questions about the self-awareness of narrative critics as 
interpreters. Watson’s arguments, however, raise a more disturbing possibility, 
namely that narrative criticism’s confessional interests and formalist 
methodology are profoundly at odds. If Watson is correct, then a narrative-
critical understanding of the Gospel text as a self-contained story world 
renders the text incapable of functioning as Scripture in the way that Powell 
claims to support. Why, then, did narrative critics select a critical methodology 
which actually works against their underlying interpretive motive? 
 
 
From Formalism to Reader Response: Conflicts of Interest in Narrative 
Criticism 
As we have seen, Mark Allan Powell and other narrative critics developed 
their approach in the context of a breakdown of confidence in historical-
critical scholarship during the 1970s and 1980s. Turning to literary theory for 
an alternative method, they found it in New Criticism and narrative theory, 
which appeared to suit their confessional commitment to the Bible as 
scripture. Powell in particular, however, has attracted sharp criticism both in 
                                                 
98Watson 1994, 75. 
 142 
terms of his theoretical foundations and his ethics of interpretation from 
postmodern critics. A further  perceived weakness of narrative criticism is that 
the integrity of its commitment to formalist analysis of biblical texts is 
actually threatened by a strong confessional motivation. We will now proceed 
to consider how this conflict of interests arises and what its consequences for 
the viability of narrative criticism as a postmodern approach might be.  
 
First generation narrative criticism presented itself as an objective, text-
centred critical approach drawn from narrative theory. Narrative critics sought 
to define their position in the middle ground between the “intentional fallacy” 
of authorial interests and the “affective fallacy” of subjective reader response: 
the object of study was the text itself and the only reader in which narrative 
criticism professed to be interested was the implied reader assumed and 
inscribed in and by the text itself. 
 
In practice, however, this position proved impossible to maintain, due to 
tensions between narrative criticism’s formalist methodology and its 
confessional motives. The conflict between narrative criticism’s 
methodological and ideological interests is evident in What is Narrative 
Criticism? when, having clearly and repeatedly emphasised that narrative 
criticism is objective and text-focussed, Powell departs from this position 
towards the end of the book in setting out his “expanded hermeneutic”, 
asserting that narrative criticism “unleashes the power of biblical stories for 
personal and social transformation”.99 Keeping his distance from historical 
criticism by denying that the transforming power of story derives from its 
referential function, Powell abruptly shifts his reader perspective from the 
implied reader to the real reader: 
 
                                                 
99Powell 1993c, 90. 
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the narrative form itself corresponds in some profound way to reality 
and thus enables us to translate our experience of the story world into 
our own situation. Entering the story world of a narrative may be 
likened to attendance at a modern-day motion picture. Once inside the 
theatre, we may find ourselves involved with a view of reality distinct 
from that of the world in which we actually live. Nevertheless it is 
possible for our encounter with this simplified and perhaps outlandish 
view of reality to have an effect on us, an effect that may continue to 
make itself felt long after we leave the theatre and return to the real 
world.100 
 
The process of attempting to read as the implied reader thus becomes, for 
Powell, a step on the way to faith. If, in the process of reading, the real reader 
must take on the role of the implied reader of the Gospel narrative, and if that 
implied perspective is necessarily a faith perspective, then the experience of 
reading the story of Jesus through the eyes of faith may remain with the reader 
after their encounter with the story ends. The interaction of reader and text 
may so shape the reader’s consciousness as to produce faith where none 
existed before. 
 
It is clear that at this point what was presented as a formalist reading strategy 
has been transformed into a confessional hermeneutic. It is also clear that, in 
theoretical terms, Powell has gone beyond formalism and stepped over into 
reader response. To be fair, Powell has himself flagged up this possibility 
earlier in the book, where he observes that “in recent years narrative criticism 
and reader-response criticism have been coming closer together”, and that the 
two “may eventually become indistinguishable”.101 Even so, Powell is at pains 
in What is Narrative Criticism? to distinguish his approach from reader 
response, and his movement in that direction at the very point in his argument 
at which he seeks to set out the advantages of narrative criticism as a 
                                                 
100Powell 1993c, 90. 
101Powell 1993c, 21. Powell has remarked that at this point in his original manuscript his 
editor, Dan O. Via, wrote “They should!” (Powell 2001, 67). 
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confessional interpretive approach raises the suggestion that his 
methodological slippage is ideologically motivated. 
 
Powell’s understanding of the way in which the Gospel narrative impacts on 
the real reader conforms to a “soft” reader response or rhetorical hermeneutic 
of the kind proposed by Wayne Booth or Wolfgang Iser. For both Booth and 
Iser the implied reader is not a purely text-immanent construct, but a role 
which the real reader must adopt in order to experience the rhetoric of the text. 
For Booth, the implied author of a narrative shapes not only the formal 
features of the narrative but the moral framework by which the narrative is to 
be evaluated. The implied author “will never be neutral toward all values. Our 
reactions to his various commitments, secret or overt, will help to determine 
our response to the work”.102 The interaction between reader and text, for 
Booth, is profoundly ethical, involving the communication of the implied 
author’s value-system to the reader through the act of interpretation as the text 
“must fill with its rhetoric the gap made by the suspension of my own 
beliefs”:103 
 
It is only as I read that I become the self whose beliefs must coincide 
with the author’s. Regardless of my real beliefs and practices, I must 
subordinate my mind and heart to the book if I am to enjoy it to the 
full. The author creates, in short, an image of himself and another 
image of his reader; he makes his reader, as he makes his second self, 
and the most successful reading is one in which the created selves, 
author and reader, can find complete agreement.104 
 
The success or failure of a literary work for Booth depends ultimately upon 
the conjunction of belief between author and reader, and enduring success 
                                                 
102Booth 1983, 71. 
103Booth 1983, 112. 
104Booth 1983, 138. Powell’s understanding of the transformative power of biblical texts 
appears to owe much to Booth, although he does not make this debt explicit. 
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comes when the reader retains the values of the implied reader after the 
reading process is complete.105 
 
For Iser, who coined the term, the implied reader is similarly a role which 
straddles the boundary between real reader and textually-inscribed role.106 Iser 
argues that the literary work is a collaborative interplay between text and 
reader: the literary text only takes on life when “concretised” or “actualised” 
through the application of the reader’s perception, which is itself channelled 
and structured by the formal qualities of the text. Hence, the literary work is 
“something like an arena in which reader and author participate in a game of 
the imagination”.107 Literary texts are structured so as to engage the reader’s 
mind and imagination actively, involving them in constantly forming and 
reforming interpretive perspectives on the text in a quest for coherent 
meaning.108 Most significant in this process are “gaps” or “indeterminacies” in 
the text, breaks or discontinuities in the smooth flow of information which 
must be filled by the reader for meaning to be established. These gaps force 
the reader to participate actively in the creation of meaning, applying their 
own interpretive resources rather than relying passively upon the text to reveal 
itself. 
 
The implied reader is not to be confused with any specific reader.109 For Iser 
the implied reader is a construct, a potential reader, encompassing the entire 
                                                 
105Booth is insistent that interpretation must engage with subjective issues of belief: “The 
question is whether the enjoyment of literature as literature, and not as propaganda, inevitably 
involves our beliefs, and I think that the answer is inescapable. [...] our convictions even about 
the most purely intellectual matters cannot help fundamentally affecting our literary 
responses” (Booth 1983, 139-40). Later he continues, “to claim that we can make ourselves 
into objective, dispassionate, thoroughly tolerant readers is in the final analysis nonsense” 
(Booth 1983, 147). 
106Iser’s implied reader is the counterpart to Booth’s implied author. Booth himself adopts the 
term in his Rhetoric of Irony (1974) (see Booth 1974, 126). 
107Iser 1974, 275. 
108Iser 1974, 288. 
109Iser 1978, 34. 
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range of possible reader responses to the text. The implied reader can therefore 
never be realised in a single reading: rather, “each actualisation [...] represents 
a selective realisation of the implied reader, whose own structure provides a 
frame of reference within which individual responses to a text can be 
communicated to others”.110 The implied reader is therefore an heuristic tool, 
“a transcendental model which makes it possible for the structured effects of 
literary texts to be discerned”.111 Any individual reading of any text can be set 
against the conceptual implied reader just as, for example, an individual 
actor’s performance of Hamlet can be evaluated against the whole range of 
possible responses to the script which he might have adopted, and which have 
been adopted by other actors before him. 
 
The parameters of valid interpretation are, however, at all times set by the 
written text in its formal patterns, structures, devices and gaps. Crucially, the 
formal quality of the text and the subjective perspective of the reader mutually 
inform to produce an interpretive dynamic in which the reader’s experience 
and self-understanding are ultimately expanded. The acts of conception 
involved in the reading process “are possible and successful to the degree that 
they lead to something being formulated in us [...] someone else’s thoughts 
can only take a form in our consciousness if, in the process, our unformulated 
faculty for deciphering these thoughts comes into play”.112 The reader’s 
encounter with unfamiliar world-views in the process of reading causes them 
to think and to experience thoughts and feelings which could not have been 
generated by themselves alone, bringing to consciousness aspects of their own 
awareness which were previously latent. Hence, the experience of reading 
proves genuinely transformative for the reader as their interpretive horizons 
                                                 
110Iser 1978, 37. 
111Iser 1978, 38. 
112Iser 1974, 294. 
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are constantly challenged and expanded through their encounter with the 
“otherness” of the text.113 
 
It is apparent that Powell’s “expanded hermeneutic” has strong affinities with 
the moderate reader response theories of Booth and Iser. This, however, 
creates difficulties for Powell when he has sought to define narrative criticism 
as an objective, formalist critical method which deliberately brackets out 
considerations of authorial intention and reader response. The methodological 
slippage revealed in the closing section of What is Narrative Criticism? has 
rendered Powell’s narrative criticism vulnerable to accusations from 
postmodern critics that it is actually a reader response approach which lacks 
the self-awareness or intellectual honesty to declare itself as such.  
 
The slippage between overt objective formalism and covert subjective reader 
response is characteristic not only of Powell but of other important figures in 
first generation narrative criticism. R. Alan Culpepper’s Anatomy of the 
Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design (1983), for instance, displays 
similar internal tensions.114 Like Powell, Culpepper uses Murray Krieger’s 
metaphor to contrast the historical-critical use of the Gospel text as a 
“window” onto its own history with a literary reading of the text as 
“mirror”.115 The role of the critic is to look at the Gospel narrative rather than 
                                                 
113Wallace Martin has characterised Iser’s concept of the reader as “not the fictitious figure 
addressed by the implied author, the real person reading, or some combination of the two; 
rather, the reader is a transcendental possibility, not yet realised, that exists and changes only 
in the process of reading” (Martin 1986, 162). Terry Eagleton has pointed out the influence 
upon Iser of Gadamer’s hermeneutics of the expansion of horizons through encounter with the 
unfamiliar, and draws a parallel with Russian Formalism, whose key concept of 
“defamiliarisation” similarly sees the role of the literary text as to present reality to the reader 
in an unfamiliar way so as to stimulate the reader to perceive reality afresh (Eagleton 1996, 
68-69). 
114I would argue that Powell and Culpepper are the two most important first-generation 
narrative critics. This is reflected to some extent by the amount of attention paid to them by 
hostile postmodern opponents. 
115Culpepper 1983, 3-5. 
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looking through it in order to look for historical data.116 The appropriate 
approach to the Gospel narratives, Culpepper concludes, is a formalist analysis 
of their literary rhetoric, based upon an enhanced version of the model of text 
as communication given by Chatman.117 
 
The bulk of Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel is an impressive and rigorous 
application of narratology to the Gospel.118 Culpepper is careful to distance his 
analysis from historical interests, insisting that “understanding the interests 
and theology of the real author is not our primary concern”, but that the object 
of the exercise is “to understand the gospel itself more clearly” through 
examination of the implied author and reader.119 In his treatment of the 
implied reader, however, Culpepper shows that he is unable to remain within 
the formalist boundaries he has set for his method. It is increasingly apparent 
as his discussion develops that Culpepper is interested not simply in a 
description of the formal properties of the narrative but in an evaluation of the 
literary rhetoric of the Gospel, and the impact of that rhetoric upon real 
readers. Drawing upon Peter J. Rabinowitz, Culpepper identifies the narratees 
of the Gospel (the audience implied by the narrative) with the author’s 
intended audience (the audience the real author had in mind when writing).120 
Building upon this identification, Culpepper then examines the narratees of the 
Gospel in detail on the basis of their implied knowledge of characters, places, 
language, Judaism and events in the narrative, concluding that “it appears that 
the intended readers are not Jewish, but their prior knowledge of many parts of 
                                                 
116In a published address from the same period, “Story and History in the Gospels”, Culpepper 
puts the metaphor slightly differently: “If the Gospels are windows, they are stained glass 
windows. Light shines through from the other side, but the figures are on the surface of the 
window, fashioned there by the literary artist” (Culpepper 1984, 471). 
117Culpepper 1983, 6. 
118As well as Chatman, Culpepper draws upon work by Gerard Genette, Boris Uspensky, 
Gerald Prince and Meir Sternberg among others. It is clear that Culpepper is well versed in 
narrative theory as practised in a number of schools, so that at least as regards his 
narratological method his approach is theoretically literate. 
119Culpepper 1983, 15. 
120Culpepper 1983, 206-11.
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the Gospel story shows that the intended audience is either Christian or at least 
is familiar with the Gospel story”.121 The Gospel, Culpepper concludes, 
provides its readers with a definitive interpretation of Jesus as the divine logos 
and a paradigm of faith in the person of the Beloved Disciple, and thus 
functions as a rhetorical source of communal identity for the Johannine 
community: 
 
Readers found their identity in the Gospel story and through it they 
could rise from their present struggles to hear their values and views 
reaffirmed, to hear again reassuring words from Jesus, to glimpse the 
mystery of the world above, and find themselves, or at least their ideal, 
in the figure of the Beloved Disciple, whose witness was true and 
whose ‘place’ was the bosom of the Lord.122 
 
It is important to note at this stage that Culpepper’s treatment of the reader has 
stepped beyond the text-immanent construct of the implied reader to overlap 
the real first-century readers of the Gospel. This is significant because running 
through Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel is an underlying assumption that the 
modern reader can also be affected by the literary rhetoric of the narrative in 
the same way as its intended historical audience. Throughout his analysis 
Culpepper emphasises the rhetorical nature of the narrative. His discussion of 
plot, for instance, concentrating on the conflict between faith and unbelief, 
suggests that the effect of the Gospel’s narrative structure “is to enclose the 
reader in the community of faith” through thematic development and 
rhetorical strategies.123 
 
This emphasis becomes most clear in a chapter on implicit commentary, where 
Culpepper summarises the role of irony in the Gospel. Commenting on the 
“silent communication” through which the reader is encouraged by the 
                                                 
121Culpepper 1983, 224. 
122Culpepper 1983, 227. 
123Culpepper 1983, 98. 
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narrator to enter imaginatively into the Gospel’s ironic structure, he argues 
that: 
 
author and reader are drawn together in a shared perception of meaning 
and reverence before mystery [...] united in the transformation effected 
by an experience of encounter with transcendental majesty. [...] the 
reader is called to no less than the conviction that man and God can be 
united and that from this union new life is born in man, and 
specifically in the reader.124 
 
It is clear that Culpepper believes that to read fully as the implied reader 
requires the adoption of the Gospel’s understanding of Jesus as incarnate 
Word of God, and this conclusion is made explicit in what he describes as “a 
churchman’s postscript”, where he argues that the cultural gap between 
historical text and contemporary reader emphasised by historical approaches 
makes it difficult for the modern reader to interpret the Gospel. The Fourth 
Gospel retains its place in the canon, however, because it offers “a refuge from 
all the unreliable narrators of modern life and literature”, an alternative view 
of reality which Christian readers find conducive.125 Culpepper calls for a re-
evaluation of the modernist view that truth must of necessity be literal rather 
than literary, and argues that “The future role of the Gospel in the life of the 
Church will depend upon the Church’s ability to relate both story and history 
to truth in such a way that neither has an exclusive claim to truth and one is 
not incompatible with the other”.126 If such a reconciliation is achieved, 
Culpepper concludes, “we will again be able to read the Gospel as the author’s 
original audience read it”.127 
 
Underneath Culpepper’s apparently rigorous and objective formalist approach 
to the Gospel narrative lies a fundamentally theological reader response 
                                                 
124Culpepper 1983, 202. 
125Culpepper 1983, 235. 
126Culpepper 1983, 236. 
127Culpepper 1983, 237. 
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hermeneutics which informs and affects his approach to the Gospel text.128 
The fact that, as with Powell, this affiliation remains implicit rather than 
explicit until what amounts to a long footnote at the very end of the book has 
drawn criticism from a number of postmodern scholars including 
(unsurprisingly) Stephen  Moore.129 Culpepper’s confessional hermeneutics is 
sublimated in Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel, a work aimed at a general 
academic audience, in favour of a strong text-centred formalism. Ultimately, 
however, Culpepper is unable to maintain the exclusion of historical or real-
world reader perspectives from consideration, because his confessional 
commitment to the Gospel text requires him to address issues of faith which 
are intrinsic to his interest in the text’s rhetoric.  
 
The work of Culpepper and Powell reveals that narrative criticism as a strictly 
formalist critical approach is unable to operate within its self-defined 
boundaries. On the one hand, the fact that the implied reader of the biblical 
                                                 
128Culpepper has set out this commitment elsewhere: “The experience of the narrative world 
of the Gospels, the experience of Jesus, when we read openly and sensitively draws us into 
that world and challenges us to view our world as the narrator views the narrative world, from 
a stance of faith. [...] we rehearse the response of faith and commitment in reading and in 
successive readings of the Gospels until we find in them a place to stand, an experience of 
Jesus, a knowledge of God, and a view of the world in which we live that is for us true, 
authentic and real. The Gospels, therefore, mediate and effect in us subjectively the 
redemptive work of Christ which was accomplished objectively in history by Jesus of 
Nazareth” (Culpepper 1984, 476). 
129Moore has attacked Culpepper more than once, concentrating each time on the theoretical 
underpinning of what he regards as Culpepper’s reader-response dynamic and arguing that 
unacknowledged ideological commitments inevitably lead to an unconscious contamination of 
what is presented as an objective approach to the study of the Gospel (Moore 1994, 78-80; 
Moore 1996b, 50-72). Moore objects to the “text as mirror” metaphor, arguing in the light of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis that a mirror only reflects the viewer back to themselves, making the 
unified text discerned by narrative criticism a reassuring confirmation of narrative critics’ own 
ideological investment in the text (Moore 1994, 79-80). Moore further criticises Culpepper 
and other confessional critics for blinding themselves to challenging questions posed by 
historical or poststructuralist criticism because of their emotional involvement with the body 
of work they propose to anatomize. Extending the metaphor suggested by the title of 
Culpepper’s Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel, Moore argues that confessional critics “have 
failed to dig beneath the surface, to extract the historical core of the passion narrative - its 
spinal cord, so to speak - from its fleshy, fictional housing. [...] And why? Because they have 
felt too emotionally attached to the literary corpus laid out on the slab, or rather to the person 
whose body that corpus has become” (Moore 1996b, 67). Some of Moore’s attacks on 
Culpepper were previously directed against Elizabeth Struthers Malbon: see  Malbon 1993; 
Moore 1993. 
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texts it studies is historically situated and possessed of knowledge which 
contemporary readers do not have means that narrative critics cannot bracket 
out historical questions. On the other hand, the confessional motivation which 
inspired narrative criticism in the first place drives narrative critics towards 
engagement with issues of reader response which they claim to want to avoid. 
The result, according to the authors of The Postmodern Bible (1995), is that 
“the unreflective grafting of readerly terminology onto historical-critical 
scholarship has produced an ideological mutation that is blind to both the 
oppressive and liberating power of its critical discourses”.130  
 
The search for the historically situated implied reader, combined with a strong 
theological agenda, results in a reader response approach which bears little 
relation to that practised by literary critics.131 Further, the lack of self-
awareness in such approaches means that narrative critics fail to recognise the 
extent to which their theological commitments affect their interpretation, since 
“if any theory (such as Iser’s) is adopted uncritically, then the theory will 
serve primarily to reinforce the existing ideological ends of that community’s 
reading strategies”.132 Crucially, first-generation narrative critics have failed to 
recognise that “the implied reader for whom they are reading is themselves, 
and that the implied readers whom they construct are reading strategies by 
which to verify their own readings”.133 
 
It seems clear that first-generation narrative criticism is compromised as a 
coherent interpretive approach by a crucial disjunction between its objective, 
                                                 
130Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 40. 
131Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 39. “The biblical reader-response criticism being created 
in the laboratories of the Society of Biblical Literature is an ideological mutant of historical 
criticism and biblical narrative criticism. Although to most biblical critics it appears to be a 
normal scion, it would astound the villagers if it ever stumbled down the mountain to 
fraternise with secular reader-response critics” (Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 44). 
132Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 59. 
133Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 54. 
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formalist methodology and the subjective, reader response hermeneutic to 
which its practitioners are drawn by their confessional commitment to the 
Bible as scripture. Returning again to our development of Stephen E. Fowl’s 
concept of interpretive interests, we might argue that narrative criticism’s 
methodological interests in features of textual form, focussed through the text-
immanent construct of the implied reader, are in tension or even conflict with 
its ideological interests in the ways in which textual rhetoric impacts upon the 
consciousness of real readers. But why should narrative critics choose a 
critical method which fails to address their theological interests in biblical 
texts? Why did narrative criticism not declare itself as a reader response 
approach from the outset? 
 
One answer, perhaps, is that narrative critics’ failure openly to embrace reader 
response reflects a more significant conflict of political interests. Like de-
confessional postmodern biblical criticism, narrative criticism grew out of the 
reaction in the 1970s against historical-critical interpretive paradigms. Unlike 
de-confessional criticism, however, narrative criticism had no interest in 
detaching itself from historical-critical scholarship altogether. One reason for 
this was that whereas de-confessional scholarship found itself at odds both 
with traditional scholarship’s methodological and ideological interests 
(including a strong but sublimated confessional interest in the Bible as 
scripture), narrative criticism rejected historical criticism as a method but 
retained its ideological interest in the underlying value of biblical study. 
Narrative critics were not seeking to escape from the mainstream of biblical 
scholarship, but to broaden it. Hence, at the same time as they justified their 
new approach by contrasting it with the perceived failures of historical 
criticism, they were careful not to reject mainstream Biblical Studies 
altogether. Culpepper, for instance, is careful in setting out his formalist 
approach at the beginning of Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel not to portray 
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historical criticism as an enemy. The objective, Culpepper argues, is not to 
replace historical scholarship but to offer an alternative by means of which 
new data may be gathered and new perspectives on the text perceived.134 
Culpepper denies that literary and historical criticism are opposed, arguing 
that “Once the effort has been made to understand the narrative character of 
the gospels, some rapprochement with the traditional, historical issues will be 
necessary”.135 This rapprochement has, in fact, been attempted by second-
generation narrative critics such as Mark Stibbe, who acknowledges a 
particular debt to Culpepper’s Anatomy, to which he claims all subsequent 
work has been “footnotes”.136 
 
Powell, similarly, is careful to make clear, even as he contrasts historical and 
literary approaches to biblical texts, that an assertion of literary interests does 
not question the legitimacy of historical inquiry. Literary critics bracket out 
questions of historicity so as to concentrate upon the literary aspects of the 
texts, but this is not to deny that biblical narratives may also serve a referential 
function or that “it may be rewarding to study them in that regard as well”.137 
Powell stresses that historical criticism should not be disparaged simply 
because it raises questions that are difficult for people of faith. Employment of 
narrative criticism to evade difficult or controversial issues is a “misuse” of 
the method, since mature theological reflection requires both literary-critical 
                                                 
134Culpepper 1983, 5. 
135Culpepper 1983, 11. Norman Petersen, in his Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics 
(1978), similarly warns of the danger of defining historical and literary approaches in 
opposition to one another. Petersen reminds his readers of the “cultural lag” between  literary 
theory and Biblical Studies, and points out that literary theory has moved beyond the 
polarisation of historical and literary methods towards a “bifocal” approach. Warning that “we 
cannot ignore our apparently inevitable return to a bifocal approach to our texts”, Petersen 
concludes that “If we learn our lessons well, we will not once again suffer from cultural lag by 
absolutising the metaphor of mirrors as we did the metaphor of windows” (Petersen 1978, 24-
5). 
136Stibbe 1992, 10. Stibbe’s published doctoral thesis John as Storyteller: Narrative Criticism 
and the Fourth Gospel (Stibbe 1992) proposes “an integrated narrative hermeneutic” (Stibbe 
1992, 13) which combines literary and historical methods. 
137Powell 1993c, 8. 
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appreciation and historical-critical scepticism.138 Powell closes What is 
Narrative Criticism? with a telling analogy: 
 
Different methodological approaches to exegetical study may be 
likened to a set of keys on a ring. The various keys open different 
doors and grant access to different types of insight. Narrative criticism 
has been able to open some doors that had previously been closed to 
scholars. It provides answers to questions that people of faith ask about 
the Bible and about the meaning of biblical material. But it will not 
open all the doors.139 
 
First-generation narrative criticism thus had to square the circle of establishing 
itself as methodologically distinct from traditional biblical scholarship without 
going so far that the two approaches became completely estranged. This was 
complicated by the fact that historical-critical scholarship, dominated by 
positivist interpretive paradigms, emphasised the value of scholarly objectivity 
to the extent that overt confessional commitments were frequently 
underplayed or even suppressed altogether within  mainstream Biblical 
Studies. 
 
In this context, a declaration of narrative criticism as an overtly reader 
response approach motivated by confessional interests would have made it 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish it as an accepted interpretive method 
within Biblical Studies. This explains why first-generation narrative critics 
embraced literary methodologies such as New Criticism and narratology, both 
of which were well-established in the mainstream of literary studies, and 
which offered critical methods which could be defended as “objective” and 
empirical. Put in terms of the text-as-communication model, narrative 
criticism was a step along the axis author-text-reader from author to text. This 
was as far as narrative critics felt able to go whilst remaining in touch with 
                                                 
138Powell 1993c, 89. 
139Powell 1993c, 101. 
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mainstream scholarship, to which they looked for validation. To take the 
further step of explicitly engaging reader interests would have been one step 
too far for most mainstream biblical scholars, who had enough trouble with 
literary paradigms as it was.140 Thus, although narrative critics’ theological 
motivation drew them to methodological considerations of reader interests 
from the very beginning, their political interests prevented them either from 
openly declaring their motives, as we have seen, or from embracing reader 
response methods which would have better served their purposes. One result 
of this was that, from a postmodern viewpoint informed by the ethics of 
interpretation, narrative criticism looks highly suspect: its declared 
methodological interests are at odds with its covert theological motives, 
hidden because of a political interest in gaining acceptance within mainstream 
academic and theological institutions. From this point of view, narrative 
criticism lacks ethical awareness and accountability, and has been heavily 
criticised by postmodern scholars as a result.141 
 
                                                 
140Stanley Porter, asking the question “Why Hasn’t Reader-Response Criticism Caught on in 
New Testament Studies?” (Porter 1990), argues that a number of factors militated against its 
acceptance into mainstream biblical scholarship. These include lack of consensus within 
literary theory as to what reader response is and lack of understanding of the theory by New 
Testament scholars, but also an unwillingness of biblical scholars to move beyond historical 
concerns, since “New Testament Studies appears to have very little use for an interpretative 
model which is not concerned in some direct way with history” (Porter 1990, 284). Porter’s 
argument that reader response should be taken more seriously by New Testament scholars and 
that historical concerns must be bracketed for reader response to function helpfully led to a 
tetchy exchange with Anthony Thiselton, who accuses Porter of advocating a socio-pragmatic 
approach on the lines of Stanley Fish, a charge which Porter denies (see Thiselton 1992, 548-
50; Porter 1994; Thiselton 1999, 154-62).  
141It is important to be fair. Narrative criticism has been violently attacked for failing to 
engage with, for instance, poststructuralist theory. Whilst the failure is undeniable, it is 
explicable when narrative criticism is seen in the context of mainstream scholarship during the 
1970s and 1980s, when the cloud of postmodernism was no bigger than a man’s hand. If 
narrative critics were interested in establishing themselves within the mainstream, it is not 
surprising that they showed little interest in engaging the small number of postmodern 
scholars whose voices were, at that time, very much in the wilderness. The rapid growth of 
poststructuralist, reader response and ideological criticism within de-confessional Biblical 
Studies took both historical and narrative critics by surprise, with the result that narrative 
critics found themselves under concerted attack before they were aware that any threat 
existed. 
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Towards a Postmodern Narrative Criticism 
 
We have seen that first-generation narrative criticism of the kind set out by 
Mark Allan Powell in What is Narrative Criticism? is highly vulnerable to 
postmodern critique: its formalist methodology appears outmoded; its 
bracketing of historical and referential concerns creates problems for its ethics 
of interpretation; and, most worryingly, narrative criticism’s proclamation of 
itself as an objective formalist method is undermined by a confessionally-
motivated reader response impulse which has been masked and denied in the 
interests of acceptance of the approach within the academy. Although not all 
of these objections are equally valid, as we have seen, they have been 
sufficiently established in postmodern critique of narrative criticism to 
threaten the viability of the approach in a postmodern context. We must 
therefore consider whether narrative criticism can evolve beyond its formalist 
first-generation form into a mature approach, capable of standing up to the 
demands of a postmodern Biblical Studies. 
 
Narrative criticism has not stood still since the early 1990s. Narrative critics 
have continued to wrestle with their conflicting interests, seeking on the one 
hand to achieve the rapprochement between historical and literary interests 
which Culpepper advocated, whilst also engaging more seriously with reader 
response theory and responding to challenges from poststructuralism and 
ethically-aware postmodern critics.142 Whilst many narrative critics remain 
wedded to a thoroughgoing formalism, some have moved beyond this to 
engage postmodernism more closely. Mark Allan Powell has continued to be a 
leading figure in narrative criticism, and his most recent book, Chasing the 
                                                 
142The work of Mark Stibbe offers a good example of such development. Stibbe attempts to 
combine historical and formalist literary approaches to the Gospel of John, whilst also 
exploring the prospects of reader response. See e.g. Stibbe 1992; Stibbe 1993; Stibbe 1994. 
Stibbe has also expressed interest in issues relating to charismatic hermeneutics (see Stibbe 
1998). 
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Eastern Star: Adventures in Biblical Reader-Response Criticism (2001), 
represents a major step forward in the direction of an authentically postmodern 
narrative approach. Powell responds to many of his critics by proclaiming 
narrative criticism as “the first truly postmodern approach to biblical texts, a 
method that was self-conscious of its methodological assumptions and of the 
implications of these”.143 Whilst some might question the appropriateness of 
this statement in relation to earlier formulations of narrative criticism, Chasing 
the Eastern Star is clearly a work which seeks to respond confidently and 
assertively to earlier criticism, and to establish narrative criticism as a viable 
interpretive approach in relation to the new postmodern context. 
 
Powell’s purpose in Chasing the Eastern Star is to offer “a somewhat 
amateurish postmodern phenomenology of reading”.144 Powell unpacks this 
term by explaining that his approach is phenomenological in that it is “not 
offered as a description of how people should read but as a tool that may 
enable us to understand better how people actually do read”; postmodern in 
that he recognises that there is no intrinsically correct way to read texts or any 
ideologically neutral way of analysing them; and amateurish in that Powell is 
not attempting to establish “solid philosophical underpinnings” for his critical 
method or seeking to account for everything.145 Powell then declares his own 
ideological agenda in interpretation by stating that “I guess that I am 
ultimately interested in developing a postmodern phenomenology of reading 
texts as scripture”.146 This new formulation of narrative criticism thus serves 
as a major step forward, at least in theory, in that it openly declares itself as a 
confessional approach which seeks to engage seriously with the postmodern 
context and with issues of reader response. 
                                                 
143Powell 2001, 6. 
144Powell 2001, 131 (author’s emphasis). 
145Powell 2001, 131-32. 
146Powell 2001, 132 (author’s emphasis). 
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Powell bases his approach upon interpretive polyvalence, the fact that “Texts 
can and do mean different things to different people, and at least some of the 
time people can and do find multiple meanings of texts to be acceptable”.147 
This “reality confirmed by daily experience” must be the starting point for 
contemporary hermeneutical reflection,148 and Powell therefore expresses his 
intention to sketch a hermeneutics “that works in real life [...] that has 
existential cash value”.149 The interpretive model which Powell seeks to 
construct is therefore built not on the basis of literary theory, but on the 
experience of readers in interpretation.150 Powell advocates the adoption of a 
reader response hermeneutic as the basis for his interpretive model, and 
identifies narrative criticism as a subset within reader response approaches.151 
Powell is clear that such an approach should be descriptive of practice rather 
than theoretically prescriptive,152 the goal of such analysis being self-
awareness in interpretation, which “can only be assisted by recognition of 
interpretive moves that readers make”.153 
 
                                                 
147Powell 2001, 14. Powell seeks to establish the reality of polyvalence not by philosophical or 
hermeneutical discussion, but by means of a survey of responses to two biblical passages by 
50 clergy and 50 laity, the results of which clearly show that the two groups differed 
significantly in their responses, depending on a variety of factors (Powell 2001, 28-56). 
Throughout Chasing the Eastern Star Powell is anxious to root his approach in the reality of 
reading practice, rather than on an abstract theoretical or philosophical base.  
148Powell 2001, 11-12. 
149Powell 2001, 59. 
150
 “[R]eaders are not constrained by authorial intent. Readers can and will elevate minor 
points and sublimate major ones. This, in my view, does not constitute misinterpretation. If it 
does, we’re all in trouble - and not just with this text” (Powell 2001, 22). Concern for the 
interpretations of “ordinary” readers has featured significantly in the debate over ethics of 
interpretation, the concerns of which clearly inform Powell’s recent work. His approach in this 
regard is similar to that of Daniel Patte (see e.g.: Patte 1995b; Patte 1999). 
151This shift has been made by a number of narrative critics in recent years. David Rhoads, for 
instance, suggests that narrative criticism seeks to recover the final story the author has 
created “for the reader”, and deals with how the reader experiences that story (Rhoads 1999, 
267). The goal of narrative criticism is thus “not so much to discern the unity of a text as it is 
to assess its impact - to see in what ways a narrative coheres adequately to give a satisfying 
reading experience” (Rhoads 1999, 270). 
152Powell 2001, 59. 
153Powell 2001, 65. 
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In discerning such readerly moves, Powell seeks to establish a fundamental 
distinction between expected and unexpected readings. Biblical narratives, like 
all narratives, anticipate certain responses from their readers, but the reality of 
reading is that real readers (and especially those removed from the cultural or 
historical context of the text’s implied readers) frequently produce 
interpretations which are not anticipated by the narrative and are therefore 
unexpected. The specific function of narrative criticism, Powell argues, is to 
define strategies by means of which interpreters may distinguish expected 
readings from unexpected ones.154 Detailed formal analysis of the text enables 
the role of the implied reader to be discerned as the expected reading. This 
analysis can then serve as a “base reading” against which the responses of real 
readers might be compared and contrasted, so that unexpected readings may 
be identified.155 The narrative critics will then seek to account for these 
unexpected readings and, finally, decide through evaluative critique whether 
the unexpected reading is to be adopted or rejected.156 Narrative criticism is 
thus a heuristic interpretive approach which seeks to “establish a common 
language for discussion of variant interpretations”,157 and which  “does not 
limit interpretive options; it allows choices to be made advisedly”.158 
 
Powell is careful in defining the limits and parameters of his approach. 
Crucially, he insists that the distinction between expected and unexpected 
                                                 
154Powell 2001, 64. 
155Powell 2001, 65. Powell points out that the establishment of a “base reading” is a key step 
in many ideological and deconstructionist approaches, necessary to establish the dominant 
ideology of the text which is then deconstructed or otherwise subverted. 
156Powell 2001, 7-9. 
157Powell 2001, 7. 
158Powell 2001, 66. Mieke Bal has argued along similar lines, suggesting that the contribution 
of narratology in Biblical Studies is to produce interpretations based upon the formal qualities 
of texts which can then be intersubjectively discussed and evaluated on the basis of a common 
method. The interpretations produced are transparent and thus accountable to critical scrutiny 
(Bal 1988a, 239; Bal 1997, 11). David Rhoads has similarly argued that narrative criticism’s 
emphasis upon textual unity is “a working hypothesis, a heuristic device” to discern patterns 
of storytelling on the surface level of the narrative (Rhoads 1999, 267). 
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readings is not evaluative but descriptive.159 Expected readings are not to be 
described in foundational, totalising or mystifying ways, but regarded as 
simply one interpretation against which other readings may be measured.160 
Expected readings, therefore, are not to be privileged over unexpected 
readings simply because they are expected.161 From a Christian point of view, 
Powell indicates that a commitment to biblical authority might suggest that 
expected readings would be preferable to unexpected ones, but nevertheless 
maintains that unexpected readings of scripture can add new dimensions of 
insight, and that an understanding of scripture as living word requires 
acknowledgement of a “fluidity of interpretation”, whereby static texts are 
capable of addressing changing contexts.162 
 
Powell seeks to account for unexpected readings by distinguishing three 
horizons in interpretation: the story setting is the narrative world of the 
Gospel, inhabited by the characters and described by the voice of the narrator; 
the discourse setting is the late first-century context of the intended readers of 
the Gospel; whilst the third setting is that of the modern reader.163 The 
expected reading of the narrative is one in which readers limit their knowledge 
and belief to that implied by the narrative: the implied reader knows and 
believes what the narrative expects them to know and believe, and does not 
know or believe anything the narrative does not expect.164 When, however, 
knowledge or belief proper to either the discourse or modern setting is read 
                                                 
159Powell 2001, 59-60.  
160Powell 2001, 65-66. 
161Powell 2001, 60-63. Powell gives the example of a racist joke which he found one day on a 
piece of paper in his church. His reaction of embarrassment and anger was not the expected 
reading of amusement anticipated by the text, but neither was it based upon misinterpretation. 
Rather, the unexpected reading derived from an ideological difference between the text and 
Powell as the reader, and Powell considers his unexpected reading ethically preferable to the 
expected amusement which the joke intended to provoke. 
162Powell 2001, 174. 
163Powell 2001, 83-106. 
164Powell 2001, 76. 
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into the story setting, or when real readers do not know or believe something 
the text assumes they do, then unexpected readings can result. 
 
Powell is clear that the goal of identifying the implied reader of a Gospel text 
cannot be definitively achieved, largely because the historical distance 
between the original context of composition for the Gospel text and the 
context of the contemporary interpreter makes discernment of expected 
readings an imprecise science. Powell accepts that even a well-trained biblical 
scholar lacks the linguistic competence of a native speaker of koiné Greek, and 
that a modern reader lacks some (or, indeed, much) of the general knowledge 
which the biblical texts assume of their readers. Powell argues that this may 
mean that we are sometimes unable to distinguish between expected and 
unexpected readings because of our lack of knowledge, and that frank 
admission of such failure “is necessary for hermeneutical integrity”.165 Powell 
is critical of what he regards as the attempts of some approaches to obscure 
their own limitations in this regard, especially reader response critics who 
maintain that interpretive ambiguities are inherent within or encouraged by the 
Gospel narrative itself. Powell is scathing about such critical positions, which 
he believes to be fundamentally dishonest: 
 
If we are unable to achieve the goal of reading Mark’s narrative in the 
manner expected of its implied readers, so be it. Let us at least admit 
this, and not take the easy way out by claiming that readers are 
supposed to find the text ambiguous.166 
 
Powell thus turns an admission of the limitations of his method into a moral 
strength. Further, however, he argues that recognising that the objective of his 
method may not be totally realised does not invalidate the exercise: if narrative 
criticism enables us to come closer to identifying how biblical stories are 
                                                 
165Powell 2001, 105. 
166Powell 2001, 93. 
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expected to be experienced by their implied readers then “That has to be 
enough”.167 
 
Powell’s reformulation of narrative criticism has not abandoned the formalist 
method of the 1980s and 1990s, but has broadened the scope of the approach 
in two crucial directions. First, Powell acknowledges the difficulties posed by 
modern attempts to read as a historically situated implied reader, and is open 
about the limitations of this exercise. Second, Powell has embraced an 
authentic reader response hermeneutic which takes seriously the realities of 
readers’ experience with texts and the ethical consequences of their 
interpretations, and which allows him to be explicit about his confessional 
commitments. Powell is still careful, however, not to identify narrative 
criticism either with historicism or with poststructuralism, seeking a middle 
way between the two. 
 
Powell continues to distance narrative criticism from the work of historical 
critics, whose focus upon authorial intention appears to Powell “unnecessarily 
reductionist” or even “myopic” in attempting to reconstruct the cognitive 
content of the writers’ theologies at the expense of recognising that in 
selecting narrative as their genre the writers indicated a concern for the 
affective impact of their works.168 In this regard Powell’s concern is a literary 
one, but he is also concerned about the impact of historical criticism as a 
confessional approach, expressing concern about a hermeneutic that 
“privileges an educated elite, empowering them to determine the meaning of 
scripture that is to be authoritative not only for them but for everyone else as 
well”.169 From his Christian perspective, Powell argues that excessive 
concentration on authorial intent actually prevents the biblical texts from 
                                                 
167Powell 2001, 85. 
168Powell 2001, 25. 
169Powell 2001, 4. 
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operating as the living word of scripture, so that “The task of biblical 
interpretation becomes discernment of what God said to other people a long 
time ago in a faraway place. The Holy Spirit becomes obsolete and the 
character of scripture as a living word is lost”.170 
 
Powell is careful, however, not to write historical criticism off altogether. Both 
authorially-focussed historical criticism and reader-focussed literary criticism 
are “intrinsically legitimate”: what concerns Powell is when one approach fails 
to pursue its goals with integrity, or to impose its interpretive interests upon 
the other.171 Rather, Powell urges that diversity of interpretive goals need not 
lead to conflict, since “There is no integrity in condemning one approach 
because it does not meet the goals of a different approach”.172 
 
A pragmatic approach and theological concerns also lead Powell to distance 
himself from more theoretically based postmodern approaches, especially 
poststructuralism and radical reader response criticism which, he argues, 
occupy an academic never-never land of theory which bears little or no 
relation to the everyday activity of biblical interpretation by real readers. He 
wryly describes Ricoeur, Derrida and Foucault as “brilliant scholars, at least 
according to one common definition of brilliance, that is, ‘capable of writing 
things that nobody understands’”.173 Powell indicates that the epistemological 
and hermeneutical indeterminacy of academic scholarship is out of step with 
ordinary readers of the Bible and their concerns, and argues that “it seems to 
                                                 
170Powell 2001, 177. 
171Powell 2001, 5. 
172Powell 2001, 120. 
173Powell 2001, 23. Powell acknowledges that deconstruction may make a positive 
contribution within Biblical Studies, but likens the presence of deconstructionists to that of 
“an agnostic at a prayer meeting”: “Their presence is indeed useful to those who are 
discerning and patient enough to hear them out, but that helpfulness would cease the moment 
they are converted” (Powell 2001, 206 n.84). 
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me that we have two options: enroll the world or learn to speak in terms that 
relate to how people actually think”.174  
 
Powell is careful, therefore, to define a clear space for his postmodern 
phenomenology of reading between historical-critical objectivism and radical 
poststructuralist indeterminacy. The reason for this is his overt theological 
interest in interpretation of the Bible as scripture. Recognising polyvalency 
does not necessarily lead to total relativism, and evaluation of interpretations 
remains necessary, since some are right and some wrong. Powell recognises 
that this entails the imposition of his value system upon both texts and 
interpreters, but maintains that “as arrogant as such imposition may seem, the 
only alternative is a bland ethical neutrality - which would itself reflect 
imposition of a value system, indeed of one that I reject. Interpretations can be 
wrong - not only stupidly wrong, but dangerously so”.175 Powell is 
unapologetic for evaluating readings of the Bible from a Christian perspective, 
arguing that he fails to see the logic in the position adopted in some academic 
contexts where diversity of ideological readings is welcomed except for those 
from a broad evangelical Christian perspective. “Why”, Powell demands, 
“should the Gospel of Christ be the only unacceptable philosophy?”176 
 
In setting out what the basis of a Christian evaluative standard might be, 
Powell is careful to rule out a purely subjective hermeneutic whereby readings 
are selected on the basis of their appeal to the reader’s sensibilities, arguing 
that such an approach is ultimately self-affirming, and insulates readers from 
the possibility of being transformed by texts.177 At the same time, however, 
                                                 
174Powell 2001, 69. 
175Powell 2001, 8. 
176Powell 2001, 235 n.352). Powell’s question is directed at Stephen D. Moore’s suspicious 
reaction to confessional elements in Powell’s What is Narrative Criticism? Moore 1994, 115-
16). 
177Powell 2001, 176. 
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Powell rejects fundamentalist or “timeless” readings on the grounds that such 
readings elevate “the implicit, contextually derived assumptions of biblical 
literature to the level of divinely revealed truth”.178 Powell concludes that: 
 
There is no pure exegetical standard through which an objective 
method can discover timeless truth. Thus, the standard for truth is not 
the Bible per se but the gospel of Jesus Christ, and all interpretations of 
the Bible (expected readings and unexpected ones) must be evaluated 
in light of this. The Bible remains authoritative because the gospel 
itself is derived from the Bible.179 
 
This is a crucial step for Powell’s interpretive model as a postmodern 
interpretive approach. As we have seen, a key move in the development of 
postmodern biblical criticism has been that from commentary to critique, and a 
necessary component of this development is the adoption of an evaluative 
standpoint outside the perspective of the biblical text. By taking his evaluative 
standard not from the text of scripture but from a scripturally-derived 
understanding of the Christian gospel, Powell enables himself to evaluate not 
only unexpected readings of scripture but the expected readings which the 
Bible itself anticipates. Expected readings are preferred, largely because they 
are congruent with a biblically-derived gospel, but are not uncritically 
privileged over unexpected readings.180 
 
Nor does evaluation by means of the gospel produce a closed hermeneutic 
circle. Powell admits that theological evaluation is necessarily 
autobiographical and subjective, because ultimately for Powell it is he himself 
who determines what he thinks the gospel is.181 At the same time, however, 
                                                 
178Powell 2001, 180. 
179Powell 2001, 180. Powell takes the gospel as the basis for any evaluation of interpretations, 
and in this sense it operates as an interpretive ‘rule of faith’. The importance of such rules for 
confessional interpretation is explored later (see p.253). 
180This dynamic can be seen to operate already in the New Testament, where many readings of 
prophetic texts in particular are, by Powell’s standards, unexpected readings legitimised by the 
reinterpretation of those texts in light of the Christian understanding of the gospel. 
181Powell 2001, 180. 
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Powell attempts to apply the standards of the gospel to himself as well as other 
people, thus rendering his own understanding open to critique and 
development. Powell also acknowledges the postmodern insight that all 
interpretation is to some extent skewed by the point of view of the interpreter, 
accepting that the implied reader of any narrative is an interpretive construct, 
and therefore “infected by the subjective input of those who do the 
constructing”, so that a completely objective and disinterested interpretation is 
impossible.182 At the same time, however, such admissions do not invalidate 
the narrative-critical process, but enable it to avoid delusions as to the 
authoritative scope of its conclusions and render it open to external critique.183 
 
Powell suggests that an ideologically-aware narrative criticism may be 
valuable for Biblical Studies not only in identifying expected readings of 
biblical texts, but also in revealing the interests and ideologies which motivate 
unexpected readings: 
 
Reader-response recognises that interpretation is not ideologically 
neutral. [...] I suggest that unexpected readings provide an index to the 
intents of readers. They provide a mirror that reflects the priorities of 
readers. So, regardless of whether such readings help us to discover 
anything about the text, they will often help us to discover something 
about ourselves.184 
 
Identification of differing interpretive ideologies facilitates their evaluation 
from a Christian perspective but this does not, in Powell’s view, automatically 
lead to the rejection of non-Christian perspectives. Powell distinguishes 
between anti-semitic and feminist readings of Matthew’s Gospel, both of 
                                                 
182Powell 2001, 71. 
183Powell 2001, 71. David Rhoads has similarly argued that: “every interpretation will be only 
one interpretation in a range of faithful interpretations. Given the multivalent nature of stories 
and the limitations of reader perspectives, it is not possible (or even desirable) to provide one 
correct and objective understanding of a story. The goal is to be faithful to the narrative and to 
learn from other interpretations as well” (Rhoads 1999, 284). 
184Powell 2001, 134. 
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which are unexpected in terms of the narrative’s anticipated reader response, 
but which can and must be accepted or rejected on the basis of their ethical 
implications in light of Christian faith. The result of this evaluation is that 
Powell embraces feminism whilst rejecting anti-semitism. This evaluation is 
conducted “self-consciously and publicly as a Christian, and if postmodernists 
have trouble with what seems to be (at this final stage) a totalising appeal to 
some foundational truth...well, so be it!”185 He recognises that there are those 
who will not share his convictions, but argues that this simply reflects the fact 
that they “do not belong to my community of interpreters, and both they and I 
must recognise this. Respectfully, of course”.186 
 
Chasing the Eastern Star represents a major step forward for narrative 
criticism. Powell has successfully resolved many of the conflicts of interest 
which rendered earlier versions of narrative criticism vulnerable to 
postmodern attack by taking seriously previous criticism of his work. By 
broadening from narrow formalism to broad reader response, Powell has 
moved narrative criticism forward methodologically, ideologically and 
politically. In terms of methodology, narrative criticism no longer relies upon 
an outmoded and idealistic New-Critical text theory, but is based instead upon 
a pragmatic reader response approach which takes seriously the reality of 
modern readers’ experiences, whilst at the same time addressing legitimate 
historicist concerns. Ideologically, reader response also frees Powell to 
address issues of reader ideology and the impact of texts on readers in a 
manner consistent with his confessional interests in the Bible. Finally, Powell 
has made a political gain in carving out a firm base for narrative criticism 
within the academy which is not in the shade of historicist or poststructuralist 
approaches. 
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186Powell 2001, 182. 
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Whilst Powell’s critical model is coherent and workable, however, he leaves a 
number of things undone. First, the insistence on building his model on the 
basis of pragmatism means that he avoids engagement in any depth with 
issues of literary or hermeneutical theory. Powell is openly antagonistic 
towards theory and philosophy, addressing them only to reject them as 
hopelessly obscure and unhelpful. Whilst this is consistent with the tendencies 
of narrative critics to prefer critical practicalities to theoretical speculation, 
further development of the implications of  Powell’s insights in the context of 
a broader theory of interpretation will be needed if this new incarnation of 
narrative criticism is to engage postmodern theory more constructively. 
Engagement with literary or hermeneutical theory need not be regarded as a 
bad thing: rather, it forms part of the ongoing dialogue between criticism and 
theory which has always been a part of literary studies, and which needs to 
become part of the discourse of biblical literary approaches if the discipline is 
to move beyond a divisive polarisation. 
 
Second, Powell’s open declaration of narrative criticism as a theological 
interpretive approach begs a number of theological questions. By invoking an 
extratextual theological formulation such as the Christian gospel as a key 
element in his interpretive model, Powell straddles the boundary between 
Biblical Studies and Theology, and makes mutual dialogue between the 
disciplines an essential feature of the ongoing development of narrative 
criticism. A particular area of concern is the question of interpretive authority. 
Powell indicates that he regards the Bible as authoritative within the Christian 
community, but argues that this authority derives from its function as the 
source of the extrabiblical “gospel of Jesus Christ” which sets norms for 
Christian interpretation. It is arguable, therefore, that Powell locates scriptural 
authority not in the Bible itself but in the believing community, but this is in 
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turn questioned by his assertion that, ultimately, he decides for himself what 
the gospel is. Powell’s understanding of the relationship between biblical text, 
individual interpreter and believing community is unformed, and can only be 
clarified in the light of a coherent understanding of how the Bible functions as 
scripture. Further dialogue and  development is therefore essential if Powell’s 
model is to function effectively within a broader theological framework. 
 
Third, Powell sets his narrative-critical approach in the context of a broader 
hermeneutical enterprise which takes seriously the competing interests of 
different interpretive communities and is informed by an ethics of 
interpretation. Powell is able to acknowledge the legitimacy of other 
interpretive perspectives whilst at the same time asserting the validity of his 
own Christian viewpoint, but fails to engage fully with the question of how 
interpretive differences should be negotiated. Powell’s acknowledgement that 
those who do not share his Christian faith do not belong to his community of 
interpreters amounts effectively to an agreement to differ.187 But what if other 
interpreters are not content with interpretive détente? How are conflicts to be 
resolved? Or how might different, even opposing, interpretive perspectives 
engage one another constructively? Powell’s Christian interpretive approach is 
confident and assertive, but further consideration needs to be given to the 
question of how such an approach will operate in dialogue with other 
competing and sometimes hostile interpretive communities. Again, this issue 
returns partly to questions of interpretive authority. Powell fails to address the 
question of how individual interpreters operate within interpretive 
communities, both in terms of the relationship of the individual believer to the 
believing community, and in terms of whether academic biblical interpreters 
who wish to pursue confessional interests might have to negotiate between the 
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"You can think I’m wrong, and I will think you’re wrong. You can pity me, and I will pity 
you” (Powell 2001, 182). 
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simultaneous but conflicting interests of two interpretive communities in the 
forms of the church and the academy. 
 
Through the course of its development narrative criticism has illustrated both 
the pitfalls and the prospects for a confessional, critical approach to biblical 
interpretation within academic Biblical Studies. Having at times struggled to 
find its way in the multidisciplinary wilderness, narrative criticism is now 
beginning to appear as a coherent, viable postmodern confessional approach 
with sound academic credentials. At the same time, it is clear that narrative 
criticism itself needs to be seen within a broader theological and academic 
context. In an academic arena increasingly divided by conflicts of ideology, 
how is a confessional interpretive approach to make its voice heard? Further, 
how can an approach defined by its theological commitment to the Bible as 
scripture engage in responsible dialogue with other, sometimes hostile, 
interpretive communities? How can Christian interpreters talk with strangers, 
remaining true to themselves whilst respecting and learning from the 
strangeness of others? In the next chapter, therefore, we will begin to examine 
the question of how a Christian interpretive approach can establish a coherent 
theoretical base which safeguards both a Christian understanding of the Bible 
as the Word of God and at the same time enables such an approach to operate 
in a pluralist academic environment. 
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PART TWO: TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN, POSTMODERN, 
ACADEMIC MODEL IN BIBLICAL STUDIES 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RECONCILING INTERESTS – THEOLOGY AND 
THEORY IN CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION 
 
The yarns of seamen have a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of 
which lies within the shell of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not 
typical (if his propensity to spin yarns be excepted), and to him the 
meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, 
enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a 
haze, in the likeness of one of those misty halos that sometimes are 
made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine. 
    -Joseph Conrad, “Heart of Darkness” 
 
The postmodern context in Biblical Studies represents an opportunity for 
confessional interpreters of the Bible. The breakdown of the historical-critical 
consensus and its objectivist interpretive paradigm has led to a proliferation of 
different methodological approaches following the “literary turn” of the 1970s. 
The rise of ideological approaches, spearheaded by feminist scholarship, has 
also established the legitimacy of advocacy perspectives within the academy, 
and this means that Christian interpreters are now faced with the possibility of 
establishing a legitimate and authentically Christian approach to academic 
biblical interpretation. Confessional critics now have greater freedom to select 
critical tools consonant with their interpretive aims, and to offer confessional 
interpretations which do not have to defend themselves against accusations of 
irrationality or subjectivism. 
 
At the same time, however, the postmodern context is also challenging. Not all 
of the new approaches are sympathetic to Christian interpretation. Critical 
methods and interpretive ideologies hostile to totalising theories of truth or to 
concepts of biblical authority have become embedded in some university 
departments. Prominent de-confessional scholars have sought to set the 
parameters for what counts as a valid postmodern interpretation in such a way 
as to exclude confessional perspectives from the academy, and confessional 
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approaches which have failed to play the game by their rules have been 
strongly attacked, as we saw in the case of narrative criticism. 
 
Having examined the challenge of the postmodern context, therefore, we turn 
to the question of how confessional scholars might constructively respond to 
it. I wish to argue that three essential steps are required if a confessional 
approach to the Bible is to establish itself as academically credible whilst 
retaining its motivational integrity, and these will be addressed in the second 
part of this thesis. First, any such approach must ensure that its interpretive 
interests are not in conflict, paying serious attention to the coherence of its 
interpretive aims, theoretical base, and critical method. The self-awareness 
resulting from such attention is a crucial factor in demonstrating to other 
interpreters that a confessional approach possesses both internal coherence and 
integrity. In terms of methodological interests, therefore, confessional critics 
will need to establish that their critical methods are coherent with their 
confessional commitments, and that those methods are appropriate to the study 
of the Bible as scripture. In a pluralist academic environment, this requires 
some reassessment of what the Bible is, since the selection of critical method 
necessarily rests upon a foundational pre-understanding of the object of study. 
The development of postmodern confessional-critical approaches, therefore, 
entails the conceptualisation of a postmodern model for scripture. This chapter 
will therefore attempt to frame such a model in such a way that the Christian 
church’s experience of the Bible as a means of divine self-communication is 
reflected whilst multivalent interpretation is simultaneously affirmed. 
 
A second key step in forming a credible postmodern Christian approach is the 
construction of a coherent identity for the interpretive community whose 
interests it represents. Clear definition of the community in terms of its 
interpretive aims and interests will provide clarity on a number of key issues, 
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such as the relationship of individual critics to the texts under study, and the 
interpretive authority to which those critics appeal for the validation of their 
readings. One part of this process for Christian academics will be the 
negotiation of academic and ecclesial interests and priorities in interpretation. 
Christian critics will need to consider how the needs and interests of the faith 
and academic communities might constrain both the critical questions they 
will want to ask of biblical texts and the methods which will be acceptable in 
pursuit of those questions. A clear identity for the interpretive community is 
also essential in relating to other communities: it is only when confessional 
academics are able to be authentically themselves that open communication 
and debate is possible.  Confessional critics may also want to ask, therefore, 
whether the Christian interpretive community is closed or open, and whether 
they will want or need to engage with other interpretive approaches. Chapter 
five will engage with these issues. 
 
Finally, a confessional postmodern academic approach within Biblical Studies 
must attend to the ethics of interpretation. This will relate in part to the ways 
in which Christian academics render themselves accountable for their 
readings, and how they attempt to promote their own interpretive interests 
without unthinkingly compromising the legitimate interests of other readers. 
In addition, however, some attention will need to be paid to the question of 
what ethical principles ought to apply in biblical interpretation. Not all of the 
values espoused by prominent de-confessional critics are necessarily 
compatible with Christian ethics, and a confessional approach will need to ask 
itself the question of whose values will determine its modus operandi within a 
postmodern academy. How can Christian academic biblical scholars engage 
constructively with other interpreters who are hostile to their scripture and, 
sometimes, their very presence in the field? More importantly, how should 
Christian biblical interpreters present themselves to the wider academy? The 
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answer to these questions will need to cohere with their other methodological 
and theological commitments, and, I suggest, needs to find expression in a 
distinctively Christian ethics of interpretation. Indeed, such an ethics may be 
the greatest contribution Christian biblical scholarship can make to the 
discipline at the present time. This contribution will be considered in chapter 
six. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter we will seek to set out a postmodern 
description of the Bible as scripture. This description will need to take into 
account two distinct perceptions, both rooted in pragmatic experience. On the 
one hand, the experience of the Christian church through the centuries has 
been that the Bible has served as a means of divine communication, 
functioning as the Word of God. A description of the Bible which seeks to be 
authentically Christian must take this into account. On the other hand, as we 
have seen in the first part of this thesis, postmodern insights into the nature of 
interpretive communities and the ethics of interpretation suggest that the 
confessing community cannot necessarily claim a monopoly of interpretive 
truth. We therefore face the need for a postmodern Christian description of the 
Bible which affirms both that biblical texts can serve as vehicles of 
communication between God and human beings, and that at the same time 
multiple interpretive approaches and even interpretations unanticipated by the 
biblical texts themselves can be affirmed as valid. Such a model must, 
therefore, be both theological and thoroughly critical. The notion of a 
theological-critical model of the Bible in academic Biblical Studies, however, 
is a contested notion. Why should such a description be necessary, and how 
viable is it? 
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Theology and Theory in Interpretation 
 
As we have seen in relation to de-confessional postmodern scholarship and to 
confessional narrative criticism, critical methods in Biblical Studies tend to be 
selected on the basis of a preunderstanding of the Bible which in turn reflects 
the underlying ideological commitments and motivations of interpreters. 
Failure to be honest about one’s commitments can, as we have seen, be 
damaging to the prospects of interpretive approaches in the postmodern 
context. Approaches which fail to acknowledge or even recognise their 
ideological or theological motives can be self-defeating or self-deluding, in 
that failure to declare one’s true motive in interpretation might actually lead to 
an approach not meeting its interpretive goals. We have seen this in relation to 
first-generation narrative criticism: seeking to operate under the aegis of a 
discipline dominated by scientific objectivism, narrative critics were led to 
adopt a strong formalist approach which bracketed out questions of the text’s 
transformative impact upon the reader, when it was precisely this interaction 
which prompted many narrative critics to move away from historical-critical 
scholarship in the first place. Inability to declare that interest for fear of 
academic exclusion, however, meant that first-generation narrative criticism 
was methodologically unable to achieve its interpretive goal of understanding 
how biblical narratives worked in communicating and sustaining faith in 
readers. 
 
Second, approaches which lack self-awareness can impact negatively upon 
other readers of the text. Not to declare one’s interest risks covertly imposing 
an ideological perspective upon both one’s text and one’s readers. This may 
distort the reading offered and cause others to read against their own interests. 
One of the key requirements of postmodern criticism is a self-awareness in 
interpretation which enables the critic to be sensitive to the ideological and 
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ethical implications both of the text they are reading and of the interpretation 
of the text that they are offering. 
 
Failure openly to declare motivations and interests can backfire on approaches 
in the postmodern pluralist academy in two key ways as we have seen with 
narrative criticism: narrative critics’ failure to acknowledge their confessional 
commitments openly and incorporate them into their critical self-awareness 
unnecessarily restricted narrative criticism’s choice of critical methods, 
leading to failure to achieve interpretive objectives; further, it made narrative 
criticism highly suspect to ideologically-aware postmodern critics who saw it 
as an example of precisely the kind of covert theologising of Biblical Studies 
against which they were reacting. If confessional criticism is fully to achieve 
its interpretive aims and be able to function freely within a pluralist academic 
context, therefore, it must declare itself openly as a Christian interpretive 
approach with both critical and theological interests in the Bible and its 
interpretations. 
 
Two possible objections to this declaration need to be anticipated. First, must 
critical and theological interests be bound up with one another in this way? 
Can the critical tools of, say, narrative criticism - narratology, Anglo-
American rhetorical criticism, etc. - not be seen as neutral tools which can 
then be put to theological use? In terms of narrative criticism’s self-
understanding and positioning as a discrete approach within Biblical Studies 
the answer must be “no”. The postmodern context has demonstrated that all 
critical approaches reflect certain interests, as John Goldingay has pointed out: 
 
Approaches to interpretation presuppose and support value systems 
and systems of power. For the most part they do so unconsciously, but 
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they do so none the less for that. Sociocritical hermeneutics requires an 
awareness of the ideological factors that shape academic work.1 
 
Further, as we have seen in the cases of David Clines, Stephen Moore and 
Cheryl Exum, critics select their critical tools to suit their interpretive ends. 
The manner in which those tools are combined inevitably affects the manner 
of their deployment and the interpretive results they produce. Furthermore, the 
development of critical tools is not itself ideologically neutral, so that critical 
methods cannot be simply abstracted from the ideological and political 
interests of the interpretive communities which develop them. Ideological and 
critical interests may operate at different levels, but they are fundamentally 
bound up with one another and should not be separated if that separation 
obscures the ideological or theological commitment which underpins an 
interpretive approach. 
 
A second objection to a theological formulation of narrative criticism might be 
to ask whether it unneccesarily excludes non-confessional critics. Surely one 
can use the same critical tools - derived, after all, from non-confessional 
critical theory - on the same texts, without necessarily having a faith-
commitment to those texts? The answer is, of course, “of course”. In a 
pluralist academic context interpretive methods are not the exclusive preserve 
of any particular approach. Non-believing scholars can certainly deploy the 
same critical methods as narrative critics and will probably produce very 
similar results, but the fact remains that their interest in the text will be 
different, the uses to which they wish to put their interpretations may well be 
different, and their work will thus have a different emphasis. Most feminist 
critics would want to classify themselves as feminists first and psychoanalytic, 
structuralist or deconstructionist critics second. In the same way, confessional 
                                                 
1Goldingay 1995, 43. 
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critics will want their critical practice to be transparently consonant with their 
commitment to the biblical texts as scripture, and that means both that those 
commitments need to form part of their self-understanding and that their 
partners in scholarly dialogue should be aware of them. Confessional and non-
confessional approaches using the same methods will have large areas of 
overlap but will also have significant areas of divergence, and the integrity of 
confessional criticism as an approach requires that equal attention is paid to 
both from the outset. 
 
 
Defining the Object of Study: the Bible as Scripture in a Postmodern 
Context 
 
It is necessary for any confessional approach to offer a preliminary description 
of the Bible which will form the object of its study. This description will in 
turn determine its interpretive aims, its critical methods, and provide criteria 
for evaluating whether or not any particular reading has achieved its 
interpretive goals. The objective in offering a preliminary description of the 
Bible ought not to be to impose a rigid doctrinal perspective upon the text, but 
to offer a preunderstanding or working model of the Bible. The relationship of 
the model and the critical practice of the approach will be necessarily 
dialectic: a preunderstanding of the nature of the biblical texts will determine 
the questions asked and the methods deployed to (hopefully) provide answers, 
whilst those answers in turn lead to revision of the preunderstanding. 
 
In this respect it is necessary to emphasise the difference between a biblical 
criticism which seeks to engage with particular biblical texts and a Systematic 
Theology which seeks to draw together into a unified exposition the 
theological insights of the Bible as a whole, or to provide a coherent account 
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of God and his dealings with humanity. That is to say, confessional criticism is 
a critical, rather than a theoretical approach, standing in relation to Systematic 
Theology as structuralism does to Saussurian linguistic theory or (to extend 
the structuralist analogy further) as parole does to langue. Criticism may draw 
upon Theology for its understanding of biblical texts as scripture within the 
wider context of Christian doctrine, and may contribute to the ongoing 
development of Theology by offering new interpretations of biblical texts 
which biblical theologians may need to incorporate into their wider 
understanding, but the fact remains that criticism and Theology operate at 
different levels of study and should not be confused. This in turn means that 
any critical model for scripture which confessional criticism might put forward 
as a justification for its methodological approach is not to be taken as an 
absolute and total understanding of scripture in all its aspects. A critical model 
will be heuristic, offered as a necessary preunderstanding which facilitates 
critical interpretation of the Bible, but which is open to criticism and revision 
in the light of that interpretation. 
 
 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer: Scripture as God’s Communicative Act 
 
A good place to start to build a postmodern model for Scripture is the work of 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer. Vanhoozer’s work is of value for the theological 
development of confessional criticism for two reasons: first, he seeks to build 
a hermeneutical model for biblical interpretation based on a Christian 
theological commitment to God as Trinity; and second, his model for scripture 
takes account of the postmodern context, expecially in responding to the work 
of Jacques Derrida and Stanley Fish. At first sight, therefore, Vanhoozer offers 
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the prospect of a constructive contribution to confessional criticism’s self-
understanding. 
 
Vanhoozer’s hermeneutical approach is overtly theological, but he insists that 
it is not an approach restricted only to the Bible. Vanhoozer’s intention is not 
to develop a hermeneutica sacra, applicable only to Christian scripture within 
the boundaries of the church. Instead, Vanhoozer proposes that his model is 
capable of serving as a general hermeneutic within a Christian worldview. His 
starting point is that all communication takes place within the context of God’s 
own self-communication: 
 
In the light of the Christian confession of God as creator, redeemer, 
and sanctifier, we may say that God is the one who communicates 
himself - Father, Son, and Spirit - to others. God’s self-communicative 
activity results in creation, Christ, and church. The triune God is 
communicative agent (Father/author), action (Word/text), and result 
(Spirit/power of reception). I propose that we take God’s trinitarian 
self-communication as the paradigm of what is involved in all true 
communication.2 
 
Vanhoozer draws upon Wittgenstein, Habermas, J. L. Austin and John Searle 
to define the Bible as a meaningful communicative action or speech act. Using 
the categories of speech act theory, Vanhoozer distinguishes between the 
biblical texts’ locutionary force (i.e. their referential or propositional content), 
their illocutionary force (i.e. what the texts are intended to do), and their 
perlocutionary force (i.e. the effect or impact of the texts upon readers). 
Vanhoozer argues that the meaning of texts is to be found in their nature as 
illocutionary acts: that is to say, in the intentions of their authors in writing 
them. The text embodies an intended action on the part of the author, so that 
“The reality to which interpreters are accountable and to which their 
                                                 
2Vanhoozer 1998, 199 (author’s emphasis). 
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descriptions must correspond if they seek to be true is grounded in the author’s 
embodied and enacted intention”.3 
 
Vanhoozer stresses the importance of distinguishing between what authors 
intend (illocution) and what readers make of their texts (perlocution), and 
follows E. D. Hirsch in arguing for the separation of meaning and 
significance.4 Meaning is peculiar to illocution and significance to 
perlocution: the reader’s task is to understand the author’s communicative 
intent and to respond accordingly, but the response is secondary to the act of 
understanding, so that illocution takes priority over perlocution.5 The proper 
activity of interpretation, therefore, is to concentrate on the text’s illocutionary 
force, since “If the author’s intention is embodied in the text, then the ultimate 
criterion for right or wrong interpretation will be the text itself, considered as a 
literary act”.6 The author’s intention in writing is expressed in the “literal 
sense” of the text, and according to Vanhoozer it is the literal sense which is 
the proper object of interpretation. 
 
Vanhoozer’s understanding of the text’s literal sense is by no means 
simplistic. Rather, Vanhoozer sees the text as operating on multiple levels, 
each of which must be apprehended if the meaning of the text is to be fully 
understood.7 First, it is necessary to discern the text’s propositional reference 
(i.e. what the text is about). Vanhoozer is careful to distinguish propositional 
from historical reference, as he is aware that not all referents are susceptible to 
empirical verification, and some can only be apprehended as mediated through 
                                                 
3Vanhoozer 1998, 253. 
4Hirsch 1967; Hirsch 1976. 
5Vanhoozer 1998, 259-62. “When authors successfully enact their intentions, we can say 
meaning accomplished; when these meanings are brought to bear on other texts and contexts 
and so achieve perlocutionary effects, we should say meaning applied” (Vanhoozer 1998, 
262). 
6Vanhoozer 1998, 303. 
7Vanhoozer 1998, 312-13. 
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the text. Second, the poetic form requires attention: different literary acts are 
expressed in different literary forms, and “our main access to what a text is 
about is the text itself, the form in which the matter is described”. At the same 
time, however, to affirm that certain realities (such as Christ himself) are 
mediated through texts is not to claim that those realities have no actual 
existence beyond the text, but simply to accept that certain referents are 
available only under their textual description.8 Third, Vanhoozer argues that 
scripture must be read with its pedagogical nature and function in view: in 
other words, the Bible needs to be read as scripture, as a collection of texts 
whose intended function is as a guidebook for the believing community. 
Finally, the text must be read in its canonical context as a testimony to Jesus 
Christ: the realisation that biblical texts all point to the centrality of Christ 
reveals the “fuller sense” which is the divine intention expressed in the Bible 
as canon.9 
 
Vanhoozer argues that these different levels of meaning cannot all be 
described by a single interpretive approach. Instead, he calls for “thick 
description” which recognises the need for a number of complementary 
interpretive frameworks, each representing a valid insight into a common 
text.10 Vanhoozer calls for a “Pentecostal plurality”, whereby “the one true 
interpretation is best approximated by a diversity of particular methods and 
contexts of reading. [...] Just as many members make up the one body, so 
many readings may make up the single correct interpretation”.11 
 
As well as functioning as the complex communicative literary acts of their 
human authors, Vanhoozer argues that biblical texts operate as means of 
                                                 
8Vanhoozer 1998, 313. 
9Vanhoozer 1998, 263-65. 
10Vanhoozer 1998, 321-22. 
11Vanhoozer 1998, 419-20 (author’s emphasis). 
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divine self-communication in two important ways. First, God as “divine 
author” can intend a fuller meaning than the human authors.12 This sensus 
plenior or “fuller sense” of biblical texts is discernible by setting them within 
their canonical context, which taken as “a unified communicative act” 
represents the embodiment of divine authorial intention: 
 
to say that the Bible has a “fuller meaning” is to focus on the (divine) 
author’s intended meaning at the level of the canonical act. Better said, 
the canon as a whole becomes the unified act for which the divine 
intention serves as the unifying principle. The divine intention 
supervenes on the intention of the human authors.13 
 
Second, Vanhoozer gives the Holy Spirit a crucial role in interpretation. The 
particular sphere of the Spirit’s activity is in the text’s perlocutionary effect on 
readers, and Vanhoozer links this to the theological concept of the Spirit’s 
procession from the other persons of the Trinity: as the Spirit proceeds from 
the Father and the Son, so the literary act proceeds from its author and 
perlocution proceeds from illocution.14 The Spirit’s role is to witness to what 
is other than himself (meaning accomplished) and to bring its significance to 
bear on the reader (meaning applied).15 
 
The Spirit has three particular tasks in relation to individual readers: first, to 
act as an internal witness that convicts the reader that the Bible is divine as 
well as human communication; second, to illumine the letter of the text by 
helping the reader to discern what kind of speech act it is; third, to sanctify the 
reader, transforming their heart and mind, purging “hermeneutic sin” and 
conforming their interests to those of the Word.16 Within the Christian 
                                                 
12Vanhoozer uses the example of Isaiah 53, interpreted as a reference to Christ, to illustrate his 
point. The “fuller sense” of this passage as having a Christological referent is only discernible 
when set in the overall context of the Christian canon. 
13Vanhoozer 1998, 265 (author’s emphasis). 
14Vanhoozer 1998, 410. 
15Vanhoozer 1998, 413. 
16Vanhoozer 1998, 413. 
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community, the Spirit acts as minister of the Word, leading the community 
into a unified understanding of the literal sense. Vanhoozer stresses that this 
unified understanding is not, however, uniform but plural, in accord with his 
call for “Pentecostal plurality”: 
 
Yes, the Spirit is the Spirit of unity, but this unity is both a gift and a 
task. It is a vital union, a harmonious union of many voices, not a unity 
of unison. It is a dialogical rather than a monological unity. It is, in 
short, an ethical unity - a unity of love - that welcomes legitimate 
differences without seeking to reduce them to uniformity.17 
 
Vanhoozer’s approach is aligned closely with critical realism: he maintains 
that theories describe things that exist (hence, “realism”) and that such theories 
can be either true or false (hence “critical”). At the same time, however, 
Vanhoozer insists that theories need not be absolutely correct. Rather, it is 
enough to say that some descriptive frameworks may yield some knowledge. 
Vanhoozer rejects Derridean poststructuralism’s argument that language 
systems are constitutive of reality rather than descriptive of it: 
 
It is not that our descriptive frameworks construct reality, then, but 
rather that certain aspects of reality only emerge or come to light under 
particular descriptions. [...] While we inevitably come to the text with 
an interpretive scheme, it may nevertheless be the text’s meaning that 
comes to us, and not only our own reflection. Our knowledge of what 
is there - in the world, in the text - though partial, can still be true.18 
 
At the same time, however, Vanhoozer sees deconstruction as having a helpful 
role to play in undermining what he describes as “the idolatry of literary 
knowledge”, that is, the “real danger of mistaking one’s interpretation, which 
is always secondary, contextual, and never ultimate, for the text itself”.19 
 
                                                 
17Vanhoozer 1998, 421. 
18Vanhoozer 1998, 323. 
19Vanhoozer 1998, 184. Vanhoozer goes so far as to commend Derrida’s work as “a standing 
challenge to interpretive pride” (Vanhoozer 1998, 184). 
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Vanhoozer’s motive in locating meaning in the author’s intention and arguing 
for its determinate nature is to defend the Bible from claims that texts are 
radically indeterminate or subject to the socio-pragmatic constraints of 
interpretive communities. Vanhoozer’s reliance on speech act theory to define 
the biblical texts as purposeful, communicative acts mirrors similar attempts 
by Francis Watson and Anthony Thiselton to bolster the authority of the Bible 
to challenge and transform its readers.20 Against the social pragmatism of 
Stanley Fish, Vanhoozer follows Thiselton in rejecting Fish’s assertion that 
interpretive communities make meaning from texts by both defining textual 
genres and by imposing rules for their interpretation. Such an argument, 
Vanhoozer insists, renders the interpretive community immune from textual 
critique and robs biblical texts of their power to speak, replacing the voice of 
the text with the reflected voice of the community and leaving the text 
incapable of functioning as the Word of God to the community.21 The same 
consequence, Vanhoozer argues, comes from following Derrida’s argument 
that linguistic meaning is intrasystemic and thus fundamentally unstable, 
indeterminate and dislocated from any external reality: 
 
The Undoers effectively strip the Bible of any stable meaning so that it 
cannot state a fact, issue a command, or make a promise. Furthermore, 
without the author to serve as touchstone of the distinction between 
meaning and significance, every interpretation becomes just as 
authorised a version as another. A text that cannot be set over against 
its commentary is no authority at all. Finally, biblical authority is 
undermined by the instability of meaning because, if nothing specific 
is said, the text cannot call for any specific response. Interpreters can 
give neither obedience nor belief to texts that lack specificity. If there 
is no meaning in the text, then there is nothing to which the reader can 
be held accountable.22 
                                                 
20See e.g. Thiselton 1992, 272-307; Watson 1997, 71-93. See also Thiselton 1999. Speech act 
theory has been criticised by both Derrida and Fish (see Derrida 1972; Fish 1980a, 97-111, 
197-245), and has generally failed to make much headway as an approach in literary studies, 
largely because of a perceived inability to deal with the complexities of literary texts (see e.g. 
Magnusson 1993; Eagleton 1996, 102-04).  
21Vanhoozer 1998, 170, 182. See also Thiselton 1992, 537-55. 
22Vanhoozer 1998, 86. 
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Vanhoozer’s model for scripture is potentially very helpful for a confessional  
critical approach, as may be illustrated by reference to our earlier 
consideration of narrative criticism. First, Vanhoozer offers a strong model of 
the biblical text as communication which coheres with narrative criticism’s 
existing text-as-communication model, inherited from Seymour Chatman. 
Potentially, Vanhoozer provides the theological context and framework which 
Chatman’s model lacked, thus bolstering narrative criticism as a confessional 
approach. Second, although Vanhoozer insists upon the priority of authorial 
intention, something which narrative critics have tended to bracket out of their 
approaches, he accepts that some realities to which biblical texts point are 
mediated solely by the text, and that therefore a focus upon their poetic form is 
indispensible. Third, Vanhoozer’s call for methodological pluralism validates 
narrative criticism’s role alongside existing historical-critical approaches 
within a confessional approach to Biblical Studies. Fourth, Vanhoozer resists 
the implications of radical reader response and deconstruction without 
disengaging from debate altogether, offering the prospect of a model by means 
of which confessional interpretive approaches might engage constructively 
with de-confessional academic interpreters.  On the face of it, Vanhoozer 
would appear to offer narrative criticism exactly the theological and 
hermeneutical framework it needs to establish itself as a valid confessional-
critical interpretive approach. 
 
There are, however, weaknesses in Vanhoozer’s model which make it 
inadequate as a sole resource for a broader confessional approach in 
postmodern Biblical Studies. First, it is clear that Vanhoozer’s prioritisation of 
the author’s intention necessarily subordinates the concerns of the reader to 
those of the author and this is a major stumbling block for postmodern ethics 
of interpretation. Whilst Vanhoozer does not make it impossible for readers to 
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interrogate or to bring their own contextual interests to the text, he does 
consider such responses inappropriate, given his insistence that proper 
interpretation lies in discerning the illocutionary force of a text and responding 
appropriately. For Vanhoozer, the only real meaning is the meaning which the 
author (divine or human) puts in a text, and every other consideration is 
secondary. This leads to some problematic ethical reasoning. For instance, 
Vanhoozer responds to feminist concerns over the apparent misogyny of some 
biblical texts by seeking to defend the biblical authors from “ethical 
consequentialism”.23 Vanhoozer argues the need to distinguish between the 
intended purpose of communication (illocution), the foreseen or desired 
consequences of communication (perlocution), and unintended or unforseen 
consequences (accidents): 
 
The author’s communicative act is never the sole causal factor in 
bringing about a perlocutionary effect. Only the illocutionary, 
therefore, refers to something intrinsic to the action. Strictly speaking, 
then, consequences should not be considered part of the internal 
structure of the action. [...] If the biblical narratives have come to be 
read as promoting sexism (or racism, for that matter), this should be 
seen as an unintended consequence of the author’s communicative 
action for which they ought not be held responsible.24 
 
Vanhoozer attempts to illustrate his point by analogy. If, for instance, he 
breaks a glass whilst washing up and is asked what he is doing, the response 
will not be “breaking glasses”. The washing of dishes is the intended result, 
whilst the breaking of the glass is an unintended consequence. The difference 
between the two can only be established by establishing the intention of the 
act. Consequently, Vanhoozer claims, “the best way to avoid interpretive 
accidents is to attend to authorial intention”.25 
 
                                                 
23Vanhoozer 1998, 255. 
24Vanhoozer 1998, 255. 
25Vanhoozer 1998, 255. 
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It seems clear that Vanhoozer is here engaged in special pleading. To use his 
analogy, he did not mean to break the glass but to wash the dishes, and so 
should not be held responsible for something he did not intend to do. The act 
should be judged by its intention and not by its consequences. But this is 
unreasonable. The glass was not intentionally broken, but it was broken and 
remains so, and Vanhoozer is the responsible agent. Vanhoozer’s claim that 
only his intention counts in evaluating his action is to evade responsibility for 
it. By the same token, Vanhoozer attempts to shift the responsibility for 
readings of the Bible as sexist away from biblical authors and onto feminist 
interpreters. Vanhoozer accuses them of misreading, blaming the biblical 
authors for meanings they did not intend and for which they should not be 
held accountable. “The biblical authors did not intend these texts as sexist,” 
Vanhoozer says, “If you read them as such, then that is your fault for not 
paying proper attention to what they really meant to say.” 
 
The problem with this argument is that, as feminists and ideological critics 
have pointed out, sexist, racist and other ideologies are generally endemic and, 
therefore, rarely conscious or intended. A writer may not intend to produce a 
racist or sexist text but may still do so because the text reflects his or her 
unthinking prejudices. Sexism and racism are, in effect, structural or cultural 
sins which are no less sinful because they are unconscious or so prevalent in a 
community that they are taken for granted. It is not Vanhoozer’s insistence 
that the intention of biblical authors ought to weigh more in the balance of 
critical evaluation than the unintended consequences of their acts that weakens 
his argument so much as the necessity, forced on him by his stress of authorial 
intent as the only locus of textual meaning, of dismissing feminist concern as a 
secondary interest which generates misreadings of the text.  
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A further weakness of Vanhoozer’s argument at this point is that he falls foul 
of the classic literary-theoretical argument of the “intentional fallacy”, which 
insists that authors’ intentions cannot be accessed directly, but only through 
the medium of the text. Since the text is the outcome of the intention, it is not 
always possible to judge whether a textual consequence was consciously 
intended by the author or not.  Evaluation of interpretations as perlocutionary 
effects in light of the author’s illocutionary intention is therefore not possible 
in the absence of external evidence as to what that intention might have been. 
In the case of most biblical texts our only access to illocutionary intent is 
through perlocutionary effect, and it is not always possible to distinguish this 
from interpretive accident or the results of unconscious communication by 
authors. This renders illocutionary force unreliable as a means of evaluating 
interpretations. 
 
One alternative response might have been to recognise that, as biblical texts 
find their way into new contexts, the limitations imposed upon them by their 
original contexts of production become apparent. As the Spirit leads the 
community of faith into a fuller realisation of the truth, it is sometimes 
necessary to recognise that the biblical texts were written in particular 
cultures, and that they will therefore sometimes reflect the endemic sins of 
those cultures. The response of the community should, therefore, be charitable 
but not uncritical: one can accept a text as well-meaning, judging it ultimately 
by its intention, at the same time as identifying and rejecting some of the 
cultural baggage which comes with it. Vanhoozer’s emphasis on determinate 
meaning forces him into an either/or response when a both/and solution might 
have been more helpful. As it is, Vanhoozer’s location of meaning in authorial 
intention poses a problem for his interpretive ethics and limits the usefulness 




A second problem with Vanhoozer’s hermeneutics is his depiction of the role 
of the Holy Spirit in interpretation, which in trinitarian terms is arguably 
subordinationist. Vanhoozer sees the roles of Father and Son as bound up with 
the production of meaning, with the Father as author or motivating force, and 
the Son as the Word or the incarnate means of communication, but the Spirit is 
allowed only a secondary role in enabling the reader and the faith community 
to respond to the biblical text and understand its significance. This is not to 
suggest that Vanhoozer has misidentified the Spirit’s role in interpretation, but 
rather that he has been led to undervalue it by his emphasis on the importance 
of authorial intent for biblical authority. If, on the other hand, a robust 
trinitarian theology would want to avoid any suggestion of subordinationism 
and insist that Father, Son and Spirit are co-equal in all things, it is arguable 
that the Spirit’s activity in interpretation is equally as important, and that 
Vanhoozer’s definition of meaning is therefore rendered deficient through 
ascribing the production of meaning to two persons of the Trinity rather than 
to the Trinity as a whole. If the production of meaning is the activity of the 
Godhead, then the creation of meaning in the mind of the reader by the Spirit 
must be considered an equal and integral part of that divine activity. Reader 
response to the biblical texts, therefore, must be given full consideration in any 
model of divine self-communication through scripture, rather than being seen 
as a secondary and derivative activity.26 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be worth asking the question of the 
impact of Vanhoozer’s understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit in interpretation on a 
doctrine of biblical inspiration. Vanhoozer identifies the role of the Spirit in relation to the 
reader, as enabling the reader to receive the perlocutionary force of the biblical text. A 
doctrine of inspiration must also, however, find some role for the Spirit in the creation of the 
text, and Vanhoozer appears not to address this. 
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Stephen E. Fowl: Scripture, Spirit and Community in Dialectic Relationship 
 
A counterpoint to Vanhoozer is the work of Stephen E. Fowl, whose book  
Engaging Scripture: A Model for Theological Interpretation (1998) offers a 
corrective to Vanhoozer’s model.27 Fowl raises objections to the kind of 
determinate interpretation that Vanhoozer advocates. Locating meaning within 
the text is to see meaning as a property of the text, uncoverable through the 
application of particular interpretive procedures: 
 
On this view, the biblical text is seen as a relatively stable element in 
which an author inserts, hides or dissolves (choose your metaphor) 
meaning. The task of the interpreter, whether lay, clerical, or 
professional, is to dig out, uncover or distill the meaning of the text.28 
 
 The problem with the search for meaning, however, is that different 
approaches have different conceptions of what the meaning of a text might be. 
Historical criticism, for instance, argues that the meaning of the Bible lies 
primarily ‘behind the text’, either in the historical events to which the biblical 
narratives refer, or in the intention of the author or authors. Formalist criticism 
has tended to argue that meaning is ‘in the text’, encoded or embodied in the 
literary form of narratives which, whilst not necessarily referentially true, 
nevertheless present a true vision of human-divine relationships. Reader 
response critics, meanwhile, insist that meaning lies ‘in front of the text’, in 
the interaction of text and reader, where meaning is created when the text is 
brought to life in the reader’s context in such a way as to illuminate the 
reader’s situation. Disagreements over meaning and where it is to be found 
have, as we have seen, been a particular problem for first-generation narrative 
criticism, which carefully bracketed out issues behind and in front of the text, 
and which stressed the importance of meanings located within the text itself. 
                                                 
27Fowl 1998. 
28Fowl 1998, 34. 
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As a result, narrative criticism attracted sometimes vitriolic criticism from 
both historical and ideological critics, who insisted that narrative critics were 
looking for meaning in the wrong place. 
 
Fowl’s argument, which we noted in chapter two, is that in the postmodern 
pluralist context the term ‘meaning’ has become so indeterminate that it 
should be abandoned altogether in favour of the framing of interpretive 
approaches in terms of their interpretive interests. Fowl anticipates that such 
framing may help dissolve some interpretive issues, but does not anticipate 
that it will resolve disputes altogether.29 Instead, he suggests that such disputes 
can be relocated and reframed so as to generate more positive results than 
have previously been achieved.  In particular, the redefinition of interpretive 
approaches in terms of interests helps to avoid some otherwise problematic 
issues. For instance, a view of meaning as determinate forces interpreters into 
a view of the history of Christian interpretation as a history of failure: if a 
determinate meaning is available, and if we have not achieved consensus on 
what that meaning is, then attempts to define it to date must have been 
failures.30  
 
Fowl rejects the suggestion that abandonment of meaning in favour of 
interests leads to interpretive anarchy or indeterminacy: indeed, he resists 
Derridean anti-determinate interpretation on ethical grounds, and proposes 
instead an “underdetermined” approach to interpretation framed in terms of 
interpretive interests. Such an approach will take into account vital contextual 
                                                 
29Vanhoozer agrees with Fowl that “Much confusion could indeed be eliminated if interpreters 
would stop speaking of meaning and instead say what exactly they are describing (or 
prescribing) and why” (Vanhoozer 1998, 328), but sees this as operating within the context of 
his pluralist approach to the literal meaning of the text. To acknowledge a number of 
legitimate interests in anything other than the authorial intention of the text would, in 
Vanhoozer’s view, threaten the authority of the Bible by taking a step too far in the direction 
of relativism. 
30Fowl 1998, 33-40. 
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considerations in interpretation which text-centred approaches to biblical 
‘meaning’ have overlooked: 
 
theological conviction, ecclesial practices, and communal and social 
concerns should shape and be shaped by biblical interpretation. [...] for 
Christians, at least, biblical interpretation will be the occasion of a 
complex interaction between the biblical text and the varieties of 
theological, moral, material, political, and ecclesial concerns that are 
part of the day-to-day lives of Christians struggling to live faithfully 
before God in the contexts in which they find themselves.31 
 
Fowl anticipates the objection that to abandon determinate meaning and focus 
instead on contextual factors in interpretation reduces biblical interpretation to 
the socio-pragmatic exercise advocated by Fish, in which the Bible loses its 
power to transform readers and communities. Fowl notes the importance of 
resisting the temptation simply to use the Bible to underwrite sinful practices 
embedded in the reader’s interpretive context, and suggests two key factors in 
avoiding such readings: first, the Christian community must be vigilant, 
reflective, aware of their own sinfulness and open to external critique;32 and 
second, the Christian community must be able to interpret scripture in tune 
with the Holy Spirit, to whom he attributes a much more significant role than 
Vanhoozer. 
 
Fowl argues on the basis of Jesus’ farewell discourse in John 13-17, that the 
role of the Spirit is twofold: first, he will help the disciples remember what 
they have been taught (14:26); and second, he will guide the disciples into 
further truth (16:12-15).33 Fowl argues with reference to John 2:22 and 12:16, 
                                                 
31Fowl 1998, 60. Fowl has elsewhere argued that “The ways in which people read and write 
texts are decisively shaped by material circumstances and by the kinds of people they are and 
hope to become. Interpretation, like ethics, requires attention to particular conceptions of 
communities in which people learn to read and write texts and learn to become this or that sort 
of person” (Fowl and Jones 1991, 20-21). 
32Fowl 1998, 62-96. Fowl’s insights on the characteristics of virtuous reading communities are 
fundamental to the formation of a Christian ethics of interpretation, and we will return to them 
later. 
33Fowl 1998, 99. 
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where the disciples remember and understand both scripture and Jesus’ 
teaching after his death and resurrection, that the Spirit’s role in reminding 
believers of what they have been taught is actually guidance in interpretation 
of scripture in the light of Jesus’ death and resurrection. Changing 
circumstances lead to old words being understood in new ways, and Fowl sees 
this as the “more” that the Spirit speaks whilst simultaneously leading the 
disciples to “abide in the true vine”. Hence, believers will interpret scripture in 
light of their experience and in tune with the Spirit, leading them to act in 
ways that are both new and, at the same time, in continuity with the past.34 
 
Fowl develops his argument by means of an extended analysis of the Spirit’s 
role and the church’s use of scripture in Acts 10-15 and, later, in Paul’s letter 
to the Galatians.35 The process of discernment whereby Gentiles are admitted 
into the community of faith reveals, for Fowl, a complex and dialectical 
relationship between discernment of the activity of the Spirit in the church’s 
experience and the guidance of the Spirit in relating that experience to 
scripture. Most importantly, and contrary to many modern interpretive 
presumptions which assume that scriptural interpretation precedes communal 
praxis, Fowl observes a pattern whereby “experience of the Spirit’s work 
provides the lenses through which scripture is read rather than vice-versa”.36 
Fowl warns, however, against taking this as an abstract hermeneutical rule. 
Rather, he suggests that the practice of interpretation depicted in Acts and 
Galatians is a complex one which takes place in the context of a community 
sensitive both to the Spirit’s work in their own lives and in their wider context, 
and open to the guidance of the Spirit in their interpretation of scripture. 
Within that community, scripture and Spirit activity interpret one another: 
 
                                                 
34Fowl 1998, 101. 
35Fowl 1998, 101-13, 137-45. 
36Fowl 1998, 114. 
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Understanding and interpreting the Spirit’s movement is a matter of 
communal debate and discernment over time. This debate and 
discernment is itself often shaped both by prior interpretations of 
scripture and by traditions of practice and belief. This means that in 
practice it is probably difficult, if not impossible, to separate and 
determine clearly whether a community’s scriptural interpretation is 
prior to or dependent upon a community’s experience of the Spirit. 
Experience of the Spirit shapes the reading of scripture, but scripture 
most often provides the lenses through which the Spirit’s work is 
perceived and acted upon.37 
 
The dynamic of interpretation within the Spirit-led community, Fowl suggests, 
is not one-way, such that interpretation of scripture is primary and application 
is secondary. Rather, scripture provides a conceptual framework for 
recognising the Spirit’s activity, which is then in turn brought to bear upon the 
community’s understanding of scripture in such a way as potentially to 
transform it. This means that close attention to the Spirit’s action in the world 
and the community is essential if interpretation is to operate properly.38 It is 
not sufficient, Fowl argues, to concentrate attention only on what God says in 
scripture. Rather, attention to the Word of God in scripture must go hand in 
hand with attention to what the Spirit of God is doing in the context of the 
reading community.39 
 
Fowl’s analysis of Acts 15 closely parallels a similar interpretation by John 
Christopher Thomas, whose interest is in using the passage to construct a 
                                                 
37Fowl 1998, 114. 
38Fowl 1998, 115. 
39
 Vanhoozer has argued that Fowl’s approach confuses the meaning of the text with textual 
effects (Vanhoozer 1998, 410).  Vanhoozer queries whether effects which are unintended by 
the text should be considered to be textual meanings, wonders how Spirit-guided interpretive 
practice can be distinguished from mundane, and worries how Fowl’s approach can avoid 
reducing “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us” (Acts 15:28) to a Fishian “It seemed 
good to us”. Fowl’s suggestion, for Vanhoozer, provides too few checks on what counts as 
valid or legitimate interpretation, and undermines the authority of the biblical texts by 
emphasising the interpretive authority of the reading community (Vanhoozer 1998, 410-12). 
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model for Pentecostal hermeneutics.40 Thomas finds in Acts 15 a number of 
interpretive factors and dynamics which resonate with the experience of 
Pentecostal interpreting communities, in particular the interpretive movement 
from experience to scripture rather than the other way around.41 Thomas first 
notes the importance in Acts of the community as the context for 
interpretation. The community is both the place where the Spirit acts and 
where testimony regarding God’s activity is offered, assessed, accepted or 
rejected. The community is also a check to interpretation, offering balance, 
accountability and support but also guarding against “rampant individualism 
and uncontrolled subjectivism”.42 Second, Thomas argues that the Spirit’s role 
in interpretation in Acts 15 goes far beyond classic accounts of the Spirit’s 
role in “illumination”: the Spirit creates the context for interpretation through 
his actions and, consequently, guides the church in determining which texts 
are most relevant in a given situation and clarifies how they might best be 
approached.43 
 
Thomas insists that the Spirit’s role in interpretation is much greater than 
simply facilitating the communication of the text’s literal meaning to the 
reader. Rather, through his activity in and through church and text, the Spirit 
enables scripture to function dynamically, “making necessary a more intensive 
engagement with the text in order to discover its truths in ways that transcend 
                                                 
40Thomas 2000. This essay is based upon an earlier one in which Thomas applied his 
hermeneutic based upon Acts 15 to the question of the inclusion of women in the life of the 
church (Thomas 1994). Some Pentecostals have been quite enthusiastic about postmodernity 
as a hermeneutical context (see, for instance, Archer 1996). Fowl does not appear to be aware 
of Thomas’ work, which makes the similarity of their analysis all the more suggestive. 
41Thomas 2000, 113. 
42Thomas 2000, 119. 
43Thomas 2000, 119. 
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the mere cognitive”.44 Finally, however, Thomas insists that placing a higher 
emphasis upon contextual factors in interpretation does not undermine biblical 
authority because the text continues to exercise a normative function against 
which experience is measured and in the light of which practices or views can 
be evaluated.45 
 
Fowl and Thomas together demonstrate that a model like Vanhoozer’s, which 
focusses primarily upon meaning-in-the-text as the locus for understanding the 
Bible as scripture, does not do sufficient justice to the full range of divine 
activity in and through scripture. Ethical and contextual issues which 
Vanhoozer considers secondary are actually primary issues to many of those 
who seek to interpret the Bible in the context of believing communities, and 
Fowl and Thomas’ emphasis on the interaction of scripture, Spirit and 
community seeks to correct that imbalance. At the same time, however, 
Vanhoozer’s work provides a solid foundation both in stressing that any 
understanding of the Bible as scripture must be firmly rooted in a doctrine of 
God’s trinitarian activity in and through the text, and also in pointing out that a 
confessional approach must be multi-faceted in order to do justice to the 
complex nature of the Bible as communicative text. Vanhoozer thus sets out 
the parameters for a strongly confessional approach which is nevertheless 
committed to operating in a pluralistic context.  
 
The weaknesses of Vanhoozer’s argument lie not in what he affirms but in 
what he denies or underemphasises, particularly the role of the Holy Spirit in 
                                                 
44Thomas 2000, 119. 
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relation to readers and interpretive contexts. Fowl and Thomas’ emphasis 
upon the importance of reading contexts and communities, and upon the 
dialectical nature of the relationship between Spirit-led experience and 
scriptural interpretation offers the potential for reframing and broadening 
Vanhoozer’s model to include a wider range of interpretive interests, thus 
rendering it more capable of responding to de-confessional interpretive 
approaches. In doing so, however, it will be important to attempt to hold Fowl 
and Vanhoozer’s distinct emphases in tension: if Fowl is helpful in preventing 
biblical interpretation from becoming a textual monologue, Vanhoozer is also 
right to resist suggestions that it should be readers who make all the 
conversation. A balanced but polyvalent model for scripture must attempt to 
hold both poles in tension. 
 
Towards a Pluralist Model for Scriptural Interpretation 
 
Having examined the approaches and differing emphases of Fowl and 
Vanhoozer, and having noted their respective strengths, is it possible to work 
with both in defining a theoretical/theological model for confessional biblical 
criticism? Such a model would meet the criteria for a postmodern Christian 
description of scripture which we set out at the beginning of this chapter: first, 
reflecting the church’s experience of the Bible as a means by which God 
speaks to the community; and, second, acknowledging the pragmatic reality of 
multivalence in interpretation. On the face of it, Vanhoozer would seem to 
offer the first criterion and Fowl and Thomas the second. 
                                                                                                                                
45Thomas 2000, 119-20. 
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Scott David Foutz has argued that the hermeneutics of Fowl and Vanhoozer 
are incompatible on the grounds that Vanhoozer bases his approach upon the 
nature of the text whilst Fowl begins from an understanding of the work of the 
Spirit in the context of reading.46 These disparate foundations, Foutz argues, 
mean that it is not possible to hold to both hermeneutics  simultaneously. I 
agree that Vanhoozer’s definition of meaning as authorial and text-immanent 
is defined in opposition to a contextual emphasis such as Fowl advocates. I 
would suggest, however, that Fowl’s model is capable of incorporating 
Vanhoozer’s when Vanhoozer’s definition of textual meaning is reframed in 
Fowl’s terms of interpretive interests. When this is done, Vanhoozer’s  
argument for the exclusive location of meaning in the text is revealed to be a 
bid for the prioritisation of text-centred interpretive interests. Such 
prioritisation is to be resisted in the interests of preserving the legitimacy of a 
wider range of interpretive approaches than Vanhoozer allows.  
 
Confessional criticism, therefore, should follow Vanhoozer’s argument that a 
multi-faceted model for scripture is required, but frame that model in broader 
terms than Vanhoozer concedes. This broader model will do fuller justice to 
the breadth and depth of the communicative activity for which the biblical 
texts provide a focus, but in which readers and contexts have significant roles 
to play. The broadening of Vanhoozer’s model allows his distinctive insight to 
be affirmed, but not at the expense of other interests. Such reframing 
compensates for the weaknesses of Vanhoozer’s approach whilst retaining its 
                                                 
46Foutz 1999. 
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strengths, especially his insistence upon a strong theological foundation for 
confessional hermeneutics, and also better fits a confessional approach to the 
Bible as scripture for life in an academic environment where it will be forced 
to interact with de-confessional approaches. 
 
Vanhoozer’s model is valuable in acknowledging that the biblical text is a 
multivalent communicative act which needs to be interpreted using a number 
of interpretive frameworks, but the description is unhelpfully limited in its 
definition of meaning.47 I would suggest that Vanhoozer’s description of 
textual meaning as propositional, poetic, pedagogical and canonical needs to 
be supplemented and developed so as to include a broader range of 
interpretive interests than he allows. One way of doing this might be to draw 
upon a model framed by the Russian Formalist and structuralist theorist 
Roman Jakobson.48 Jakobson argues that any linguistic act has six essential 
elements.49 At the heart of the act is a message initiated by an addresser and 
directed to an addressee. In addition, however, the message requires a means 
of contact between addresser and addressee; a code which is comprehensible 
by both parties; and a context understood by both addresser and addressee, 
which enables the message to make sense (i.e. what the message is about). In 
                                                 
47
 A. K. M. Adam has argued that the linking of the Holy Trinity to the interpretive triad of 
Author, Text and Reader which Vanhoozer attempts “in a sort of literary vestigium trinitatis” 
fails to account for the possibility that the constitutive elements of interpretation number more 
that three, and suggests that the contexts of author and reader ought to be included. Adam also 
points out that numbers other than three carry theological significance within Christian 
tradition, and suggests that the argument from triunity “should be granted ornamental, not 
probative, force” (Adam 2004, 36). 
48Jakobson 1960. For overview and assessment of Jakobson’s work see Culler 1975, 54-74; 
Hawkes 1983, 76-87; Kidder 1993. Against anticipated poststructuralist allegations that 
Jakobson’s model is out of date, it should be stated that any model is helpful as long as its 
uses outweigh its limitations, and that those limitations are open to evaluation for as long as 
the model remains only a model and does not become an absolute paradigm. 
49Jakobson 1960, 353. 
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the case of Paul’s letter to the Galatians, for example, the message is the 
urging of Paul as addresser of the Galatians as addressees to remain in the 
grace of God and not revert to the constraints of the law; the code by means of 
which the message is communicated is Greek; the contact is the paper and ink 
of the letter itself; and the context is the church’s ongoing struggle to discern 
the appropriate response to the inclusion of gentiles within the church. 
 
Terence Hawkes makes two important observations about Jakobson’s model.50  
First, he observes that the message, or propositional content of the 
communication, is not the whole meaning. All of the elements must be taken 
into account if the communicative act is to be understood as a whole. This 
suggests that Vanhoozer’s model of textual meaning should be expanded to 
include aspects of Jakobson’s model which Vanhoozer omits or subordinates 
as secondary concerns.  
 
Second, Hawkes argues that meaning is “not a stable, predetermined entity 
which passes, untrammelled, from sender to receiver”.51 The reason for this is 
that the six elements of communication are never in perfect balance. In 
different contexts, one or other is likely to dominate, and this will affect the 
nature of the communication as a whole. Each element therefore performs a 
particular function: the elements addresser, message, addressee, code, contact 
and context correspond to the emotive, poetic, conative, metalingual, phatic 
and referential functions respectively. Hence, if the burden of the 
communication is to the effect that “I feel sad,” the crucial element will be the 
                                                 
50Hawkes 1983, 83-84. 
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emotional state of the addresser, and the emotive function will be dominant. 
Similarly, if the purpose of communicating is to ask “Can you read my 
handwriting?” then the orientation of the communication is towards the 
contact, and the dominant function will be phatic. 
 
It is arguable that Jakobson’s model provides a fuller account of the biblical 
text as communicative act than Vanhoozer’s. In addition, however, although 
Jakobson’s model was designed for the categorisation of different kinds of 
communicative acts, it also offers a helpful way of categorising interpretive 
interests.52 Hence, biblical linguists attempting to compile dictionaries of 
biblical Hebrew and Greek may approach the text with a metalingual interest 
in its linguistic code. Similarly, a biblical historian interested in reconstructing 
the context of pre-exilic temple worship from the Books of Kings and 
Chronicles will pursue a referential interest in the context of the text’s 
production. 
 
Some approaches, of course, will address more than a single aspect of the 
Bible as a communicative act, and a confessional narrative criticism would fall 
into this category. Narrative critics are interested in the poetic function of 
biblical narratives in that they are interested in the way biblical narratives 
communicate through their literary form; they are also interested in the 
conative function of scripture as a communication which forms and transforms 
its readers; and as a confessional approach they are interested in the 
                                                                                                                                
51Hawkes 1983, 84. 
52Mark G. Brett has also offered a model for categorising interpretive interests (Brett 1990), 
but his model is addressed to, and operates almost entirely within, historical-critical 
scholarship. 
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referential function of biblical narratives which point beyond themselves and 
reveal the reality of divine-human relationships. 
 
There is, however, one potential difficulty with Jakobson’s model when 
applied to the Bible, and that is in relation to the referential function of 
biblical texts. The difficulty is that the context of the biblical authors as 
addressers and contemporary biblical readers as addressees do not coincide, 
either temporally or culturally. This has led to a fundamental disjunction in the 
minds of many interpreters between what the text meant and what the text 
means.
53
 The absence of a common context for communication appears to 
threaten the viability of the communicative act, and it is precisely this 
contextual gap which many ideological critics have seized upon to deny the 
relevance or authority of the Bible for the contemporary situation. The biblical 
texts, it is argued, do not actually address us at all. Instead, they are ‘dead 
letters’, the echoes of conversations long past, decontextualised artefacts of 
culture which modern readers can do with as they will.54 
 
This contextual disjunction arises in part because modern literary theory lacks 
any metaphysical context. As a result of presuppositions that the only facts 
capable of critical evaluation are those which can be empirically verified, or 
                                                 
53
 See e.g. Stendahl 1962 for an influential argument on this basis. 
54This is to say that modern readers are not the intended addressees of biblical texts, and that 
as such, modern readers should not feel bound by any sense of responsibility either to the text 
or to the author. Francis Watson has attempted to counter this argument by stressing a key 
aspect of texts as written communicative acts: namely, that “their effect may be indefinitely 
extended in space and in time”, and that this continuation into an open future is intended in the  
act of writing itself (Watson 1997, 119-20). In other words, biblical texts are not dead letters 
but open ones, whose literary forms enable them to extend their horizons beyond those of their 
authors, even if such extension is beyond the author’s control. Were this not the case, they 
would have nothing to say to readers in contexts other than those for which they were 
produced. 
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that truth can be understood exclusively in terms of human experience, literary 
models for textual meaning will tend to look for that meaning within the 
process of textual formation and communication. If, however, Jakobson’s 
model is applied to the Bible as scripture and seen within the framework of a 
trinitarian theology, then the difficulty is potentially eased. Whilst it must be 
acknowledged that the cultural and historical contexts of biblical authors and 
readers are diverse, those separate contexts exist within the broader context of 
a world itself created, defined and sustained by the activity of God the Trinity. 
Vanhoozer’s insistence upon a trinitarian hermeneutics thus comes into play: 
God facilitates communication by setting the parameters for it, and insofar as 
the Bible is a means of divine communication, such communication is not 
threatened by divergent cultural contexts provided that God is seen to be 
active by the Holy Spirit in both the context of textual production and the 
context of textual reception and interpretation. Neither the author nor the 
reader, both of whom are part of the process of communication, are the 
originators of meaning, nor is it inherent in the text. Rather, because the 
communicative act takes place within the wider context of a created order in 
which God is omnipresent and in which the Holy Spirit is constantly 
operative, then any and all aspects of the text as comunication may serve as 
loci of meaning or, better put, conveyors of truth, at different times and in 
different situations.  
 
This is not to say that cultural and historical differences are not potential 
problems for communication, or to minimise the dangers of inadvertently or 
uncritically misreading or misappropriating ethical or theological concepts 
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because of cultural, historical or linguistic ignorance. Nor does it imply that 
study of ancient middle eastern culture and language is not essential if we are 
to understand anything of the Bible at all. Rather, it is to argue only that the 
divergence of authorial and reading contexts does not render the interpretation 
of scripture as the Word of God hopelessly problematic. A strong 
pneumatological doctrine of inspiration is essential here: the Spirit who 
inspires and enables the production of biblical texts is the same Spirit who 
indwells and inspires biblical readers, and enables them to interpret the 
biblical texts as the Word of God. 
 
If Jakobson’s model enhances Vanhoozer’s, it also offers a helpful means of 
locating interpretive interests in the Bible as scripture within the range of 
confessional approaches. Fowl is, I believe, correct in his analysis of the 
breakdown of ‘meaning’ as a term with broad currency in Biblical Studies, 
and his assertion that it can no longer be assumed that all interpreters are in 
search of the same thing when they talk about meaning. In response to this, I 
would suggest that confessional criticism should reframe its interpretive goals 
not in terms of meaning but in terms of interests in textual truth. Ceasing to be 
able to say definitively “This is what the text means” is not the same as no 
longer being able to say things about the text which are true, or to resist 
assertions about the text which are untrue. On the contrary, definition of 
approach in terms of interpretive interest facilitates a fuller exploration and 
understanding of multi-faceted and polyvalent textual truth.55 Hence, 
                                                 
55
 This is to argue not for the abolition of meaning as a concept, but for a maximalised 
conception which sees meaning as the fullness of the complete communicative act. This 
encompasses not only authors, texts and readers, but also contexts of textual production and 
interpretation in which God is active, and to whose self-revealing activity both biblical authors 
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historical-critical scholarship seeks the truth of the events behind the biblical 
texts or the history of textual composition by focussing on the text’s historical 
referential function or by specialised focus on metalingual aspects; formalist 
or literary-rhetorical approaches seek the truth of the texts’ poetic form and 
their semantic and literary structure as communicative acts by engaging poetic 
and metalingual functions of the text; reader response critics seek to 
understand the truth of how the biblical texts interact with readers by 
examining the interaction of poetic and conative functions. In each of these 
areas there are truths to be discerned, but they are of different kinds and 
orders. As long as the whole model is kept in view, it is possible to assert an 
interest in particular kinds of textual truth and to put forward interpretations 
which reveal that truth more fully, without falling into the temptation to claim 
that one has come into exclusive possession of all truth about the text. 
Reframing the search for meaning as a search for textual truth frees 
interpretive approaches to be themselves, pursuing their own interests using 
the most appropriate methods, whilst at the same time affirming and valuing 
the interests and scholarship of others. 
 
Interpretive interest offers a helpful tool for interpreters seeking to operate 
within a pluralist context. As Fowl suggests, defining one’s interest may help 
to defuse interpretive dispute by revealing that certain interests are not as 
                                                                                                                                
and readers bear witness through the functions of a biblical text which itself serves as a 
vehicle of God’s self-communication. Put another way, this is to argue that meaning is not to 
be located exclusively within the communicative act, but in the act in context. The meaning of 
the Bible is not in the text but through the text: God chooses to use the Bible in order to reveal 
truths about  his relationship with the world he has made, and with authors and readers who 
exist within that divinely-determined context. The meaning of scripture in a Christian context 
is that it bears witness to the activity of God outside itself, and it is that activity which 
provides the essential context for its inspiration and legitimate interpretation. 
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incompatible as might have been thought, but by the same token a clear 
definition and declaration of interest may reveal previously hidden tensions 
and conflicts of interest, enabling them to be addressed and, hopefully, 
resolved. It is possible, however, that categorising interests in different ways 
may be helpful. For instance, as suggested above, declaring that one’s broad 
interest lies behind the text, in the text or in front of the text might helpfully 
define areas of interest within Biblical Studies and remove the need for 
intradisciplinary sniping and skirmishing between interpretive paradigms. If it 
is accepted that each interest is of value, then scholars can get on with 
pursuing their interpretive aims and not waste time and energy fighting one 
another for possession of the discipline. 
 
Furthermore, talk of interests may help to adjudicate disputes between 
different interpretive interests. Daniel Patte has suggested that a key criterion 
in negotiating between differing interpretive perspectives is the distinction 
between legitimacy and validity. Legitimacy is a reflection on the extent to 
which a given reading engages with an aspect or feature of the text. Patte 
draws upon the work of Mieke Bal and A. J. Greimas to argue that any given 
text can be conceived of as a plurality of distinct “meaning-producing 
dimensions”, any one of which can provide the basis for a coherent reading of 
the text. Texts are not simple and one-dimensional but complex multi-
dimensional puzzles, whose pieces can be arranged into several different 
coherent meanings.56 Different readers, with their differing interests and 
locations, will engage with different dimensions, and thus produce a wide 
                                                 
56Patte 1995b, 98. 
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range of meanings, readings and interpretations, all of which are legitimate if 
they engage with a genuine dimension of the text.57 
 
Many arguments about legitimacy in interpretation (i.e. the correct 
interpretation of the text) are, in fact, arguments about the validity of 
interpretations (i.e. interpretation of the text in the light of particular concerns 
or interests): 
many of our rejections of ordinary readings as illegitimate are actually 
rejections of the interests and concerns that govern those readings. This 
is not a judgement about legitimacy. This is a judgement about 
validity, that is, about the value of being interested in one meaning-
producing dimension of the text rather than another.58 
 
Validity, for Patte, reflects the “interested” character of exegesis and the 
contextual nature of interpretation. Readings have value in that they seek to 
address particular problems or affirm the particular interests of a community 
of interpreters.59 Arguments about validity are therefore less arguments over 
the text and more disagreements about the concerns or interests which 
underpin a particular interpretation. 
 
Patte’s distinction is helpful in clarifying interpretive disputes and differences. 
It is possible, for instance, to acknowledge another person’s reading as 
legitimate (that is, to recognise that it brings a reasonable concern, interest or 
                                                 
57Patte 1995b, 28. Patte draws especially upon Bal 1988b, in which she demonstrates the 
applicability of different interpretative “codes” to the story of Sisera in Judges 4 and 5. Bal 
argues that the application of different codes produces different legitimate readings, and that 
this means that no one interpretation can claim a monopoly of interpretative truth in relation to 
that particular narrative. In his article “The Contextual Character of Male, European-American 
Critical Exegeses”, Patte uses the analogy of the black-and-white picture commonly used in 
psychological studies which can be perceived either as a goblet or as two persons looking at 
each other. Both images are in the picture, but the pictures perceived by different viewers will 
be radically different (Patte 1995a, 52). 
58Patte 1995b, 101. 
 211 
question to the text and engages seriously and appropriately with the evidence 
of the text itself), without at the same time accepting the validity of the 
reading  (that is, to accept the other reader’s assessment of the importance or 
significance of their interpretation). Taking Jakobson’s model as a framework, 
for instance, narrative critics may acknowledge the legitimacy of historical-
criticism’s referential interests in the biblical texts whilst at the same time 
rejecting the suggestion that historical-critical approaches are universally valid 
for understanding all functions of the text. It is possible to seek the factual 
truth of the historical events depicted in biblical narratives, to seek the truth of 
how the text depicts divine-human relationships in its literary form, and to 
seek the truth of whether the Exodus narrative or Jesus’ advice to turn the 
other cheek provide helpful theological and ethical resources for communities 
living under oppression or persecution at the same time.  
 
The gain of moving from talk of meaning to talk of interpretive interests is that 
the value of each interpretive interest can be appreciated without its 
necessarily being seen as in competition with the others. As we have seen with 
Vanhoozer, the problem with the use of ‘meaning’ as a definitive concept in 
defining critical approaches to the Bible is that by claiming to find the 
meaning of a text in one area of study one immediately makes a claim for the 
prioritisation of that approach at the expense of others.60 A logical conclusion 
which might be drawn from Vanhoozer’s emphasis upon illocutionary 
intention, for instance, is that if what the text means is what the author intends 
it to mean, then that is where most interpretive resources and energy should be 
                                                                                                                                
59Patte 1995a, 47. 
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expended. Anyone interested in some other aspect of the text is not interested 
in what the text means, but in something secondary and therefore, by 
definition, less important.61  
 
Stephen Fowl addresses this point by sketching the range of interpretive 
interests in the life of a twelfth-century French monk: 
 
As part of his daily prayer, both communal and personal, he reads (and 
interprets!) The Psalms. In the course of his daily work he lectures on 
Psalms at the university of Paris. Being a gifted artist, he is also 
illuminating a manuscript of the Psalms. On Sundays he preaches from 
Psalms. All of these activities involve interpretation, but they cannot 
all fit under a single determinate theory of interpretation. If one 
privileges the interpretation done in the university, for example, 
claiming that it provides “the meaning” of the text, what is one to say 
about these other interpretive activities?62 
 
By contrast, Fowl argues, dealing with each activity in terms of interpretive 
interest allows each activity to be both clearly explained and evaluated without 
the differing activities competing. 
 
In qualification of the foregoing, it is important to stress that reducing 
competition between interests does not mean that all interests are equal. In the 
case of the monk, Fowl argues, there was probably an order of interests based 
upon contextual factors such as doctrinal, moral, ecclesial and communal 
concerns, themselves contingent upon a specific time and place, and upon his 
                                                                                                                                
60
 Patte describes the elevation of one interpretive interest over others as “idolatry”, “taking as 
absolute what is not absolute” (Patte 1995b, 25). 
61
 This is not to say that Vanhoozer thinks that secondary considerations are unimportant. As a 
Christian scholar, Vanhoozer would want to say that application of the text to the life 
situations of contemporary readers is an essential activity. The logic of his argument, 
however, requires the subordination of reader interests to authorial interests in such a way as 
to endanger the ability of some biblical texts to speak to contexts which their authorial 
horizons did not envisage. 
62Fowl 1998, 37. 
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participation in a particular interpretive community. In the same way, it is 
reasonable that contemporary Christian interpretive communities will seek to 
order their interpretive interests according to their perceived needs.63 It would 
be legitimate for the Christian community to regard some interests as less 
important, unimportant, unneccesary or even irrelevant. What would be 
unreasonable would be for Christians to attempt to impose their interpretive 
values and interests upon others. It is precisely this situation which has given 
rise to much of the hostility which Christian interpretation faces within the 
academy.64 
 
It is also important to note that the validity of interpretive approaches need not 
be absolute or universal: an interest may be accepted as valid without being 
allowed to dominate interpretation. For instance, a confessional narrative critic 
might well affirm the legitimacy of a non-confessional feminist approach to 
Jesus’ encounter with the Samaritan woman in John 4 in terms of the 
seriousness of the concern which the feminist brings to the text and the 
appropriateness of the critical analysis applied to produce a feminist 
interpretation. The narrative critic may also affirm the validity of the feminist 
                                                 
63
 Charles H. Cosgrove has offered a fourfold model for guiding considerations in choosing 
between competing plausible interpretations of scripture (Cosgrove 2004b): theological 
considerations assess interpretations against the standard of accepted norms of faith; moral 
considerations set interpretations against ethical standards which rest upon Jesus’ principle of 
double love in Matthew 22:34-40; correlational criteria seek to assess the profundity and 
relevance of an interpretation to the lives of Christians and their communities; and ecumenical 
considerations seek interpretations which can be as broadly inclusive as possible. These 
criteria would also serve as a working model for prioritisation and adjudication of interpretive 
interests within Christian communities and for approaches coming into the community from 
outside. 
64This is not to say that Christians cannot attempt to convince others of the validity of their 
interpretive interests. Rather, it is unethical to attempt, either covertly or overtly, to place 
someone in a position whereby they adopt interpretive strategies which force them to read 
against their own interests - for instance, as many feminists such as Cheryl Exum report they 
have been forced to do (e.g. Exum 1996, 28, 89). This needs to be qualified from the Christian 
point of view by the observation that prevalent human sin means that what an interpreter may 
believe to be in their interests may in fact not be. This means that from a Christian perspective 
it is quite ethical to attempt to persuade another reader to adopt an interpretive approach on 
the grounds that it is in their interest to do so, provided that it is their interests and not only 
one’s own that motivates the persuasion. The importance of negotiating interpretive interests 
will be addressed in detail in chapter six. 
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insight that the structure of the narrative places the woman in a subordinate 
position to Jesus, and that this might in some contexts be construed as an 
excuse to subordinate women to men within the church. The narrative critic 
may, however, reject this feminist reading as having a definitive significance 
for Christian interpretation, providing the dominant reading which defines the 
way in which the Christian community will respond to the narrative. 
Acknowledging the validity of the reading does not necessarily give it 
normative force. 
 
Broadly speaking, the distinction between legitimacy and validity is also a 
distinction between methodological and ideological or theological interests. 
Interpreters with differing ideological interests may find agreement over 
critical method, if only temporarily. The confessional narrative critic, for 
instance, might agree that the non-confessional feminist critic’s analysis of 
Jesus’ encounter with the Samaritan woman provides a full account of the 
literary dynamics of the text, whilst adopting a completely opposing 
ideological stance in relation to the sexism which the feminist perceives to be 
embedded in the text. Again, defining interests in this way helps to clarify 
both points of agreement and disagreement without necessitating battles over 
what the text actually means. 
 
 
Understanding the Bible as Authoritative Scripture in a Pluralist Context 
 
Having established that a pluralist model for biblical interpretation is 
theoretically viable and serves the needs of Christian academics in a 
postmodern context, it is necessary to ask whether such a model also enables 
the Bible to function within the confessing community as scripture – that is, as 
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a means of divine communication and an authority for Christian belief and 
behaviour. One objection to a broad interpretive pluralism from a Christian 
point of view is that such a model may threaten to undermine the Bible’s 
authoritative status. Fowl and Thomas, as we have seen, seek to place greater 
emphasis than Vanhoozer on the role of the Spirit and interpreting 
communities of readers, which Vanhoozer considers secondary to the priority 
of divine and authorial intention within the text. Vanhoozer’s methodological 
stance, however, is fuelled by a theological desire to protect biblical authority: 
Vanhoozer needs to locate meaning in the text by means of authorial intention 
because he also locates authority within the text by virtue of that same 
intention, and identifies the meaning as the basis for the authority. For 
Vanhoozer, the meaning and authority of the text are logically prior to 
readings of the text in specific contexts, and therefore the primary focus of 
biblical interpretation should be on the text and not on readers. To elevate 
reader interests to the same level of priority as the literal sense of the text is to 
risk subordinating the text’s interests to those of the reader. 
 
On one level, Fowl appears to be open to this accusation. His insistence that 
meaning and ideology are not properties of the text appear to reflect an 
interpretive model in which the text is emptied of substance and prey to the 
whims of readers. But this is not what Fowl intends: rather, he seeks a model 
in which textual and contextual concerns mutually inform. For Fowl, scripture 
is a crucial outside voice which serves as a governing factor in the life of the 
church as interpreting community, potentially preventing the church from 
indulging in interpretive practices which simply reinforce its own interests and 
prejudices: 
 
to read Scripture over-against ourselves is to allow it to challenge our 
presuppositions and established interpretations. To allow Scripture to 
be an outsider is to recognise that this side of the Kingdom our 
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interpretations are provisional, always open to revision. The aim of 
treating Scripture as an outsider, however, is not interpretive paralysis. 
Rather, the goal of seeing Scripture as an outsider is the maintenance 
of interpretive humility and openness to hearing the voice of Scripture 
afresh.65 
 
Fowl insists, though, that if scripture is to be allowed to speak into the life of 
the Christian community, then dialectical engagement between the text and the 
community’s contextually-situated concerns must be allowed to happen. In an 
ongoing and never-foreclosed process of engagement, as the interests of 
readers and the biblical texts are seen to interact and mutually inform under 
the guidance of the Spirit, so Christian readers are formed into readers who are 
more able to hear the voice of God speaking through scripture into their 
interpretive context. It is the necessity of readerly formation which causes 
Fowl to stress the importance of reading the Bible theologically: 
 
The primary reason for this is that Scripture is the first of God’s 
providentially ordered vehicles by which we learn of and are drawn 
into the economy of salvation. Indeed, there is a happy circular 
movement here: at its best, the reading of Scripture (under the Spirit’s 
direction) teaches us both the contours and depths of God’s drama of 
salvation. This increases our capacity for and habit of thinking, feeling, 
and acting in ways that enhance our communion with God and each 
other. Being thus formed, we are able to read Scripture in deeper and 
richer ways so that we become like Augustine’s perfectly wise person 
who, “supported by faith, hope, and charity, with an unshaken hold 
upon them, does not need the Scriptures except for the instruction of 
others”.66 
 
                                                 
65Fowl and Jones 1991, 112. Fowl elsewhere continues to see the Bible as a vehicle for divine 
communication: “Commenting on scripture is a theological discipline in that one expects that 
by attention to the words of scripture one will hear the voice of God. Of course, listening to 
God’s voice is the primary activity of prayer, too. Thus, commenting on scripture can be a 
form of prayer. [...] one of the aims of theological commentary must be to allow others to hear 
God’s voice” (Fowl 2005, 5).  
66Fowl 2005, 206-07. Fowl notes that he has never met one of these people, but comments that 
he is less worried about that than about what he sees as the failure of the church to perceive 
the close ties between readerly formation, scripture, and the church’s ability to live and 
worship faithfully. 
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Fowl does not regard the Bible as an indeterminate text over which readers are 
free to write their own meanings: on the contrary, it is a vehicle for divine 
communication and an essential authority for the communal life of the 
believing community. At the same time, however, Fowl insists that 
interpretation is not a one-way monologue in which authoritative authorial 
intention is straightforwardly decoded from the text and applied to readers’ 
lives, because readers are themselves contextually situated and must therefore 
bring their own concerns and interests into play when interpretation occurs. 
The key safeguard of biblical authority is not the text in itself, but a practice of 
confessional interpretation in the context of a believing community which 
places high value upon the biblical texts and seeks to interpret them in light of 
their contemporary situation under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.67 For 
Fowl, it is the presence and activity of the Spirit in the interpretive process 
which safeguards biblical authority, not an authorial intention embedded 
within the text. 
 
Fowl and Thomas are not alone in arguing that more emphasis needs to be 
placed upon the role of the Spirit and Spirit-led readers in interpretation. 
Terence J. Keegan, similarly, has suggested that one implication of the advent 
of postmodernism in biblical studies is that biblical scholars will have to deal 
with questions which objective modern methodologies allowed them to avoid, 
and that the question of inspiration is one of these: “What is it that allows the 
Bible to function as sacred literature? It is not the literalism of 
fundamentalism, nor the objective verification of modern methods of research, 
but only the Holy Spirit”.68 Keegan warns, however, that a comprehensive and 
                                                 
67
 In other words, Fowl prefers to put his trust primarily in the creator-Spirit who enables 
interpretation rather than the created text which is interpreted. Fowl’s model is more 
ambiguous, less determinate, infinitely less predictable and, in that sense, less “safe” than 
Vanhoozer’s. But then, safety and predictability are questionable priorities for a community 
which seeks to model its corporate life on a crucified and resurrected Jesus. 
68Keegan 1995, 11. 
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sharply defined definition of inspiration may prove elusive because of the 
nature of the Spirit himself: 
 
The Bible itself speaks of the Spirit in terms that are indeterminate, 
multivalent, and highly subjective. The Spirit is both a recurrent 
feature of the biblical text and one that resists every attempt to 
encapsulate it in a definition. It is both as pervasive and  as ephemeral 
as one of its common metaphors, the wind. To use Kelber’s terms, it is 
simultaneously logocentric and deconstructing.69 
 
If, then, one attempts to define scriptural authority in terms of its inspiration 
rather than in terms of the location of its meaning, it is likely that the model 
for scripture which emerges will reflect the terms in which the activity of the 
Spirit who inspires it is described: multi-faceted, flexible, and polyvalent. 
 
David R. Law argues that any concept of biblical authority is dependent upon 
the inspiration of scripture, and that inspiration is not only located in processes 
of textual composition, as Vanhoozer’s model might suggest.70  Inspiration 
can be both objective, in that God has input into the process of textual 
composition, and subjective, in that to accept the text as scripture the reader 
themselves must be inspired. Inspiration, Law argues, “cannot be reduced 
exclusively to a feature of the text. The acceptance of a text as inspired 
involves a subjective response on the part of the reader”.71 Law argues that the 
role of the Holy Spirit through the process of textual communication is 
important: the Spirit prompts and guides biblical authors, but also provides the 
inner testimony in the reader which enables the encounter with the Bible as 
God’s authoritative Word.72 
 
                                                 
69Keegan 1995, 11. 
70Law 2001. 
71Law 2001, 37. 
72Law 2001, 39. John Goldingay also insists that “The inspiration of the writing of scripture 
needs to be complemented by the inspiration of the reading of scripture” (Goldingay 1995, 
188). 
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Following Ulrich H. J. Körtner,73 Law argues that the “implicit reader” of the 
biblical texts is an inspired reader and insists upon an existential approach to 
biblical interpretation. The relationship of readers to biblical texts should not 
be objective but participatory, since the meaning of the Bible is not conveyed 
merely by objective presentation of its content. Readers must interpret the 
Bible existentially, going beyond an objective-historical attitude to a 
consciousness of the existential demands that these texts make upon them.74  
 
John Goldingay, similarly, argues that interpretation of scripture as scripture 
must involve more than the purely passive apprehension of meaning: rather, 
readers must bring their concerns and interests to the text if the text is to speak 
to them: 
 
To avoid imposing our own questions on the text is not yet to let it 
press its questions on us, only to overhear it talking to itself. 
Interpreting biblical narratives involves more than merely 
understanding a text as an object over against me, of which I seek to 
gain a rational, objective grasp. The stories were written to do 
something to people, and our approach to interpretation needs to be 
able to handle - or be handled by - this aspect of them. It involves the 
possibility that what the story had the power to make happen to its 
audience will happen to us.75 
 
It is important to stress that Vanhoozer does not deny the importance of 
subjective involvement with the biblical texts. On the contrary, biblical texts 
create a space wherein readers lay themselves open to divine communicative 
action, so that “Interpreting scripture entails a personal encounter from which 
no responsive reader remains unchanged”.76 This encounter, however, comes 
from diligent attention to the illocutionary intent embedded in the text. 
                                                 
73Körtner 1994. Körtner’s approach has more than a touch of Wolfgang Iser about it. 
74Law 2001, 188. Law’s point has resonances of 2 Timothy 3:16, which stresses the role of 
scripture in teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in righteousness. 
75Goldingay 1995, 39. 
76Vanhoozer 1998, 406. 
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Vanhoozer resists postmodern calls to celebrate the birth of the reader, arguing 
instead that Christian biblical interpretation requires the reader’s death through 
submission to the text’s illocutionary force, and that “The desire to project 
oneself onto the text, so prevalent in the age of the reader, forestalls the 
possibility of genuine transformation”.77 
 
The difference between Vanhoozer’s text-centred hermeneutics and Fowl’s 
text-interactive pneumatological approach, then, is one of emphasis rather than 
fundamental difference. Vanhoozer, together with scholars such as Anthony C. 
Thiselton, does not deny the importance of existential engagement with the 
text, but sees the interaction more as a monologue than a dialogue, as the 
reader receives the meaning of the text and then applies it. Fowl, Thomas, 
Law, Goldingay and others see the interaction of text and reader as a dialectic 
relationship within a context defined by a Christian interpreting community 
and within which the Holy Spirit is active. Vanhoozer’s concern to yield as 
little ground as possible to radical reader response theory leads him to adopt 
an either/or approach which is less than helpful in that it rules out legitimate 
perspectives and concerns, and subordinates others. 
 
It is arguable that an understanding of scriptural authority which incorporates 
the roles of readers and the Spirit in the context of interpretation is valuable 
for a postmodern critical approach, if for no other reason than that it helps us 
understand scripture as the Christian community actually experiences it.78 This 
marks a distinction between criticism and theology/theory. Theology, like 
theory, is often interested in arguing from first principles to logical 
conclusions, or from cause to effect: having understood what the Bible is, we 
                                                 
77Vanhoozer 1998, 406-07. 
78A pneumatological hermeneutics therefore offers the theological and theoretical 
underpinning which we previously noted as lacking in Mark Allan Powell’s most recent 
reader-response approach, and provides a means of adjudicating between different 
“unexpected readings” of biblical texts. 
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are then able to interpret it appropriately.79 Criticism, on the other hand, 
tracing the contours of scripture through engagement with specific texts, tends 
to work in the opposite direction, and consideration of the experiential aspect 
of texts is a major consideration in postmodern ideological criticism. A 
pneumatological hermeneutics which places value upon reader interests and 
contextual considerations in interpretation may, therefore, offer a more helpful 
validating model for a postmodern confessional practice of biblical 
interpretation than an abstract theology of scripture. 
 
Logically, to be sure, the question of what scripture is is prior to that of how 
Scripture works, but as a critical approach confessional criticism will ask the 
second question first, and for good reason. R. H. Fuller, in his account of New 
Testament Christology, makes the point that Christian doctrine is a 
response to God’s activity, and that it is therefore simply not possible to work 
from cause to effect. Christology (the doctrine of Christ’s person) logically 
precedes soteriology (the doctrine of Christ’s work), since it was “because he 
was who he was that Jesus Christ did what he did”, but in the New Testament 
people are confronted first by the deeds and words of Jesus, to which they 
respond in terms of a Christological confession of faith. “Through what he 
does they come to see who he is”.80 
 
In the same way, the doctrine of what scripture is logically precedes the 
understanding of how scripture works, but we can only know the first through 
the second, as John Goldingay observes: 
                                                 
79
 Terence Penelhum, for instance, criticises David R. Law’s recent study of inspiration in 
terms of reader effects on this basis: “to centre one’s interpretation of biblical inspiration on 
the role the Bible plays in the spiritual development of its readers is to abandon the task of 
offering a theological explanation of why the Bible is uniquely able to function in this way. It 
is to tell us how the Bible can inspire us, rather than how it itself is inspired” (Penelhum 2003, 
458). My argument, with Law, is that we cannot understand what the Bible is apart from 
understanding its effects upon readers. 
80Fuller 1965, 15. 
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In practice, when people hold to the conviction that the Bible is the 
crucial resource and norm for belief and behaviour, this commonly has 
a background in a personal history of involvement with the Bible. If 
they come to have a theory as to how and why the Bible has such 
authority, this theory takes shape some time after they have known the 
Bible speaking to them, encouraging them, giving them a perspective 
on life, and challenging them. Biblical authority is a living reality 
before such people begin to theologise about it, try to explain it, or 
seek to defend it.81 
 
David Law, similarly, argues that the problem with centering the inspiration 
(and hence the authority) of the Bible upon the inspiration of the writers is that 
their motivations are not directly accessible to readers, except as mediated by 
the text. Rather, it is only the text and the reader’s reactions and interactions 
with the text which provide the basis for understanding of what scripture is 
and how it works, or for the understanding of God which results from the 
reading process. The Bible, for Law, is “only ever an expression of what God 
is for us. It is not an expression of what God is in himself but an expression of 
the reality of God in relation to human beings”.82 
 
This does not, however, mean that there is no objective truth in the biblical 
texts, or that the image of God which readers perceive through them is a 
creation of the reader: rather, it is to recognise that although God must already 
be present and active in the reading of scripture in order for it to impact upon 
the reader, the reader’s only way of knowing this is through their experience 
of reading. Hence, the experience of reading generates knowledge of the 
reality which preceded it and made it possible. A focus on the role of readers 
                                                 
81Goldingay 1994, 123. 
82Law 2001, 196. Goldingay affirms this insight: “the scriptural documents that we seek to 
interpret are themselves exercises in understanding. Their authors had seen or heard 
something, which they then expressed in writing. Their writings are expressions of their 
author’s understanding before they are the object of our understanding” (Goldingay 1994, 
121). At the same time, however, Goldingay has stated that he feels Law’s account of 
inspiration is too existentialist (Goldingay 2002). 
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in biblical interpretation is not to say that readers make meaning or that they 
create God, but to recognise the limitations imposed by human subjectivity: 
 
The Bible is written by human beings, but God is also active in these 
texts in so far as they become prisms through which he can be 
glimpsed. But we cannot view this agency from the divine perspective. 
Our acceptance of divine involvement in these texts is a leap of faith, 
but not a blind one. It is because of the ability of these texts to resonate 
in our being that we attribute them to divine initiative.83 
 
For the church to call a biblical narrative the Word of God is a response to the 
church’s having heard God speaking through it. Hence, to paraphrase Fuller, 
“Through what scripture does we come to see what it is.” Confessional 
criticism’s interest as a critical approach is primarily in what scripture does, 
but confessional critics will want to resist suggestions that this is a secondary 
concern. 
 
Emphasis of contextual or reader roles in interpretation need not be at the 
expense of textual authority, as Vanhoozer fears. Daniel Patte, for instance, 
helpfully points out that the authority of biblical texts can be understood in 
two ways. First, authority can be extrinsic: that is,  authority is ascribed to 
biblical texts as a response to the interpretation generated by the reading 
process, so that the authoritative text is the text-as-read. On this model, readers 
play a dominant role in bringing life to inert texts and attributing authority to 
them.84 Alternatively, however, authority can be intrinsic: the text has 
authority within the text-reader relationship, if only because, being fixed in 
writing, it imposes constraints upon readers, but also because it is a semantic 
                                                 
83Law 2001, 193-94. John Webster has criticised Law for being too immanentist, emphasising 
reader subjectivity; too docetic, limiting the sphere of the Spirit’s work to readers so that “the 
text itself is not touched by the inspiring action of God”; and too reticent about divine activity 
through scripture so that “the gap left by the withdrawal of the self-communicative divine 
presence is filled by readerly activity” (Webster 2003, 34-35). This is unfair. Law is clear that 
inspiration operates in both authors and readers, and that God is ontologically prior to reader 
response, but seeks to be rigorous in recognising the limited horizons of human subjectivity. 
84Patte 1995b, 95. 
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representation of a discourse (i.e. it is a motivated, purposeful communicative 
act) which plays an active role in generating meaning.85 
 
Patte, adopting a strongly Iserian phenomenological approach, argues that 
both dynamics are operative in interpretation, but that the text’s intrinsic 
authority exercises final control by setting the parameters and the tone of the 
encounter: 
 
Is it not our common experience that as soon as we truly interact with 
any text in a reading process, we are affected by this text? The text 
demands a response from us even as we read it, that is, before we have 
envisioned its meaning for us. Readers are forced to react to the text, 
positively or negatively, with passion or indifference, with fascination 
and excitement or with boredom and weariness, with consent and 
submission or with rejection and rebellion. By the very fact that we 
react to the text, we are transformed by the text.86 
 
The sense that readers control the reading process is, Patte argues, an illusion 
of our subjective perspective: readers initiate the reading process and thus give 
life to the dead letter of the text, but once that life is given the text takes the 
initiative back, claiming attention and raising issues. “Because it is written,” 
Patte continues, “fixed on pages, the text constantly remains in control, in a 
position of power; it keeps the initiative, it sets the subject matter of our 
dialogue”.87 The multiplicity of readings which readers produce may seem to 
support the view that it is readers who generate meaning, but the range of 
available readings is limited by the meaning-producing dimensions of the text, 
which ultimately defines the parameters of its own legitimate interpretation.88 
 
                                                 
85Patte 1995b, 96. 
86Patte 1995b, 97. Vanhoozer makes a similar point and argues for the importance of 
interpretive hospitality, whereby the reader extends to the text the courtesy of trying to fully 
understand it before evaluating it. For a fuller discussion of Vanhoozer’s view see p.301. 
87Patte 1995b, 98-99. 
88
 The word “legitimate” is crucial. One could, of course, argue that a text says “black” when 
the word on the page is “white”, but most readers would regard such an interpretation as 
illegitimate. 
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I would suggest at this point that the appropriate resolution to the tension 
between textual and reader authority in interpretation is not to subordinate one 
to the other, but to affirm the indispensibility of both for interpretation. As 
Patte points out, readers choose to read texts, and texts which are not being 
read cannot speak. At the same time, texts which are being read are not 
passive or inert: rather, they set the boundaries and establish the agendas for 
their interpretation. Most texts are capable of sustaining a number of 
conversations with their readers, but at the end of the day texts will only 
answer questions for which they can provide answers. Biblical authority, I 
would argue, like meaning and inspiration, is not exclusively a property of the 
text, but neither is it exclusively a property of readers.89 Rather, as N. T. 
Wright points out, authority is the result of an active process which God 
initiates, so that “the phrase ‘authority of scripture’ can only make Christian 
sense if it is a shorthand for ‘the authority of the triune God, exercised 
somehow through scripture’”.90 
 
Authority, like meaning and inspiration, is not exclusively a property of the 
text. Wright points to the Bible’s own strong insistence that authority belongs 
to God, and specifically to Jesus Christ,91 and offers his own model for 
biblical authority,92 suggesting an analogy with a Shakespeare play whose 
fifth act has been lost. In order to stage the play a fifth act must be provided, 
but to write one would freeze the play into one form and permanently link 
Shakespeare to work which was not, in fact, his own. Instead, Wright argues, 
the fifth act should be improvised by highly trained actors who have immersed 
                                                 
89
 “The authority of scripture [...] is not so much an invariant property of the biblical texts, as a 
way of ordering a set of textual relationships. To call scripture authoritative also establishes a 
particular relationship between that text and those people and communities who treat it as 
authoritative” (Fowl 1998, 6). 
90Wright 2005, 17. 
91See e.g. Romans 13:1; John 19:11; Matthew 28:18; Philippians 2:9-11; Hebrews 1:1-2. 
Wright notes that the prologue to John’s Gospel does not end “and the word was written 
down”, but “and the word became flesh” (Wright 2005, 17). 
92Wright 1991. See also Wright 2005, 89-93. 
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themselves in the first four acts and in Shakespearian language and culture. 
The result would be a fifth act under the authority of the first four: the four 
acts would serve as the standard against which fifth-act characterisation and 
plot development could be evaluated, but the fifth act would not slavishly 
repeat the earlier four. Instead, it would represent an appropriate and 
innovative conclusion to the whole play. The actors would thus need to 
perform with full attention both to innovation and consistency. 
 
Wright suggests that the Bible can be understood in the same way. The 
narrative of scripture falls into four existing acts: creation, fall, Israel, and 
Jesus. The fifth act is the work of the church, which stands in relation to the 
biblical story as the actors stand in relation to the four existing acts of the play. 
The first scene of the fifth act is the New Testament, which sets the tone and 
pattern for the rest of the play and also indicates in its more apocalyptic 
passages what the ending will be. The church’s task is to work out the 
implications of the scripture in ways which are at one and the same time both 
new and in continuity with what has gone before. 
 
Wright emphasises that his model is not a doorway to interpretive anarchy: 
 
As all musicians know, improvisation does not at all mean a free-for-
all where ‘anything goes’, but precisely a disciplined and careful 
listening to all the other voices around us, and a constant attention to 
the themes, rhythms and harmonies of the complete performance so 
far, the performance which we are now called to continue. [...] The 
music so far, the voices around us, and the ultimate multi-part harmony 
of God’s new world: these, taken together, form the parameters for 
appropriate improvisation in the reading of scripture and the 
announcement and living out of the gospel it contains. All Christians, 
all churches, are free to improvise their own variations designed to take 
the music forwards. No Christian, no church, is free to play out of 
tune.93 
 
                                                 
93Wright 2005, 93. 
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If we apply Wright’s fifth-act model to Christian academic Biblical Studies, it 
offers a helpful model which coheres with the insights we have already 
examined. Confessional biblical criticism is motivated primarily by the desire 
to understand the Bible as scripture in such a way that its continued relevance, 
authority and transformative power in the present context of scholarship is 
revealed and sustained. As such, biblical interpretation involves the production 
of readings which are demonstrably rooted in the biblical texts: such readings 
result from critical methods which can in turn be critically evaluated in such a 
way as to provide academic accountability.  At the same time, however, self-
consciously interested readings do something new by bringing the biblical 
texts into dialogue with the changing contexts and developing interpretive 
communities within which they are read. Just as contexts and communities 
will bring new light to bear on aspects of the biblical texts, so the texts will in 
turn illuminate aspects of contexts and communities.  
 
The nature of the Bible as a communicative act is such that a multiplicity of 
interpretive approaches will be appropriate to different contexts and 
communities as they develop and pursue their interpretive interests. The 
danger of a pluralist approach, as we have seen, is that one or more approaches 
will succumb to the endemic human will to power and attempt to colonise the 
others, claiming exclusive rights over the biblical texts and dominance within 
the interpreting community. Within the confessional context, however, the 
disparate interests of interpreters are held together within a conception of the 
Bible which emphasises the biblical text as a locus of divine activity and 
authority through the work of the Holy Spirit.  
 
The doctrine of the Spirit as one person of an inseparable trinity reminds 
confessional scholarship of the need to entertain diversity and co-equality 
within the boundaries of a confessional approach. The Spirit also suggests an 
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appropriate postmodern approach to biblical interpretation which does not 
subordinate readers to authors or to texts, but which sees both reader and text 
as caught up in the Spirit’s work of communicating the truth of God in Christ 
through scripture.94 The result is a flexible, polyvalent commitment to the 
Bible as a text through which God communicates with human beings, and 
through which human beings can encounter the divine. 
 
 
The Benefits and Costs of a Pluralist Christian Approach 
 
I have suggested that a self-consciously Christian approach to the Bible which 
seeks to interpret the text as scripture, and which seeks to interact 
constructively with a postmodern academic context, should redefine itself and 
its conception of the Bible. By moving away from disputed attempts to locate 
textual meaning and redefining itself in terms of interests in textual truth, 
Christian scholarship may reap benefits both in terms of the internal 
relationships between different critical methods and in terms of its external 
relationships with other approaches. An understanding of scripture as a multi-
faceted communicative process, incorporating the activity not only of authors 
but of also of readers in the broader theological context of the Spirit’s work of 
inspiration, both validates and legitimises a wide range of interpretive 
methods, affirming diversity within the Christian interpretive community 
whilst potentially defusing and reducing divisive arguments and conflicts.  
 
At the same time, the adoption of methodological pluralism defines Christian 
Biblical Studies within the wider discipline as an ideological rather than a 
methodological approach along similar lines to feminist criticism. Like 
                                                 
94
 I suggest that a working definition of scripture for the church is “the Bible interpreted in the 
Spirit”. 
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feminism, Christian study of the Bible is motivated by strong theological, 
ideological, social and ethical commitments, but those commitments do not 
commit Christians to adopting only one critical method or interpretive 
paradigm. Instead, like feminists, Christian scholars can draw from a number 
of critical methods. Such eclecticism does not necessarily threaten the 
coherence of a Christian approach if the methods selected can be seen to 
cohere with the theological commitments which motivate Christian 
scholarship.  
 
Finally, methodological pluralism frees Christian scholars to share 
methodological interests with interpreters from other interest groups, even 
when ideological differences exist: indeed, a fringe benefit of such interest-
sharing is that discussion of methodological common ground also gives either 
party an opportunity to share something of its theological/ideological 
motivation, pursuing its motivating aims constructively rather than 
polemically. Methodological pluralism thus offers Christian biblical 
scholarship a methodological identity which is truer to the nature of the 
biblical texts, strengthens the distinctive identity of confessional as opposed to 
de-confessional approaches, and also facilitates constructive dialogue and 
engagement with other interpretive approaches, at least at the methodological 
level. 
 
There are, however, costs involved in such a re-definition. First, a 
methodologically pluralist approach will necessarily sacrifice a certain amount 
of interpretive clarity in favour of interpretive breadth. A recognition that no 
one approach can provide a definitive interpretation of the text means that 
confessional scholars who are interested in more than one textual function 
must be prepared to change methodological focus on a regular basis, accepting 
that not all methodologies are equally or mutually compatible even when they 
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cohere within a wider theological framework. This means confessional 
criticism will have to forego attempts to produce definitive statements or 
pronouncements of what is true about the text. Although the unity of the 
approach is safeguarded by recognition of multiple interpretive interests 
cohering around a core set of confessional commitments and values, that unity 
cannot be expressed in unison. The findings of confessional interpretation will 
be expressed as a chorus of voices, and not all of those voices can be 
guaranteed always to be in perfect harmony. 
 
A second cost of the pluralist approach is that followers of a particular interest 
will have to accept that they may not always have something to say about 
important interpretive issues, or that the Christian community may, from time 
to time, rank their contribution lower than that of another critical approach. 
This means that scholars may have to get used to being less competitive and 
yield the floor to other interpreters more frequently and willingly than they 
might previously have been inclined to do. This, however, may be a good 
thing, and may serve to promote some of the more distinctively Christian 
virtues (such as humility), which have not been generally regarded as 
characteristic of academic biblical interpreters.95 
 
A third cost of pluralism is a permanent commitment to a degree of 
uncertainty and indeterminacy in interpretation. A model for scripture which 
affirms that no single interest has exclusive rights in interpretation, and which 
also acknowledges the importance of contextual interpretive factors, will 
necessarily require of interpreters a self-awareness that interpretations, 
however profound and convincing, are always provisional and contingent. I 
cannot be sure that my reading of the story of (for instance) Jesus and the 
                                                 
95
 It may be helpful for Christian interpreters to bear in mind Paul’s image of the church as a 
body of many parts, each of which has its particular function, but none of which can function 
as the whole body. For an application of this metaphor see later, p.293. 
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woman caught in adultery, which seems so powerful to me and so relevant to 
the situation in which my interpreting community finds itself, will not be 
called into question by the insights of a critic using a different critical method 
and who may require me to qualify some of my presuppositions or, indeed, 
conclusions. Nor can I guarantee that, as interpretive contexts change and my 
community’s interests grow and develop in response to that change, my 
reading will retain the prominent and normative place I currently seek for it 
and which my community is prepared to grant it. The multidisciplinary model 
for Christian interpretation which I have sought to develop above reflects the 
multivalent nature of the Bible itself, and serves as a reminder that, like 
interpreters, interpretations are like grass and flourish like flowers of the field 
until the wind goes over them and they are gone, their places knowing them no 
more. Interpretations come and go, but the scripture remains, and it is only the 
word of the Lord that endures forever (Isaiah 40:6-8). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CHURCH IN THE ACADEMY AS 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY 
 
You think the only people who are people 
are the people who look and think like you, 
but if you walk the footsteps of a stranger 
you’ll learn things you never knew you never knew. 
  - Stephen Schwartz, “Colours of the Wind” 
 
In seeking to establish a Christian postmodern academic model for biblical 
interpretation it is important to pay some attention to the nature of the 
interpretive community whose interests such an approach would pursue.  Two 
key issues are, first, how the interpretive community defines its relationship 
with its textual objects of study and, second, how the community defines itself 
in relation to other communities of interpreters with different interests. Both of 
these aspects of definition will have a profound impact upon the manner in 
which the community conducts itself in relation to texts and to other 
interpreters. Increasing pluralism in Biblical Studies has led to the formation 
of a number of different communities of scholarship, each with its own 
interests in the Bible. As we have seen in chapter two, these interests are not 
always compatible, and ideological conflict is an increasing reality in biblical 
scholarship. Clarity about the community to which one belongs is therefore 
important for scholarly self-awareness in the postmodern context. Failure to be 
clear about the nature and expectations of one’s interpretive community can be 
damaging, as we have seen in the case of first-generation narrative criticism, 
especially in leading critics to adopt methodological positions which are 
incompatible with their underlying interpretive interests. 
 
Interpretive communities perform two vital functions for scholars: first, they 
set agendas for interpretation by maintaining the importance of particular 
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interpretive interests; and second, they serve as a source of authority to whom 
individual scholars submit their interpretations for validation. Critical methods 
for biblical study are generally developed within the context of a specific 
interpretive community which has an interest in particular questions which the 
community wishes to address to the text. The critical methods, however, and 
the questions which they are designed to answer, arise from prior theological 
or ideological commitments to the value of particular interpretive interests, 
and to preconceptions of the text. To use Daniel Patte’s terminology, the 
legitimacy of critical approaches is fundamentally tied up with the validity of 
the questions which those methods are designed to answer. Interpretive 
communities ask questions of texts because they think the questions, and the 
ideological commitments and agendas which lie behind them, are important. 
Hence, methodological interests are fundamentally bound up with, and 
dependent upon, ideological/theological interests.  
 
This dependence helps to explain academic conflicts between different critical 
approaches. Historical-critical complaints that literary approaches bracket out 
questions of historical referentiality in biblical texts, for instance, are generally 
pitched as criticisms of inadequate critical method, but are in fact accusations 
that literary critics are asking the wrong questions. The conflict arises from 
strong precommitments to differing views of the nature of the Bible, but these 
commitments in turn reflect deep interests in whether biblical texts are 
documents which support or undermine faith, and in what ways they do so. 
Confessional historical-critical scholars are generally motivated by a desire to 
use the Bible as a means of discerning God’s saving action through the history 
which the biblical texts narrate and, further, to affirm the value of the biblical 
account as a basis for faith; their secular colleagues, on the other hand, are 
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A Servant of Two Masters? Christian and Academic Communities. 
 
It is important, therefore, that Christian biblical scholars should be clear about 
the interests and motives which underpin the critical methods supported by 
different interpretive communities. In particular, they must pay attention to the 
fact that they operate simultaneously within two overlapping communities: as 
confessional scholars they are accountable to the interests of the Christian 
interpreting community; as confessional scholars they are accountable to the 
academy. The interests of these two communities cannot be assumed to 
cohere. Indeed, as we have seen in the case of the Sheffield University 
Department of Biblical Studies, a major element in the academic self-
definition of a number of its scholars is that academic and ecclesial interests 
are seen to be mutually exclusive. On the other hand, the academy defined as a 
pluralist community has little grounds for excluding Christian scholarship 
without undermining its own liberal values, or revealing those values as a 
front for more vested anti-ecclesial interests. A number of Christian academics 
have recently argued that overtly Christian biblical scholarship ought to be 
perfectly acceptable within the range of approaches allowed by the academy, 
provided that Christian scholars are prepared to play by academic rules and to 
render their interpretive methods critically accountable. Francis Watson, for 
instance, argues that whilst the church must remain faithful to its own tradition 
it must also relate to the wider world in which it exists, and that therefore: 
 
                                                 
1One example of the latter kind of scholarship is Maurice Casey’s Is John’s Gospel True? 
(Casey 1996). Casey’s argument that John’s Gospel is factually inaccurate and anti-semitic to 
boot is a clear assault upon the credibility of the Gospel as a basis for faith. 
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there seems no valid theoretical reason why one should not practise a 
mode of interpretation responsive both to the traditions of the ecclesial 
community and to the demands of the world beyond the community, 
for the church is itself related diachronically to its own past and 
synchronically to the wider world, and must be faithful to the 
requirements imposed by both dimensions of its location.2 
 
Stephen Fowl similarly insists that confessional and academic interpretation 
are not incompatible. He notes that the formal inclusion of Christian interests 
within the plurality of the academy requires the bringing of theological 
concerns and convictions into discussion in a way that most biblical theologies 
either truncate or deliberately exclude,3 but maintains that Christian and 
academic concerns are not mutually exclusive in the way that many have 
thought. Christians, by virtue of their identity, are required to read scripture 
theologically, but this practice, and the universal truth claims which arise from 
it, do not invalidate other reading practices, so that “Christian biblical scholars 
can in principle engage in the whole panoply of diverse, and irreducibly 
distinct, interpretive practices characteristic of the profession of biblical 
scholarship”.4 
 
At the same time, however, Fowl insists that the boundaries of Christian and 
academic communities cannot be assumed to coincide. Rather, they should be 
seen as overlapping, meaning that some Christian practices of biblical 
interpretation will not be acceptable within the academy, and that some 
academic interpretive practices will be unacceptable to the church. Fowl 
suggests that the church’s use of professional biblical scholarship will be ad 
hoc, because not all professional biblical scholarship will be equally useful to 
the Christian community all the time.5 Fowl acknowledges that biblical 
                                                 
2Watson 1994, 229. 
3Fowl 1998, 21. 
4Fowl 1998, 30. 
5Fowl 1998, 179. Some major figures within Evangelicalism have argued that the professional 
training of Christian ministers as biblical interpreters should be formally distanced from 
mainstream academic biblical scholarship, because the interests of the academy generally fail 
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scholarship may raise important issues for Christians, but thinks there are 
fewer instances of this than might be anticipated, largely on the grounds that 
scholarship is by nature an exclusive preserve of scholars. Academic Biblical 
Studies actively excludes non-academic Christian interpreters, and the 
specialisation of its discourse makes transmission of its insights beyond the 
boundaries of the academic community problematic.6 Fowl suggests that 
whilst there might not be outright enmity between academic and confessional 
interests, there may not be much fruitful co-operation either, and notes the 
importance for confessional scholars of keeping the interests of both 
communities in view and evaluating those interests appropriately: 
 
the crucial issues will revolve around keeping the two sets of 
commitments, habits, and practices characteristic of both the 
profession and the church in some sort of appropriate order, 
recognising overlaps, distinctions, and incommensurabilities. On the 
one hand, there is no fixed or determined way in which these 
relationships must be ordered in the lives of particular scholars seeking 
to live faithfully before God. On the other hand, one should avoid a 
sort of schizophrenia, common in many Christians, in which one’s 




One issue which confessional critics will have to negotiate is whether the 
interests of one interpretive community should be prioritised over another. 
Francis Watson has argued that as far as the reading of biblical texts as 
scripture is concerned, the church should be regarded as the primary 
                                                                                                                                
to serve the interests of the church. See, for instance, Martyn Lloyd Jones’ address at the 
opening of the London Theological Seminary, “A Protestant Evangelical College”, in which 
he stresses the importance of theological training which does not require university validation 
(Lloyd Jones 1989, 356-75). 
6Fowl 1998, 180. 
7Fowl 1998, 187. Robert O. Baker, writing within a Pentecostal tradition, has argued on 
precisely these lines that academic biblical scholarship has adopted a schizophrenic approach 
to interpretation by emphasising the rational at the expense of the experiential. Baker suggests 
that Pentecostal models for interpretation which emphasise not just orthodoxy (right belief), 
but also orthopraxy (right action) and orthopathy (right feeling) are well placed “to 
deconstruct the Enlightenment myth and ideal of critical and passionless objectivity” (Baker 
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interpreting community.8 Biblical texts are biblical by virtue of being included 
in a canon of sacred scripture which finds its origin and definition within the 
boundaries of the Christian community and its communal use of these texts. 
The designation “scripture”, therefore, “is not an alien imposition upon texts 
whose essential being and meaning is to be found elsewhere, for texts do not 
give their essential being and meaning to be known apart from the process of 
their reception”.9 John Goldingay, similarly, insists that in taking the Bible 
into the pulpit Christians are not doing something alien to its nature but that, 
given the origins of the Bible as words addressed to the people of God, it is 
more at home there than in the university study.10 
 
The argument of confessional scholarship is that the Christian community has 
not co-opted free-floating texts out of their original context into a confessional 
framework. The biblical texts were produced in, by and for faith communities, 
and the claims of faith communities as contexts for biblical interpretation are 
therefore prior to those of the academy. Indeed, the reasons which underpin 
academic interest in the Bible are fundamentally tied up with the history of the 
church’s relationship with these texts and with the wider cultures in which it 
has existed. It is out of that history that the Bible’s authority and continuing 
currency as a foundational artefact of western culture is derived. An approach 
to the Bible as scripture (that is, an approach characterised by theological and 
confessional interests) must, therefore, acknowledge that the claim of the 
                                                                                                                                
1995, 35), and proposes Iser’s reader response as the basis for a hermeneutical model for the 
formation of Christian affections. 
8
 Watson asserts that this proposal is “not self-evidently wrong, and may at least serve as a 
working hypothesis” (Watson 1994, 4). 
9Watson 1994, 4. 
10Goldingay 1995, 8. 
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academy as an interpretive community is both secondary and derivative. The 
Bible is the church’s gift to the academy, not vice versa. 
 
This is not to say, however, that the church can thereby assert its ownership of 
the Bible in such a way as to demand the subordination of all other interests to 
its own.11 Confessional biblical scholarship which operates within a pluralist 
environment will wish to assert both the legitimacy and the wider validity of 
its own concerns, but will be breaking the rules of the pluralist game if it 
attempts to exclude other interests. Christian scholars may argue, as Fowl 
does, that as Christians their approach to the Bible is necessarily theological, 
but that does not prevent other interpreters from coming to the text with 
different questions. The confessing community exists within a wider society in 
which the Bible’s importance as a cultural icon and its cultural relevance 
extends beyond its devotional use within the boundaries of the church. As a 
part of that wider culture, Christian approaches to biblical scholarship must 
affirm the legitimacy of de-confessional interests and concerns related to the 
Bible, whilst not necessarily accepting their validity for the confessing 
community. 
 
Christian academics who wish to function as members of the academic 
community must also be prepared to conform to academic standards of 
scholarship, and to be accountable to the values of the academy. Confessing 
scholars must therefore be comfortable with a “dual nationality”, belonging 
simultaneously to two interpretive communities which, whilst they overlap in 
                                                 
11
 See our earlier discussion in relation to Philip Davies’ Whose Bible is it Anyway?, p.104. 
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terms of their focus of interest in the Bible, nevertheless have different 
interests and different discourses. Whilst confessional critics will want to try 
to integrate the interests of both communities, both for their own integrity and 
their ethical and academic accountability, they will have to remain aware that 
the two communities are distinct, and that their interests will not always be 
compatible. When conflicts arise, Christian academics will need to make 
choices about which community’s interests are more important: are they 
Christian academics or academic Christians? 
 
I would wish to argue that feminist scholarship offers a helpful model for a 
valid postmodern Christian interpretive approach. Feminist scholarship finds 
its distinctive identity in a core commitment to pursuing the interests of 
women in interpretation. The distinctive contribution of feminist scholarship 
has not been primarily methodological: there is no critical method which 
feminists can claim as exclusively or even originally theirs, and most feminists 
would wish to describe themselves as feminists first and narratologists, 
psychoanalytic or deconstructive critics second. Instead, feminism’s 
contribution has been to demonstrate the viability, legitimacy and validity of 
an eclectic methodology which coheres around a core of ideological 
commitments and interests. Like Christianity, feminism possesses its own 
ideological framework and a specialist terminology to express that ideology, 
but the language of its criticism is the language of its critical methods, which it 
shares with a number of interest groups, rendering feminist interpretation 
transparent and heuristic. Feminists have not always found the academy a 
sympathetic or affirming environment, and have had to struggle with conflicts 
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between their political and academic interests, seeking often to resolve such 
conflicts by transforming the ethos and culture of the academic departments in 
which feminist academics have served. Feminism is also internally diverse 
rather than monolithic, cohering around a core set of beliefs but offering a 
diverse array of approaches in pursuing the interests generated by those 
beliefs. These qualities might therefore render feminism attractive as a model 
for a Christian church characterised by a diversity of theological positions, 
spiritual traditions, and patterns of corporate life, but which nevertheless 
coheres around a shared core of fundamental faith commitments, and which 
seeks to establish itself as a credible academic approach within an often 
unsympathetic academic environment. 
 
A Christian approach to the interpretation of the Bible as scripture will, I 
suggest, cohere around two core commitments. First, the Bible is a means of 
divine self-communication, capable of revealing the truth of human 
relationships with God and providing a pattern for human relationships with 
one another. Second, being historically a missionary faith, Christian 
interpretation will want to assert not only the legitimacy of its interpretive 
practice within the boundaries of the Christian community, but the validity of 
much of that interpretation beyond the community. These two core 
commitments will drive the Christian interpretive community to find its 
identity in two relational aspects: first, the community will define itself in its 
relationship to the text it studies, expressed in an interest in textual truth in all 
its aspects; second, the community will wish to define itself in terms of its 
relationships with other communities and interpreters, whom Christian 
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interpreters will wish to convince of the validity of their readings. 
Understanding themselves in terms of their core commitments and interpretive 
interests will enable Christian academics to be confident in their ability to 
offer readings of the Bible which are distinctively and characteristically 
Christian, to respond assertively and confidently to ideological attack from 
other interpretive perspectives, and to engage constructively in dialogue with 
other approaches over both the legitimacy and validity of their interpretive 
practices. 
 
The postmodern context, however, poses a significant challenge to both of 
these aspects of identity, in the form of socio-pragmatic understandings of the 
nature of interpretive communities. On the one hand, Stanley Fish’s assertion 
that interpretive communities have absolute power over texts, determining 
issues of textual genre and setting the interpretive parameters within which 
texts are to be interpreted, implies that texts cannot challenge or transform 
interpretive communities because they can never speak in terms which lie 
outside the community’s existing ideological framework, and this threatens a 
Christian commitment to the Bible as a means of divine communication.12 The 
second problem with interpretive communities which follow Fish’s model is 
that, when linked with postmodern concepts of the particularity of discourse, 
interpretive communities are rendered incapable of sharing their interpretive 
insights into texts with one another. The critical discourse of any given 
community will be specific to that community, reflecting its distinctive world-
view and interpretive interests, and will therefore be opaque to outsiders. This 
                                                 
12
 See earlier discussion of Fish, p.45. 
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threatens the ability of Christian interpreters to assert their interpretations as 
valid beyond their own community. As we have seen, postmodern critics such 
as Stephen D. Moore, David Clines and Philip Davies have used these 
assertions as political weapons in attempts to invalidate confessional 
interpretation as an academic approach and to exclude it from the academy 
altogether. 
 
If confessional critics are to overcome these challenges it is incumbent upon 
them to demonstrate that Christian interpretation is not the self-validating 
closed interpretive circle that Fishian orthodoxy would understand. Some, 
such as Anthony Thiselton and Kevin Vanhoozer, have simply rejected Fish as 
incompatible with Christian models for scripture and church. If, however, 
confessional scholarship is to engage constructively with a wider secular 
academy within which Fish’s model is well-established, then a middle way 
must be found between swallowing Fish whole (which might result in choking 
to death) and rejecting him outright. Rather, confessional scholarship must be 
prepared to approach Fish’s concept charitably, prepared to affirm truth when 
present whilst resisting the more extreme claims of theory. One important step 
in this process is to begin with the understanding that Fish’s concept is only a 
model and, like any model, it is derived from, rather than definitive of, the 
interpretive communities it describes. As such, if the Christian community can 
demonstrate that it does not conform to Fish’s model, then it is arguably the 
model which is at fault and not the community. 
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Anthony Thiselton has suggested that one difference in character between 
British and American approaches is that British scholarship is less enamoured 
of sweeping theoretical models. Thiselton sees the American tradition as 
providing fertile soil for postmodern notions of the indeterminacy and 
socially-pragmatic nature of texts, but adds that this “intermixture of literary 
theory and philosophical world-view” encounters higher resistance in Britain, 
where a more empirical tradition “encourages the identification of stubborn 
counterexamples which, like jagged rocks, may puncture the pretensions of 
such sweeping theories”.13 The prospects for such a hope are encouraged by 
the recognition, even among committed postmodern critics, that some of 
Fish’s more radical proposals about the unreality of the reader-text dichotomy 
are only sustainable at the theoretical level but incapable of being applied, 
possible “as long as he talks about criticism without actually doing it”.14  
 
A socio-pragmatic model for the church as interpretive community will seek 
to challenge the Christian commitment to the Bible as divine communication 
and to the extra-communal validity of Christian interpretation in a number of 
ways. First, the biblical texts which the church claims as authoritative were 
written by and for faith communities, and formed into a canon of scripture 
whose basis was, at least in part, that its contents conformed to the Christian 
faith as the church understood it.15 Second, the church has provided 
                                                 
13Thiselton 1992, 15. That is, some of Fish’s theoretical models are only sustainable at the 
theoretical level but are incapable of being practically applied. If biblical criticism is not to be 
a hostage to the philosophical precommitments of theorists, then criticism and theory must 
mutually inform in such a way that one is not prioritised at the expense of the other. 
14Bible and Culture Collective 1995, 34. 
15
 For accounts of canon formation see, for instance, Kelly 1977; Patzia 1995; McDonald 
1997. Four criteria generally accepted as crucial in the process of canon formation are 
apostolicity, orthodoxy, antiquity, and usage within the churches. Of these, orthodoxy and 
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parameters for interpretation in the form of credal statements and doctrines 
which provide a normative framework for the interpretation of canonical texts. 
A Fishian critic might note that some of these statements, such as the 
Apostles’ Creed, predate the formation of the Christian canon. Hence, as well 
as defining what scripture is, the church has also determined the criteria by 
which acceptable interpretation is to be evaluated, demonstrating that 
Christian texts conform to Christian ideologies rather than the other way 
around. 
 
Further, the church’s discourse is characterised by a theological world-view 
and terminology which is neither shared nor easily understood by those 
outside the confessional community. Indeed, the church’s self-definition has 
often emphasised the distinction between those who understand theological 
discourse and those who do not.16 This reinforces the assertion that Christian 
biblical interpretation is an activity entirely internal to the church community 
and lacking in validity for those outside. The Christian interpretive community 
is, therefore, a community characterised by closed boundaries; by an 
                                                                                                                                
usage can be seen to cohere with a view of canon formation as the church’s selection of texts 
which conform with its existing theological commitments. 
16
 The rhetoric of the Gospel of John operates on these lines by positing a series of 
interconnecting binary opposites which serve to define the Christian community of believers. 
Those who belong to God recognise Jesus for who he is and respond appropriately (John 1:12-
23; 15:19; 17:6, 14). Those who are not of the Spirit cannot understand the truth of the 
incarnate Word, and it is precisely their failure to perceive correctly which reveals their true 
nature as belonging to the world and the devil rather than to the Word and the Spirit (8: 42-
47). This is the thrust of the story of the man born blind in John 9, where it is the healed blind 
man who acknowledges the truth of who Jesus is, and the Pharisees who remain blind to that 
truth (9:39-41). The nature of Johannine polemic as the self-validating discourse of the 
Johannine community has been pointed out by Wayne Meeks and Mark Stibbe, who argues 
that the gospel is a “legitimating narrative” which vindicates the social identity of the 
community for which it is written (Meeks 1986; Stibbe 1991, 35). Meeks characterises the 
language of the gospel as “self-referring”, a “closed system of metaphors” (Meeks 1986, 161). 
Johannine discourse is, in a real sense, a language for insiders, a marker of identity which 
distinguishes them from the wider community outside whilst rendering their discourse opaque 
to that wider community.  
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internally-focussed discourse designed to keep outsiders outside; and by a 
canon of sacred texts whose function is to provide the community with a 
means of self-affirmation. 
 
Such a model challenges the practice of confessional scholarship not only in 
terms of its self-understanding but also in terms of its relationships with the 
wider academy. How, though, can the model be resisted and the church’s self-
understanding and external relations be safeguarded? I would suggest that an 
appropriate response is not to deny the truth of the model in toto, but rather to 
suggest that the model does not say all that there is to be said in those areas 
upon which it touches. 
 
Community and Text: Who Makes Whom? 
 
It is important to acknowledge the truth of a socio-pragmatic model where it 
exists. It is necessary to affirm, therefore, that the church’s preconception of 
the Bible as scripture (that is, as a vehicle for divine communication and self-
revelation) shapes and predisposes Christian biblical interpretation towards 
certain critical methods and away from others. Stephen Fowl has observed that 
granting a text authoritative status creates a particular relationship between the 
text and the community which treats it as an authoritative norm for faith and 
practice, and this relationship is characterised primarily by trust.17 John 
Goldingay, similarly, argues that the confessional interpreter “studies scripture 
as a member of a church committed to and involved in a believing, expectant, 
                                                 
17Fowl 1998, 3-6. 
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obedient approach to scripture and is drawn to share its faith, expectancy, and 
obedience”.18 
 
This fundamental commitment to the Bible as an authoritative norm for belief 
and practice means that the confessional critic’s work will be characterised by 
a hermeneutic of understanding rather than a hermeneutic of suspicion. As 
Goldingay points out in reaction against what he regards as destructive 
historical-critical scholarship, for confessional interpreters biblical texts 
“deserve to be treated more like friends we should be able to trust than 
potential deceivers whom we need to suspect and torture”.19 Confessional 
critics will be less likely than their secular counterparts to have recourse to 
text-resistant methods such as deconstruction. This does not mean that 
confessional critics will be incapable of interrogating the text, nor of adopting 
text-resistant methods if those are considered appropriate. Rather, such 
hermeneutics and methods will not be the first recourse of confessional critics, 
whose interest is in understanding the text before they consider whether or not 
to resist it, and whose fundamental reason for approaching the text is because 
they believe there may be something useful to be gained from such an 
encounter. 
 
It is also important to grant that, at various times in its history, the church has 
interpreted the Bible in self-affirming ways. The use of Old Testament 
conquest narratives and prohibitions on Jewish and Gentile intermarriage in 
postexilic texts, for instance, to support the injustice of apartheid in South 
                                                 
18Goldingay 1995, 234. 
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Africa, or the appeal to the cursing of Ham in Genesis 9 to support the African 
slave trade, are undeniable instances of Christian communities reading 
scripture within a framework defined and dominated by their own political and 
economic interests. As Stephen Fowl has observed, a fundamental step in the 
formation of a distinctively Christian ethics of interpretation is the recognition 
that Christian readers are just as liable to commit hermeneutical sins as anyone 
else.20 John Goldingay, too, has recognised that there is no interpretive method 
which can guarantee that a community will avoid reading practices which 
simply reflect its own interests: 
 
Scripture has an objective givenness over against us, and in theory thus 
has the capacity to protect us from ourselves. But it can only offer the 
possibility of escape from the limitations of our present convictions; it 
cannot stop us from continuing in self-deception if we are set on it.21 
 
Acknowledgement that self-affirming readings are possible, however, is not 
the same as agreeing that they are inevitable. The goal of Christian biblical 
interpretation is not the affirmation of the reader but their transformation 
through textual encounter with a divine “other”, so that “Scripture is not 
simply us in disguise; it should not be a mirror we use to reflect our prejudices 
back to us as the Word of God”.22 If a socio-pragmatic model can be 
demonstrably operative at various points in the history of Christian 
interpretation, eaxmples of the opposite tendency may also be noted. The 
British social reform movements of the nineteenth century, for instance, were 
driven at least in part by an evangelical faith which took the Bible’s 
injunctions regarding social justice at their word, and which prompted a large 
                                                                                                                                
19Goldingay 1994, 36. 
20Fowl 1998, 62-96. 
21Goldingay 1994, 91. 
22Fowl and Jones 1991, 112. 
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number of wealthy and influential people to reform their practice against their 
own material interests.23  
 
A Christian challenge to a Fishian understanding of the interpretive 
community rests upon two aspects of Christian experience with scriptural 
interpretation for which Fish’s model does not sufficiently allow. First, Fish’s 
model, like many other literary-theoretical models, pays insufficient attention 
to the diachronic aspect of literary texts. That is to say, Fish is concerned with 
the relationship between texts and interpretive communities in the literary 
present (i.e. in the contemporary context of interpretation). For Fish, literary 
texts are made in the image of their present interpreters because it is these 
interpreters who set the parameters for valid interpretation, and the text is 
encompassed within their ideological and epistemological horizons. A 
Christian approach, however, which sees the Bible as a communicative act 
which transcends the present, offers a more dynamic relationship between text 
and community. 
 
John Goldingay argues that the Bible, coming into the present from the past 
with the status of “tradition”, has the power to uncover the ideological 
predispositions of its interpreters without being bound by them. The Bible is a 
dialectical text: it offers its readers legitimation by reassuring them about 
God’s involvement with them and providing a context of meaning for their 
experiences; but it also challenges its readers’ commitment to God’s 
                                                 
23
 A collective example might be the millworkers of Lancashire who, during the American 
Civil War, supported the Union against the Confederacy because of its anti-slavery policy, 
even though this stance led to real hardship, disease and in some cases starvation because the 
Union’s economic blockade of the Southern States prevented Lancastrian mills from 
importing the raw materials needed for the production of cloth. Strong interpretations of the 
Bible oriented to issues of social justice played a significant role in this episode, and offer an 
example of a community interpreting the Bible against its obvious interest. 
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purposes.24 Goldingay argues that it is precisely the trans-historical nature of 
the Bible which enables it to challenge its readers, since the values and world-
view it expresses cannot mesh completely with those of the communities in 
which it is read: 
 
When we find scripture speaking in terms that we find objectionable, 
that is where we are tempted to locate its ideological element. Actually 
the challenge we need to hear may lie there if we are to move on from 
our present limited perspectives. [...] Passages that seem to undermine 
the commitment we have already made will be those we hear 
especially attentively in the hope of opening ourselves to constructive 
criticism. They will not be passages that we seek to subvert by 
declaring them historically or ideologically conditioned and 
irrelevant.25 
 
The ability of the Bible to challenge and transform comes in part from its 
trans-historical and trans-cultural aspects: that is, from its diachronic nature. 
As scripture, the Bible is interpreted in communities which stand in a 
continuity of tradition with those which produced the texts, but which are also 
discontinuous because they exist within differing social contexts which 
inevitably impinge upon their self-understanding and their interpretive 
interests.  
 
Francis Watson draws upon Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of the “classic” 
text to explain this aspect of scripture’s function for the Christian 
community.26 The classic comes into the present horizon of interpretation 
through the mediation of historical tradition. Its interpretation is not, however, 
                                                 
24Goldingay 1995, 109. Goldingay draws upon Fish 1972, 1-2. This work comes from Fish’s 
earlier period of “affective stylistics”, in which he still attributed a role to the text in 
interpretation. 
25Goldingay 1995, 110. 
26Watson 1997, 49-50, drawing upon Gadamer 1975, 263, 265. 
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fixed by the textual context of production but at least partly by the historical 
situation of the interpreter as he or she stands in the stream of tradition. As 
classics biblical texts bear truth-claims, “and the primary task of interpretation 
is to come to terms with that truth-claim in a context which will always be 
different from past contexts in which the truth-claim has been heard, to 
struggle with the difficulties that it may pose, and to bring to light its 
disclosive possibilities for the present”.27 
 
The Bible is received trustingly by the Christian reader because it has achieved 
a place of authority within Christian tradition, but the process of textual 
interpretation is not simply one of straightforward appropriation. The 
otherness of the text can make the textual encounter uncomfortable, even 
traumatic, as Kevin Vanhoozer acknowledges: 
 
the struggle with the text is ultimately a spiritual struggle - with the 
text and with ourselves. Readers may have reasons for wishing not to 
encounter the meaning of the text; it may be too challenging, a threat to 
our lifestyle, if not to life itself. For the Gospels call us to die to self, to 
former practices, to previous self-understandings. The reader’s struggle 
with the text, then, is sometimes a struggle to death. It is at the very 
least a wrestling match in which we may ask for a blessing but receive 
a dislocated hip.28 
 
The trans-historical and trans-cultural character of both the Bible and the 
Christian community which interprets it offers a necessary corrective to a 
socio-pragmatic understanding of the confessional community as ‘closed’. The 
                                                 
27Watson 1997, 50. 
28Vanhoozer 1998, 381. Walter Wink has described the process of textual engagement in 
similarly striking terms: “I listen intently to the Book. But I do not acquiesce in it. I rail at it. I 
make accusations. I censor it for endorsing patriarchalism, violence, anti-Judaism, 
homophobia, and slavery. It rails back at me, accusing me of greed, presumption, narcissism, 
cowardice, and an addiction to war. We wrestle. We roll on the ground, neither of us 
capitulating until it wounds my thigh with ‘new-ancient’ words. And the Holy Spirit is right 
there the whole time, strengthening us both” (Wink 2004, 3). 
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confessing community is open to otherness through its diachronic nature: 
Christians are open to a past which is different from their present, mediated 
through scripture and Christian tradition; and are open to a different future as 
they seek to be changed through encounter with the biblical texts in the light 
of their present context. The text is a fixed point to which the community 
returns again and again for affirmation of its identity and challenge to grow 
and change. 
 
The validity of this insight can be seen in relation to precisely those features of 
Christian interpretive frameworks that a socio-pragmatic model emphasises. In 
relation to the recognition of biblical texts as scripture and their formation into 
canon, for instance, the testimony of Christian experience throughout the 
church’s history has been that canonisation is a response to the reading of the 
Bible as the Word of God, not a precondition of it. John Goldingay has argued 
that the process of canon formation was complex and dialogical: the texts 
which found their way into the canon did not begin to have religious authority 
after the process of canonisation was complete, but rather went through the 
process because they already possessed authority within the church, and 
because “the community wanted them to be able to exercise it through 
changing circumstances, in new contexts, for new purposes”.29 
 
The canon is privileged within the confessing community, but not immune to 
question or critique: Stephen Fowl acknowledges that the process of canon 
formation was neither pristine nor simple, and that issues of theology, ethics, 
power and self-interest need to be accounted for.30 Goldingay points to Jesus’ 
treatment of the Mosaic law regarding divorce as evidence of an inner-biblical 
recognition that the holy scripture can still be contaminated by human sin,31 
                                                 
29Goldingay 1994, 106. 
30Fowl 1998, 5. 
31Goldingay 1995, 106-07. 
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and cautions that the contents of the canon are part of the tradition passed 
down from generation to generation, having the right to be treated with 
respect, but not without question.32 
 
An understanding of the Christian interpretive community as open to 
transformation needs to account for an ongoing dialectical relationship 
between text, community and context. The focal expression of this relationship 
is in the rule of faith which encapsulates the community’s understanding of its 
core beliefs. The term “rule of faith” has been taken to mean a number of 
different things, but in this case I take it to refer to the core values and 
theological commitments which provide a community with its 
ideological/theological sense of coherence and identity. In other words, it is 
the set of beliefs which the community considers normative. The rule of faith 
may be summarised in credal or doctrinal statements, but these are expressions 
of the rule rather than the rule itself, which is the more abstract and inchoate 
system of beliefs which the community holds in common. Sociologically it 
conforms to Fish’s characterisation of the sense of fellowship which confirms 
that two people belong to the same interpretive community: “The only ‘proof’ 
of membership is fellowship, the nod of recognition from someone in the same 
community, someone who says to you what neither of us could ever prove to a 
third party: ‘we know’”.33  
 
On the face of it, the rule of faith in the form of doctrinal formulations and 
credal statements may appear to represent a means of communally-
authoritative interpretive control.34 Such formulations and statements act as 
                                                 
32Goldingay 1994, 178. 
33
 Fish 1980b, 173. 
34
 Fish identifies Augustine’s version of the rule of faith in On Christian Doctrine as just such 
an example of interpretive control. Augustine’s stipulation that everything in scripture points 
to God’s love for us and our reciprocal responsibility to love fellow creatures for His sake “is 
both a stipulation of what meaning there is and a set of directions for finding it, which is of 
course a set of directions - of interpretive strategies - for making it, that is, for the endless 
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doctrinal norms against which biblical interpretations can be evaluated, 
affirmed or rejected, and thus can serve to close down avenues of 
interpretation or suppress interpretive interests if these appear to threaten the 
community’s self-understanding. In short, it might be argued that the rule of 
faith as applied to biblical interpretation predetermines the questions which 
may be addressed to the text and the answers which will be considered 
acceptable.  
 
Again, although there are times when creeds and doctrines have been used to 
guillotine interpretive approaches, there is more to it than this. The rule of 
faith represents the community’s self-understanding in relation both to their 
inherited tradition and to their contemporary context, for which the rule serves 
to explain the core values and commitments of the community in their current 
present. Francis Watson stresses that credal statements are not inflexible 
structures which impose dogmatic constraints upon biblical interpretation, 
claiming that the creed “is simply an outline which requires to be filled out by 
the far more varied content of holy scripture and by the interpretative 
reflection of preaching”.35 Stephen Fowl, similarly, argues that the rule of 
faith both shapes and is shaped by biblical interpretation, and emphasises the 
need for Christian interpretation to involve a complex interaction in which 
Christian convictions, practices and concerns are brought to bear on scripture 
in ways that mutually interact.36 The rule of faith thus arises out of the 
interpretation of a scriptural tradition by a community sensitive to its 
contextual present: the regula fidei serves to define the boundaries of the 
interpretive community and provide norms by which interpretation within the 
                                                                                                                                
reproduction of the same text” (Fish 1980b, 170). Fish notes that although any interpretive 
strategy could have similar success, few have been as “spectacularly successful as this one”.  
35Watson 1994, 6. 
36Fowl 1998, 7-8. 
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community may be evaluated, but it is not an absolute, to be rigidly applied 
without equivocation in all circumstances. 
 
Goldingay notes that tradition is by nature changing rather than static, and that 
passing on elements of tradition does not leave them unchanged. In the 
process of transmission from one context to another traditional elements are 
adapted to bring out their significance for the people to whom they are 
given.37 At the same time, Christian tradition is accountable to the Bible it 
claims to interpret, providing a check but not a final norm for interpretation. 
Ultimately, “the text has to be its own norm”.38 The catholic creeds, for 
instance, are a guide for interpretation used by the community on the 
understanding that they crystallise scripture’s own central thread, and should 
only continue to be used as such as long as it is seen that their representation 
of scripture is faithful: 
 
They provide us with [a] map for our theological exploration of 
scripture. As such they encourage such exploration, and we will 
hesitate to assume that their mapwork is mistaken, though it remains 
only mapwork. The map is answerable to the land, not the land to it, 
and is measured by it and not vice versa.39 
 
The rule of faith is the expression of the church’s interpretive tradition in the 
present context and, as the context changes, so may the rule. Put another way, 
the rule of faith exercises a normative function in relation to interpretive 
practice, but it is also answerable to that practice. The rule of faith is 
expressive of the Christian community’s understanding of the Bible, not 
constitutive of it. As one example of this in the Anglican context it is helpful 
to call to mind Articles VI and XXI of the Articles of Religion appended to the 
                                                 
37Goldingay 1994, 54. 
38Goldingay 1995, 227. 
39Goldingay 1994, 184-85.  
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Book of Common Prayer. Article VI makes clear that “Holy Scripture 
containeth all things necessary to salvation”, and that nothing which is not 
contained therein should be expected to be believed, whilst Article XXI 
maintains that General Councils of the church can (and have) erred on the 
most fundamental matters, and that “things ordained by them as necessary to 
salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that 
they be taken out of holy scripture”.  Throughout the Thirty-Nine Articles it is 
consonance with scripture which forms the basis for the affirmation or 
rejection of belief and practice.40 
 
Beyond Socio-Pragmatism to Critical Openness 
 
Francis Watson has argued that one way of ensuring that biblical interpretation 
is able to transcend the socio-pragmatic horizons of self-affirming interpretive 
communities is to bring the biblical texts fully into dialogue with 
contemporary interpretive interests or “contemporary perceptions” from the 
wider society which the church inhabits. The value of such a dialectic is that 
contemporary perceptions enable readers to recognise previously overlooked 
aspects of the biblical texts whilst the texts simultaneously give a particular 
focus and shape to those perceptions.41 Watson stresses that such interaction 
does not represent the readerly imposition of extra-textual agendas upon the 
text: rather, an approach to the Bible which addresses it in the light of a new 
interpretive perspective may result in the foregrounding of textual elements 
which the interpretive tradition has previously passed over, and which may be 
used to challenge oppressive or vested-interest readings. Such insights can 
                                                 
40
 See e.g. articles VIII, XXII, XXIV and XXXIV. 
41Watson 1994, 190. 
 256 
thus act as an expression of the text’s ability to self-critique, and even to 
challenge the history of its interpretation within the community.42 
 
Watson takes the Pauline contrast between gospel and law as an indication that 
the Bible is not only capable of self-critique but invites it. If scripture offers 
the prospect of oppression through a law “that contravenes the divine 
intention”, it also transcends itself by pointing towards an eschatological 
liberation and hope, “fulfilling what was promised in the beginning and 
already making its presence felt, in fragmentary and anticipatory form, in 
those inner-historical events and actions to which the future belongs”.43 
 
Watson argues that the designation of the Bible as scripture does not close off 
interpretive possibilities but opens them. Interpretation in the light of new 
perspectives may reveal previously unnoticed elements of hope and liberation 
within the Bible, which can then be applied to the contemporary context: 
 
The concept of holy scripture does not inevitably lead to a neo-
conservative hermeneutic which denies the legitimacy of the exposure 
and critique of inner-biblical ideological constructions. It calls instead 
for an attempt, never completed and always provisional, to distinguish 
the biblical witness to the liberating gospel from its entanglement in 
the oppressive law, resisting the latter not for the sake of the 
satisfactions of negation but as a contribution to the appropriate 
contemporary expression of the gospel.44 
                                                 
42
 To borrow Russian Formalist terminology, the process is one of defamiliarisation: by being 
brought into a new interpretive context or being approached with a new interpretive interest 
the text is defamiliarised or “made strange” so that it can be perceived and understood afresh; 
at the same time, the “otherness” of the biblical text serves to defamiliarise the preconceptions 
of the interpreter, calling them into the foreground of critical attention so they can be re-
examined and re-evaluated in light of the textual encounter. 
43Watson 1994, 199. Watson may at first sight appear to be arguing for a “canon within the 
canon”, but the point he is making is more subtle than this. Watson is not arguing for the 
prioritisation of certain biblical texts over others, but making an observation on the nature of 
the Bible as a trans-historical canon, transmitted through history into different contexts. 
Oppressive or liberating readings depend not on the objective content of the Bible but also on 
the context of interpretation, proceeding not “from a contextless encounter between a 
hypersensitive reader and a pure, uninterpreted text, but from the contemporary interpretative 
context within which the reading takes place” (Watson 1994, 235). Logically, therefore, a text 
might function as oppressive in one context and as liberating in another. 
44Watson 1994, 155. 
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Watson takes feminist approaches to the Bible as an example of this dynamic: 
the application of feminist interpretive interests to scripture has revealed a 
latent and previously underemphasised anti-patriarchal tradition within the 
biblical texts. Feminist readings which recognise this inner-biblical tradition 
cohere with the values of the gospel in such a way as to offer new insights into 
the text, and to issue a challenge to patriarchal practices and interpretive 
traditions in the interpretive community and the world which has the weight of 
biblical authority behind it. The “narratives of liberation” which feminist 
scholarship has revealed “can be seen as pointing beyond biblical or 
contemporary patriarchy towards the new future that divine Wisdom is 
preparing through her human agents, now, in the so-called ‘secular’ world 
which remains her creation, beyond the world of the sacred text”.45 
 
Watson’s approach is significant for suggesting what a Christian model for 
biblical interpretation open to transformation of readers and contexts through 
textual encounter might offer. Watson’s recognition of the importance of 
acknowledging inner-biblical tensions goes beyond the text-resistant 
deconstructionist destabilising of texts and interpretations.46 Instead, Watson 
goes beyond a strategy of pure resistance to embrace what he describes as a 
“hermeneutics of hope”, which conforms more fully to Schüssler Fiorenza’s 
model for interpretive ethics than much de-confessional biblical criticism, 
which has tended to perform only the text-critical elements of Schüssler 
Fiorenza’s ethical dance. The application of contemporary interpretive 
interests to the biblical texts in Watson’s hermeneutics allows them and their 
                                                 
45Watson 1994, 200. 
46
 A major feature of J. Cheryl Exum’s feminist critique is a deployment of deconstruction to 
offer alternative readings to dominant patriarchal traditions in texts and their interpretation, 
not with the intention of replacing those traditions but simply of rendering them equivocal 
(see e.g. Exum 1997, 92, 128). The limitation of this approach is that it ties the feminist 
interpreter to a parasitic, text-resistant approach in which the critic is incapable of escaping 
from the patriarchal ideology she seeks to resist. 
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history of interpretation to be interrogated so as to perform text-critical steps,47 
but the  additional foregrounding of latent liberating elements of the biblical 
texts performs Schüssler Fiorenza’s task of remembrance and re-construction; 
alignment of those elements with the eschatological hope of the gospel 
functions as a hermeneutics of imagination; and the application of the results 
of the interpretive process to the interpretive context gives rise to a 
hermeneutics of transformation and action for change. The paralysation and 
impotence of text-resistant interpretive approaches which we noted earlier is 
transcended by a self-consciously confessional approach which is open to the 
transformative power of the biblical text as scripture without denying the need 
for wariness and questioning. 
 
It is worthwhile adopting a metaphor in the manner of Stephen D. Moore to 
underline the essential difference between confessional and de-confessional 
interpretation. In order to engage in interpretation, secular and confessional 
interpreters must first draw close to the text and lay hands upon it, becoming 
intimate with its detail, its nuances, its hidden depths and inner workings. In 
short, as they interpret biblical interpreters of both varieties are engaging in 
textual intercourse. From a distance, the wrestling and embracing of both 
activities might look very much the same, but there is a crucial difference. The 
secular or de-confessional critic is not making love: rather, s/he will have 
taken precautions (by means of a prophylactic preconception of the text as 
ideological or cultural object) to deny the possibility that textual intercourse 
might implant anything within him/her which might change his/her self-
understanding, because to let the text do so would be a violation of the 
                                                 
47
 A hermeneutics of experience and social location which affirms the legitimacy of women’s 
experience as the basis for an interpretive approach; an analytic of domination which 
addresses the roles of biblical texts in supporting oppressive social structures; a hermeneutics 
of suspicion by means of which the texts are critically interrogated; and a hermeneutics of 
ethical and theological evaluation which assesses the values of texts and interpretations 
against a scale of values. 
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interpreter’s exclusive rights over his/her own body of thought. Indeed, for de-
confessional critics wrestling with the text might be less the throes of passion 
than a desperate attempt to fend off ideological rape.48 The confessional critic, 
on the other hand, receives the embrace of the text as a lover, openly and 
trustingly if sometimes warily (because the intercourse is sometimes rough on 
either side), allowing it to merge its horizons with their own so that the two 
become one, and implanting within them something which will, if it comes to 
birth, transform them and, through them, the world into which it is born. If de-
confessional criticism is sterile, confessional criticism offers the prospect of 
new birth and future hope. 
 
 
Lost in Translation? Difficulties of Intercommunal Discourse 
 
The second challenge posed by socio-pragmatic models for confessional 
scholarship is the argument that it is impossible for Christians to function 
within a pluralist academy, because the world-view which informs their 
interpretation is so specific to them that their readings have no validity for 
anyone who does not share their confessional commitments. Christian 
discourse is a language for insiders and excludes those who do not share 
Christian faith suppositions, whilst academic discourse depends upon the 
heuristic intersubjective sharing of interpretations so they can be critically 
evaluated. The highly subjective and non-empirical theological assumptions 
                                                 
48
 The ideological criticism produced by some postmodern scholarship goes further than this. 
Graham Ward has recently questioned Stephen D. Moore’s treatment of the Bible in his 2001 
book God’s Beauty Parlour, suggesting that one response to Moore’s readings of biblical texts 
as bound to violence, domination, subjugation and oppression is to conclude that they should 
simply be put aside: “But that is not what Moore wants to do. He wants to stamp up and down 
and pulverize them. And that offers no hope to the millions of people who still draw comfort, 
joy, inspiration and sustenance from these texts. What I am suggesting here is that at some 
point iconoclasm has to give way to a constructive project, otherwise the critical gesture is 
simply anarchistic” (Ward 2003, 255). 
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which precondition Christian readings, it is argued, inevitably make Christian 
readings uncritical and, therefore, unacceptable in the academic arena. If 
Christian scholarship is to gain an equal hearing with other interpretive 
approaches, then it must be able to show that these reservations are unfounded. 
 
One response is to argue the need to avoid what Kevin Vanhoozer describes as 
“nothing but” reductionism: that is, the description of one level of textual 
meaning in terms of another. Vanhoozer argues that both deconstruction and 
socio-pragmatism of the kind suggested by Stanley Fish are “socio-
semiology”, an approach which describes higher levels of textual function in 
terms of ideological sign systems and interpretive communities, with the result 
that the ensuing descriptions fail to do justice to the complexities of those 
levels and effectively eliminate communicative agency.49 Fish, for instance, 
accurately observes that interpretive groups with common interests play an 
active role in shaping interpretive approaches by their ideological 
precommitments. This insight is then universalised and raised to the level of 
dogma, resulting in a model of interpretive communities closed off from 
external critique or enlightenment, and isolated from one another by the 
separation of their critical discourses and interpretive methods. Fish’s 
assertion that the texts read by communities are actually nothing but 
projections of their own ideologies closes off any attempt to set the 
communities he describes in a broader context.50 The contention of the 
                                                 
49Vanhoozer 1998, 329. 
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 Stanley Fish’s interpretive community bears a strong resemblance to Emile Durkheim’s 
concept of the religious totem.The totem functions not as a mediator of transcendence but as a 
projection by the community of its own sense of social identity and values, so that the object 
of the community’s worship  is in fact itself. Whilst Durkheim and Fish are correct in 
identifying important social dynamics in religious practice and textual interpretation, both are 
also reductionist in reducing religious phenomena to purely sociological activities, and thus 
serve as good examples of “nothing but” reductionism. For Durkheim’s theory see e.g. 
Durkheim 1915. Durkheim’s theories are recognised by a number of modern sociologists as 
coloured by his own atheist commitments, which led him to refuse to accept the reality of 
human belief in unseen spiritual realities and to explain religion away as a purely social 
phenomenon (see e.g. Sharpe 1986, 82-86; Hughes 1996, 51-53).  
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Christian community, however, is that this model fails to do justice to the 
bigger picture, and allows for no interaction between human subjects and 
transcendent divinity. Much postmodern scholarship has taken valid insights 
into the workings of human subjectivity and elevated those to the level of a 
universal truth-claim that human subjectivity is all there is. Christian 
scholarship will want to challenge this view as having fatally restricted 
horizons, without denying the validity of the truths which postmodernism has 
helped to uncover. 
 
A second response to the objection that Christian discourse is conceptually 
and terminologically closed to external critique is to point out that the same 
objection is not applied to other interpretive approaches within the academy. 
Many postmodern methods and approaches present exactly the same problem 
for scholars who do not share their philosophical presuppositions and technical 
terminologies. One example of this is the work of Mieke Bal, whose 
pioneering work of the late 1980s has been highly influential in the area of 
literary and ideological study of Old Testament narrative.  
 
Trained originally as a structural narratologist in the tradition of French 
structuralism laid down by Genette, Greimas and Barthes, Bal has gone on to 
adopt insights from Derridean and Lacanian poststructuralism, Freudian 
psychoanalysis and American feminist criticism.51 Bal thus brought to her 
study of the Bible a formidable arsenal of rigorous critical tools which she has 
deployed with precision in the service of a feminist interpretation of the Old 
Testament in general and of the book of Judges in particular.52 Bal’s 
persistence in paying close attention to the text, refusing to gloss over textual 
                                                 
51See Bal 1991, 4-5. 
52Bal has been described as “an adroit and ruthless reader, a picker-apart of texts, whose 
manner of close investigation rubs off to some degree on anyone who samples her work” 
(Murphy 1999, 119). 
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problems in pursuit of a ‘coherent’ interpretation and her insistence on an 
interdisciplinary approach which renders every interpretation open to critique 
from other disciplines has caused many to re-evaluate the very basis of their 
interpretative strategies.  
 
At the same time, however, the unfamiliarity of Bal’s critical methods and the 
challenging nature of her ideological and philosophical base has rendered the 
introduction of her approach into Biblical Studies problematic. Despite Bal’s 
attempts to lay bare the theoretical and methodological underpinning of her 
work, scholars working within the boundaries of Biblical Studies have found 
her importation of not one but many foreign critical approaches at best 
daunting and at worst baffling. One reviewer of Murder and Difference found 
her technical terminology “difficult and sometimes impenetrable”, and 
admitted “from the start to the possibility of having misunderstood or 
misrepresented what this book is all about”.53 Others have flatly stated that 
“Bal’s works are difficult to read”, and that passages “which use the technical 
jargon of semiotics without adequate explanation obscure the meaning of parts 
of the book”.54 Even Alice Bach, an enthusiastic supporter of Bal’s approach, 
admits that “working through Bal’s method can produce literary vertigo before 
one grows easy in its harness”.55  
 
The difficulties of reception encountered by Bal’s work suggest that 
interdisciplinary dialogue between approaches which proceed from different 
philosophical and ideological bases, and which operate using different critical 
terminologies, can be problematic. This raises a major question mark over the 
                                                 
53Greenspahn 1990, 104. 
54Brettler 1990, 96-7. 
55Bach 1991, 333. David Jobling has commentated extensively on the theoretical accessibility 
of Bal’s work (Jobling 1991), noting that her explicitly theoretical work is more accessible but 
unknown to biblical scholars, and that heavily theoretical sections of her early works were 
removed in translation, ironically for fear of alienating her audience. 
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long-term prospects for the open and free dialogue which the pluralist 
postmodern academy proposes. As we have seen, a vital prerequisite of 
dialogue is a shared language, and one argument against the inclusion of 
overtly Christian biblical scholarship is that its confessional language and 
conceptual framework are not shared by all academics. But neither, by the 
same token, are the language and frameworks of Moore, Bal or, for that 
matter, any critic who seeks to deploy interdisciplinary approaches in their 
study of biblical texts.  
 
It is questionable whether a Christian critical discourse which shapes its 
interests, its theological base and its critical method in relation to the biblical 
text which is itself the object of study, should be excluded from academic 
consideration when equally intrasystemic critical discourses drawn from 
existential philosophy, structural semiotics, psychoanalysis and a host of other 
ideologically and philosophically committed approaches have been welcomed. 
The answer common to both objectivist and ideological criticism is that 
confessional approaches are too interested in the biblical texts to stand over 
against them, to which the confessional response is to ask why only standing 
over against the text should necessarily result in a fuller and truer 
understanding of texts which are fundamentally rhetorical. Not to submit 
openly to the rhetoric of the text, even temporarily, precludes the possibility of 
full understanding.  
 
The fact that not all interpreters share the conceptual framework which gives 
rise to an interpretation does not mean that the interpretation cannot be 
understood or critically evaluated. On the contrary, it is only through 
extrasystemic critique that theories and critical methods can evolve and 
develop rather than becoming circular arguments or dead ends. There is no 
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reason why confessional interpretation should be placed in a separate category 
to other approaches in this regard. 
 
Finally, Francis Watson has argued that Christian discourse cannot be totally 
intrasystemic, since the church’s broader context shapes its socio-linguistic 
formation. Christian understanding is expressed in a language which the 
church receives from the wider culture, so that “any correct apprehension of 
Christian truth or the praxis that must accompany it will occur only through 
the mediation of a discourse that is not in itself distinctively Christian”.56 This 
is to say, the language which the church uses to describe its understanding of 
God is not language which the church creates and which belongs to it alone. 
Rather, the church takes terms and concepts from the surrounding socio-
linguistic culture and uses them to express its apprehension of spiritual truth. 
All religious language is metaphor, and the vehicles of that metaphor are 
drawn from the semiotic system which the church shares with its host culture.  
 
This can be seen clearly, for instance, in the terms used by Paul to describe the 
work of Christ, and which subsequent generations of Christians have taken as 
paradigmatic. Paul’s language of adoption, redemption and justification are 
not specifically religious terms, but are concepts with wide currency in the 
culture within which he lived. Indeed, it was precisely the currency of these 
concepts which made them useful in the formative missionary phase of the 
church’s existence. Paul’s metaphorical application of these concepts to truths 
about the effect of Christ’s ministry gives the terms he chooses a new 
significance, but by the same token the church’s understanding of its central 
doctrine has been fundamentally shaped by the socio-linguistic structures of 
the first-century context. Watson argues that the interaction of church and its 
wider context must be taken into account: 
                                                 
56Watson 1994, 9. 
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Language is not a transparent medium but shapes and forms the reality 
of which it speaks; for linguistic agents, there can be no encounter with 
a reality that is not already shaped and formed by language. The 
church may therefore not perceive itself as an enclosed, sealed sphere 
in which truth is preserved in pure form, untouched by the passing 
fashions of the age. The church too is permeated by contemporary 
discourse and its passing fashions, and this is the indispensable, 
inescapable medium through which truth is to be apprehended.57 
 
If Watson’s argument is a challenge to the church not to separate itself off 
from its wider context, it also serves to correct the argument that Christian 
frameworks cannot be translated into the academic arena. At least within 
English-speaking scholarship, both confessional and de-confessional discourse 
share a common linguistic framework which facilitates, rather than hinders, 
communication. If certain concepts are not shared, much more is held in 
common, making intersubjective and intercommunal dialogue possible. 
Differences between interpretive communities are not insuperable if a 
common linguistic base is shared. 
 
In terms of Christian biblical criticism, however, Watson’s point also holds 
good in that Christian interpretive approaches within academic Biblical 
Studies generally use the same critical methods as non-confessional 
scholarship. It is therefore important to be clear about the level at which 
perceived difficulties arising from differing ideological or theological 
discourses arise. Christian critical and methodological discourse is not 
distinctively or especially Christian. Rather, Christian scholarship deploys 
critical methods drawn from a range of disciplines in the service of 
specifically Christian interpretive goals. What distinguishes Christian from 
other kinds of biblical interpretation is the theological framework within 
which interpretation takes place, and into which the results of interpretation 
                                                 
57Watson 1994, 9-10. 
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must be integrated. Differences of discourse at the theological/ideological 
level are not to be ignored or the difficulties of negotiation underestimated, but 
it is clear that communication between interest groups with divergent 
ideological frameworks is still possible at the level of, and in the discourse of, 
critical method. Kevin Vanhoozer, however, points out that even at the level 
of ideology “people with different conceptual schemes are often able to reach 
understanding, if not agreement; how else could Marxists and capitalists, 




Christian Interpretation and Other Approaches: Can We Talk? 
 
In the preceding argument I have attempted to show that an explicitly 
Christian approach to biblical interpretation ought to be possible within a 
Biblical Studies which is committed to both methodological and ideological 
pluralism. By offering a model of the Bible as a multi-dimensional 
communicative act, Christian scholarship may retain its commitment to the 
Bible as scripture (that is, as a vehicle for divine communication) whilst 
simultaneously affirming the need for a multivalent and multidisciplinary 
approach which affirms the legitimacy and validity of a wider range of 
interpretive interests, including the de-confessional.  Confessional interpreters 
will share many interests with non- or de-confessional colleagues at the level 
of methodology, and will wish to conform to standards of academic practice 
which are current within the academy. 
 
                                                 
58Vanhoozer 1998, 319. Vanhoozer bases his argument on the work of Donald Davidson 
(Davidson 1984, 183-99). 
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The confessing community will wish to resist suggestions that its practice 
forms a closed hermeneutical circle.59 On the contrary, an authentically 
Christian approach to biblical interpretation will seek to engage fully with the 
text and with the contemporary context of interpretation, both in order to 
reveal new insights into the Bible and to bring biblical insights to bear on the 
community’s interpretive context. Confessional interpreters will not seek to 
close themselves off from other interpretive perspectives, but will wish to 
engage constructively with other interest groups. This last goal, however, 
requires further exploration. How should a confessional approach to academic 
biblical interpretation conduct itself in a postmodern context? In particular, 
how can interpretive and ideological conflict be negotiated? In responding to 
this challenge, confessional criticism must give thought to its own ethics of 
interpretation. 
                                                 
59
 Possibly by pointing to examples from its own history when radical transformation has 
occurred as a result if scriptural interpretation, such as the Reformation or the evangelical 
rediscovery of social justice issues in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. 
 268 
CHAPTER SIX: TALKING WITH STRANGERS – A CHRISTIAN 
ETHICS OF INTERPRETATION 
Brother, sister, let me serve you, 
let me be as Christ to you; 
pray that I may have the grace 
to let you be my servant too. 
  - The Iona Community 
 
As we have seen in our earlier treatment of Sheffield postmodernism, the 
ethics of interpretation have become a major consideration in postmodern 
biblical scholarship. If a distinctively Christian approach within Biblical 
Studies is to be credible in the emerging academic context, it will have to take 
ethical issues into account. These issues relate specifically to the political 
interests of the approach, expressed in the ways in which confessional scholars 
interact with other interpretive interests and communities. Interpretive ethics 
becomes particularly important when confessional critics seek to interact with 
interpretive approaches whose ideological base is unsympathetic or even 
overtly hostile to orthodox Christian interpretations of the Bible. 
 
One preliminary objection to the notion of a Christian ethics of interpretation 
might be to question whether a distinctively Christian approach is necessary. 
Is it not sufficient to play the academic game by the rules everyone else uses? 
For self-consciously confessional critics the answer must be “no”, for the same 
reasons which ought to drive a self-consciously confessional approach to 
biblical interpretation in general. Once the importance of ideological interests 
in interpretation is understood, it also becomes clear that fundamental interests 
are not shared by all interest groups. Further, it is clear from the foregoing 
argument that academic practices, interpretive paradigms and ethical 
approaches have often been co-opted by interests which seek to exclude or 
relativise Christian perspectives. It is important to note that the debate on 
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ethics of interpretation has been taken up most stridently (though not 
exclusively) by interested parties whose objective is at least in part to resist the 
inclusion of overtly confessional approaches within the discipline.  
 
That being the case, it cannot be assumed that the ethical standards prevalent 
within academic Biblical Studies will be fully consonant with Christian 
interests, any more than the development of poststructuralist and socio-
pragmatic interpretive communities within the discipline can be said to be. 
The formation of a distinctive Christian approach to ethical interpretation is 
therefore necessary for the maintenance of a distinctive Christian approach to 
interpretation. To play by someone else’s rules may be to find that those rules 
exclude confessional concerns by ruling them unethical. At the same time, a 
Christian approach to interpretive ethics may have something to offer the 
wider discipline which can serve as a corrective to some of the difficulties that 
we have noted with postmodern scholarship, especially the fragmentation of 
the discipline into disparate interpretive interest groups who do not talk to one 
another. A Christian interpretive ethics which stresses the importance of 




Why Talk With Strangers? 
 
In what follows, my aim will be to sketch the outlines of a model for 
interpretive ethics within Biblical Studies which reflects Christian concerns 
and values. The proposed dialogue partners most clearly in view will be the 
scholars and interest groups whose work has been engaged elsewhere in this 
argument, especially those whose stance in relation to confessional criticism is 
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hostile. The reasons for this are primarily twofold: first, de-confessional 
scholarship of the kind we have addressed has done much to set the tone and 
direction of debate in relation to interpretive ethics, and therefore must be 
engaged if a credible Christian alternative is to be proposed; second, if it is 
possible to demonstrate that distinctively confessional interpretive ethics can 
overcome some of the difficulties which we have identified with more extreme 
interpretive positions, then the value of the approach for interaction with less 
difficult dialogue partners will be all the greater. 
 
But why should confessional scholarship seek to talk with strangers in the first 
place? Preliminary objections to such conversation can be anticipated from 
both confessional and de-confessional perspectives. The Christian community 
might reasonably ask why it is necessary to engage in dialogue with scholars 
whose interests are often overtly hostile to confessional interests: why can we 
not simply let them get on with it and pursue our own interests in our own 
ways?1 One of the attractions of a pluralist academic context which recognises 
the legitimacy of many interpretive interests is the prospect of being free to 
pursue one’s interpretive goals without having to justify them to others who 
do not share an interest in those goals. But this is to ignore the continuing need 
for critical accountability to the wider academy, and to avoid the need to deal 
with real and serious conflicts of interest when they arise. Even in a pluralist 
environment, confessional and de-confessional scholarship will come into 
contact with one another within university departments, in the pages of 
journals and Zeitschriften, in seminars and at conferences. If it is not possible 
for confessional and de-confessional critics to avoid one another entirely, they 
                                                 
1
 In the process of completing this thesis I have offered a number of papers to research 
seminars in a variety of confessional settings, including Christian training institutions. In 
almost every case, the first question posed by colleagues has tended to be, “Why bother?” The 
interests of de-confessional and confessional scholarship have seemed to be so disparate as to 
render attempts at engagement futile. I hope that I have by now made clear my reasons for 
believing that this is not the case. 
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must develop ways of talking with one another and negotiating interpretive 
differences and conflicts of interest which involves more than simply 
pretending the other party does not exist. 
 
From the de-confessional point of view, the preliminary objection to 
conversation might well derive from a nervousness about the intentions of 
Christian criticism. Suspicion of Christian universal truth claims is deeply 
rooted in the academy, not only because of the liberal humanist foundations of 
many institutions of higher education, but also because of the experience of 
many emergent interest groups. If the experience of Christian interpretation 
and use of the Bible for some interpretive communities has been oppressive 
and damaging, then confessional scholars should not be surprised when those 
communities, having carved out a space within the academy where they are 
free to pursue their own interests without having to answer to ecclesial 
concerns, are reluctant to engage in civilised conversation.2 
 
There are a number of reasons why Christian scholarship should seek to 
engage with perspectives beyond its own horizons, the first of which is that the 
Christian interpretive community exists within a wider context from which it 
cannot be separated. We have noted Francis Watson’s argument that the 
discourse of the Church is drawn from the wider discourse of its socio-
linguistic context: Watson also argues that the world in which the church 
exists is the focus of the church’s mission. The confessing community takes 
from its study of scripture a number of truth-claims which it is called upon to 
communicate beyond its own boundaries: 
 
                                                 
2
 Again, a personal anecdote may be helpful. On presenting a paper at a recent conference of 
the British New Testament Society in which I suggested the need for translation of 
confessional conceptual frameworks into terms with which, for instance, secular feminists 
could constructively engage, I was rebuffed by a feminist scholar who told me she could “take 
or leave” my confessional interests without the need for such translation. 
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the biblical story itself refuses to permit its own enclosure and 
confinement within the walls of the church, but requires the 
community of faith to look outwards into the conflict-ridden 
sociopolitical sphere in which it is of course already located and 
implicated.3 
 
At the same time, however, Watson notes that although the church’s ecclesial 
claims about the Bible have relevance beyond the church, those claims are 
disputed in the wider culture within which the church exists and operates, and 
upon whose discourse the church depends in order to communicate. Hence, 
Watson argues, “the community of faith is entirely dependent on a language or 
discourse which is constantly developing ways of resisting and concealing its 
claims”.4 If the church is to fulfil its missiological purpose within the wider 
culture it must constantly engage with that culture in order to find the means 
of communicating its message.5 
 
In the academic context, this means that engagement with postmodern and de-
confessional scholarship and discourse is essential. Kevin Vanhoozer argues 
along similar lines to Watson, and offers several reasons why Christian 
scholarship should engage postmodern approaches. First, as scholars Christian 
academics have an obligation to be intellectually honest and even charitable, 
and that means taking the trouble to understand postmodernism before writing 
it off. Second, postmodernism as an interdisciplinary phenomenon has 
occasioned a crisis in scholarship which is changing the context of the 
academy: understanding of its context is essential for the church to perform its 
mission, making engagement with the wider academic context essential. Third, 
postmodern approaches such as deconstruction are already prevalent within 
                                                 
3Watson 1994, 11. 
4Watson 1994, 10. 
5
 Although it lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be interesting to explore whether 
insights from the field of missiology could not be usefully deployed in engaging the emerging 
situation within Biblical Studies, drawing upon the work of, for instance, David J. Bosch or 
Lesslie Newbigin (see e.g. Newbigin 1986; Newbigin 1989; Bosch 1996). 
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the academy and therefore cannot be avoided. Fourth, approaches such as 
deconstruction “may have something to teach us”.6 
 
To engage with postmodern approaches is not simply to acquiesce in them, but 
seriously to evaluate them. This involves a process of dialogue in which the 
Christian scholar must be open to the possibility that non-confessional 
interpretation may have something to teach, at the same time as seeking to 
identify and resist elements of postmodern models for interpretation which 
might threaten the integrity of a Christian approach. John Goldingay suggests 
that: 
 
to keep up a conversation with the thinking of the day seems a good 
principle. These intellectual currents are unlikely to be totally wrong, 
even if they have been distorted, not least through their lack of 
relationship to the gospel. The ease with which we ourselves 
domesticate or otherwise distort the gospel makes such intellectual 
currents positive handmaids, by virtue of their facing issues that we 
may avoid.7 
 
Goldingay argues that Derrida, for instance, “cannot be domesticated” because 
one aim of his approach is to destroy metaphysical theology by cutting away 
its philosophical and epistemological base, but affirms the value of 
deconstruction in revealing ideological factors in interpretation.8 Vanhoozer 
similarly regards deconstruction as a valuable check to hermeneutical pride 
whilst at the same time resisting its demands for radical textual indeterminacy, 
whilst Watson makes a similar argument at the same time as insisting that the 
claims of postmodern theories must be negotiated and not simply succumbed 
to.9 
                                                 
6Vanhoozer 1998, 174. Francis Watson argues that postmodernism should be regarded as “an 
important dialogue partner which will assist in the shaping of its form and substance even as it 
is resisted” Watson 1994, 86. 
7Goldingay 1995, 29. 
8Goldingay 1995, 27. 
9Watson 1994, 84-85. 
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As well as the need to evaluate postmodern theory and criticism and the 
possibility of practical gain from an open engagement, there is a strong 
theological imperative which should drive a properly postmodern Christian 
academic approach to engage postmodernism with an open mind. We have 
noted Francis Watson’s argument that the bringing to bear of “contemporary 
perspectives” on the biblical texts has the potential to bring to the fore and 
render operative liberating elements of the texts which have previously been 
ignored or suppressed.10 The recognition of this dynamic directs the attention 
of confessional interpretation away from a primary focus upon the text alone 
and towards a recognition of what the Holy Spirit is doing in the wider 
world.11 Watson argues that to regard the church as closed off from the world 
is “ecclesiological docetism”, and urges that a recognition of the role of the 
Spirit beyond the boundaries of the confessing community can enable the 
church to recognise valuable insights into scripture which originate outside 
itself.12 Watson draws upon biblical material which points to the role of the 
Holy Spirit in creation,13 and points to the depiction of the Persian ruler Cyrus 
in Isaiah 45 as a paradigm of the Spirit’s working beyond the boundaries of 
the community of faith. Although Cyrus does not know God, he is 
nevertheless God’s “anointed” (45:1), and the instrument of divine purpose 
and policy. Cyrus thus presents to the covenant community a challenge to their 
ability and willingness to acknowledge the redemptive and disclosive action of 
the Spirit in this apparently secular figure.14   
 
Watson concludes his survey of the Spirit’s role by arguing that: 
 
                                                 
10Watson 1994, 190. 
11Watson 1994, 200-01. 
12Watson 1994, 236. 
13
 E.g. Romans 11:36; Psalms 104:30 and 139:7; Job 33:4. 
14Watson 1994, 239. 
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The sphere of creation-redemption encompasses the whole world, and 
the indwelling creator Spirit may also act as the redeemer Spirit, 
redemptively present in all goodness, justice and truth. To permit 
disclosures of goodness, justice and truth originating outside the 
community to impinge upon the interpretation of the sacred texts is not 
to contaminate them.15 
 
Extra-ecclesial movements challenge and question the church’s self-
understanding and this, Watson claims, is one means by which the Spirit leads 
the church into all truth (John 16:13), and by which the difference between 
law and gospel may be discerned. 
 
Stephen Fowl and L. Gregory Jones also argue the need for the confessing 
community to open itself to external perspectives. We have noted Fowl’s 
stress upon the importance of maintaining a dialectical relationship between 
the text, the interpreting community and the interpretive context in which the 
Spirit is seen to be operative, and his assertion of Luke’s account of the 
inclusion of Gentile believers in the church in Acts 15 as a paradigm of 
interpretive practice. Proper attention to the interpretive context, Fowl and 
Jones argue, entails the interpretive community producing readings or 
interpretations of the world, but also includes the need to allow the world to 
provide readings of the community.16 This is particularly so in relation to 
ethical positions, in that when the church judges the ethical standards of the 
world it also judges itself. Extra-ecclesial perspectives may be able to reflect 
the church back to itself in such a way as to reveal persistent instances and 
practices of hypocrisy, for instance in relation to institutionalised racism or 
sexism. Fowl and Jones argue that the world has a right to judge the church by 
the church’s own standards, and that such judgement may be more perceptive 
and incisive than the church’s own. It is therefore incumbent upon the 
confessing community to be open to outsider perspectives which identify 
                                                 
15Watson 1994, 240. 
16Fowl and Jones 1991, 47-49. 
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instances of the Christian community failing to practise what it preaches. A 
further benefit of engagement with outsiders, they argue, is that understanding 
the context within which we operate may enable us to discern when the 
practice of the confessing community is being unhelpfully shaped by the 
material or social context in which it finds itself, and to find ways of resisting 
such constraints. 
 
Fowl and Jones helpfully identify a number of outsiders with whose 
perspectives Christians may need to engage:17 these include outsiders who 
regulate the community’s common life in the form of scripture and the 
resurrected Christ; outsiders in the church’s midst in the form of marginalised 
groups within the church such as homosexuals; and outsiders who bear a 
family resemblance, such as Jewish believers. Particularly important, however, 
are those outsiders who they class as “complete strangers”. As interpreters of 
the Bible, outsiders can challenge and correct Christian interpretive practices, 
reminding confessional interpreters of the provisionality of their readings and 
encouraging them to live up to the values and principles they espouse. 
 
Daniel Patte also affirms the importance of outsiders who are radically other 
than ourselves, but interprets their role Christologically: 
 
Those people that we marginalise, reject and/or oppress, because they 
are different from us, are precisely those who are Christ-for-us. When 
Christ enters our idolatrous world in order to free us from it, our first 
reaction is to crucify him, to reject her as a blasphemer, to marginalise 
and oppress her; liberation occurs for us when we acknowledge that 
the one we had rejected is Christ.18 
 
                                                 
17
 Fowl and Jones 1991, 111-17. 
18Patte 1995a, 40 n.14. Patte bases this conviction on his experience as a Protestant formed in 
the ecumenical movement in a secularised and Catholic France, and the memory of Jews 
hidden by the Protestant community in World War II. 
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Patte argues that traditional androcentric and Eurocentric practices in 
interpretation are idolatrous, because they take as absolute understandings of 
scripture which are in fact only partial. Such idolatry is a destructive bondage 
for interpreters because it turns them into oppressors who impose their 
perspectives upon others, to the harm of both oppressors and oppressed. 
Recognition of the idolatry, however, is not enough to enable us to escape it, 
as Patte argues with reference to Romans 7. Liberation from idolatry is only 
possible through the intervention of a Christlike person or group, who does not 
conform to the pattern of the idolatrous world. The response of the world is to 
reject and crucify the other, but liberation can occur when the other is 
recognised as a bearer of truth in their otherness: 
 
The Christlike person is then a sign of contradiction that breaks the 
power of bondage of our idol. In the process the partial revelation that 
was also in bondage is itself freed. We can then affirm the legitimacy 
and validity of this revelation as partial revelation (that is, as 
contextual truth) - rejecting it would be falling into another idolatry.19 
 
The outsider who is unlike us, who challenges our preconceptions, our sense 
of self and our fundamental commitments, Patte argues, may not in fact be the 
enemy we perceive them to be, and we should be careful before we reject, 
marginalise or even crucify them: they may turn out to be Christ for us, 
offering us freedom from the bondage of our existing horizons and offering us 
a liberation and hope which we had not looked for. 
 
Whilst Patte’s argument is compelling, it must be taken with caution. Outsider 
perspectives should not be welcomed uncritically with open arms as bearers of 
messianic and liberating interpretive paradigms just because they are 
challenging and different. Patte’s argument is that outsiders may be 
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instruments of gospel liberation, but some may simply be outsiders, and some 
may be enemies. In any case, as we shall see later, openness to outside 
perspectives does not mean simply surrendering one’s own distinctive 
identity. 
In light of these arguments it is possible to see that even some of the hostile 
interpretive approaches we have examined have things to say to Christian 
scholarship which confessional interpreters need to hear. Postmodern and 
ideological criticism has called for standards of intellectual and ideological 
honesty and integrity, and for consideration of the interpretive needs of others. 
It has challenged confessional scholars to become aware of the impact of their 
interpretations upon others and to acknowledge that this impact has not always 
been beneficial. It has called upon academics to ensure that their critical 
methods are transparently coherent with their ideological and theological aims. 
These calls, whilst challenging, are arguably consonant with Christian 
convictions about the importance of approaching others with respect and 
humility. If the sometimes vitriolic attacks upon confessional scholarship have 
revealed something of the truth of how Christian interpretation is perceived by 
those outside the Christian community, then that revelation can only be 
beneficial if Christian interpreters take it on board and adjust their critical 
practice appropriately. 
 
There is, however, a final reason why Christian scholarship should seek to 
engage de-confessional approaches constructively within Biblical Studies. We 
have noted that one feature of de-confessional criticism is its frequent 
bracketing out of theological interests. We have also noted that this is often a 
means of self-defence against what are perceived to be overbearing ecclesial 
interests. Daniel Patte, however, has argued that acknowledgement of the 
                                                                                                                                
19Patte 1995a, 45-46 n.27. 
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importance of ideological commitments in interpretation is also a de 
facto acknowledgement that the critical-exegetical task is a theological one, 
concerned not only with issues of empirical fact but also with issues of belief 
and value - in short, with issues of faith. The aim of critical practice is not just 
to reveal the meanings of texts, but to uncover the beliefs and values which 
motivate interpretation in the first place, bringing them out into the open 
where they can be examined, discussed and negotiated: 
 
a critical exegesis aims at bringing to critical understanding a 
precritical interpretation that belongs to the realm of faith, the realm of 
convictions felt as self-evidently true. Even though the ordinary 
readings that are brought to critical understanding by exegeses are 
often against traditional faith-interpretations by churches and religious 
groups, they nevertheless are the expression of convictions that belong 
to a faith (defined as a system of convictions), possibly a liberal or 
even a secular faith. Saying that these interpretations are precritical is 
the same as saying that they are convictional and thus belong to the 
realm of faith.20 
 
It is important, however, to ask what kind of faith motivates the de-
confessional scholarship we have been seeking to engage. We have seen in the 
cases of David Clines and Stephen Moore, at least, that their anti-ecclesial and 
anti-biblical rhetoric is in part a conversional stance from previously held 
confessional commitments. This leads to an active exclusion of confessional 
interests on the basis that such commitments are a bad thing. The post-
Christian ideology of Clines and Moore conforms to a kind of faith which 
Francis Watson has identified as prevalent within the academy: 
 
especially in a university setting, ‘faith’ is far more likely to take a 
non- or anti-ecclesial form [...]. How is this faith to be characterised? 
As a certain sense of the mystery or wonder of existence, perhaps - a 
residue of a former religious commitment that has dwindled away 
                                                 
20Patte 1995b, 120. 
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under the impact of critical scholarship, also leaving behind a settled 
dislike of what is perceived as the dogmatism of ecclesial religion.21 
 
The recognition that some de-confessional scholars are post-Christian provides 
a further motivation for Christian scholars to engage with them, and that is that 
they are not completely outsiders to the confessing community, because they 
were once part of it. For that reason the confessing community cannot simply 
leave them to their own devices, because a major part of the church’s 
understanding is that lost sheep ought not to be left to wander, but should be 
sought after (Matthew 18:12-14). If the process of seeking reveals that some 
reasons for these prodigals leaving the community were the community’s fault 
and if this revelation prompts re-evaluation and reform of critical practice, 
then the continuing engagement with de-confessional biblical criticism will be 
worthwhile even if the lost sheep insist upon remaining lost. 
 
 
“A Time to Keep Silence, and a Time to Speak” 
 
A Christian ethics of interpretation is not necessarily to be found in particular 
interpretive practices, but in the exercise of particular interpretive virtues 
which characterise the Christian interpreter’s relationships both with the 
biblical text and with other interpreters and interpretive approaches. Most 
importantly, as Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and Daniel Patte have observed, 
the task of ethical interpretation is never complete: rather, the ethical 
interpreter commits him/herself to an ongoing dialogue which incorporates 
both challenge and affirmation.22 
                                                 
21Watson 1994, 14. Watson is referring to historical-critical scholarship, but I would wish to 
argue that postmodern de-confessional scholarship also fits this description. 
22
 “An ethics of biblical interpretation is never achieved: It is a process, through which we 
must continuously examine and reexamine our interpretations and how they affect others” 
(Patte 1995b, 12). 
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Dialogue is a two-way process. Francis Watson has argued, following Alistair 
McFadyen, that all genuine communication is dialogical rather than 
monological. In monologue, individuals are manipulated or manipulators, as 
one conversation-partner treats the other not as an autonomous subject but as a 
means to an end.23 The domination of conversation by one party prevents the 
other from asserting their own interests or concerns. In dialogue, however, 
“space is conceded to the other so that he or she may become not only a 
respondent to my questions but also an initiator who calls me to respond as 
well as to initiate”.24 Dialogue thus entails allowing the other person space to 
be themselves, to express their concerns and interests, and to assert their 
identity independent of ourselves: in short, it commits each party to receptive 
silence as well as to speech. Watson stresses, however, that dialogue does not 
involve “a self-abnegation in which the other is intended as superior simply by 
virtue of his or her otherness. [...] Just as the other is to be ceded space within 
which to resist my communication if he or she so chooses, so I must retain for 
myself the space which makes resistance possible”.25 
 
Daniel Patte, similarly, affirms the need for interpretive dialogue, whereby 
each side affirms the legitimacy of the other whilst retaining its sense of self. 
Patte reflects upon the history of his own critical practice and notes that in 
addressing the interpretive needs of other groups than our own it is not 
sufficient either to attempt to incorporate their interests within our own 
discourse (to speak for them), or to conform our own discourse to theirs, 
overlaying our discourse with theirs (listening to them). Neither approach 
recognises the legitimate differences between socio-cultural or ideological 
                                                 
23Watson 1994, 107f.. Watson draws upon McFadyen 1990. Watson applies McFadyen’s 
ideas to a dialogical relationship between the Bible and the reader, but the application of the 
model to dialogue between interpretive perspectives seems equally valid. 
24Watson 1994, 111. 
25Watson 1994, 112. 
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horizons. Instead, Patte argues for the need to speak with others in dialogue 
which respects mutual difference.26 
 
The problem with androcentric and Eurocentric perspectives is not that they 
are androcentric or Eurocentric, Patte argues, but that these perspectives have 
been absolutised within academic scholarship to the exclusion of others.27 
Dialogical engagement requires scholars to recognise the provisionality of 
their interpretive interests, not to renounce them altogether: 
 
we need to adopt a positive critical attitude toward our own distinctive 
perspective as male European Americans. We must not only 
acknowledge it but also affirm its legitimacy and validity as a 
perspective. This acknowledgment and affirmation are possible only 
insofar as we “speak with others” in a genuine dialogical relationship, 
that is, as we acknowledge and affirm the legitimacy and validity of 
the “otherness” of others.28 
 
The key factors and interests which shape our corporate identities cannot be 
jettisoned, Patte argues, because they constitute our sense of self, and it is only 
as ourselves that we can offer a distinctive contribution in dialogue with 
others. Only when we recognise what makes us different from others can we 
acknowledge that which makes them different from us, and it is that which 
makes either party different from the other which provides each’s distinctive 
contribution to dialogical conversation. 
 
                                                 
26Patte 1995b, 25. Patte’s emphasis on interpretive difference reflects his background in 
structuralist criticism, especially the structuralist insight that semiotic signifiers are defined 
primarily in terms of their paradigmatic relationships, that is, in terms of their differences 
from one another. 
27Patte 1995b, 25. 
28Patte 1995a, 46, author’s emphasis.  “[B]eing freed from our bondage to androcentrism and 
Eurocentrism does not involve rejecting our male and European perspectives. [...] our 
maleness and Europeanness are good gifts from God, so long as we do not transform them 
into destructive idols. It is the idolatry alone that needs to be rejected. [...] we must not only 
acknowledge but also claim our own “maleness” and “Europeanness,” provided that we do so 
in a “critical” way that prevents their absolutisation. [...] Then, it is hoped, we can be 
ourselves” (Patte 1995b, 26).  
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“Do Not Think of Yourself More Highly Than You Ought” 
 
It is arguable that the primary postmodern interpretive virtue is honesty. At the 
heart of postmodern and ideological criticism of traditional biblical 
scholarship is the accusation that biblical critics have too often allowed 
themselves to be blind to the interpretive impact of their ideological and 
theological commitments. The prevalent objectivist paradigm in Biblical 
Studies has obscured such concerns, rendering them no less potent but 
potentially more damaging for being allowed to operate covertly rather than 
transparently and accountably. The calls of Schüssler Fiorenza, Patte and 
others for biblical academics to acknowledge their personal commitments and 
their impact upon scholarly practice have been welcomed by many as a 
liberating call, as well as an ethical challenge. As we have seen, agreement 
that open declarations of interpretive interest are an ethical imperative has 
freed critics to openly declare interests which they had previously felt under 
pressure to hide and, as a result, a babel of new and sometimes conflicting 
interpretive voices, perspectives and communities have been allowed to take 
their places within the biblical academy. If honesty is a postmodern 
interpretive virtue, then it is accompanied by a perception that freedom of 
speech is an interpretive right: if I am not free to declare my interest, how can 
I be honest and open about it? 
 
Alongside honesty and freedom of speech, however, a Christian interpretive 
ethics will want to assert the need for a corresponding virtue: humility. If 
methodological and ideological pluralism has released a babel of interpretive 
voices, then Christian interpretation might want to point out that if everyone 
talks at once, no-one is being listened to or being understood, and least of all 
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the biblical texts. The right to speak one’s mind honestly and openly within 
the academy, and to offer interpretations which follow one’s interpretive 
interests, is intrinsically linked to a reciprocal responsibility to listen to the 
interpretations of others, and to temper the assertion of one’s own views with a 
recognition that if one has something to say to others, they also may have 
something to say to you. This assertion is further undergirded by a Christian 
awareness of the pervasiveness of sin in thinking as well as in action, so that 
even when I have opinions and interests which I want to assert, I need to be 
open to the possibility that those may be coloured by my unreformed patterns 
of thought and require correction. 
 
We have seen that affirming the legitimacy or validity of other perspectives 
does not require the negation or invalidation of one’s own. Instead, what is 
necessary in a pluralist context is the clear identification and 
acknowledgement of one’s own interpretive interests as expressions of 
underlying theological/ideological commitments. Such interests and 
commitments are not things to be ashamed of, since as Daniel Patte has 
argued: 
 
Without interests, concerns, life-relations, preunderstandings, 
prejudgments, presuppositions, and indeed “prejudices,” reading, as 
the interplay between text and reader through which meaning is 
produced, would not occur. [...] Having a preunderstanding of a text, 
that is, coming to the text with a vested interest, and thus a question or 
an expectation, does not in itself engender a misreading. In sum, 
preunderstandings motivate our readings, including our critical 
readings.29 
 
At the same time as they facilitate our interpretations, however, our 
presuppositions limit our interpretive horizons. Patte argues that the 
application of a critical approach produces two linked effects, which he likens 
                                                 
29Patte 1995b, 56. Patte here follows Gadamer (Gadamer 1975, 235-305). 
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to the use of binoculars. On the one hand, the method enables the critic to see 
more clearly the aspect of the text in which they are interested by focusing 
specifically upon it. At the same time, however, the clarity produced by a 
specific critical focus is only achieved by the exclusion of other questions and 
interests, so that “the more rigorously we practice a given interpretation of this 
method, the more our interpretations are governed by the narrower concerns 
and interests represented by it”.30 Patte goes on to argue that recognition of the 
subjectivity of one’s own legitimate interest and critical method entails 
recognition of the legitimacy of other interpretive perspectives, accepting that 
critical theories which provide the basis for concrete and verifiable 
interpretations must be acknowledged as basically legitimate, even if they 
come from a different cultural or epistemological context.31 
 
The corresponding sin to the virtue of interpretive humility, according to Patte, 
is interpretive idolatry, which is to be found in the absolutising of a particular 
perspective to the exclusion of all others. In the case of white, male, American 
scholarship, for instance, Patte argues that traditional biblical scholarship has 
unthinkingly elevated andro- and Eurocentric interests to the level of universal 
validity, so that in the face of feminist critique “We European-American males 
are thus accused of taking as absolute what is not absolute. We are accused of 
idolatry. Our sin is a twofold idolatry: androcentrism and Eurocentrism”.32  
Kevin Vanhoozer, similarly, has emphasised the importance of avoiding the 
sin of interpretive pride which, he argues, is to be found in the belief that one 
interpretive perspective possesses exclusive rights to the true interpretation of 
a text.33 The “idolatry of literary knowledge”, however, is not the belief in a 
                                                 
30Patte 1995b, 57. 
31Patte 1995b, 58. 
32Patte 1995b, 25. 
33Vanhoozer 1998, 184. 
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correct interpretation, but the belief that one can possess that meaning 
exclusively: 
 
the claim that there is knowledge is not the same as the claim that one 
possesses it or that the possession of such knowledge allows one to 
impose one’s opinion on others. There is always something more that 
can be said in an argument. Interpretations can always be questioned; 
few proofs (outside mathematics and geometry) are ever exhaustive.34 
 
Interpretive humility does not necessitate denial of the legitimacy or validity 
of one’s own perspective, but it does necessitate acknowledgement of the 
provisionality of one’s interpretation and the need to render both one’s 
interpretations and the commitments and interests which underpin them open 
for external critique and evaluation in dialogue with other interpretations and 
interests. 
 
Interpretive humility also necessitates another characteristically Christian 
practice, namely that of repentance. Stephen Fowl roots the need for 
interpretive repentance in a reading of Luke 11:34-35, in which Jesus teaches 
that the eye is the lamp of the body, and that the health of the eye determines 
whether the body is full of light or darkness. Fowl interprets the verses to 
indicate that those who wish to perceive Jesus clearly must first pay attention 
to the state of their perceptive faculties, and that an essential part of such 
attention is “the ability to see oneself as a sinner whose only redemption is 
through a single-minded attention to Jesus”.35 In biblical interpretation, Fowl 
argues, recognition of the interpreter’s own sinfulness is essential if blind, 
self-affirming interpretive practice is to be avoided. Being able to identify 
oneself as an interpretive sinner provides a crucial element of provisionality 
which stems from the recognition that there may be something wrong in the 
                                                 
34Vanhoozer 1998, 302. 
35Fowl 1998, 81. 
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ways interpreters and their communities practice.36 Communities and 
individuals must, therefore, submit their interpretations to critique and 
scrutiny, and this may come from voices outside the community, who may be 
able to offer a truer picture of the community than it can provide for itself.37 
 
Recognition of sinfulness is, however, only a first step for Fowl: 
 
Recognition of oneself as a sinner must lead one to become situated in 
a network of practices of forgiveness, repentance, and, ultimately, 
reconciliation, if sin is not to be the first and last word on one’s life. 
The point of these practices is to help us unlearn the habits and escape 
the patterns of sin in which we have become complicit.38 
 
Recognition of the sinfulness of one’s interpretive practice is only a beginning. 
To acknowledge sin but be unable to do anything about it is to find oneself in 
a position whereby all one is, and all one will ever be, is a sinner. The final 
resolution of ethical failings involves work on both sides. Those who commit 
interpretive sin must be prepared to repent: this involves not merely 
acknowledging their mistakes but doing something to correct them. At the 
same time, inter-communal interpretive wounds cannot be healed unless those 
who bear grievances are prepared to move beyond them and practise 
forgiveness in the interests of reconciliation. 
 
De-confessional biblical criticism has accused mainstream Biblical Studies of 
institutional interpretive sin: of oppressing some interpretive interests by 
marginalising them or ignoring them altogether on the grounds of a positivistic 
                                                 
36Fowl 1998, 82. 
37
 Fowl is careful to qualify his remarks by pointing out that not all criticism is equally 
important or even correct. Outsiders may offer a truer account of ourselves than we could 
produce, but may also lack sufficient familiarity with Christian conviction and practice to 
offer a correct diagnosis of a community’s relationship with scripture. Crucially, however, 
criticism “must be attended to vigilantly because one cannot know exactly how to evaluate it 
in advance” (Fowl 1998, 82). 
38Fowl 1998, 84. 
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objectivism which itself has masked powerful vested interests. Insofar as this 
is so, Biblical Studies must undertake some sober self-examination in light of 
the accusation and, where it has been in error, must take steps not only to 
acknowledge but to correct harmful practice. De-confessional criticism has 
also levelled a particular accusation against confessional scholarship: Christian 
interpreters have often acted as if they had exclusive rights to the Bible, and 
have dismissed or rejected out of hand extra-ecclesial perspectives (and, on 
occasion, intra-ecclesial perspectives) which appeared to conflict with their 
own vested theological interests. The interpretations produced by Christian 
scholarship have, often unthinkingly, impacted negatively upon readers who 
did not conform to a particular Christian self-image projected as a universal 
truth, causing them to read against their own interests. The fact that many of 
these sinful practices were institutional and unconscious does not make them 
any less sinful. 
 
A Christian approach to biblical interpretation which takes Christian ethical 
imperatives seriously must be prepared to apologise when it is proved to have 
been in error, or when its interpretations can be seen to have harmed others. 
Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s call for an ethics of accountability is in full 
accord with the foundational Christian conviction that individuals and 
communities are to be prepared to accept responsibility for their actions and 
their consequences. Christian biblical scholars must be prepared to say sorry if 
there is genuinely something to say sorry for, and this includes the 
unanticipated consequences of our interpretations. 
 
What might interpretive repentance look like, and who should do it? Is it for 
individual interpreters to apologise for institutionalised practises and 
normative interpretations from the whole history of Christian interpretive 
traditions? Is it possible to ask for, and to receive, forgiveness when those who 
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were harmed by an interpretive practice are no longer alive? How, then, shall 
we live? 
 
First, repentance means turning away from that which we know to be wrong. 
For individual scholars, this means engaging in some serious and sober self-
examination, asking whether our interpretive practice has always measured up 
to standards of ethical accountability based on a Christian ethic such as Jesus’ 
double rule in Matthew 22:37-40: in seeking to love God with heart, soul and 
mind, have we lost sight of the neighbours we should love as ourselves? Have 
doctrinal concerns caused confessional interpreters to neglect pastoral care in 
interpretation? In seeking the truth of the scripture, have we sometimes 
neglected to speak the truth (as we perceived it) in love?39 
 
Part of this reflective process will involve listening to the voices of those 
outside the confessional community. If one of the sins of which biblical 
scholarship stands accused is that it has marginalised and suppressed the 
voices of minority interests, then part of the process of repentance for that sin 
is to give those voices room to speak, and to pay them proper attention while 
they do. This involves allowing them to come into the centre of debate, even if 
only temporarily, and allowing them to present to the confessional community 
an image of itself as outsiders see it. The truth of this image will then need to 
be assessed, and an appropriate response made in terms of adjustments to 
critical practice.40 This assessment will need to happen both in the self-
awareness of individual scholars, but also within the various instititions of 
Biblical Studies, whether departments, colleges, or professional societies. If 
one claim of ideological criticism is that Biblical Studies is in institutional 
                                                 
39C.f. Ephesians 4:15. 
40
 This is not to say that all criticism will be unquestioningly accepted as valid, but to say that 
the basis for the confessional community’s evaluation of external critique must be an honest 
and open attention to the criticisms while they are being made. 
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bondage to interpretive idolatry, then some response will be necessary at the 
institutional level. 
 
A second step in repentance will be the adoption of more ethically accountable 
critical practices. This means that individual scholars should take into account 
the foreseeable implications of their interpretations not only for their own 
interpretive interest group, but also for others within the wider academic (and, 
indeed, non-academic) community. One means of doing this might be to 
develop more collaborative and dialogical methods of interpretation, whereby 
scholars with complementary or even conflicting interests produce corporate 
interpretations which take into account their differing horizons.  
 
A. K. M. Adam has offered one model for such a development by arguing the 
case for a shift within Biblical Studies from “integral” to “differential” 
hermeneutics.41 Integral hermeneutics forms the self-understanding of 
traditional biblical scholarship, based upon a belief in the determinacy of 
meaning and the ability of scholarship to devise critical methods to uncover or 
reveal that meaning.42 Adam points out that integral hermeneutics fails to 
fulfil its interpretive goal because scholars cannot agree on a determinate 
textual meaning, but also argues that an integral approach has unfortunate 
ethical consequences in that it lacks positive criteria for the evaluation of 
interpretive difference. Ultimately, “a proponent of integral hermeneutics can 
in the end offer no respectful account of why anyone would disagree with him 
or her”.43 Disagreement is usually accounted for by suggesting that one’s 
                                                 
41Adam 2004. 
42
 “The interpreter bears an ethical obligation to respect the authorial intention of the text 
because the meaning resides there. An interpreter who treats the text as though it meant 
something other than its authorial intent distorts the truth about the text. Such interpretations 
are unjust to the author (who imbued the text with its meaning) and are capriciously 
inconsistent with the stability we expect of textual meaning in our everyday lives. A meaning 
inherent in texts demands our interpretive deference” (Adam 2004, 27). 
43Adam 2004, 32. 
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opponents simply do not understand the matter as well as one does, but other, 
less charitable explanations (fundamentalism, radical scepticism, feminism, 
patriarchalism, racism, political correctness, traditionalism, etc., etc.) are also 
deployed. “At the end of a debate conducted under the auspices of integral 
hermeneutics,” Adam argues: 
 
one is left only with the alternatives of saying that one’s rival is either 
ignorant, less intelligent, misguided, perverse or insane. If she knew 
the relevant factors as well as the correct interpreter - me, or you - and 
if she understood the proper weight to ascribe to each bit of evidence, 
she, too, would assent to our interpretation.44 
 
Integral hermeneutics sees interpretive difference as a problem to be overcome 
or explained away, usually by means of putting down other interpreters’ work 
in favour of our own. Hence, Adam maintains, “The integral-hermeneutic 
quest for single textual meaning feeds on, and in turn itself feeds, theological 
conflicts”.45 
 
By contrast, Adam advocates a practice of “differential hermeneutics”. This is 
not a commitment to radical pluralism, which sees the proliferation of 
interpretations as a good in and of itself. Rather, differential hermeneutics 
seeks to account for interpretive difference positively, by starting from the 
premise that different interpreters have good reasons for adopting different 
interpretations and interpretive practices.46 This does not mean that these 
differing approaches cannot or should not be evaluated, because the possible 
reasons for the differences still include the possibility of ignorance, 
intellectual error, or unhelpful ideological agendas. Rather, differential 
hermeneutics begins by identifying the criteria by which an interpretation 
                                                 
44Adam 2004, 33. 
45Adam 2004, 29. 
46Adam 2004, 33. 
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claims validity and then seeks to evaluate the soundness of that claim.47 A 
differential approach recognises that all evaluative and interpretive criteria are 
local, in the sense that they apply only within certain contexts and 
communities of shared interests. Some of these contexts and communities are 
small and distinct, such as particular schools of biblical interpretation, whilst 
others may be very large indeed, but claims to universality can be resisted by a 
single dissenting voice. Interpretive agreement does not reveal the “true 
meaning” of the text, but the convergence of interpreters’ priorities and 
sensibilities in a manner which can be celebrated without claiming normative 
force for all interpretive contexts. 
 
Adam insists that a differential hermeneutics which seeks positive evaluations 
of interpretive difference does not commit Biblical Studies to a radically 
indeterminate and subjective pluralism. Judgements about correctness are not 
banished but put in perspective, so that “A differential hermeneutic can 
stipulate explicitly what counts as a good reason within a particular 
interpretive discourse without demanding that every interpretive discourse 
adhere to that criterion”.48 Adam links his understanding of positive difference 
to Paul’s metaphor of the church as body (1 Corinthians 12:12-30). 
Differences in interpretation, like differences in human constitution and 
identity, “signal the human distinction from God and serve to give God glory 
precisely by the harmonious expression of their difference”:49 
 
As parts of the body are not all eyes, feet, hands or nose, so 
interpretations of scripture are not all historically-warranted assertions 
about the original intent of a human (or divine) author; nor is 
interpretive differentiation any more a result of sin than is corporal 
differentiation. Again, the very existence of difference serves the 
positive purpose of enabling human beings, whose individual 
limitations cannot satisfactorily represent God, to begin to represent 
                                                 
47Adam 2004, 34. 
48Adam 2004, 35. 
49Adam 2004, 36. 
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truth by the harmonious ordering of differentiated bodies and 
interpretations.50 
 
Adam’s model for differential hermeneutics offers one example of what a 
positively repentant confessional Biblical Studies might look like. Without 
sacrificing its own integrity, it allows for positive evaluation and collaboration 
between different interpretive interests and approaches, and seeks to avoid the 
intra- and inter-disciplinary wars which have so often raged between biblical 
scholars. As a model it supports Christian ethical standards of humility, 
respect for others, and inclusivity, without submitting Christian interpretation 
to radical postmodern relativism or the tyranny of a liberal humanist 
“totalitolerance” by which any and all interpretive approaches must be equally 
valid. In short, it offers a model for a Christian pluralism which potentially 
combines interpretive identity with interpretive charity. 
 
As a final observation on humility and repentance in confessional interpretive 
ethics it seems appropriate to make the point that, if interpretive repentance is 
essential for the redemption of hermeneutical sinners, it is also essential for 
the healing of those sinned against. In that respect, open acknowledgement of 
fault may go a long way to resolving some of the ideological conflicts 
currently flaring in Biblical Studies. The vitriolic tone of some de-confessional 
scholarship arises at least in part from feelings of hurt, injustice, and 
exclusion, and the adoption of socio-pragmatic, poststructuralist and 
ideologically critical methodologies within postmodern approaches marks 
them out as part of a movement of protest.  One problem with this, however, is 
that an approach which defines itself in opposition to another can never escape 
that which it opposes: to assert oneself as part of an anti-ecclesial interpretive 
                                                 
50Adam 2004, 36. It is important to note that the horizon of Adam’s model is confessional, and 
is situated within a collection of essays whose stated perspectives are “multi-denominational 
Christian” (Cosgrove 2004a, ix). Adam is not arguing that all interpretations are 
fundamentally equal. 
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approach is to forever bind oneself to that ecclesial approach which one fights 
so hard to resist, because without the opposing perspective one’s own 
approach would lack definition. This is not to suggest that de-confessional 
interpretation has nothing positive to say, but gently to offer the possibility 
that a sense of interpretive identity expressed more often than not in negative 
terms tends to produce negative results both for the interpreter and for the 
readers of their interpretations. 
 
There is an argument, therefore, that confessional scholarship ought to model 
humility and repentance not only for its own good but for the good of those 
approaches which are opposed to it. It is possible that if confessional criticism 
is prepared to concede where it has been at fault in its interpretive practice, 
then this will open the door for more constructive engagement and dialogue 
between approaches. This cannot be guaranteed, nor should it necessarily be 
expected. It would not be surprising if de-confessional approaches, having (as 
they see it) escaped from the clutches of an oppressive interpretive context, 
were reluctant to re-engage with the very approaches from whose influence 
and interests they have fought so hard to sever themselves. It may not be 
possible to overcome old hurts, but the responsibility of confessional scholars 
in this regard is that, as far as it is in their power, they should do everything to 
make reconciliation possible.51 In doing so they will render their own position 
more ethically accountable and secure, and their act of repentance may also 
serve as a call to de-confessional approaches to engage in some self-
examination of their own. Ironically, a repentant confessional approach may 
be in a unique position to suggest to its de-confessional counterpart that 
unforgiveness, a refusal to accept repentance and apology where it is offered, 
can also be an interpretive sin which ultimately harms the victim, locking 
                                                 
51 Cf. Romans 12:18. 
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them into a victimised self-image which will then work itself out in their 
external relations.52 
 
One objection to the exercise of humility and repentance in academic  
interpretation is that such practices are more appropriate to the church than the 
academy.53 Indeed, even the briefest survey of academic journals and 
scholarly books reveals that humility is not highly prized as an academic 
virtue. Key skills which academics have to develop in order to be able to 
operate within the academy include the ability to critique the work of other 
scholars and, conversely, the ability to engage in robust self-justification in 
response to such critique. These skills are especially necessary when particular 
approaches are associated with individual scholars or groups. In such 
instances, reputations are intrinsically linked with the success or failure of 
particular positions, with the result that scholars have on occasion argued more 
on the basis of their vested professional interest than on the strength of the 
position. This is not to say that academic consensus is impossible, or that 
academics do not genuinely believe in it: rather, it is to suggest that a 
prevailing adversarial culture within the academy, whereby positions are held 
over against others, hinders rather than builds consensus, because scholars are 
too often prevented from admitting their errors by the desire not to lose face in 
the sight of their peers. It is sometimes more acceptable to go down fighting 
than to admit to a mistake. In Christian terms, however, pride is a sin where 
humility is not, and an overtly Christian approach within Biblical Studies 
                                                 
52
 Christian interpreters will be mindful, for instance, that the petition for forgiveness in the 
Lord’s Prayer is conditional on the forgiveness of others by the petitioner (Matthew 
6:12//Luke 11:4). See also Jesus’ teaching in the parable of the unmerciful servant (Matthew 
18:21-35), or the parable of the tax collector (Luke 18:9-14). De-confessional scholars are 
right to point out the hermeneutical sins of confessional scholarship, but they should be wary 
that emphasis upon the sins of others should not blind them to their own shortcomings 
(Matthew 7:3-5). 
53
 Stephen Fowl applies his insight into the importance of repentance only within the 
boundaries of the Christian community. My argument is that the principles which Fowl 
correctly emphasises are applicable in the wider academic context. 
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which operated self-consciously on that basis might model a more helpful way 
of proceeding. Part of the distinctive contribution of Christian scholarship to 
the wider academy might be found not so much in its content, as in the manner 
in which it conducts itself. 
 
 
“Do Not Neglect to Show Hospitality to Strangers, for by Doing that Some 
Have Entertained Angels without Knowing it.” 
 
Interpretive ethics is not only about being self-aware about our own 
interpretive interests and practices, it also affects the ways in which we 
interact with other interpreters. As we have seen, the ways in which 
confessional and de-confessional interpretation have engaged with one another 
have not always been constructive or mutually affirming. What might a 
Christian ethics of interpretation offer which might help the process of 
genuine dialogue? 
 
A key step in genuine dialogue is an affirmation of the legitimacy of other 
people’s interests in the biblical text. As we have seen, a pluralist Christian 
approach which sees the Bible as a multi-faceted text makes it more possible 
for Christian interpretation to affirm a range of approaches as valid. In the 
wider pluralism of the academy, however, Christian interpretation must also 
develop the skill of being able to affirm non-confessional approaches. Daniel 
Patte has argued that recognition of the distinctiveness of our own approach 
entails recognition of the distinctiveness of others: 
 
in order to be consistent with our own sense of vocation [...], we 
should also affirm the legitimacy and validity of other views of 
vocation of critical biblical scholars - for example, those of feminist 
and other advocacy biblical scholars - that are grounded in different 
views of the basic human predicament that reflect their different 
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contextual experiences and specific perceptions of what is problematic. 
In sum, our own sense of vocation requires that we affirm the 
legitimacy of the different views of vocation of most other interpreters 
of the Bible.54 
 
In short, dialogue begins with an affirmation of the other person (and their 
interpretive perspective), and their right to exist. The important thing to note, 
however, is that the affirmation is not on the grounds of the similarity or 
coherence of different interpretive perspectives, but precisely because of their 
differences. It is what makes interpreters different from one another which 
marks the distinctiveness of what they might be able to offer one another, and 
it is the prospect of gaining a new and enhanced understanding which prompts 
engagement with horizons beyond one’s own. 
 
This understanding is affirmed by Stephen Fowl, who has argued for the 
practice of “charitable interpretation” within the Christian community. 
Charitable interpretation is found not in particular interpretive practices, but in 
the development of Christian virtues in interpreters. The need for charity is to 
be found in the recognition that in any ongoing tradition of biblical 
interpretation disagreements over texts will arise, and that such disagreements 
are actually indicative of the health of the tradition, demonstrating its 
continuing life and activity in interpreting texts in light of changing contexts.55 
The exercise of virtue in Christian interpretation is not primarily a way of 
minimising disagreements: “Rather, it provides part of the context in which 
disagreements can best be articulated, debated, and, at least provisionally, 
resolved, so that Christians can live and worship faithfully in the situations in 
which they find themselves”.56 
 
                                                 
54Patte 1995b, 78. Patte is careful to qualify this by stressing the need to contest the validity of 
vocations which claim to be the only legitimate and valid one. 
55Fowl 1998, 87. 
56Fowl 1998, 87. 
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An important first step in charitable interpretation is the honest recognition of 
interpretive differences, and resistance of the temptation to reduce or 
rationalise those differences away. This means that interpreters should avoid 
declaring prematurely that interpretive divides are unbridgeable, assuming that 
outsiders are completely alien, and that differences of ideology or language are 
insurmountable, or that differing interpretive perspectives are reducible to a 
single solution, attempting to reduce or smooth away differences by arguing 
that outsiders are actually like us.57 Fowl and Jones identify strategies similar 
to those noted by Daniel Patte, such as attempting to show others that if they 
could only see things from our point of view they would think like us 
(engaging the other in a monologue aimed at conversion), or attempting to 
strip away differences to reveal a shared core of beliefs (denying the 
particularity of their position).58 A basic premise of interpretive charity is to 
assume that the beliefs of outsiders have a consistency and integrity of their 
own, which ought not to be violated by the assumption that their view is either 
a less coherent version of our own or that if we strip away our particular 
differences we will discover that we believed the same things all along. Such 
an approach respects the integrity of neither side of the debate. A first step in 
interpretive charity, therefore, is to respect the otherness of the other and 
engage seriously with it in an attempt to understand them: 
 
Charitable interpreters will resist the move to close off this activity 
prematurely; they will always recognize the provisionality of their 
work. That is, interpretive charity entails both a willingness to listen to 
                                                 
57
 Fowl and Jones 1991, 125-29. 
58
 Fowl and Jones note that a Christian approach which attempts to reduce elements of 
particularity in difference endangers not only the distinctiveness of the other perspective but 
also its own. Christian faith is permeated with particularity which derives from the basis of 
that belief in a specific scriptural narrative, so that failure to recognize particularity on both 
sides will result in the distortion of Christian convictions into something else. The danger is 
that agreement is reached only in the form of “a hybrid system of belief and practice that 
faithfully represents neither party’s views” (Fowl and Jones 1991, 124). As with Patte, 
dialogue entails openness to otherness without denial of one’s own central convictions. 
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differences and a willingness to hear those differences in their 
fullness.59 
 
Fowl observes that sometimes distinctive differences can only be brought into 
focus when interpreters also acknowledge what they have in common, 
recognising that “all differences, all agreements, are only intelligible against a 
background of similarity and agreement”.60 If interpreters begin by negotiating 
what they have in common, then the nature and type of disagreement may be 
clarified, and it may turn out that differing perspectives share certain 
assumptions which can be used to debate the disagreement. As we have seen, 
Fowl’s suggestion that approaches be defined in terms of interpretive interests 
is useful here and, as we have also noted, agreement may be found to be 
operative at one level whilst disagreement is found at another. In relation to 
biblical interpretation, one thing which all interpreters share is an interest in a 
given text which forms the focus for discussion. Interpreters may also share 
methodological interests which can be constructively debated, whilst at the 
same time possess differing ideological/theological commitments which may 
give rise to disagreement about the merits of particular interpretive questions 
or the uses to which interpretations are put. 
 
A further step of interpretive charity according to Fowl is that interpreters 
should, as far as possible, maximise the reasonableness of those with whom 
they differ. This is to say that one should avoid the assumption that another 
person’s views are unreasonable or irrational simply because they conflict 
with one’s own. By contrast, “the charitable interpreter presumes that those 
who differ hold their differing views for good reasons and tries to display what 
those reasons are or were”.61 
                                                 
59Fowl 1998, 89. 
60Fowl 1998, 89. 
61Fowl 1998, 91. 
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Fowl, as we have seen, maintains that a key motive in engaging with outsider 
perspectives is the prospect of encountering God the Holy Spirit, but 
emphasises that if the Christian engages with the perspectives of others in the 
hope of discerning something of the Holy Spirit’s work in their wider context, 
then this requires the building and maintenance of relationships. Unless we 
know others and allow them to know us, we cannot hope to discern God’s 
activity in their lives: 
 
no matter how acute our spiritual insight, we will not be able to detect 
the Spirit’s work in the lives of others unless we know them in more 
than superficial ways.62 
 
Within the context of the Christian community, Fowl offers a model for 
knowing others through relationships built within a context of hospitality, 
friendship and patience.63 The gaining of understanding and the building of 
consensus takes time, and can only be achieved on the basis of mutual trust 
and respect. 
 
Interestingly, Kevin Vanhoozer has adopted a similar ethical approach to 
Fowl, focussed upon the appropriate stance a reader should take in 
approaching the biblical texts. Vanhoozer claims that “the theological virtues 
are also epistemological virtues, in which case we should speak of faith, hope, 
and love seeking textual understanding. And it may well be that the greatest of 
these is love”.64  Vanhoozer argues that the working out of these virtues is in 
the practice of honesty, whereby one acknowledges one’s prior commitments 
and presunderstandings; openness, whereby the interpreter is willing to hear 
and consider the ideas of others without prejudice or malice, open to the 
                                                 
62Fowl 1998, 117. 
63Fowl 1998, 118. 
64Vanhoozer 1998, 317, author’s emphasis. 
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possibility that they may themselves be changed by the experience; attention, 
whereby the interpreter is not self-absorbed but focussed upon the text, paying 
careful and patient attention in order to gain understanding of the text as it is; 
and obedience, whereby the reader is prepared to follow the rhetorical 
directions of the text rather than follow their own inclination.65 Like Fowl, 
Vanhoozer argues that the development of interpretive virtues is not a matter 
of specific rules and procedures, but of the acquisition of skills and good 
practice. The two-fold responsibility of readers is to understand the text and to 
respond appropriately, and this involves extending a certain hospitality to the 
text: 
 
our duty to receive the textual stranger as a welcome guest is an 
obligation implied in the covenant of discourse. Moreover, we can only 
judge the moral worth of a text after we get to know it. [...] The 
proactive reader is willing to make an initial step of faith and open 
himself or herself up to the effects of the text: “I believe in order to 
understand”.66 
 
The core of Vanhoozer’s ethics of interpretation is “to guard the otherness of 
the text” against the fragmenting isolationism of socio-pragmatism and 
deconstructionism: 
 
to preserve its ability to say something to and affect the reader, thus 
creating the possibility of self-transcendence. [...] The postmodern 
suspicion of hermeneutics is also a suspicion of transcendence, that is, 
a suspicion of our ability as readers to be addressed by what is beyond 
us. It is the postmodern suspicion of hermeneutics that threatens to 
reduce the other (the author) to the selfsame, that is, to oneself.67 
 
It is clear that although he does not say so explicitly, Vanhoozer understands 
his ethics of biblical interpretation as a valid model for general interpretive 
                                                 
65Vanhoozer 1998, 377. Vanhoozer insists that obedience does not necessarily mean doing 
what the text says but does involve at least reading it in the way the author intended. 
66Vanhoozer 1998, 397. 
67Vanhoozer 1998, 384. 
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ethics, and that the virtuous approach he advocates in relation to the biblical 
text should also be adopted in relation to other interpretive voices. Vanhoozer 
suggests “not that we should read the Bible like any other book, but that we 
should read every other book as we have learned to read the Bible, namely, in 
a spirit of understanding that lets the text be what it is and do what it 
intends”.68 The applicability of this insight to inter-perspectival differences in 
Biblical Studies is clear when we bear in mind that the way in which most 
scholars encounter one another in the field is through the medium of the texts 
they produce in the form of journal articles, seminar papers, and books. That 
Vanhoozer thinks of his approach as a general ethics is clear, too, in his 
approach to Derrida, of whom he remarks: 
 
Before Christian readers pass judgement we must interpret Derrida as 
charitably as possible. To do so is risky; we may find our cherished 
beliefs challenged, perhaps overturned. But not to risk oneself in an 
attempt to understand the other is even more dangerous; to refuse to be 
honest is to risk losing one’s integrity and hence to damage oneself.69 
 
Whilst Vanhoozer sees the focus of Christian hermeneutical encounter as 
being the transformative encounter with the biblical texts, it is equally clear 
that he is open to the possibility of transformative encounters with other 
interpreters and their approaches in a way which suggests he is not so far from 
Fowl’s position as might at first appear. Vanhoozer, like Fowl, emphasises the 
need for openness and hospitality in relation to the other. Indeed, Vanhoozer 
suggests that a potential source for Christian communicative ethics is the 
parable of the Good Samaritan, asking, “who is our neighbour? Anyone - 
speaker or author - who initiates a communication”.70 The interpreter’s first 
response to a new communication should be a respectful listening, 
acknowledging it for what it is and respecting its aims as a communicative act. 
                                                 
68Vanhoozer 1998, 379. 
69Vanhoozer 1998, 182-83. 
70Vanhoozer 1998, 402. 
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Subject to all and subject to none, the Christian interpreter must be open to 
insights from other interpreters and approaches, but must not become enslaved 
by a single intepretive method.71 
 
Vanhoozer maintains that respect for the textual other does not automatically 
guarantee agreement, stating that it is possible to recognise and even respect 
otherness whilst simultaneously contesting it. Vanhoozer sees a Christian 
interpretive ethics as an ethics of engagement. Acknowledging that 
participants in conflictual discussions may come to believe there is no further 
point in talking, Vanhoozer labels this “a moral failure”, insisting that a 
Christian morality of literary knowledge stresses virtues of self-criticism, 
clarity, consistency and patience, along with the faith and courage to follow 
the argument where it leads, in the hope of achieving “a provisional 
consensus, if not the truth itself”.72 Even if the process of dialogue ends in 
disengagement, however, it is only on the basis of a true knowledge of the 
other position: 
 
After keeping company with texts for a time, we may indeed feel that it 
is right to part, and we may even shake the dust from our feet as we do 
so. But one can only properly make such a judgement after 
accompanying texts for a time. In short, it is only legitimate to 
overstand a text once one has properly understood it.73 
 
An ethics of interpretation based upon Christian commitments and values 
offers a constructive way forward for inter-perspectival interaction in a 
postmodern academic context. The key postmodern insight that there is always 
more than one legitimate interpretive perspective finds its ethical expression in 
the academically counter-cultural virtue of interpretive humility. This does not 
mean that Christian critics will suffer from low self-esteem or be diffident 
                                                 
71Vanhoozer 1998, 402. 
72Vanhoozer 1998, 302. 
73Vanhoozer 1998, 403. 
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about offering their interpretations, but does require that they affirm the 
legitimacy and validity of other perspectives. Openness and willingness to 
learn will be characteristic features of such an approach. Awareness that the 
Holy Spirit is operative in the world beyond the boundaries of the faith 
community will drive Christian interpreters to engage with other perspectives, 
seeking to know and understand them fully before evaluating them, whilst not 
committing them to accepting their insights blindly simply because they are 
different. 
 
Ethical Christian interpretation will also seek critical and ethical 
accountability, desiring to see itself through the eyes of others and 
incorporating practices of self-critique. Christian interpreters will be prepared 
to repent when their interpretations are shown to have been in error or to have 
had harmful consequences for other readers, acknowledging their fault and 
amending their interpretive practice. An interpretive approach which shows 
pastoral concern for academic neighbours may play a significant role in 
changing the sometimes adversarial and confrontational culture of academic 
debate. 
 
Finally, however, a Christian interpretive approach will demonstrate a 
fundamental integrity in its interpretation, in that its critical methods and 
ethical interactions with other approaches will cohere fully with its ideological 
and theological commitments. Secure in their own identity, Christian 
interpreters will be able to venture out from the community of faith into the 
context of postmodern Biblical Studies, confident in what they have to offer 
and open to the new insights they might encounter. Free to be themselves, 
postmodern Christian interpreters will seek to show how the Bible continues 
to function as the Word of God in the fascinating and varied postmodern 
discipline of Biblical Studies, talking with strangers as they go. 
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Jesus and the Syrophoenician Woman: Strangers in Search of 
Transforming Encounter 
 
What, then, will an encounter between an authentically postmodern, academic, 
Christian interpretive approach and secular scholarship look like? One answer 
is to say that there will be as many varieties of discourse as there will be 
strangers to talk with. In a pluralist interpretive environment it is not possible 
to be prescriptive about how interpretations should be shared and negotiated, 
nor would it be helpful to try. That said, a possible biblical paradigm for such 
communication across the boundaries of interpretive communities can be 
found in Jesus’ encounter with the Syrophoenician woman in chapter 7 of the 
Gospel of Mark.74 This unique episode offers an intriguing prospect of 
transforming encounter between mutual outsiders, and indicates a number of 
factors which are essential if such transformation is to take place. 
 
The setting of this passage within the wider context of Mark’s Gospel 
indicates that issues relating to boundaries and identities, and the transgressing 
of them, are at the heart of Jesus’ encounter with the Syrophoenician woman.  
Following a period of intense ministry (6:30-56) and controversy with his 
pharisaic opponents over issues of purity and impurity (7:1-23), Jesus 
withdraws from public view and enters the Gentile region of Tyre (v24). The 
episode begins, therefore, by Jesus’ crossing a significant boundary between 
“home” and “foreign” territory and, by doing so, highlights the issue of his 
relationship with those beyond the boundaries of the Jewish community. Jesus 
is entering an alien environment, and within that environment he himself is an 
outsider. Not that Jesus is entering Gentile territory because he wants to be in 
contact with Gentiles: Mark emphasises his desire for solitude by telling the 
                                                 
74A parallel passage is found in Matt 15:21-28. I have chosen to engage with the Markan 
version because its simpler structure more clearly demonstrates the dynamics of Jesus’ 
exchange with the woman. 
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reader that having entered a house he wished no-one to know he was there 
(v24). Unable to escape notice, however, Jesus finds himself confronted by a 
Syrophoenician woman who pleads with him to deliver her daughter of an 
unclean spirit (v25). 
 
The woman is characterised (v26) not by name but by gender (gunhv), by her 
Hellenistic culture ( JEl l hniv~), and by her Syrophoenician ethnicity 
(Sur of oinivkis s a  t w/ gevnei). Her social standing in the eyes of the reader is 
also depressed by the fact that she appears to be a woman alone, and that the 
child on whose behalf she pleads is a daughter, a child of lower status than a 
son.75 Mark thus emphasises that this is an encounter across boundaries which 
are significant to both Jesus and the woman. By any commonly accepted 
standard of behaviour within the Gospel’s story world, the encounter between 
Jesus and the woman ought not to be taking place on grounds of gender, 
culture, religion, ethnicity, and social standing. Mark’s characterisation of the 
woman and his setting of the encounter outside the boundary of the Jewish 
community emphasise that Jesus and the woman are complete outsiders to 
each other, separated by multiple barriers of culture. This separation appears 
to be upmost in Jesus’ mind for, when asked to heal the woman’s daughter, he 
replies harshly, “Let the children (t a ; t evkna ) be satisfied first, for it is not 
right to take the children’s bread and throw it to the dogs (t oi~ kunar ivoi~)” 
(v27). 
 
The harshness of Jesus’ comparison of the woman and her daughter to dogs 
has offended commentators, who note that the comparison not only rejects the 
woman’s request but insults her at the same time.76 Nor does the use of a 
diminutive term for dogs (possibly referring to household pets rather than wild 
                                                 
75Ringe 1985, 70. 
76Witherington III 1984, 65; Ringe 1985, 66; Fowl and Jones 1991, 120. 
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dogs)77 soften the force of the insult: as T. A. Burkill points out, to be called a 
“little bitch” is no less offensive than to be called “a bitch” without 
qualification.78 The effect of the saying is to make Jesus appear harsh, 
unsympathetic and insensitive, and this has surprised interpreters, especially in 
light of the fact that the portrayal of Jesus earlier in the Gospel (as, for 
instance, in the case of the healing of the haemorrhaging woman and Jairus’ 
daughter in Mark 5) indicates his willingness to heal in spite of cultural 
taboos.79 In light of that earlier portrayal, and considering the controversy with 
the Pharisees over purity and impurity which immediately precedes this 
encounter and in which Jesus calls Jewish purity laws into question, the fact 
that Jesus not only refuses to heal the woman’s daughter but rubs her nose in it 
as well creates a jarring impression.80 
 
Jesus’ response to the woman’s request could be considered an act of 
interpretation. The woman’s appeal for healing prompts Jesus to apply his 
understanding of himself and his role to the situation, a self-understanding 
framed in terms of his relationship to the Jewish community.81 It is clear 
                                                 
77Lane 1974, 262. 
78Burkill 1967, 173. 
79Fowl and Jones 1991, 119. 
80Stephen Fowl and L. Gregory Jones point out that different cultural horizons mean that 
modern readers interpret this passage in ways which a first-century reader might find 
surprising. To the modern reader it is Jesus’ refusal which shocks, whilst a first-century reader 
would be more likely to be shocked at Jesus’ eventual acquiescing to the woman’s request 
(Fowl and Jones 1991, 132 n.20). This reinforces Mark Allan Powell’s point that modern 
readings may, from the point of view of textual rhetoric, be unexpected. 
81Within the literary rhetoric of the Gospel, Jewish-Gentile relations appear to be the primary 
issue in this encounter. This is suggested by Mark’s editorial placement of the story in the 
midst of other episodes which place Jesus in Gentile territory and in contact with Gentiles 
(6:45-8:26), and following a controversy over the key Jewish-Gentile issue of ritual 
defilement (7:1-23). Intertextual first-century evidence of use of the term “children” to refer to 
Israel and “dogs” to refer to Gentiles, plus the resonance of Jesus’ reply with other early 
Christian expressions of the church’s mission first to the Jews and then to the Gentiles (e.g. 
Rom 1:16; Acts 3:26), suggests a rhetorical context within which this passage foreshadows 
and authenticates the church’s Gentile mission (for discussion see e.g. Lane 1974, 261-62; 
Ringe 1985, 68). Both Lane and Ringe suggest that the Jewish-Gentile emphasis of the 
passage is largely editorial and that Jesus’ saying in the original tradition reflected the milieu 
of the household and addressed his own need for rest, but this is to seek meaning “behind the 
text” rather than in terms of the text’s own literary rhetoric, in which it is the Jewish-Gentile 
tension which is foregrounded. 
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elsewhere in the Gospel that Jesus regards himself as the Jewish messiah, and  
that he understands this role both in relation to Jewish messianic expectations 
and to scripture.82 His remark that it is for the children to be fed first before 
their bread is thrown to the dogs indicates his own sense that his mission is 
first to the children of Israel, and that they have first call on his healing power. 
The fact that Jesus and the woman come from different communities is a 
barrier between them which Jesus is not prepared to breach. 
 
Framed in terms of interests, the exchange of Jesus and the woman can be 
seen as a debate over the legitimacy, validity and priority of Jewish and 
Gentile interests in Jesus’ healing power. Jesus’ own identity is fundamentally 
linked to that of the Jewish people, and their interests are therefore higher on 
his scale of priorities than those of Gentiles. It is important to note that Jesus 
does not deny the legitimacy of the woman’s desire for healing, stating that the 
children should be fed before and not instead of the dogs, but that he does 
deny its validity when addressed to him. That said, however, the strength of 
his rejection of the woman’s appeal through the insulting comparison of her 
and her daughter with dogs shows that Gentile claims on his attention rate so 
low on his scale of values as to be almost non-existent. In structuralist terms, 
Jesus’ reply stresses the oppositional or paradigmatic aspect of Jewish-Gentile 
identity, rather than the relational or syntagmatic. 
 
As an act of interpretation, Jesus’ response to the woman reveals a 
hermeneutics shaped by the particularity of his community. Jesus sees himself 
in terms of Jewish values and priorities, and these colour not only his self-
understanding and sense of identity, but also his relationships with those 
beyond the boundaries of that community. The Jesus who responds so harshly 
to the woman’s legitimate appeal for help reflects the values of a self-
                                                 
82E.g. Mk 8:27-33; 9:2-12; 10:32-34; 12:1-12.
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contained, introverted community which sees its interests as exclusive of the 
interests of outsiders. This is emphasised in the narrative by the clear 
statement that Jesus comes to Tyre seeking isolation, and the intrusion of an 
“uppity woman” causes him to attempt to close down their communication 
through emphasis of that which divides them.83 Jesus is interested in being a 
Jewish messiah, not a Gentile one, and rejects as invalid any suggestion that 
he might see himself in any other way. 
 
The woman’s response to Jesus’ insulting brush-off is striking not only for its 
wit, but for the way in which she takes the logic of Jesus’ remark and 
transforms it in a way which is at one and the same time both deeply 
challenging and fundamentally affirming. Her first direct speech in the episode 
begins not with anger or hurt at his insult, but with respect, and even with 
deference: “Lord” (kur iev), she answers (v28). The woman appears to 
understand and accept that, being a Jew, Jewish interests will outweigh 
Gentile ones in Jesus’ priorities. At the same time, however, she rejects Jesus’ 
oppositional definition of their mutual identities, instead suggesting that a 
more positive relationship is possible without undermining Jesus’ own 
integrity, which she affirms but also qualifies. The significance of the small 
word ka iv is crucial for the effect of what she says next, in that it is not a 
confrontational or negatory “but”, but rather an enhancing “and yet”. She does 
not deny the legitimacy of what Jesus has said, but suggests that there is 
something more. What Jesus says is true, “and yet the dogs under the table eat 
the children’s crumbs” (v28). Prioritisation of Jewish interests does not 
necessitate the exclusion of Gentile ones. Jesus does not threaten his role as 
Jewish messiah by healing her daughter, but broadens it. Her needs and those 
of her daughter can be addressed without threatening Jesus’ sense of who he 
                                                 
83Ringe 1985, 65. 
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is. Jesus finds the argument persuasive: because of what she has said (dia ; 
t out on t o;n l ovgon, v29) she may go, for the demon has left her daughter.84 
 
Seen in terms of interpretive ethics and interests, the conversation between 
Jesus and the Syrophoenician woman represents a shared interpretation and a 
debate over the interests which should determine the application of that 
interpretation. Jesus and the woman agree on a reading of him and his identity 
as Jewish messiah, but disagree initially over the validity of the woman’s 
interest in that interpretation, which Jesus’ initial refusal denies. The woman’s 
response affirms Jesus’ prioritising of Jewish interests but simultaneously 
argues for a raising of his estimation of the validity of her interest without 
giving it equal status. At the beginning of the encounter the woman’s most 
pressing interest is Jesus’ lowest priority: by the end of the episode it has 
moved up his scale of values sufficiently for him to grant her request and heal 
her daughter. Crucially, successful resolution of the exchange is enabled by 
the fact that neither totally denies the legitimacy of the other’s interests, but 
only their relative validity. 
 
Both Jesus and the woman risk status in their community and their own sense 
of self in this encounter across community boundaries, and the initial 
prospects for their exchange are not good. Both, however, come away from 
the encounter with their situations changed. The woman gets what she wants, 
and Jesus gains an enhanced understanding of himself and his role. Indeed, 
Sharon G. Ringe suggests that one of the most striking features of the 
encounter is the woman’s ministry to Jesus by faith. The woman’s faith is “an 
                                                 
84Joanna Dewey points out that this is the only canonical instance of a character changing 
Jesus’ mind (Dewey 1995, 486). Encounters such as this were not the mainstream of Jesus’ 
experience, and this suggests that encounter across the boundary of interpretive communities 
ought not to be the mainstream experience of Christian biblical interpreters either. The 
presence of the episode within the canon, however, means that Christian interpreters ought not 
to be closed to the transforming potential of such encounters when they arise, and should not 
foreclose them prematurely. 
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act of trust, of engagement, risking everything”, but by investing that trust in 
Jesus she enables him to see himself and his situation in a new way, becoming 
free “to respond, to heal, to become again the channel of God’s healing 
presence in that situation”. The woman’s wit is her gift to Jesus, “her ministry 
that opened up the possibility of his”. 85 
 
In spite of what at first sight appear to be insuperable difficulties, Jesus and 
the Syrophoenician woman are able to achieve a transforming and affirming 
encounter across barriers of faith, culture, ethnicity, gender and social class, 
and several crucial factors enable this. First, both are secure in their own 
identity: Jesus does not ask the woman to become a Jew, nor does she expect 
him to become a Gentile. Each asserts their interests in light of their own 
identity, and accepts the other’s identity as a given. The object of the 
encounter is not that either of them should become the other, but that their 
distinctive differences should be acknowledged and negotiated so as to enable 
a constructive contact between mutual outsiders. Second, both parties agree a 
shared interpretation of Jesus and his role as a Jew and healer, and this shared 
understanding gives them a common basis from which to begin a negotiation 
of interests. Third, neither Jesus nor the woman denies the basic legitimacy of 
the other’s interests. Jesus does not say that the woman ought not to request 
healing for her daughter, nor does the woman deny the priority of Jewish 
claims on Jesus’ healing abilities. Instead, each is prepared to negotiate the 
level of priority which their differing interests should be given in order to 
achieve a practical resolution which benefits both parties. Fourth, both Jesus 
and the woman are prepared to overlook their divisions (and, in the woman’s 
case, forego a legitimate sense of offence) in order to reach agreement. The 
woman exercises humility in putting her daughter’s need for healing above her 
own hurt at Jesus’ insult, whilst Jesus demonstrates repentance in changing his 
                                                 
85Ringe 1985, 72. 
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mind and acceding to her request. The desire to pursue a common good 
ultimately enables both parties to transcend division and conflict. Finally, both 
Jesus and the woman take risks, both in relation to their status within their 
own communities and in relation to their own sense of identity. Being 
prepared to put aspects of their identity up for negotiation, they find those 
identities transformed and enhanced by encounter with a stranger. 
 
 
Jesus’ encounter with the Syrophoenician woman offers a paradigmatic 
parable for a Christian, academic postmodern approach to biblical 
interpretation. Christian interpreters can be confident in their own identity and 
interests in the Bible, and need not apologise for asserting those interests not 
only within the community of faith but beyond it. At the same time, they will 
need to recognise that other perspectives and interests are also legitimate, and 
be prepared to negotiate the validity of their own interests against others. 
Authentically postmodern Christian interpreters will seek to emphasise 
diversity rather than division and affirm difference as legitimate and 
constructive, accepting the identities of other interpreters as having legitimacy 
and integrity. They will also be prepared to engage with those outside the 
interpretive community, and to take risks in making their own interests 
available for negotiation. They will exercise humility and repentance, listening 
attentively to the voices of other interpreters and taking on board both 
criticism and affirmation.  Above all, they will seek genuine encounter with 
outsiders in the shared arena of academic biblical interpretation, talking not at, 
to, or for them but with them, hopeful that somewhere in the conversation they 
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